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Abstract 
 
This thesis aims to establish Sara Coleridge’s place in literary history. Her authorial 
achievements have been obscured by two factors. First, she has been the subject of 
predominantly biographical, rather than literary attention. While this thesis does draw on 
specific biographical contexts, its approach is literary and critical throughout. Second, 
Coleridge’s mature writings are theological, and consist of polemical contributions to 
religious debate in the two decades following the Reform Act of 1832. In order to 
analyse the qualities of Coleridge’s mature authorship, this study undertakes the 
necessary historical and theological contextualization. 
 Coleridge’s politico-religious setting requires innovatory authorial methods: she 
is, above all, a dialogic writer. The thesis examines her evolving dialogue with her 
‘literary fathers’, and addresses the relationship between her editing of STC and her 
original writing. Bakhtinian theory informs the approach of this thesis to Coleridge’s 
textual analysis of STC and his sources. Gadamer’s hermeneutic concept of the ‘fusion’ 
of historical ‘horizons’ informs the study’s analysis of her appropriation of STC’s 
thought, which she reworks in addressing post-Reform fractures. Prevailing polemical 
styles exacerbate such fractures, Coleridge maintains. This study finds that Coleridge is 
committed to individual religious liberty, and an inclusive theology underpinned by 
Kantian epistemology. This is the basis for her sustained critique of the Oxford 
Movement’s authoritarian tendencies. In her theological writings, therefore, she 
develops dialogic styles and forms by which to convey her liberal religious philosophy. 
Along with published sources, this thesis refers to the unpublished writings of 1850 and 
1851 that reveal the full extent of Coleridge’s literary innovation. 
 This study is constructed chronologically; it aims to elucidate Coleridge’s 
development through the stages of her writing life, and to uncover the connections 
between the various strands of her work. It shows that dialogic elements are present from 
an early stage of Coleridge’s literary career, and that her writings in different genres all 
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Introduction 
Sara Coleridge: A Career of Authorship 
 
A Literary Study 
Sara Coleridge is a neglected figure in literary history. She was born in December 1802, 
and died prematurely of cancer in May 1852, aged forty-nine. She had two surviving 
elder brothers: Hartley, born in 1796, and Derwent, born in 1800. Her father, Samuel 
Taylor Coleridge, was absent for much of her childhood and adolescence, during which 
her parents lived together for ‘less than two years’.1 For over a decade, between April 
1812 and January 1823, Coleridge did not see her father. She grew up in the household 
of her uncle, Robert Southey, at Greta Hall, Keswick, in which she was born. She and 
her mother lived there as Southey’s dependents until Coleridge’s marriage to her cousin, 
Henry Nelson Coleridge, in 1829. Southey developed a close friendship with the 
Wordsworths, with whom Coleridge and her mother already had intimate connections. 
Southey and Wordsworth were Coleridge’s paternal influences in moral and intellectual 
terms, as she explains in the final year of her life:  
 
I knew dear Mr. Wordsworth perhaps as well as I have ever known any one in 
the world – more intimately than I knew my father, and as intimately as I knew 
my Uncle Southey […] [M]y mind and turn of thought were gradually moulded 
by [Wordsworth’s] conversation, and the influences under which I was brought 
by his means in matters of intellect, while in those which concerned the heart 
and the moral being I was still more deeply indebted to the character and daily 
conduct of my admirable Uncle Southey.2 
 
Relative to the common experience of middle-class women in the early nineteenth-
century, Coleridge received a remarkably advanced education. The home schooling for 
the children of Greta Hall was systematic and followed a regular timetable. Coleridge’s 
aunts, mother and Southey were the teachers. As Kenneth Curry remarks, ‘[t]he 
scholarship of Sara Coleridge […] is evidence of the thoroughness of [Southey’s] 
instruction’.3 Southey told Unitarian minister John Estlin that she ‘has received an 
education here at home which would astonish you’.4 Coleridge benefited also from the 
use of Southey’s extraordinary library, which comprised ‘the impressive total of 14,000 
books’.5 De Quincey reports that ‘Southey’s library […] was placed at the service of all 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Mudge, p. 19. 
2 Criticism, p. 96. 
3 Kenneth Curry, Southey (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975), p. 42. 
4 Mudge, p. 22. 
5 Curry, p. 45. 
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the ladies’.6 Coleridge benefited conspicuously from Southey’s scholarship and 
generosity. As this study will show, he was a significant influence upon Coleridge’s 
literary career. Like him, she would become a writer of politico-religious polemic, and 
would revisit topics on which he had written, such as Methodism. Southey’s household 
offered an academically and socially stimulating environment for the young Coleridge. 
As Poet Laureate from 1813, Southey was a public figure who received eminent visitors. 
According to Molly Lefebure, a ‘non-stop flow of bishops, politicians, academicians, 
poets, judges, dons, merchant bankers and Harley Street consultants […] visited Greta 
Hall during [the] summer seasons’.7 This stirring formative setting, combined with her 
remarkable home education, helped to form the basis for Coleridge’s equally remarkable 
literary career. 
 The goal of this study is to discover Sara Coleridge’s distinctive literary 
qualities, and the originality of her concept of authorship. My study foregrounds 
Coleridge’s work rather than her life, and adduces biographical information only when it 
throws light on her literary activities. I analyze Coleridge’s writings across the range of 
genres in which she worked, from children’s literature to theological polemic. I aim to 
describe Coleridge’s procedures as STC’s editor in terms of her hitherto unrecognized 
literary theory.8 Similarly, the relationship of Coleridge’s editorial to her original work 
has not been sufficiently analysed. It has been suggested that Coleridge would have 
achieved a greater reputation in English literature but for her paternal legacy.9 I will 
reconsider how she responds as a writer to this inheritance. The story of Sara Coleridge’s 
life has been uncovered in a number of biographical studies. Yet, her writings, and the 
development of her authorship, remain obscure. The predominantly biographical focus 
upon Coleridge continues in the present decade, notably in Jeffery W. Barbeau’s Sara 
Coleridge: Her Life and Thought (2014), Katie Waldegrave’s The Poets’ Daughters: 
Dora Wordsworth and Sara Coleridge (2013), and Molly Lefebure’s The Private Lives 
of The Ancient Mariner: Coleridge and his Children (2013).10 Barbeau followed his 
book with a biographical article in 2015, ‘Sara Coleridge on Love and Romance’, which 
focuses on Coleridge’s relationships with Henry Nelson Coleridge and Aubrey de 
Vere.11 Waldegrave reflects a tendency to combine a study of Coleridge with that of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Thomas De Quincey, ‘Lake Reminiscences From 1807 to 1830’ by the English Opium Eater, V: 
‘Southey, Wordsworth and Coleridge’, Tait’s Edinburgh Magazine, 6 (1839), 523-517 (p. 514). 
7 Molly Lefebure, The Bondage of Love: A Life of Mrs. Samuel Taylor Coleridge (London: Gollancz, 
1986), p. 220. 
8 I refer to Samuel Taylor Coleridge as STC in this thesis. 
9 Kathleen Jones, A Passionate Sisterhood (London: Virago Press, 1998), p. 329. 
10 Jeffrey W. Barbeau, Sara Coleridge: Her Life and Thought (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). 
Katie Waldegrave, The Poets’ Daughters: Dora Wordsworth and Sara Coleridge (London: Hutchinson, 
2013). Molly Lefebure, Private Lives of the Ancient Mariner: Coleridge and his Children (Cambridge: 
Lutterworth Press, 2013). 
11 Jeffery W. Barbeau, ‘Sara Coleridge on Love and Romance’, Wordsworth Circle, 46 (2015), 36-44 
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another figure, or figures. Eleanor A. Towle’s A Poet’s Children (1912) places 
Coleridge’s life story alongside Hartley’s, and Kathleen Jones narrates Coleridge’s life 
in a context of the wider female community of the Lake Poets’ circle.12 Such approaches 
highlight Coleridge’s relationship with her literary fathers in personal rather than literary 
terms. The neglect of Coleridge as an author stems from the predominantly biographical 
bias of studies devoted to her. The emphasis has been on Coleridge as STC’s daughter, 
rather than Coleridge the writer. Her life story has been foregrounded as an exemplar of 
female filial subjection, and to lend new insight into STC and the Lake Poets’ circle. 
This thesis redresses the balance: I show, through critical analysis, how Coleridge 
practises and develops her craft of writing, and her conception of it.  
 
Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Studies 
Religious and political instability energized Coleridge’s authorship. Amid continuing 
cultural change through the decades after her death, however, Coleridge’s writings were 
all but lost from view. Coleridge’s daughter sought to redeem her from obscurity. In 
1873, Edith Coleridge published in two volumes the Memoir and Letters of Sara 
Coleridge, which, according to E. L. Griggs, ‘was apparently widely read, since four 
editions appeared within a year’.13 Edith Coleridge emphasizes religious subjects in her 
selection of correspondence. The Memoir and Letters appears to have been successful in 
temporarily boosting interest in Coleridge’s life and work. A reviewer of the volumes in 
January 1874, though, perpetuates the myth of Coleridge’s literary subservience: he 
describes her as Henry’s ‘zealous helpmate’, and STC as her metaphysical ‘Pope’. 
Nonetheless, he concedes that, as editor of STC, she ‘proved […] an efficient substitute’ 
after Henry’s death.14 Towle’s biographical study reflects the religious emphasis of the 
Memoir and Letters: for example, in her idealized image of the piety of the Greta Hall 
household: ‘religion’ she observes, ‘maintained its rightful supremacy’ in the domestic 
ethos, and ‘moved like the Spirit of God […] on the face of the waters beside which the 
little Coleridges played’.15 
 Henry Reed, an American scholar who had corresponded with Coleridge near 
the end of her life, published a biographical tribute to her in July 1852, two months after 
her death. Reed’s account established a gendered interpretation of Coleridge’s 
authorship. He constructs Coleridge’s ‘career of womanly authorship’ in terms of a 
feminine ideal. He refers to the ‘maidenly modesty’ of her early translations, which were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Eleanor A. Towle, A Poet’s Children: Hartley and Sara Coleridge (London: Methuen, 1912). 
13 Memoir and Letters of Sara Coleridge edited by her Daughter, 2 vols (London: King, 1873). Earl Leslie 
Griggs, Coleridge Fille: A Biography of Sara Coleridge (London: Oxford University Press, 1940), p. 189. 
14 ‘Memoir and Letters of Sara Coleridge’, Edinburgh Review, 283 (1874), 44-68 (p. 56, p. 61, p. 56). 
Published anonymously. 
15 Towle, p. 40. 
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published anonymously and sanctioned by her uncle. Reed describes her volume of 
children’s poetry, ‘a mother’s work’, as an expression of ‘matronly modesty’. Written 
for her children, the poems would have remained in the domestic realm, had it not been 
for Coleridge’s husband’s insistence on their publication. Her ‘editorial labours’ were ‘a 
fit filial and conjugal work’, Reed contends, and her ‘high intellectual powers were held 
in harmony with […] feminine delicacy and gentleness’.16 Reed approves of Coleridge 
as editorial mediator of STC, because the role implies pious subjection to father and 
husband. 
 E. L. Griggs follows Reed in foregrounding Coleridge’s gender. His 
biographical study of 1940 emphasizes Coleridge’s ‘humility’ and ‘filial devotion’. 
Griggs’s work remains a valuable quarry of information on Coleridge’s life: for 
example, regarding her circle of eminent acquaintances in widowhood. He also includes 
significant extracts from Coleridge’s unpublished manuscripts. Nonetheless, Griggs’s 
study is circumscribed by his belittling preconceptions of female authorship. He remarks 
that, in Coleridge’s literary criticism, ‘a feminine bias often interferes with her 
judgment’. He cites her alleged failure to ‘appreciate the increasing use of the novel for 
sociological purposes’, and her conception of fiction ‘as a representation of life’.17 
Coleridge favours ‘the novel of every day life’ as the genre ‘in which women […] have 
such perfect success’, and regards Jane Austen as the ‘princess of novelists’.18 Griggs 
reveals his own masculine ‘bias’ in referring Coleridge’s literary judgments to the 
criteria of a patriarchal canon: ‘[i]f she failed to recognize Browning, Tennyson, and 
Landor as we do to-day (sic), at least she did not set up Letitia Landon, Hannah More, 
and Mrs. Hemans as leading figures’.19 Griggs’s disparaging attitudes to women’s 
authorship limit his attention to Coleridge’s religious writings. He notices that 
Coleridge’s theology in ‘On Rationalism’ differs from STC’s, but fails to develop this 
significant observation. Griggs does not treat chronologically the last nine years of 
Coleridge’s life, which are her most productive. Therefore, the structure of Griggs’s 
study occludes her development into authorial maturity. Virginia Woolf’s eloquent and 
sympathetic essay on Coleridge is a review of Griggs’s biography.20 Unsurprisingly, 
then, she views Coleridge’s story as another case of female subservience to patriarchal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Henry Reed, ‘The Daughter of Coleridge’, in L. N. Broughton, Sara Coleridge and Henry Reed (New 
York: Ithaca, 1937), pp. 1-16 (p. 3, p. 9, p 12, p. 2). 
17 Griggs, Coleridge Fille, p. 166, p. 215. 
18 Criticism, p. 187. Wordsworth Trust, WLMS A/Coleridge, Sara/78, 
http://collections.wordsworth.org.uk/wtweb/home.asp?person=&place=&object=&event=&activiyu=&stat
e=&concept=&words=&phrases=&author=Coleridge%3C=Sara=%281021852%29&recipient=&date1=&
date2=&submitButton=&Submit+search=search&page=Letters=search=home [accessed 15 May 2015]. 
19 Griggs, Coleridge Fille, p. 215. 
20 ‘Sara Coleridge’, in The Essays of Virginia Woolf, ed. by Andrew McNeille and Stuart N. Clarke, 6 vols 
(London: The Hogarth Press, 1986-2011), VI: 1933-1941, and additional essays 1906-1924, ed. by Stuart 
N.Clarke (2011), pp. 249-255. 
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literary authority. 
 Bradford K. Mudge’s Sara Coleridge: A Victorian Daughter (1989) appeared 
almost half a century after Griggs’s Coleridge Fille. Like Griggs’s biography, Mudge’s 
is an indispensable resource. The ‘Appendix’ contains six previously unpublished essays 
by Coleridge, and her autobiographical fragment. Mudge’s biography reverses Griggs’s 
bias and presents a feminist reading of Coleridge’s life. He recognizes that her editorship 
of STC’s works is a strategy to enable her to participate in the literary marketplace. The 
Coleridge he constructs, however, conditioned to believe in ‘the impropriety of female 
authorship’, remains subservient to patriarchy. For Mudge, ‘On Rationalism’ was a 
matter for Coleridge of ‘[d]iscovering her father within herself’, while in her editorial 
contributions to STC’s work she ‘renounc[ed] authorship and embrac[ed] patriarchal 
authority’. Mudge’s valuable and readable book is limited by an absence of engagement 
with Coleridge’s theological work. For example, Mudge ignores Coleridge’s 
commitment to her religious dialogues when he asserts that she ‘abandoned’ her 
autobiography in autumn 1851 ‘in order to devote herself exclusively to a new edition of 
her father’s poems’. This assumption supports Mudge’s polemical intentions: ‘[s]uch a 
decision was perfectly in keeping with Sara’s attitudes about female authorship and with 
her devotion to the reputation of her father’.21 Although Coleridge collaborated with 
Derwent in preparing the 1852 edition of STC’s Poems, and wrote most of the notes and 
the brief ‘Preface’, the project that occupied her from September to November 1851 was 
an original and innovative religious work, the Dialogues on Personality. The ‘Preface’ 
to STC’s Poems, just over seven pages long, was written in March 1852, which suggests 
that Coleridge gave priority in her final illness to the completion of original work. 
 Kathleen Jones’s biographical study of the women of the Wordsworth – Southey 
– STC circle, published in 1997, follows the same feminist viewpoint as Mudge. Jones 
portrays a Coleridge who has internalized society’s patriarchal assumptions and colludes 
in her own literary repression. Coleridge edits her father’s writings, and dedicates herself 
to maternal duties, according to Jones, to the willing detriment of her potential for 
original work. Jones adopts the assumptions of Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar in 
their pioneering study: she assumes that Coleridge, thwarted by patriarchy, practises 
‘that graceful […] self-abnegation which, for a nineteenth-century woman, was 
necessity’s highest virtue’. Jones and Mudge are influenced by Gilbert and Gubar’s view 
of female literary activity: ‘[a]uthored by a male God and by a godlike male, killed into a 
“perfect” image of herself, the woman writer’s self-contemplation may be said to have 
begun with a searching glance into the mirror of the male-inscribed literary text’. In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Mudge, p. 157, p. 99, p. 157, p. 10. 
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these feminist terms, for the daughter of the poet whose ‘god-like’ aspirations created 
‘Kubla Khan’, the ‘anxiety of authorship’ would be the more ‘sickening’.22 To 
summarize, nineteenth-century commentaries on Coleridge, and Griggs’s account of 
1940, are limited by their tacit patriarchal assumptions. Late twentieth-century feminist 
interpretations provide a necessary corrective, though the deliberate focus of their 
polemical agenda narrows their perspectives on Coleridge the writer. They substitute 
ideology for textual analysis. This is an approach against which Lucy Newlyn cautions 
in relation to Romantic women authors: ‘we should be wary of allowing theoretical 
constructions to interfere with an awareness of the practices of individual writers’.23  
Coleridge’s revisionary authorship employs dialogic ‘practices’, which require close 
textual analysis; neither Mudge nor Jones offers this.  
 
Twenty-First Century Editions and Studies  
Feminist approaches to Coleridge continue in the twenty-first century. Joanne Wilkes in 
2010, for example, adopts the same theoretical perspective as Mudge and Jones. 
According to Wilkes, Coleridge sacrificed her own literary ambitions in a ‘quest to 
promote her father’s genius’. Wilkes reads Coleridge’s subtle tactic of publishing ‘On 
Rationalism’ as ‘Appendix C’ of Aids to Reflection (1843 and 1848) as an act of 
‘subordinat[ion] […] in the service of her father’s output’.24 However, to borrow Mary 
Poovey’s terms, Coleridge exploits ‘strategies of indirection and accommodation’ in her 
publication of ‘On Rationalism’ that enable her ‘to make [her] presence felt’.25 The 
success of her tactics is reflected in the Bishop of London’s high praise for the essay.26 
Wilkes repeats Mudge’s assumption that Coleridge ‘abandoned’ her ‘autobiography […] 
for the sake of yet more editing of her father’s work’, and ignores the original religious 
work which Coleridge produced in the autumn of 1851.27  
 Other twenty-first century scholars advance feminist readings of a more 
analytical nature. Donelle Ruwe’s chapter, ‘Opium Addictions and Meta-Physicians: 
Sara Coleridge’s Editing of Biographia Literaria’ (2004), is a case in point. Ruwe 
argues that Coleridge’s account of STC’s medical condition, in which she emphasizes 
‘the bodily nature of the mind’, undermines the dominance of a male-orientated 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar, The Madwoman in the Attic: The Woman Writer and the 
Nineteenth-Century Literary Imagination, 2nd edn (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), p. 575, p. 
15, p. 64. 
23 Lucy Newlyn, Reading, Writing and Romanticism: The Anxiety of Reception (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), p. 233. 
24 Joanne Wilkes, Women Reviewing Women in Nineteenth-Century Britain: The Critical Reception of 
Jane Austen, Charlotte Bronte and George Eliot (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), p. 139. 
25 Mary Poovey, The Proper Lady and the Woman Writer: Ideology and Style in the Works of Mary 
Wollstonecraft, Mary Shelley, and Jane Austen (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. xi. 
26 See Chapter 2, below, p. 60. 
27 Wilkes, p. 39. 
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creativity based in a disembodied transcendental imagination. Ruwe refers to Isobel 
Armstrong’s suggestion that, in the nineteenth century, ‘illness and physical weakness 
experienced by […] women writers gave them access to sensory knowledge that could 
be maneuvered into a position of intellectual authority’.28 Ruwe argues that Coleridge’s 
account of STC’s nervous disorder challenges his concept of the relation of body and 
mind. She revises earlier readings, therefore, in which Coleridge’s authorial individuality 
is subordinated to that of STC. In a chapter also published in 2004, Alison Hickey 
emphasizes the element of collaboration in Coleridge’s work. In this respect, she follows 
the lead of Jack Stillinger’s seminal study, Multiple Authorship and the Myth of Solitary 
Genius (1991). Stillinger refers to Coleridge’s ‘creative editing’ of Biographia 1847, 
which, he contends, constitutes a practice of ‘collaborative authorship’.29 Hickey 
similarly holds that Coleridge, as editor, becomes ‘a co-producer’ of STC’s ‘work’. She 
maintains that Coleridge’s ‘threefold paternity’ makes her particularly receptive to the 
concept of ‘multiple authorship’.30 Dennis Low makes a case for Coleridge as an author 
in her own right. In his chapter on her earlier work in The Literary Protégées of the Lake 
Poets (2006), Low traces the development of her writings from the translation of 
Dobrizhoffer to her novel, Phantasmion. Low contends that Southey is an enabling 
influence for Coleridge in supporting her early translation projects. He also suggests that 
the essential conception of Phantasmion relates to STC’s literary theories. This 
concurrence with STC, he indicates, demonstrates Coleridge’s ‘actively creative 
correspondence with her father’s ideas and values’.31 Because Low focuses on women 
writers of the 1820s and 1830s, his account of Coleridge’s authorship ends at 1837. This 
is the year in which she begins to form the agenda for her mature literary projects.   
 Twenty-first century interest in Coleridge has grown steadily since the 
publication of Peter Swaab’s pioneering edition of her Collected Poems (2007).32 One 
hundred and twenty of the 185 poems it contains were published for the first time. In 
2012, Swaab published a selection of Coleridge’s literary criticism.33 The texts included 
were either published for the first time or recovered from out-of-print nineteenth-century 
editions. Swaab’s ‘Introduction’ to this volume presents the most balanced survey of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Donelle Ruwe, ‘Opium Addictions and Meta-Physicians: Sara Coleridge’s Editing of Biographia 
Literaria’, in Nervous Reactions: Victorian Recollections of Romanticism, ed. by Joel Faflak and Julia M. 
Wright (New York: State University of New York Press, 2004), pp. 229-251 (p. 243). 
29 Jack Stillinger, Multiple Authorship and the Myth of Solitary Genius (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1991), p. 205, p. 230 n.  
30 Alison Hickey, ‘The Body of My Father’s Writings: Sara Coleridge’s Genial Labour’, in Literary 
Couplings and the Construction of Authorship, ed. by Marjorie Stone and Judith Thompson (Winsconsin: 
University of Winsconsin Press, 2006), pp. 124-147, (p. 132, p. 129). 
31 Dennis Low, The Literary Protégées of the Lake Poets (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), p. 141. 
32 Sara Coleridge, Collected Poems, ed. by Peter Swaab (Manchester: Fyfield Books, Caracanet Press, 
2007). 
33 The Regions of Sara Coleridge’s Thought: Selected Literary Criticism, ed. by Peter Swaab 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). 
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Coleridge’s intellectual and authorial characteristics that has been produced to date. He 
emphasizes the range of Coleridge’s intellectual interests, and her linguistic vitality. He 
excludes Coleridge’s theological writings, except where they have literary implications – 
such as her comments on Newman’s prose style. Swaab’s editions are major sources for 
my thesis. He has written authoritatively on Coleridge as a critic of Wordsworth. My 
study draws on Swaab’s article, ‘The Poet and Poetical Artist: Sara Coleridge as a Critic 
of Wordsworth’ (2012), particularly his emphasis upon the religious inflection of 
Coleridge’s response to Wordsworth, as shown, for example, in her discussion of ‘A 
Song at the Feast of Brougham Castle’.34 
 Alan Vardy, in 2010, produced a study of the Coleridge family’s attempts to 
restore STC’s reputation in the two decades following his death.35 Coleridge’s 
contributions feature significantly in Vardy’s study, in which he argues that the family 
sought to re-market STC as a High Tory, High Anglican reactionary. Vardy implicates 
Coleridge in this scheme of alleged cultural falsification. He argues that Table Talk is a 
product of Henry’s ideology, and is actually ‘Henry’s [b]ook’, rather than a balanced and 
accurate representation of STC’s thought. Henry’s brother, John Taylor Coleridge, and 
brother-in-law Derwent, are also implicated in this supposed cabal. Vardy regards 
Coleridge’s treatment of STC’s plagiarisms as an element of the wider family 
conspiracy. He attacks Coleridge for what he regards as culpable distortion in her 
presentation of STC’s political thought. In certain respects, Vardy asserts, her political 
judgment ‘comes close to obscenity’. He attributes Coleridge’s alleged failure of 
political principle to her marriage to ‘an ultra-Tory who kept her isolated in Regent’s 
Park’.36 Vardy’s verdict contradicts the evidence of Coleridge’s letters: the letters reveal 
that she was not influenced by Henry’s politics, and that he encouraged and supported 
her in publishing her work, including ‘On Rationalism’. Furthermore, Vardy’s opinion 
reflects his adoption of Slavoj Žižek as his model of political analysis. Žižek’s Marxist 
ideology, adapted to what he terms ‘postmodern post-politics’, cannot be directly applied 
to an historical setting in which twenty-first century concepts of political Left and Right 
did not exist.37 As James Vigus notes, Vardy’s book displays considerable 
‘inconsistency’ in its political and biographical interpretations.38 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Peter Swaab, ‘“The Poet and the Poetical Artist”: Sara Coleridge as a Critic of Wordsworth’, in 
Grasmere 2012, Selected Papers From The Wordsworth Summer Conference, compiled by Richard Gravil 
(Penrith: Humanties-EBooks, LLP, 2012), pp. 130-146. 
35 Alan D. Vardy, Constructing Coleridge: The Posthumous Life of the Author (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010). 
36 Vardy, pp. 46-63, p. 141. 
37 Slavoj Žižek, The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology (London: Verso, 2008), p. 
236. Žižek’s emphasis. 
38 James Vigus, ‘James Vigus reads Constructing Coleridge: The Posthumous Life of the Author’, 
Coleridge Bulletin, n.s., 38 ( 2011), 134-136 (p. 135). 
	   13	  
 Two biographical studies were published in 2013: Katie Waldegrave’s joint 
study of Sara Coleridge and Dora Wordsworth, and Molly Lefebure’s Private Lives of 
the Ancient Mariner. Waldegrave’s study emphasizes the sustaining family circle in 
which Coleridge grew up, despite her father’s absence. It also provides insight into 
Coleridge’s illnesses and medical condition. These aspects of Waldegrave’s book 
provide valuable contextual material. Although Waldegrave acknowledges Coleridge’s 
theological writings, like Mudge and Jones she does not engage with them. Lefebure’s 
book is a revisionary study that ranges widely across STC’s activities and family 
relationships, including significant reinterpretations of his work for The Morning Post 
and his government service in Malta. Lefebure also includes new insight into 
Coleridge’s relationship with her father, and the ways in which his neglect, continuing 
into adulthood, caused her severe psychological damage.  
 In the most recent book-length study of Sara Coleridge, published in 2014, 
Jeffrey W. Barbeau sets out to tell the story of Coleridge’s life, and to explain her 
intellectual ideas.39 Barbeau is a professional theologian and discusses Coleridge’s ideas 
in religious contexts to which I also refer: importantly, he recognizes the influence of the 
Oxford Movement in the development of Coleridge’s thought. He comments on her 
responses to such key events as Newman’s Tract 90 (1841) and the Gorham crisis. 
However, he does not relate the religious context with any precision to the broader 
political situation, with which it is inextricably entwined. Hitherto, Barbeau and myself 
in this thesis are the only commentators to discuss at length the major part played by the 
Oxford Movement in Coleridge’s work.  
 However, my thesis and Barbeau’s book differ in methodology. Barbeau is 
interested in the content of Coleridge’s thought; I am interested in the processes of her 
intellectual and literary production. Barbeau and I are working in different disciplines. 
He is a biographer and an historian of religious ideas; my rationale is literary. Barbeau’s 
recent article, in which Coleridge remains the devoted wife and filial disciple of earlier 
studies, reflects the same methodological limitations as his book.40 Barbeau’s 
substitution of ‘extratextual […] reality’ for textual analysis, to borrow M. M. Bakhtin’s 
terms, is particularly reductive for a writer like Coleridge whose creativity flourishes in 
dialogue with other writers.41 I attempt to enlarge perspectives on Coleridge by focusing 
on her writing, and on her critical conceptualization of the processes of writing. Joanne 
E. Taylor’s article of October 2015 is closer to my approach in considering Coleridge 
from a literary viewpoint. Taylor reads Phantasmion alongside a hitherto ignored sketch 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Barbeau, Life. 
40 Barbeau, ‘Love and Romance’. 
41 M. M. Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, trans. by Vern W. McGhee, ed. by Caryl 
Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986), p. 162. 
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map by Coleridge of the novel’s setting. Taylor argues convincingly that Phantasmion’s 
landscapes are subtle ‘refraction[s]’ of the Lake District of Coleridge’s childhood and 
literary fathers: they are ‘a world that exists on the other side of the looking glass’, in 
which she finds her own poetic space independent of ‘those of her precursors’. In 
focusing on Coleridge’s quest for ‘autonomy’, this innovative article paves the way for 
my placing Phantasmion in the wider context of Coleridge’s whole authorial 
development. I differ, however, by positioning the novel in the realm of public debate. 
Taylor concludes her article by calling for a reassessment of Coleridge’s ‘marginal […] 
space’ in literary history.42 My thesis answers that call with a radical revaluation of 
Coleridge’s whole literary development.  
 
Theorizing Coleridge 
My theoretical approach is distinct from that of Barbeau and all previous commentators. 
Barbeau assumes, in writing a thinker’s life, a traditional pre-Barthesian concept of 
personal authorship and the literary text, as do earlier commentators on Coleridge. My 
approach draws upon post-structuralist re-conceptualizations of the relationships of 
texts, contexts and authors. Indeed, Coleridge’s own theory and practice anticipate post-
structuralism in certain respects. For Coleridge, a text is a composite product ‘made of 
multiple writings’, to borrow Barthes’s phrase.43 While a study such as Hickey’s refers 
to the collaborative nature of Coleridge’s literary activity, I analyze the dialogic nature 
of her texts. Two complementary theoretical models permeate my reading of Coleridge: 
M. M. Bakhtin’s concepts of hybrid construction and dialogism; and Hans-Georg 
Gadamer’s hermeneutic theory. I am indebted, also, to Michael Macovski’s discussion 
of Bakhtinian methodology, in which he ‘conceives of literary discourse as a composite 
of voices – interactive personae that not only are contained within the literary text but 
extend beyond it, to other works, authors and interpretations’. This conception applies to 
Coleridge’s analyses of STC’s texts, and to her development of dialogic forms of 
theological writing. Macovski explains Bakhtin’s distinction between Platonic and 
Socratic methodology. This distinction informs my critical approach to Coleridge’s use 
of Socratic dialogue in her late works on baptismal regeneration, in which form and 
meaning are inseparable: 
 
 In contrast to the “already found, ready made” truisms established by Platonic 
 dialectic, Bakhtin stresses the ongoing construction of knowledge, an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Joanne E. Taylor, ‘(Re-)Mapping the “native vale”: Sara Coleridge’s Phantasmion’, Romanticism, 21 
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43 Roland Barthes, ‘The Death of the Author’, in Image Music Text, ed. by Stephen Heath (London: 
Fontana Press, 1977), pp. 142-148 (p. 148). 
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 epistemological openness that he traces to the “Socratic method of dialogically 
 revealing the truth”. Such a method holds that knowledge belongs not to  an 
 “exclusive possessor”, but “is born between people collectively searching for 
 truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction”.44 
 
Coleridge’s analysis of the Biographia text reveals STC’s ‘searching for truth’ by 
dialogic means. STC describes ‘truth’ as a ‘Divine Ventriloquist’, rather than the 
property of an ‘exclusive possessor’.45 Bakhtinian theory enables me to redefine the 
relationship between Coleridge’s editorial work and her independent writing: her ethic of 
religious discourse in the ‘Dialogues on Regeneration’ is based on a collective and 
dialogic methodology.  
 Hermeneutic activity is at the heart of Coleridge’s literary career. As translator, 
poet, editor and religious polemicist, her writing is rooted in the interpretation of others’ 
texts. Therefore, Hans-Georg Gadamer’s Truth and Method enables me to develop my 
understanding of the dialogic nature of Coleridge’s works. For Gadamer, ‘the 
hermeneutic phenomenon […] implies the primacy of dialogue and the structure of 
question and answer’.46 Bakhtin and Gadamer’s ideas inform my understanding of 
Coleridge’s redefinition of religious discourse as a collaborative enterprise. Reactions to 
political and religious reform between 1828 and 1833 precipitated a crisis that was 
essentially hermeneutic, and continued for the two remaining decades of Coleridge’s 
life. The interpretation of Scripture and Christian tradition was the site of polemical 
contest. Coleridge develops her dialogic approach, therefore, in response to hermeneutic 
division. She engages in dialogue with STC’s Christian Philosophy, and ‘brings [it] 
down into the present hour’.47 To apply terms Gadamer uses in relation to Hegel, 
Coleridge’s treatment of STC’s ideas ‘consists not in the restoration of the past but in 
thoughtful mediation with contemporary life’.48 Gadamer explains that such ‘mediation’ 
involves a ‘fusion’ of the interpreter’s present ‘horizon’ with that of the ‘past’: 
 
 [T]he horizon of the present is continually in the process of being formed 
 because we are continually having to test all our prejudices. An important part 
 of this testing occurs in encountering the past and in understanding the tradition 
 from which we come. Hence the horizon of the present cannot be formed 
 without the past. There is no more an isolated horizon of the present in itself 
 than there are historical horizons which have to be acquired. Rather, 
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 understanding is always the fusion of these horizons supposedly existing by 
 themselves.49 
 
In the ‘fusion’ of her own present with STC’s historical ‘horizon’, Coleridge rewrites 
and revitalizes his ‘past’ ideas for a new context. This is true, particularly, of her 
Regeneration Dialogues. 
 Coleridge’s authorial context in the decades following the 1832 Reform Act was 
significantly different from that in which STC had worked. As F. J. A. Hort observed in 
1856: ‘[t]he prodigious changes which have taken place in the last forty years render 
much of Aids to Reflection very perplexing to those who have forgotten the time when it 
was written’.50 In STC’s critique of eighteenth-century mechanistic empiricism, and its 
deadening influence on the established church of the early nineteenth-century, he 
‘rethink[s] […] the Platonic Christian tradition, principally through his wrestling with 
Kant and contemporary German Idealism’. Douglas Hedley goes on to locate STC 
within ‘an Idealistic tradition in British thought whose provenance lies in the Florentine 
Renaissance and passes through later antiquity to Plato’.51 STC’s Neo-Platonism is a 
significant factor in his struggle against Lockean modes of thought. However, in 
Coleridge’s appropriation and development of STC’s philosophy, she tends to occlude 
its Neo-Platonism, while exploiting overtly its Kantian elements. In her ‘Introduction’ to 
Biographia 1847, she foregrounds STC’s application of Kantian metaphysics to 
Christianity, but neglects to relate this to the Neo-Platonic strands of his thought. 
Coleridge’s consistent Kantian bias is strategic. She exploits the Critique of Pure Reason 
in order to establish a conceptual basis for her critical analysis of Tractarianism; she uses 
STC and the influences upon him as a resource for her own polemics. 
 Coleridge contends that Tractarianism lacks an underpinning conceptual 
rationale; that it has no clear epistemological foundation. While she embraces 
Tractarianism’s ‘exalted’ devotional ethos, as expressed, for example, in ‘the sermons of 
John Henry Newman’, she regrets that its conceptual basis is flawed: Newman’s devout 
‘views’ are ‘supported by unfair reasonings’, she contends, which severely detract from 
their potential for positive influence upon the practice of the Christian life.52 Coleridge, 
meanwhile, presents a clear and consistent epistemology based on Kant’s critical 
analysis of the mind’s range and structure. She expounds this epistemology with a 
remarkable combination of technical precision and poetic eloquence in her essay ‘On 
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Rationalism’, discussed below in Chapter 2.53 Kant’s transcendental philosophy 
investigates ‘our manner of knowing objects’, and Coleridge appropriates the terms of 
this enquiry in her account of how the mind apprehends ‘the great objects of faith’. For 
Kant, the practice of metaphysics requires a prior analysis of the powers of the mind in 
order to avoid dogmatism based on unexamined assumptions. Coleridge adapts this 
rigorous principle to religious experience: before we can apprehend ‘spiritual truth’, we 
must undertake ‘a cleansing of the medium through which [it] is beheld’. In Critique of 
Pure Reason, Kant sets out to present ‘a treatise on the method’ of ‘metaphysics […], 
not a system of the science itself.’ Coleridge’s critical analysis of religious ideas, 
insistent on rigour and cohesion of ‘method’, suspicious of ‘system’ and dogma, reflects 
the influence of Kant’s project.54 
 In defining Coleridge’s distinctive qualities as a writer, I have followed the lead 
of Nicola Healey in her pioneering study of Hartley Coleridge.55 Healey releases 
Hartley’s poems from misleading biographical stereotypes by analyzing their textual 
characteristics. Similarly, I attempt to free Coleridge from the biographical image 
promoted by Mudge and Jones of the ‘dutiful’ and repressed ‘Victorian daughter’ who 
sacrifices herself for her father’s ‘reputation’.56 My method is based on literary analysis 
and informed by historical contextualization. I argue that Coleridge develops as a writer, 
and I show the connections between the different strands of her work. That Coleridge’s 
body of work lacks homogeneity obscures these connections: for example, between 
translation and her revisionary account of STC. Coleridge resists classification as a poet, 
a novelist, or an essayist, and the key to the unity of her work resides in her religious 
writings. That Coleridge’s mature writings are located in theological polemics is a 
principal reason why she has been neglected as an author. The themes of Coleridge’s 
theological writings soon lost their topicality in the second half of the nineteenth 
century. This is true, also, of her theological opponent Robert Wilberforce, who had ‘the 
misfortune to produce his great doctrinal synthesis’, on Incarnation, Baptism and the 
Eucharist, ‘in the three years which lie either side of 1850’. Doctrinal controversies 
would soon become insignificant in the wake of two decisively influential publications: 
Darwin’s The Origin of Species in 1859, and Essays and Reviews in 1860, which 
subjected the Bible to modern scholarly criticism. Wilberforce’s ‘writings, therefore, 
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became out of date before they had had a chance to make the impact they deserved’.57 
Coleridge’s theological writings would similarly lose all but academic interest. In the 
1840s, though, the issues with which she engaged, such as the doctrine of baptismal 
regeneration, were matters of urgent public debate. Their reverberations registered in the 
sphere of party politics. This is why I place Coleridge in her historical context. Her 
writings, including those in her major editions of STC, engage with live politico-
religious issues of the two decades following the Reform Act of 1832. The same is true 
of the writings of John Henry Newman between 1833 and 1845. An analysis of the work 
of Coleridge, as of the Anglican Newman, requires detailed reference to specific 
political and religious circumstances.  
 
Coleridge and Gender: Preliminary Perspectives 
I discuss the strategies Coleridge employs to exploit and subvert the gender conventions 
of her times. Barbeau not only condemns these conventions, but also Coleridge’s alleged 
uncritical acceptance of them. He brands Coleridge’s own position on women’s 
authorship as ‘frankly, outrageous’.58 This intemperate expression recalls Vardy’s 
political condemnation of Coleridge. Barbeau, like Vardy, imposes anachronistic 
expectations upon an author working in the first half of the nineteenth century. 
Barbeau’s view is based in late 1970s feminism, exemplified by Gilbert and Gubar. He 
does not consider the recuperative strategies of women writers, analyzed more recently 
by scholars such as Anne Mellor and Lucy Newlyn. He therefore cannot help but fail to 
recognize that Coleridge is a subtle and determined strategist. Mary Jacobus criticizes 
Gilbert and Guber because, she claims, Victorian women writers wished for ‘the 
freedom of being read as more than exceptionally articulate victims of a patriarchally 
engendered plot’.59 This applies to Coleridge, who engages on equal terms, in a 
masculine academic register, with the leading scholars and theologians of her day. For 
example, in 1835, Julius Hare, eminent German specialist and theologian, had initially 
answered De Quincey’s exposure of STC’s plagiarisms from Schelling. Following 
Ferrier’s more rigorous discussion of the topic in 1840, Hare implies that he regards 
Coleridge as a fellow scholar who is better qualified to respond. He tells her that it is 
‘indispensable for you to take some notice of the various charges of plagiarism made 
against [STC], especially by Ferrier and De Quincey’.60 This is a remarkable tribute, 
considering that Hare, with Carlyle, was one of the leading Germanists of the day. It is 
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not surprising, therefore, that Coleridge expects to participate on equal terms in the 
masculine scholarly arena. In 1845, at the time she was editing Biographia, she admits 
to having ‘take[n] a dudgeon being thought feminine, either in my small writings or 
aught else’.61 The scholarly and forthright style of ‘On Rationalism’ demands ‘the 
freedom’ for Coleridge ‘of being read’ on the same terms as her clerical interlocutors.   
 Diane D’Amico argues that ‘feminist scholarship’ has ‘not yet allowed 
[Christina] Rossetti to be a woman poet of faith’.62 Similarly, I would maintain that the 
approach adopted by Mudge, Jones and Wilkes belittles Coleridge as an author, and 
occludes the religious dimension of her authorship. It obscures the dynamic link between 
Coleridge’s editorial reading of STC and her independent writing. Lucy Newlyn 
comments that Romantic women writers ‘frequently collapsed the division between 
writing- and reading-subjects as a mode of self-empowerment’. This applies to the way 
in which Coleridge’s editorial mediation of STC’s work empowers her as an 
autonomous author. Newlyn cites Mary Robinson’s poem, ‘To the Poet Coleridge’, as an 
example in which the female reader seeks ‘to be included on equal terms’ in the male 
author’s ‘act of creation’: she extends ‘a paradise he has created’. Robinson’s ‘slippage 
from an imitative to a supplementary model of reading–writing’ anticipates Coleridge’s 
appropriation of STC’s voice in her ‘Introduction’ to Essays, for example.63 
 Diane D’Amico’s account of the historical reception of Rossetti as a religious 
writer influences my view of the way Coleridge has been received. D’Amico notes 
Victorian ‘high praise’ for the ‘feminine’ qualities of Rossetti’s poetry; what a male 
critic in 1904 termed ‘the purely feminine spirit of her inspiration’, which he associates 
with passivity and ‘acquiescence’. This is reminiscent of Reed’s construction of 
Coleridge’s ‘filial’ and ‘conjugal’ authorship as a feminine ideal. D’ Amico notes that 
modernist criticism of Rossetti ‘diminished her worth […] by focusing on the feminine 
as inadequate’. This parallels Griggs’s prejudice against Coleridge’s ‘feminine’ literary 
criticism. In reaction against modernism’s limited version of Rossetti, D’Amico 
explains, feminist scholarship presents ‘a strong-minded woman asserting the feminine 
self and subverting the patriarchal ideologies of her time’. Coleridge scholarship has 
emphasized her subjection to convention, rather than her subversion of it. For both 
Rossetti and Coleridge, though, an emphasis on gender has taken priority. According to 
D’Amico,  
 
 in this most recent phase of Rossetti scholarship, the focus is still on Rossetti’s 
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 life as a woman, as it was for the Victorians and the moderns, only now 
 womanhood is seen in different terms. For example, instead of renouncing 
 marriage for the sake of her faith, Rossetti is seen to have been “resisting” 
 marriage for the sake of her poetry.64  
 
For Coleridge, too, the ‘focus’ remains on her ‘life as a woman’, though as a victim 
rather than resister of patriarchy. As a result, the originality of her religious writings has 
not been examined. In the Tractarian era, Coleridge’s posture of reticence and self-
effacement is strongly inflected by religious values as well as by social constructions of 
femininity. 
 For practical as well as religious reasons, Coleridge upholds in her authorship 
the ethic of a ‘modesty of service’, to borrow John Ruskin’s phrase.65 A project of 
publication unsanctioned by male management or family support would be undignified, 
‘ungentlewomanly’, as she puts it. It would compromise the writer’s standing as ‘a 
Lady’.66 This is a crucial point for Coleridge in 1845, not only as editor of STC, but 
particularly as a single mother and widow. As defender of the family name, responsible 
for the commercial viability of the literary legacy, Coleridge herself must project an 
image of unimpeachable propriety. As Elaine Showalter observes: ‘Victorian women 
were not accustomed to choosing a vocation: womanhood was a vocation in itself’.67 
Reed’s account of Coleridge shows how successful she was in appearing to combine the 
vocations of ‘womanhood’ and authorship. She expresses the kinds of attitude Barbeau 
deplores when, in 1845, she comments on the behaviour of ‘our old Keswick rector’s 
daughter, Miss Lynn’. Eliza Lynn, aged twenty-three and single, was lodging in London 
in order to research ‘at the B. Museum – in behalf of an historical novel she has in hand’. 
Coleridge expresses strong disapproval of a ‘female’ ‘ambition of publishing’. If a 
woman is to write and publish, the endeavour must arise from a family context, 
Coleridge contends, and must be conducted under the management of a male relative: 
‘[t]ill a Lady can publish under the superintendence and protection of a father, brother or 
husband, and carry on her literary pursuits, in the bosom of her own family, she had far 
better keep her productions to her own desk or content herself with dwelling on the 
thoughts of others’.68 Ironically, when she wrote this, Coleridge was her own literary 
manager, working on her pioneering edition of Biographia Literaria. The contradiction 
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between Coleridge’s stated view and her practice has a notable precedent. Poovey cites 
Lady Mary Wortley Montagu whose ‘comment that a woman should “conceal whatever 
Learning she attains” is sharply undercut by her mastery of Latin, German, Turkish, 
Spanish, and Greek and by her own publications’.69 Coleridge’s editing of Biographia, 
however, was a project begun in proper collaboration with her husband. When Coleridge 
asks her brother-in-law, John Taylor Coleridge, to comment on her ‘Introduction’ to the 
edition prior to its submission for publication, she satisfies convention by seeking the 
sanction of a male relative. Equally, she is testing her theological arguments. John is a 
principled supporter of Tractarianism, a friend of John Keble’s, whose criticism 
Coleridge trusts: his theological judgment, she says, ‘is the best I can have’.70 Again, 
family circumstances enable Coleridge to reconcile literary professionalism with 
feminine propriety.  
 When Coleridge meets the multi-talented author ‘Miss E. Rigby’ in 1849, 
‘perhaps the most brilliant woman of the day’, she comments that the ‘top of [Miss 
Rigby’s] perfections’ are her ‘well-bred, courteous, unassuming manners’, and her 
‘thoroughly feminine’ qualities.71 Equally, in her review of Tennyson’s The Princess, 
Coleridge promotes the received view that men and women occupy separate and 
complementary spheres. The ‘moral’ of Tennyson’s poem is an ages-old ‘truth’, she 
contends: ‘that woman, in soul as in body, is no duplicate of man, but the complement of 
his being; that her sphere of action is not commensurate or parallel with his, but lies 
within it, sending its soft influence throughout his wider range, so that the two have an 
undivided interest in the whole’.72 Nonetheless, as Leonore Davidoff and Catherine Hall 
observe: ‘[p]ublic was not really public and private was not really private despite the 
potent imagery of “separate spheres”’.73 Coleridge’s editorship of her father’s works, 
begun in collaboration with her husband, enables her to collapse the unstable distinction 
between ‘private’ and ‘public’. She performs in the public sphere as an ostensible 
expression of private piety. Coleridge balances the conventions of what Mary Poovey 
terms ‘the Proper Lady’ with professional authorship. 
 
Coleridge’s Anxious Brothers 
Gilbert and Gubar argue that in the nineteenth-century the ‘female anxiety of authorship’ 
was more ‘profoundly debilitating’ than ‘the “male” tradition of strong, father-son 
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combat’.74 This prescription does not apply to STC’s children. Coleridge engages in 
revisionary ‘combat’ with STC, while Hartley and Derwent feel diminished and disabled 
by the literary presence of their father. Coleridge, by contrast, was empowered by the 
mentorship and encouragement of her Uncle Southey at the beginning of her literary 
career. Although, as Jane Spencer suggests, ‘the literary daughter’ was debarred from 
‘inherit[ing] the father’s estate’, Coleridge exploits the educational opportunities of her 
upbringing to become STC’s literary and intellectual heir.75 STC’s fragmentary work 
required expert reconstruction and mediation. Mediation is the bridge between critical 
and creative authorship for Coleridge. Her ‘self-creation’ involves ‘what Adrienne Rich 
has called “[r]evision —the act of looking back, of seeing with fresh eyes, of entering an 
old text from a new critical direction”’.76 Rich’s definition of ‘revision’, cited by Gilbert 
and Gubar, applies exactly to Coleridge’s critical and creative engagement with STC’s 
‘old text[s]’. It applies to her innovative Dialogues on Regeneration, which develop 
from her revisionary textual encounter with STC.  
 By contrast, the cultural presence of STC is a source of anxiety for her brothers. 
Derwent, a clergyman and schoolmaster, the sibling whose primary interests were not 
literary, produced one full-length book, The Scriptural Character of the English Church 
(1839). In his ‘Preface’, Derwent expresses tense disquietude. He seeks to free himself, 
as a religious author, from the disabling presence of STC. He wishes to assert his 
distinctive textual identity and to differentiate his work from that of his father. At the 
same time, he is careful to express pious respect for, and essential concurrence with, 
STC’s ideas. He is more concerned, though, with ‘the apparent and the actual’ than his 
father, and insists more fully, he says, ‘on the necessity […] of a ceremonial worship’, 
and ‘the sacramental nature of all outward religion’. This contrast of principle, Derwent 
asserts, arises from the difference between his own and his father’s ‘mental pursuits’, 
and from the ‘legitimate influence of [his own] sacred profession’. Derwent distances 
himself from STC by emphasizing that his theological interests are distinct from those of 
his father. It is for this reason, he explains, that he is not qualified to edit STC’s literary 
remains. Derwent fears, nonetheless, that readers will inevitably judge his work in the 
light of STC’s: ‘I am admonished that this comparison cannot but be made by every 
reader of my father’s works, who may be inclined to cast an eye over that of his younger 
son’. Implicit here is Derwent’s frustration that his status as STC’s ‘son’ will be the 
primary reason why he might gain readers, rather than his own merits. Derwent insists, 
however, that he has ‘worked out’ his own ideas ‘independently’. His book is not ‘an 
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exponent of [STC’s] views’.77 As a parish clergyman, working with practical problems 
of the church and Christian doctrine every day, defending Anglicanism against the 
influence of Baptists and Plymouth Brethren in his parish, Derwent is confident in the 
integrity and coherence of his religious position. Yet, he worries that readings of his 
work will be inflected by reference to his father’s metaphysics. Derwent would 
subsequently abjure any aspirations to authorship to focus on his professional career as 
cleric and educator.  
 For Hartley, too, the legacy of STC was associated with debilitating anxiety.  
STC and Wordsworth’s poetic idealizations of Hartley the child as ‘Faery Voyager’ and 
‘limber elf’, for example, were inhibiting for Hartley the writer.78 As Nicola Healey 
contends, ‘he was fighting a battle against a textualized version of […] his self’.79 That 
Hartley was his ‘father’s favourite’, according to Andrew Keanie, placed disabling 
pressures upon him.80 Coleridge, by contrast, received gentle encouragement from 
Southey. STC projected onto Hartley a legacy of unsustainable intellectual and literary 
ambition. Hartley refers to ‘the awful weight | And duty of my place and destiny’.81 Like 
Derwent, he could not escape the literary trap of his family name. He recognized that he 
would be read as STC’s son, ‘[a] living spectre of my Father dead’.82 Hartley’s response 
was to work in different literary modes to those of his father, and to develop a 
‘commitment to miniaturism’, to borrow Andrew Keanie’s apt term.83 Above all, Hartley 
rejected STC’s metaphysics. He found STC’s religious philosophy ‘too large’ for his 
‘comprehension’ and ‘too high’ for his ‘apprehension’.84 STC’s ‘great Idea was too high 
a strain | For [his] infirmity’.85 In an alternative draft of the poem, Hartley describes the 
‘celestial fire’ of STC’s intellect as ‘what [he] dreaded most’.86 Just as Derwent is 
inhibited by the prospect of theological comparison with STC, Hartley finds STC’s 
‘Vast’ metaphysical vistas incapacitating.87 At the same time, his idealization of STC 
produces disabling guilt. As this thesis will show, Coleridge, by contrast, thrives as an 
author within the family setting. Far from idealizing STC, she is sharply aware of his 
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literary and personal disabilities, which she exposes in Biographia 1847. In sympathy 
with the substance of STC’s intellect, she seizes the authorial opportunities for 
originality that his fragmentary oeuvre affords.  
 
The Development of Dialogic Authorship 
My study traces Coleridge’s whole literary development. In the first chapter, I discuss 
her early work as a translator, in which Uncle Southey was her mentor and literary agent, 
and based writings of his own upon her translations. I show that, from the outset, 
Coleridge experiences literary productivity as a communal, familial and dialogic 
activity. My subsequent analyses of three poems emphasize that Coleridge’s authorship 
is rooted in the family community: the poems directly address family members and 
engage in revisionary textual dialogue with her literary fathers. Two of the poems I 
examine appeared in Coleridge’s volume Pretty Lessons in Verse for Good Children 
(1834), and were written initially for her own children. Henry, as Southey had done 
earlier, acted as her sympathetic editorial reader and literary agent in bringing the 
volume to publication. Such was the case also with Phantasmion (1837), a fairy-tale 
novel intended initially for the domestic sphere, written for her children. Phantasmion 
reflects Coleridge’s ongoing dialogue with her literary fathers in asserting the educative 
potency of the imagination against the prevailing culture of Benthamite Utilitarianism. 
Coleridge expresses her gratitude for Henry’s encouragement of her novel and his 
editorial input, and she enlists his moral and practical support for her projected work on 
the theology of the Oxford Movement. 
 At the time Coleridge was writing Phantasmion, she was also engaged in 
editorial collaboration with Henry on editions of STC’s works and selections from his 
posthumous literary remains. Henry is named on the title pages as sole editor, though I 
argue that Coleridge’s contributions to editions of STC’s work between 1834 and 1843, 
the year of Henry’s death, are far more extensive than is initially apparent. Coleridge’s 
editorial research gives her the necessary resources for undertaking her essay ‘On 
Rationalism’, which is the focus of my second chapter. This religious work is 
remarkable for its innovative subversion of early Victorian gender conventions: 
Coleridge infiltrates the male domain of academic theology and engages the leading 
theologians of the day in polemical colloquy on equal terms, in the ostensible cause of 
pious obedience as daughter and widow. ‘On Rationalism’ reveals Coleridge to be 
working towards a dialogic style in her polemical writing, in which she attempts to 
present the views she opposes fairly, and to criticise the doctrine, not the writer himself, 
for whom she maintains a tone of respect. I analyse Coleridge’s critique of specific 
aspects of Tractarian theory, in which two dominant themes emerge: her view that 
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Tractarianism is elitist and authoritarian, resistant to dialogue; and that its doctrines 
impose arbitrary limitations on the boundlessness of God’s grace. A boldly original 
work, ‘On Rationalism’ is in dialogue with STC’s Aids to Reflection, and adapts STC’s 
Christian philosophy to serve her own polemical ends. When the integrity of STC’s 
philosophy is called into question by charges of plagiarism, Coleridge undertakes to edit 
Biographia Literaria and examine the evidence. This project is vital for the viability of 
her long-term scheme to reconstruct STC’s whole oeuvre, and also for the reception of 
her own writings, in which she appropriates and develops his philosophical ideas. 
 Coleridge’s engagement with STC’s plagiarisms is the subject of Chapter 3. 
Again, the family context – her roles as STC’s daughter and widow of his late editor – 
sanctions her authoritative incursion into the male territory of academic philosophy. 
Coleridge’s editorship of Biographia is a pivotal project for her: it brings into play her 
formative experience as a translator, and requires her to analyse the textual structure of 
STC’s work, which will influence her subsequent practice as an author of dialogic 
religious prose. I discuss Coleridge’s exposure of the profound contradictions in STC’s 
authorial theory and practice in relation to contemporary debates over literary property. 
Coleridge analyses STC’s literary transgressions in textual, philosophical and 
psychological terms. Her academic methods reveal the evidence of STC’s plagiarisms, 
and she exposes what she believes to be their underlying cognitive and affective causes. 
Her strategy of openness seeks to pave the way for a just evaluation of STC’s strengths, 
having closed down controversy and speculation by candid exposure of his weaknesses. 
Also, in exposing STC’s literary incapacities, Coleridge opens an authorial space for 
herself. 
 My fourth chapter follows the development of Coleridge’s religious authorship 
in her ‘Introduction’ to Biographia 1847, and her ‘Extracts from a New Treatise on 
Regeneration’ (1848). Coleridge argues that STC’s major achievement was his 
application of Kant’s critical philosophy to the vindication of Christian faith. She again 
confirms that her priority in encountering STC’s ideas is to apply them to problems of 
her own day. She engages at length with Newman on the contested doctrine of 
justification, and concludes that the distinctions between Catholic and Protestant 
versions of the doctrine are merely verbal. This anticipates her argument in ‘Extracts’, 
that sectarian polemicists have a professional investment in creating and perpetuating 
controversy. Therefore, she contends, they magnify minute distinctions between 
doctrines that are in fact fundamentally similar. Their unscrupulous provocation of 
religious division is reflected in ostentatious literary styles, which reflect authorial 
arrogance. Coleridge proposes, by contrast, a code of conduct for fair and cordial 
engagement in religious discourse. She adopts John Keble’s aesthetic criteria of reserve 
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and plainness in her theory and practice of polemical prose. In her ‘Extracts’, Coleridge 
engages in a poetic dialogue with Keble, in which her tone and language are affectionate 
and reverent, exemplifying the ethos of friendly respect she advocates in polemical 
discourse. Her dialogue with Keble also reflects her view that the development of 
religious doctrine is necessarily a communal and collaborative activity. 
 In Chapter 5, I discuss the ways in which Coleridge refines her dialogic methods 
of writing: firstly, in the ‘Introduction’ to Essays on His Own Times (1850), in which she 
employs a polyphonic textual structure, reminiscent of STC’s practice of assembling a 
new literary product from diverse textual components. Coleridge exploits this technique 
to make an authoritative case against England in its dereliction of moral duty towards 
Ireland. Secondly, I discuss Coleridge’s use of Socratic dialogue in her unpublished 
Dialogues on Regeneration, a substantial and strikingly innovative body of work 
produced in the last two years of her life. In these works, Coleridge creates a community 
of speakers, who span a wide spectrum of religious and sectarian viewpoints. Coleridge 
exploits the Socratic form to demonstrate a collaborative methodology in which 
characters collectively progress towards a clearer conception of religious truth. The 
Dialogues abound in genial humour and friendly interchange, suggesting that Christian 
fellowship and heartfelt devotion transcend doctrinal and sectarian division. Ultimately, 
the Dialogues reflect Coleridge’s vocational conception that the end of theological 
discourse must be practical: to support and guide the Christian way of life. My 
Conclusion focuses on two complementary poetic responses by Coleridge to STC, which 
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Chapter One 
Collaboration and Dialogue: Sara Coleridge’s Authorship, 1822 –1837 
 
Southey’s Student and Collaborator: Sara Coleridge as Translator.  
Coleridge’s first published literary works were translations. An Account of the Abipones, 
an Equestrian People of Paraguay, from the Latin of Martin Dobrizhoffer was published 
in 1822 when Coleridge was aged nineteen.1 Her second publication, which appeared in 
1825, was a translation from early sixteenth-century French: The Right Joyous and 
Pleasant History of the Feats, Gests, and Prowesses of the Chevalier Bayard, the Good 
Knight without Fear and without Reproach.2 John Murray published both translations, 
while the translator herself remained anonymous. Translation affords insight into the 
processes underlying textual production. This formative experience influences 
Coleridge’s future career, therefore, both as STC’s editor and as a writer of dialogic 
religious prose. Translation also enables her to engage in sustained literary activity 
compatible with the gender conventions of her era. According to Lesa Scholl, translation 
was seen in Coleridge’s day as ‘inferior and derivative’, and therefore a socially 
acceptable pursuit for women.3 
 Previous commentators on Coleridge accept the assumption that translation is a 
subordinate literary activity. Kathleen Jones suggests that the family endorsed 
Coleridge’s translation work for this reason: ‘[w]omen were domestic beings’, Jones 
contends, ‘unsuited to public life, who might turn a pretty verse or write romances, or 
even translate the work of great men like Dobrizhoffer, so long as it did not interfere 
with the real [domestic] business of their lives’.4 Jones’s ironic ‘great men’ suggests that 
a female translator is the servant of an inevitably male original author. This overlooks 
the empowering processes of translation. Gadamer regards translation as an hermeneutic 
activity: ‘a re-creation of the text’, an ‘interpretation, and not simply reproduction’. It 
employs a dialogic procedure, according to Gadamer: ‘translating is like an especially 
laborious process of understanding’, he observes,                        
 
in which one views the distance between one’s own opinion and its contrary as 
ultimately unbridgeable. And, as in conversation, when there are such 
unbridgeable differences, a compromise can sometimes be achieved in the to 
and fro of dialogue, so in the to and fro of weighing and balancing possibilities, 
the translator will seek the best solution — a solution that can never be more 
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than a compromise.5  
                                                                              
The translator, participating in a creative activity of negotiation, possesses a significant 
measure of autonomy. Susan Bassnett describes translation, therefore, as ‘an act of 
creative rewriting’. Throughout Coleridge’s career, ‘creative rewriting’ is her essential 
literary mode, in which she develops her authorial identity. It also defines the 
compositional processes she finds in STC’s texts. Because a translation ‘is a physical 
manifestation of one person’s reading and rewriting of someone else’s text’, Bassnett 
argues, the experience of translation ‘offer[s] unique insights into processes of textual 
manipulation’.6 Coleridge herself will exploit such ‘insights’ as STC’s mediator and as 
original author. The misconception of translation as a subordinate activity worked 
‘inadvertently’ to the benefit of ‘women writers’ in the nineteenth century, Scholl 
argues.7 This applies to Coleridge, whose experience as translator inducted her into 
dialogic processes of creativity. 
 A.W. Schlegel, in the generation before Coleridge, anticipated the post-modern 
conception of the translator as ‘a creative artist’.8 Coleridge would later research the 
elder Schlegel’s work in relation to STC’s plagiarisms and literary criticism. In 1803, 
Schlegel argued that translation is an act of original creativity: ‘it is easy to demonstrate 
that objective poetic translation is true writing, a new creation. Or if it is maintained that 
you should not translate at all’, Schlegel continues, ‘you would have to reply that the 
human mind hardly does anything else, that the sum total of its activity consists of 
precisely that’.9 Schlegel’s idea that translation is essential in all cognitive processing 
anticipates Coleridge’s analysis of STC. According to Coleridge, STC appropriates, 
translates and synthesizes literary material with a fluidity that dissolves cognitive 
boundaries, and invalidates the concept of authorial ownership. She will find that STC, 
in the process of translating Schelling and Maass, engages in a textual dialogue with his 
sources that results in a ‘new’ hybrid ‘creation’. Coleridge’s early translation projects 
prepare her for a radical understanding of authorship, in which, to borrow the words of 
Michael Macovski, ‘literary meaning is rendered not […] by a single author, but is 
communally constructed and exchanged’.10 Coleridge’s mature theory and practice will 
reflect this principle. 
 Bella Brodzki describes translation as a process of redefinition and rediscovery. 
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This sheds light upon Coleridge’s mediation of STC, and her understanding of this task: 
‘in an act of identification that is not imitation’, Brodzki argues, ‘translation hearkens 
back to the original or source text’. It ‘elicits what might otherwise remain recessed or 
unarticulated, enabling the source text to live beyond itself, to exceed its limitations’.11 
This applies to Coleridge’s analysis of STC’s textual and intellectual appropriations 
from German philosophers. STC’s texts, according to Coleridge, adapt the ideas of 
Schelling and Kant to Christian doctrine. Their writings, therefore, ‘live beyond 
[themselves]’ in STC’s work, and ‘exceed’ what Coleridge regards as ‘their limitations’.  
Brodzki’s formulation applies also to Coleridge’s appropriation of STC’s material in her 
writings. She takes STC’s ideas and terminology from their original context and 
‘bring[s] [them] down into the present hour’.12 In Coleridge’s refashioning, STC’s work 
is able ‘to live beyond itself’ in early Victorian Britain, and to ‘exceed [the] limitations’ 
of its own times.13 Processes essential to the practice of translation are central to 
Coleridge’s whole literary career. 
 Coleridge’s experience as translator inducts her into authorship as a 
collaborative activity. In his discussion of John and Harriet Mill as ‘joint authors’ of 
John Stuart Mill’s Autobiography, Jack Stillinger observes that ‘[i]n many cases multiple 
authorship begins […] at home’.14 Collaboration was important within the STC, 
Wordsworth and Southey circle in the 1790s; within the family context, it is a defining 
factor of Coleridge’s career. She took on the task of translating An Account of the 
Abipones under the mentorship of her Uncle Southey. Initially, she collaborated on the 
translation with Derwent. In 1818, Derwent needed to raise funds for his university 
education, and was working as a private tutor, coaching two boys for entry to Eton. 
Southey suggested that he earn extra income by translating Martin Dobrizhoffer’s 
Historia De Abiponibus, which ‘might possibly bring some profit’.15 Dobrizhoffer was 
an Austrian Jesuit priest who had worked as a missionary in Paraguay before the 
expulsion of his Order. Dobrizhoffer’s Latin account of his experiences in Paraguay was 
published in 1674.  
 Southey was aware of the proliferation of translation as a professional 
occupation, but regarded it as badly paid and highly competitive, as he observed in 1818: 
‘new books are sent out from France and Germany by the sheet as they pass through the 
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press, lest the translation should be forestalled’.16 Coleridge undertook to assist Derwent, 
and they embarked on the task late in 1818, Derwent working on Volume 1, Coleridge 
on Volume 3. When his place at university was secured soon afterwards by the 
generosity of STC’s friend, John Hookham Frere, Derwent withdrew from the project. 
As Mrs. Coleridge explains, ‘it was thought too much for his health to pursue the 
translation’ alongside tutorial duties, ‘and by Mr. Wordsworth’s advice it was 
withdrawn’.17 Southey examined Coleridge’s work-in-progress after Derwent’s 
withdrawal and gave his approval for her to continue.  
 Coleridge greatly enjoyed the potentially profitable task of translation. Her 
mother reported approvingly that Coleridge ‘liked the employment “of all things”’.18 
Sara Fricker Coleridge encouraged her daughter’s literary work, just as she had 
superintended — with Southey — her advanced education. As Molly Lefebure 
comments, ‘it took an exceptional woman, in the first decades of the nineteenth century, 
to encourage her daughter to acquire [and exercise] learning as Mrs C encouraged 
[Coleridge]’.19 Coleridge’s mother reports that Southey had advised her, kindly, to 
manage her expectations sensibly: ‘she must not be disappointed if nothing was gained’ 
by her efforts, ‘and she must not work too hard’.20 Mudge and Jones interpret Southey’s 
attitude to Coleridge as belittling. They refer to Southey’s discouraging advice to 
Charlotte Bronte —‘[l]iterature cannot be the business of a woman’s life and ought not 
to be’. Yet, they ignore Southey’s statement, earlier in the same letter, that he warns 
‘every young man’ who aspires to be an author against ‘the perilous […] course’ of 
following a literary profession.21 Southey is wholly supportive of Coleridge’s translation 
work. Derwent was thought equally susceptible to stress: to continue the translation 
would impair his health, it was feared. Coleridge’s mother held a Wollstonecraftian view 
of her abilities. Southey, entrusting the whole project to Coleridge, clearly shares this 
attitude. As Virginia Woolf observes of Southey, ‘that admirable, erudite and 
indefatigable man’ oversaw Coleridge’s education and facilitated her intellectual and 
literary activities.22 
 In the event, Coleridge’s health flourished as a result of her work. When An 
Account of the Abipones was close to publication, her mother reported that Coleridge 
was ‘at present in better health than [she had] ever known her […] so fond [was] she of 
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literary employments’.23 It was fortunate that Coleridge enjoyed an activity from which 
she could earn money. She refers to having been ‘more than amply […] remunerated’ for 
her translation.24 Griggs regards Coleridge’s translation work as serious employment, in 
which her ability to ‘earn a small income’ was a significant consideration, enabling her 
to achieve a sense of independence.25 Coleridge was paid £125 for the translation, a 
tolerable sum in 1822, considering that ‘Letitia Landon, one of the most famous and 
prolific authors of the later romantic period, lived on £120 a year’.26 A sizable amount of 
Coleridge’s earnings went to Derwent for his university expenses, and the rest funded 
the visit she and her mother made to London in 1822. The financial rewards of An 
Account of the Abipones encouraged Coleridge to take on further translation work. She 
was aware that ‘a governess’s situation’, recommended by Uncle Edward Coleridge, was 
a likely alternative to literary employment.27  
 Coleridge’s next project was a translation of the sixteenth-century French work, 
the History […] of the Chevalier Bayard. Although a chivalric tale, ‘all about battles and 
sieges’, as she puts it, its hero appeals to early nineteenth-century Christian values.28 
Along with military valour, Bayard’s distinguishing virtue was Christian charity: ‘it was 
not known till his death of what numbers of families he had been the support’. Similarly, 
while in command of Grenoble during a plague epidemic, Bayard had provided ‘medical 
aid’ for ‘the poor’ at his own ‘expense; his beneficence would not lose sight of [the 
recipients of aid] till it was ascertained that they had regained health and strength 
sufficient to supply their necessities’.29 As in Coleridge’s first translation, her central 
protagonist is a Christian man of action.  
 Two further aspects of Coleridge’s translation work have been neglected: first, 
the importance of Southey’s literary influence upon Coleridge; second, the reciprocal 
nature of the literary relationship between apprentice and master. Southey acted as 
Coleridge’s editor, and mentored her in matters of structure, technique and style, as well 
as guiding her through the practicalities of publishing. Griggs affirms that Coleridge 
‘had drawn deeply from the mind and spirit’ of Southey.30 At this stage of her career, 
Southey was Coleridge’s principal influence. As Lefebure comments, ‘Southey had been 
far more of a true father to [her] than had her own’. When she met STC in London in 
1822, Lamb heard her punctuating STC’s monologues from time to time with, ‘Uncle 
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Southey doesn’t think so’.31 After publication of An Account of the Abipones, Coleridge 
wrote to Southey, thanking him for having ‘entrust[ed]’ the translation to her, and for 
having ‘give[n] up [his] valuable time’ to assist her in the work and for having 
‘manage[d]’ it for her.32 Southey reviewed Coleridge’s translation anonymously in the 
Quarterly. He referred to a point of narrative structure which he and Coleridge had no 
doubt discussed: ‘The translator has, not injudiciously, curtailed the work by omitting 
controversial parts in defence of [the Jesuits]’.33 Coleridge explains the rationale of these 
cuts in her ‘Preface’. She has omitted ‘many’ of the ‘controversial parts’ regarding the 
Jesuits, she explains, because they would be of no interest to contemporary British 
readers.34 In his review, Southey mentions a distinctive strength of Coleridge’s language, 
in which he may have guided her: ‘[t]he sentences have been frequently curtailed 
without any curtailment of their sense’, writes Southey, ‘a judicious mode of 
abridgement by which nothing is lost”.35 Southey’s comment indicates his belief in 
Coleridge’s mastery of her literary craft, which he himself has nurtured.   
 Her prose is characterized by a terse precision:  
 
Sixty leagues of the journey still remained, through an unknown country, full of 
woods, lakes and marshes. […] They were obliged to creep for a long time 
through trackless woods, and at every step to struggle with briers, which 
generally proved a bloody contest. To assuage the burning thirst occasioned by 
extreme heat and bodily fatigue, they could meet with nothing but stinking water 
out of pools and ditches, which offended their nostrils to such a degree that the 
poor creatures almost thought thirst preferable.36  
 
The sound effects of Coleridge’s syntax and simple diction (‘at every step to struggle 
with briers’) emphasize the men’s physical effort. Her vivid yet restrained descriptive 
style, with its judicious economy in terms of adjective use (‘bloody contest’, ‘burning 
thirst’, ‘stinking water’) anticipates Phantasmion, and her incisive vitality in polemical 
writing. Southey’s early mentorship was of lasting importance for Coleridge as a writer 
of prose. Under his guidance she learned also the committed resilience literary work 
requires. Her subsequent writing life shows that she accepted the tough conditions of 
authorship, and emulated Southey’s scholarly stamina. In 1848, she describes the 
‘labour’ of tracing references in her editorial work as ‘most […] ungrateful [and] very 
time-consuming’.37 Yet, she perseveres. Southey’s mentorship prepares her, also, for 
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literary disappointments. He described his History of Brazil as ‘the most laborious 
historical work which has ever been composed in our language’.38 Its three volumes, 
though, were of ‘little interest’ to the British reading public: as Kenneth Curry observes, 
‘the sale of the history […] netted [Southey] less than one article in the Quarterly’.39 
While Coleridge learned lasting practical and moral lessons of authorship from Southey, 
he too found the experience of mentorship creatively enabling. 
 There was a significant element of reciprocity in the literary relationship of 
Coleridge and her Uncle Southey. Coleridge’s translations brought her into close contact 
with Southey’s literary projects. He had encountered Dobrizhoffer’s book while writing 
his History of Brazil. In November 1817 he had ‘in hand’ A Tale of Paraguay, a poem 
based on Dobrizhoffer’s narrative written in Spenserian stanzas. At the time Coleridge 
was working on her translation of Dobrizhoffer, Southey had put aside his poem, having 
lost confidence in his abilities as a poet. According to W. A. Speck, Southey ‘had 
struggled to produce it in a demanding Spenserian stanza’. Early in 1824, though, 
Southey resumed work on the poem with renewed commitment: ‘I have written some 
forty stanzas in the “Tale of Paraguay”’, he reported in May. Speck suggests that 
Coleridge’s translation of An Account of the Abipones gave Southey some impetus for 
resuming his poem. Southey’s review of the translation is likely to have been a catalyst 
in re-igniting his poetic creativity. His mentoring of Coleridge was therefore of 
reciprocal benefit, and helped him to reinvigorate the poetic career he had considered 
‘almost at an end’. When he resumed writing A Tale of Paraguay, Southey found that he 
had ‘brought [himself] more into the run of verse than [he had] been for many years’.40 
His reference to Coleridge’s translation in the poem pays generous tribute to her 
achievement, and implies the close relationship between his own work and hers:  
 
In Latin he composed his history; 
A garrulous, but a lively tale, and fraught 
With matter of delight and food for thought. 
And, if he could in Merlin’s glass have seen 
By whom his tomes to speak our tongue were taught, 
The old man would have felt as pleased, I ween,  
As when he won the ear of that great Empress Queen.41 
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Southey refers to the honour paid to Dobrizhoffer by the Empress Maria Theresa when 
she invited him to describe his adventures to her. It is an equal honour, Southey implies, 
for Dobrizhoffer to have been translated by Sara Coleridge. 
 There is a further element which warrants consideration in the literary 
relationship of Coleridge and Southey, arising from her translations. Kenneth Curry 
draws attention to Southey’s success in the genre of short biography. Southey’s brief 
biographies for the Quarterly would be occasioned by ‘a new biography or a recently 
edited journal or memoir’. In Curry’s view, ‘[t]he best’ of Southey’s ‘small-scale 
biographies may well be that of the Chevalier Bayard’ in his review of the ‘memoir […] 
Sara Coleridge had just translated’.42 Coleridge’s translation of Chevalier Bayard 
confirms Southey’s confidence in her. She writes, in April 1823, that ‘my Uncle, before 
he went to Town, put into my hands the memoirs of the Chevalier Bayard, to translate 
from old French’.43 Given Southey’s predilection for the genre of short biography in the 
Quarterly (his Life of Nelson had grown from such a piece), he is likely to have had his 
biographical review of Chevalier Bayard in mind when he gave Coleridge the book to 
translate. Coleridge’s translation would provide Southey with the occasion, as Curry 
puts it, ‘to indulge his love of chivalry and the Middle Ages’.44  
 Yet, the depiction of the heroic Bayard was more than an opportunity for 
Southey to revel in a rousing chivalric tale, as his tribute to Coleridge at the beginning of 
his essay shows: ‘[t]he translator of this “right joyous and pleasant history” has […] 
performed a useful task in thus bringing forward a work which has never before 
appeared in our language’. Southey explains that the translation is ‘useful’ because it 
will help to promote English understanding and esteem of the French: it ‘may assist in 
producing well-founded feelings of respect and good will towards a nation against which 
we have had but too much cause to cherish the most hostile disposition’.45 Southey 
reflects Goethe’s view of the translator as ‘a mediator in [the] general spiritual 
commerce’ of humanity. For Goethe, the translator’s ‘calling’ is ‘to advance’ human 
‘interchange’.46 Coleridge’s translation of Chevalier Bayard fulfills this role. ‘It is 
desirable,’ says Southey,  
 
 that nations should be conversant with foreign models [of honour and virtue], 
 and particularly with those which may be found among their hereditary and 
 natural rivals. In proportion as this knowledge is cultivated they will be disposed 
 to judge more generously, more kindly, and more equitably of each other.47  
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Southey concludes his review of An Account of the Abipones by commenting upon the 
morality of international politics. He observes that the ‘miseries’ endured by ‘South 
America’ over the last decade might have been avoided if ‘the colonists’ had exercised 
‘patience’ in awaiting the outcome of affairs in ‘the mother-country’.48 As Lesa Scholl 
observes, ‘[t]ranslation had wider implications for the growing global community of the 
nineteenth century’.49 Southey views Coleridge’s translations in a ‘global’ perspective. 
As well as being politically ‘useful’, as Southey puts it, the translations are morally 
instructive. The central character of each is a Christian hero. Coleridge’s insistence on 
the ‘practical usefulness’ of STC’s works reflects Southey’s moral conception of her 
early translations.50                                                                       
 
Poems for the Family: Dialogue and Revision 
In the context of Southey’s broader interests, and alongside his review essays, 
Coleridge’s translations are components of a larger, collaborative whole. Southey was 
instigator and editorial advisor; he was also the mediator, interpreter and authoritative 
commentator. Coleridge, as translator, performed the core creative role. This dialogic 
literary model influenced Coleridge’s future career. The family setting of Coleridge’s 
authorship, and its dialogic nature, are reflected in her poem of 1828,‘Epistle from Sara 
to her sister Mary whom she has never yet seen, her “Yarrow Unvisited”’. It is addressed 
to Derwent’s wife, Mary. Coleridge’s title refers to one of her favourite Wordsworth 
poems, written in 1803, in which he decides not to visit Yarrow on his tour of Scotland, 
in order to preserve the integrity of his imagined vision, drawn from poetry and ballad: 
  
Be Yarrow stream unseen, unknown! 
It must, or we shall rue it: 
We have a vision of our own; 
Ah! Why should we undo it?  
 
Wordsworth concludes that he will keep ‘treasured dreams’ intact, which will be more 
sustaining than a real visit: ‘For when we’re there, although ’tis fair, |’Twill be another 
Yarrow’.51 
  Coleridge’s poem revises the Wordsworthian concept of the power of ‘vision’. 
She dreams of Mary, but the ‘vision’, yielded in a ‘dream’, confuses what the conscious 
mind is able to picture: 
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 But Sleep, delighted to distress, 
Each dream of thee with sadness taints, 
And, ere the vision vanishes, 
Mars all that waking Fancy paints. 
 
Coleridge, distrusting creations of the subconscious mind, reverses Wordsworth’s 
confidence in imaginative ‘vision’. The best ‘waking Fancy’ can provide is a ‘future 
scene’ coloured by ‘Hope’. Coleridge’s conclusion, that ‘visions’, however ‘glowing’, 
are unsatisfactory, revises Wordsworth’s theme: 
 
Mary! these visions of my own, 
All sweet and soothing as they be, 
O! may I change, ere weary grown, 
For truth and blest reality. 
 
‘[R]eality’ is ‘blest’, in contrast with creations of the delusive ‘Morpheus’. The image of 
‘enthral[ment] | Neath Morpheus’s […] sway’ reflects Coleridge’s reaction against the 
‘wild fantastic’ elements of the Romantic literary character, associated with STC.52 
 Coleridge’s revision of Wordsworth’s conclusion contrasts with her 
appropriation of his verse form. While Wordsworth varies his rhymes, Coleridge’s 
stanzas consistently adopt the rhyme scheme of the octave of a Shakespearian sonnet. 
This reflects Coleridge’s tendency throughout her poetry to use regular rhyme and verse 
forms. She requires ‘rhymes and stanzas [as] a mechanical support’, she says, ‘a sort of 
frame-work of poetry [to rest] upon’. The regular sound pattern of the ‘Epistle’ is neither 
predictable nor obtrusive; it anticipates the precept she states in 1851, that poetic 
language should ‘not challeng[e] attention by itself’.53 She maintains that a poet’s 
techniques should be inconspicuous. Coleridge’s tenet parallels a critical principle that 
John Keble applies to religious verse in his essay, ‘Sacred Poetry’.54 This was published 
in the issue of the Quarterly Review preceding that in which Southey’s ‘Memoirs of 
Bayard’ appeared, so it is very likely that Coleridge read Keble’s essay in 1825.   
 The religious poet, Keble contends, must avoid ‘laborious refinement’: there 
must be no ostentatious verbal ‘originality’, nor ‘what is technically called effect’.55 
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Coleridge’s style in the ‘Epistle’ reflects this principle: the regular versification 
complements her poetic diction in a formal description of the seasons, for example. The 
contrast between ‘Sweet Spring’ and a traditional Christmas scene is emphasized by the 
lighter stresses of the first line, and the stronger emphases on ‘frost’, ‘snow’, and ‘fires’ 
in line 4: 
   
Attended by the frolic Wind 
Sweet Spring each field and grove attires, 
Yet holly-berries still remind 
Of frost and snow and Christmas fires. 
The foliage of the chestnut droops 
Like Naiad’s drenched and clinging robe; 
Aurelians bloom in yellow groups, 
And half unfold the tiny globe.56 
 
Each quatrain of the octave frames a separate picture of the Keswick countryside in 
transition from late winter to early spring. It is a stylized description, in which the richly 
delicate imagery and Keatsian mythological reference idealize the view. 
 The ‘Epistle’s’ dialogic elements are characteristic of Coleridge. She finds her 
creative space in response to a textual source, the product of one of her literary fathers. 
This is reminiscent of STC’s mode of composition, in which the text of another writer 
becomes the basis for the development of a new work. In her ‘Epistle’, Coleridge is 
introducing herself, and recent family history, to her new sister-in-law. Her reference to 
Wordsworth in the form, structure and theme of the poem indicates the personal 
significance of the Rydal poet to the Coleridge children. Coleridge’s revision of 
Wordsworth’s conclusion suggests the filial licence she enjoys in engaging the poet in 
friendly dialogue. When she describes for Mary her childhood with Derwent, and happy 
memories of playing in different seasons by the River Greta, Coleridge draws on a 
Wordsworthian mode. Her description of Keswick in spring blends into a recollected 
vision of Derwent as her childhood playmate: 
 
How many Springs have bloomed and faded 
Since one whose name thou lov’st to hear, 
On Greta’s bank with trees o’ershaded 
Joined in my sports, a pleased compeer!57                                   
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In the ninth stanza, Coleridge changes her scene from ‘fancy-free’ childhood to adult 
‘sorrow’. She brings family troubles into focus in a stanza describing Hartley. She omits 
him from her recollections of childhood, introducing to Mary only ‘the wreck of time 
mis-spent’, the derelict figure of the failed adult:58 
 
I thought of one so fondly deemed 
The child of Genius and of Worth, 
By thoughtless follies unredeemed  
Low laid upon the soiling earth.59 
 
The opening words repeat those of Wordsworth in his stanza on Chatterton in 
‘Resolution and Independence’: ‘I thought of Chatterton, the marvellous Boy, | The 
sleepless Soul that perished in his pride’.60 Coleridge’s allusion associates Hartley with 
the Romantic archetype of doomed poetic genius. She relates Hartley’s adult ‘follies’ to 
STC’s ‘fond’ visions of him in childhood, and implies that Hartley, ‘child of Genius’, is 
the victim of his paternal inheritance. Her dialogue with Wordsworth, Hartley’s other 
literary father with STC and Southey, takes on a critical aspect in this stanza. She 
implicates him in having colluded, ‘fondly’ and mistakenly, in the construction of a 
damaging mythology around Hartley. Her line, ‘Low laid upon the soiling earth’, refers 
to Wordsworth’s idealized depiction of Hartley in ‘To H. C., Six Years Old’, in which 
he is    
 
a Dew-drop, which the morn brings forth, 
Not doomed to jostle with unkindly shocks; 
Or to be trailed along the soiling earth.61 
 
Earlier in the poem, Wordsworth expresses ‘fears’ for Hartley’s future vulnerability. He 
puts these aside, confident that ‘Nature’ will shield the ‘Faery Voyager’ from painful 
reality. He envisions ‘either a sudden early death or an eternal childhood for Hartley’, as 
Nicola Healey aptly puts it.62 Wordsworth’s faith that ‘Nature’ will not ‘doom’ Hartley 
‘to be trailed along the soiling earth’ is shown by Coleridge to be disastrously false. She 
confides in Mary that she assigns to Hartley’s literary fathers responsibility for his 
troubles.  
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 Coleridge’s description of Hartley as ‘unredeemed’ suggests that his soul is in 
danger, although he is guilty of ‘follies’ not vices: the foolish behaviour that caused him 
to lose his Oriel Fellowship has spiritual consequences disproportionate to the misdeeds 
themselves. Psychologically, Hartley’s motivation and self-esteem continue to atrophy 
as a result of his dismissal: ‘Hope grows sick, and will not hear |The promise e’er so 
truly meant’.63 Coleridge implies that Hartley is suffering from an earlier stage of the 
condition described by STC in ‘Work Without Hope’: ‘Work without Hope draws nectar 
in a sieve, | And Hope without an Object cannot live’.64 
 Coleridge also confides in Mary concerning her own sorrows: the ill health of 
her fiancé, Henry, and their protracted engagement. She uses imagery of flowing water, 
which will become a frequent presence in her work: ‘Not smoother ran my true-love’s 
stream | Than mountain brook by rocks impeded’.65 On learning of the engagement, 
Henry’s father, Colonel James Coleridge, forbade the union. To these cares were added 
Coleridge’s fears for Derwent. At Cambridge, he had looked for a time as if he would go 
the same way as Hartley and succumb to a ‘wayward fate’.66 Mary herself figures as an 
‘angel form’, whose appearance in Derwent’s life saves him and secures his future; a 
future in which, Coleridge hopes, she and Mary will meet in ‘blest reality’.67 Coleridge 
introduces Mary to the troubled psychological legacy of STC’s children; and, by such 
intimate communication, confirms her affectionate acceptance into the family. 
 Coleridge’s poetic activity in the early to mid-1830s arises directly from her 
family setting, following her marriage in 1829, and the birth of her children, Herbert in 
October 1830, and Edith in July 1832. Her poems are addressed to the children. This 
domestic context implies the presence of Henry as reader and adviser. Ultimately, he 
acts as her literary agent in their publication. Coleridge’s children’s poems reflect her 
educational principles: ‘[p]ut works of simple natural history and geography into [a 
child’s] head, instead of sentimental trash,’ she prescribes: 
 
[g]ive him classical Fairy Tales instead of modern poverty-stricken fiction — 
shew him the great outlines of the globe instead of Chinese puzzles and 
spillikins. Store his mind with facts rather than prematurely endeavour to 
prepossess it with opinions or sophisticate it with sentiment based on slippery 
ground.68  
 
‘[S]lippery ground’, borrowed from the assassination scene in Julius Caesar, places 
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specious ‘sentiment’ in a sinister frame.69 Evangelical educational literature exploits 
‘sentiment’, which, Coleridge holds, stunts imaginative growth and moral development. 
Her poems in Pretty Lessons in Verse for Good Children (1834) contain basic lessons on 
subjects such as Latin, Biology, Geography, and spelling rules. The moral and didactic 
agenda implied in ‘Lessons’ and ‘Good Children’ would arouse religious expectations in 
parents. Yet, only two of the poems (‘Childish Tears’ and ‘Providence’) are specifically 
religious in character.70 Coleridge had reservations about writing religious verse. It was 
too difficult, she believed, for religious poetry to meet the high demands of its subject 
with fitting language. A flawed style in a religious poem would result either in 
irreverence or cliché. Coleridge holds, therefore, that ‘the bible itself’ should be the sole 
resource ‘[f]or teaching the Christian religion to very young persons […] with a 
mother’s comments and explanation’.71  
 Coleridge’s reaction against contemporary ‘sentiment’ in Pretty Lessons results 
in some dark, pre-Darwinian poems on the animal kingdom. ‘Foolish Interference’ 
concerns a lynx for whom ‘blood’ is ‘an elixir’. The final stanza presents a grim comedy 
in which the lynx ‘sup[s]’ the ‘blood’ of a monkey who dared to comment on his eating 
habits.72 ‘The Nightingale’ refers to a bird’s grief ‘when boys have robbed her nest’.73 
‘The Usurping Bird’ gives examples of nature’s cruelty, in which every creature preys 
upon the weaker, and is preyed upon by the stronger. For example, a female wheatear 
dies of starvation after a harrier kills her mate:  
 
Her relics were gnawed by the carrion crow, 
And flies in the cave did the maggots bestow; 
The eggs which the pair had so anxiously cherished 
Were sucked by the magpies – or otherwise perished.74            
 
The jaunty rhythm presents death and decay with macabre lightness of tone. As in ‘The 
Nightingale’, Coleridge associates motherhood with death and loss.  
 Some of Coleridge’s poems addressed to her children are disturbing in 
psychological terms. They are shadowed by the presence of adult suffering, which 
reflects Coleridge’s ‘nervous illness’ that ‘continued unabated for more than two years, 
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from September 1832 to January 1835’.75 In ‘The Blessing of Health’, Coleridge the 
invalid addresses Herbert from her sick bed. She exhorts him to enjoy his health to the 
full before ‘age’ and incapacity inevitably descend. She shows him what it would be like 
for him to be ill and bedridden, ‘[w]ith limbs full of pain and a dull heavy head’.76 
Imprisoned in a sick room, he would lose the joys of the seasons and nature. In the first 
four stanzas, Herbert’s illness is considered as a theoretical scenario; the poet addresses 
him indirectly using the third person. In the final stanza, there is a grammatical turn as 
she releases him from her bedside – adding a final unsentimental reminder of future 
infirmity: 
  
Then Herbert, my child, to the meadows repair, 
Make hay while it shines, and enjoy the fresh air, 
Til age sets his seal on your brow.77 
 
‘The Blessing of Health’ subverts the Romantic visions of Coleridge’s literary fathers. 
For Wordsworth, though the ‘radiance’ and ‘splendour’ of childhood are lost, he ‘find[s] 
| Strength in what remains behind’.78 In Coleridge’s poem, neither spiritual nor physical 
‘strength’ can be salvaged from ‘sickness’, ‘grief’ and ‘age’, as the negatives of stanza 
three suggest: 
 
‘In this dull apartment’, he’d sadly exclaim, 
‘Spring, summer and autumn, to me are the same; 
In vain do the violets blow;  
I never can climb to the heather-bell’s bed, 
Nor watch the rooks building high over my head, 
Nor glide where the water-flow’rs grow’.79 
 
Whereas for Wordsworth ‘the meanest flower that blows’ is a sustaining motif, for 
Coleridge the flowers ‘blow’ ‘[i]n vain’. Nor do memories of natural beauty bring 
‘tranquil restoration’.80  
 Equally, Coleridge’s poem contradicts the pantheism of ‘Frost at Midnight’, in 
which Hartley is to be educated by the ‘Great Universal Teacher’. Passive contact with 
God in Nature, ‘Himself in all, and all things in himself’, will ‘mould’ his ‘spirit’. 
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‘Therefore’, STC tells Hartley, ‘all seasons shall be sweet to thee’.81 Coleridge tersely 
rejects STC’s pantheistic optimism: ‘[t]o those that have health every season is sweet’.82 
Her line echoes STC’s language, emphatically denying his vision. She replaces his 
pantheism with Christian realism, in which ‘[h]ealth’ is a transient ‘[b]lessing’, and 
‘sickness and grief’ are to be patiently endured.83  Coleridge’s final stanza contains a 
revisionary reference: 
 
And they that have never known sickness or grief 
Admire the deep red or the light yellow leaf, 
Which soon will be whirled from the bough.84 
 
This alludes to Christabel:  
 
 The One red Leaf, the last of its Clan, 
 That dances as often as dance it can, 
 Hanging so light, and hanging so high,  
 On the topmost Twig that looks up at the Sky.85 
 
The image expresses the joyful precision of STC and Dorothy Wordsworth’s 
observations of nature, recorded in her Alfoxden Journal: ‘[o]ne only leaf upon the top of 
a tree – the sole remaining leaf – danced round and round like a rag blown in the 
wind’.86  
 For Coleridge, delight in such observations depends on the transient ‘[b]lessing 
of [h]ealth’: ‘sickness and grief’ destroy any meanings with which health and youth 
might have invested them.87 Around the same time as Coleridge rejects the pantheism of 
‘Frost at Midnight’ in ‘The Blessing of Health’, Hartley does the same in his 
‘Dedicatory Sonnet’ to Poems 1833. In the octave of his sonnet, Hartley recalls STC’s 
‘ardent’ supplication that his infant self should learn the arcane ‘lore, which none but 
Nature’s pupils know’. The sestet shows that the granting of STC’s prayer did not have 
the desired result. Hartley gleaned only ‘shapes and phantasies’ from ‘Nature’: no 
‘eternal language’ taught mystic knowledge.88 In a note on his poem, Hartley rejects 
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STC and Wordsworth’s concept of authorship, in which poets are ‘Prophets of Nature’, 
whose sacred mission is to ‘speak | A lasting inspiration’.89 ‘[P]oets’, Hartley states 
firmly, enforcing his point by italicizing the negative, ‘are not prophets’.90 To 
misconceive the poet’s role in this way, Hartley knows – only too well – can have 
unhappy consequences. The sestet of Hartley’s sonnet, referring to ‘the passions of [his] 
sadder years’, implies STC’s failure to envision the future.91  
 Coleridge employs a multiple time frame in ‘The Blessing of Health’, in which 
an encounter is staged between three generations of Coleridges. There is the present of 
Herbert’s healthy, vigorous childhood and Coleridge’s bedridden sickness; the distant 
past of Herbert’s grandfather’s generation, whose metaphysical conceits are encoded and 
revised in the poem’s language; and the distant future when Herbert will lose his active 
delight in nature through age and illness. Herbert’s young adulthood is also implied, 
when he will be able to re-encounter the poem as an exhortation to reject the ‘phantasies’ 
of the late 1790s, and embrace the Protestant realism of Victorian England. 
 In ‘Poppies’, which also employs a multiple time frame, Coleridge rejects STC’s 
Romantic construction of dejection. She confronts her father’s themes and experience, 
and presents radical revisions. Outgoing maternal affection replaces introspective male 
solitude; active hope replaces passive despair; rational dosage of medication replaces 
uncontrolled opium (ab)use. Coleridge’s language and form recall the aesthetic ideals of 
her Romantic fathers. Bringing its addressee, Herbert, into the territory of STC’s ‘The 
Pains of Sleep’, and the inherited ‘misfortune’ of ‘uneasy health’, ‘Poppies’ revises 
perspectives on ‘sorrows of the night’. For Coleridge, ‘slumber soft’, induced by opium 
as medication, effects a release into peace from the restlessness of illness.92 For STC, 
meanwhile, an indiscriminate use of the drug renders sleep ‘[d]istemper’s worst 
calamity’, and reduces him to desolate pleading: ‘[t]o be beloved is all I need’ is his 
helpless cry in ‘The Pains of Sleep’.93 The poem represents for Coleridge STC’s 
pathological neediness and behavioural instability. She had experienced in early 
childhood STC’s hurtful unpredictability. In her autobiographical fragment, she 
describes her ‘perplexity and bitterness’ at age six on being snubbed by her father in 
favour of ‘the little Wordsworths’. The reason for the snub was Coleridge’s having 
shown spontaneous affection for her mother. In retrospect, she recalls how STC had used 
her in the emotional struggles of his broken marriage:  
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 some of my recollections [of childhood] are tinged with pain. I think my dear 
 Father was anxious that I should learn to love him and the Wordsworths and 
 their children, and not cling so exclusively to my mother and all around me at 
 home.94 
 
‘The Pains of Sleep’ is associated with STC’s dejected solitude, marital breakdown, and 
the sufferings of his children. Coleridge’s laudanum poem, by contrast, presents an 
image of loving domesticity and watchful parenting. She nurtures her son’s ‘beaming’ 
and ‘bright’ childhood, and observes in close, affectionate detail his developing 
awareness of the world around him. Knowing that he is too young to understand the 
significance of the poppies, Coleridge is confident that he will learn, in due time, of their 
therapeutic effects for his mother. Her maternal care will then be reciprocated by loving 
filial solicitude: 
 
 O then my sweet, my happy boy 
 Will thank the Poppy-flower, 
 Which brings the sleep to dear Mama, 
 At midnight’s darksome hour.95 
 
Poppies anticipates Coleridge’s tendency in later poems, as in her letters, to salvage 
from dejection and suffering an idiom of survival, spiritual resilience, and ‘an ethic of 
care’.96 Although ‘Poppies’ is concerned with adult ‘sorrows’ and anticipates Herbert’s 
induction into adult experience, the poem is decisively redemptive. Coleridge’s 
functional economy of language replaces the self-dramatizing gothic hyperboles and 
tensely paced couplets of ‘The Pains of Sleep’.  
 The Wordsworthian form of ‘Poppies’ determines its measured reflective tone, 
and underpins its outlook: ‘Mr. Wordsworth opens to us a world of suffering’, Coleridge 
observes in 1835, ‘but for every sorrow he presents an antidote’.97 In ‘Poppies’, while 
laudanum is medicinal, the real and lasting ‘antidote’ to suffering will be the healing 
restorative of family love; the simple grandeur, in Mary Wollstonecraft’s terms, of 
dignified domestic happiness. Significantly, Coleridge’s mother had been denied such 
happiness, partly through STC’s opium consumption. Anne Mellor’s description of ‘the 
cornerstones of Wollstonecraft’s feminism’ is strikingly applicable to Coleridge’s 
outlook in ‘Poppies’: ‘[t]he rational woman, rational love, egalitarian marriage, the 
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preservation of the domestic affections, responsibility for the mental, moral and physical 
well-being and growth of all the members of the family’.98 Such values are implied in 
‘Poppies’, which anticipate the ethic underlying Coleridge’s interlinking literary and 
family commitments in her final decade. ‘Poppies’ suggests other key elements of 
Coleridge’s authorial development. First, her creativity flourishes in dialogue with her 
father’s texts and themes. Second, such encounters prepare Coleridge for her critical 
reinterpretation of STC in Biographia 1847. Despite the poem’s sensitive subject, which 
displeased Derwent, ‘Poppies’ appeared in all five editions of Pretty Lessons published 
between 1834 and 1853. This suggests that its initial insertion had not been an oversight, 
as Coleridge alleged. She may have included it for its expression of Wollstonecraftian 
values, and the way it distinguishes her from STC. 
 
‘Airy Dreams are Sacred Duty’: ‘Phantasmion’ versus Benthamite Culture 
Coleridge’s fairy-tale novel, Phantasmion (1837), had its origins in the family circle.99 It 
developed from a story that Coleridge invented for Herbert as an educational 
‘entertainment’.100 Echoing Percy Shelley, that poets are ‘teachers’ concerned with ‘the 
beautiful and the true’, Coleridge explains that the rationale of Phantasmion is to 
‘cultivat[e] the imagination by exhibiting the general and abstract beauty of things’. 
Although she observes that to ‘publish a fairy-tale is the very way to be not read’, she is 
committed to the cultural values the genre represents. By writing her fairy-tale, 
Coleridge upholds the Romantic equation of ‘beauty’ with ‘truth’ against the Benthamite 
Utilitarianism of the post-Reform Act landscape.101 In socio-economic terms, 
Benthamite policy, according to ‘Tory paternalist’ Richard Oastler, would ‘break up 
society and make England a wilderness’.102 In the cultural ‘wilderness’ of utilitarianism, 
there was no place for the exercise of imagination. In 1840, Henry describes 
Phantasmion as ‘one of a race that has particularly suffered under the assaults of 
political economy and useful knowledge’.103 John Stuart Mill critiques the social and 
educational incapacity of the Benthamite mindset. He describes Jeremy Bentham in 
terms that suggest Coleridge’s reasons for writing an anti-Benthamite fairy-tale:  
 
Knowing so little of human feelings, he knew still less of the influences by 
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which those feelings are formed: all the more subtle workings both of the mind 
upon itself, and of external things upon the mind, escaped him; and no one, 
probably, who, in a highly instructed age, ever attempted to give a rule to all 
human conduct, set out with a more limited conception either of the agencies by 
which human conduct is, or of those by which it should be influenced.104 
 
In Phantasmion, Coleridge seeks to revive ‘the agencies by which human conduct […] 
should be influenced’. She maintains that ‘wherever the poetical beauty of things is 
vividly displayed truth is exhibited’. In her educational psychology, this revelation 
‘stimulate[s]’ ‘the imagination of the youthful reader […] to find such truths for itself’; 
‘truths’ outside the perceptual field of a Benthamite mind.105 
 In 1845, Coleridge inscribed “‘L’Envoy” to ‘Phantasmion’ in a copy of the 
novel she presented to Aubrey de Vere. The poem expresses the rationale of the novel:  
  
 Go, little book, and sing of love and beauty, 
 To tempt the wordling into fairy land: 
 Tell him that airy dreams are sacred duty, 
 Bring better wealth than aught his toils command 
 Toils fraught with mickle harm.106 
 
The ‘remarkable endowments’ of the Benthamite ‘empirical’ mind, combined with what 
Mill characterizes as its ‘remarkable deficiencies’, produce psychological and social 
‘harm’.107 The poem’s third line echoes Hartley’s sonnet of 1839, ‘To William 
Wordsworth’, in which he praises Wordsworth for having ‘proved that purest joy is 
duty’.108 The exercise of imagination (‘airy dreams’) becomes a religious imperative 
(‘sacred duty’) for Coleridge, in order to promote a society of spiritual ‘wealth’. John 
Henry Newman expresses similar concern about the utilitarian culture of early Victorian 
Britain. In a series of letters to The Times in 1841, he critiqued Sir Robert Peel’s 
adoption of Whiggish utilitarian policies: ‘[l]et Benthamism reign, if men have no 
aspirations,’ challenges Newman; ‘but do not tell them to be romantic, […] do not 
attempt by philosophy what once was done by religion’. Newman asserts the educative 
role of the imagination in the attainment of religious faith: scientific ‘deductions’, he 
asserts, ‘have no power of persuasion. The heart is commonly reached […] through the 
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imagination’.109 Coleridge’s novel seeks to put this principle into practice. For both 
Newman and Coleridge, cultivation of the imagination is central to the moral condition 
of early Victorian Britain. 
 Derwent criticizes Phantasmion from the viewpoint of a professional Church of 
England preceptor. He regards the novel as deficient because it lacks a moral. Although 
his orthodoxy has a traditional High Church bias, his educational theory is inflected by 
evangelicalism. He believes that a work aimed at young people should state its lessons 
overtly. Coleridge counters by asserting that ‘[t]ales of daily life, where the ostensible 
moral is strongly marked’, lack the philosophic depth of ‘Fairy Tales’, which enable the 
reader to ‘perceive the truths and realities both of the human mind and of nature.’ 
Coleridge’s vocabulary reflects the Wordsworthian inflection of her literary theory. She 
argues that the didactic tales favoured by Derwent, with their literalistic focus on the 
‘petty and particular […] have a tendency to contract and sophisticate the mind: as the 
eye is injured by long studying minute objects’.110 Similarly, Mill critiques the 
narrowness of Bentham’s perceptual range, and Percy Shelley holds that ‘[t]he story of 
particular facts […] obscures and distorts that which should be beautiful’.111 Coleridge 
argues that a work of imagination ‘according to the merit of its execution, feeds and 
expands the mind’.112 Coleridge’s justification of Phantasmion reflects STC’s 
observation that, as ‘a work of such pure imagination’, the Ancient Mariner was 
impaired by its having ‘too much moral, and that too openly obtruded on the reader’.113 
Coleridge adapts STC’s tenet to educational literature. 
 Although Coleridge would have encountered STC’s view in collaborating with 
Henry in the production of Table Talk, Phantasmion reflects Romantic principles as a 
whole, rather than any individual paternal influence. To support her belief in the value of 
the fairy-tale genre, she cites ‘Sir W. Scott and Charles Lamb, my father, my uncle 
Southey, and Mr. Wordsworth’.114 She could have added Percy Shelley, an equally 
significant influence on the concept of her novel. Shelley opens his ‘visionary rhyme’, 
‘The Witch of Atlas’ (1824), in terms that defy an empirically rational, anti-imaginative 
culture: 
 
 Before those cruel Twins, whom at one birth 
 Incestuous Change bore to her father Time, 
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 Error and Truth, had hunted from the earth 
 All those bright natures which adorned its prime, 
 And left us nothing to believe in, worth 
 The pains of putting into learned rhyme, 
 A lady-witch there lived on Atlas’ mountain 
 Within a cavern, by a secret fountain.115 
 
Coleridge, similarly, celebrates the ‘bright natures’ of ‘fairy land’.116 Like Shelley, she 
seeks to restore the imaginative faculty in a world which had ‘sacrificed’ human well-
being to ‘improvements in Mechanism’, to borrow Byron’s memorable phrase.117 Just as 
Derwent deplores the lack of an overt moral in Phantasmion, Mary Shelley ‘object[ed]’ 
to Percy’s poem for its ‘discarding human interest and passion, to revel in the fantastic 
ideas [of the] imagination’.118 For Coleridge, ‘human interest’ resides in a work’s 
imaginative appeal rather than any correspondence with material reality.  
 Hartley responds to the novel in Christian terms. In his poem, ‘Written in a 
Copy of Sara Coleridge’s “Phantasmion”’, he contrasts his recollections of Coleridge as 
enchanted child with her troubled motherhood. The form of Hartley’s poem, iambic 
octameter, with rhyming couplets until the final quatrain, creates a light and tripping 
movement, evoking a whimsical, playful mood, in the lines that treat Coleridge’s 
childhood. When the focus shifts to adult ‘suffering’, Hartley deftly reduces the tempo 
by use of enjambment, and the polysyllabic ‘suffering’, ‘subdued’ and ‘mortified’. The 
movement of the verse marks the change from childhood joy to adult care:  
 
 She that once was like a Fairy– 
 Just as light, and just as airy, 
 Whose every word was like a spell, 
 Sounded on a pearly shell– 
 Or harp–which wandering bard and blind 
 Has left to prattle with the wind–    
 When a suffering Matron, tried– 
 By grief–subdued and mortified 
 In pious woe–her God adoring 
 And thankful most, when most imploring– 
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 […]  
    the Matron mild– 
 Composed this tale. 
 
Hartley regards Coleridge’s composition of the novel, during a period of trial and 
‘mortifi[cation]’, as an act of religious devotion. Her fairy tale, produced in ‘pious woe’, 
is an offering of worship and gratitude – ‘her God adoring’ – and submission to God’s 
will. Hartley pictures the reader as a suffering adult, for whom the novel will have 
therapeutic effects. He conceives of Coleridge’s novel as a devotional offering of 
Christian service by which other ‘heart[s]’ may be ‘disburthen[ed]’ of ‘a weary bond of 
pain’. He conceives of his poetry performing a similar healing function: ‘that hearts too 
sharply bled | Should throb with less of pain, and heave more free | By my endeavour’.119 
Hartley’s view of Phantasmion as a Christian work accords with Coleridge’s idea of its 
educative character. His emphasis on the novel’s curative power alludes to a therapeutic 
principle in the narrative.  A character’s compassion for another is restorative for the one 
who exercises compassion: ‘[t]he chieftain was still telling his tale with passionate 
gestures to Leucoia, who leaned upon her stag, and felt her own griefs assuaged by the 
tears that flowed for Ulander’.120 Healing for Leucoia begins when she feels sympathy 
for another’s distress. 
 Devotional in theme, Hartley’s poem on Phantasmion is Wordsworthian in its 
affirmation of memory as agent of ‘restoration’ and creativity.121 His celebration of 
Coleridge’s novel echoes its imagery: 
    
 Recalling images and sounds 
 That model’d once the frolic bounds 
 And glancing movements of the child 
 To soothe and lull the Matron mild– 
 Composed this tale–this waking dream 
 This murmur of a distant stream– 
 This shadow of a purple mist 
 Of self-diffusing Amethyst.122 
 
Coleridge’s Wordsworthian faith in the restorative potential of memory has revived 
since she wrote ‘The Blessing of Health’. In language that evokes ‘Kubla Khan’ (1797 / 
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98), she explains that ‘for the account of Fairy-land Nature […] my native vale, seen 
through a sunny mist of dreamery, […] suppl[ied] all the materials I should want, and all 
the inspiration’.123 Similarly, as Mary Shelley observes, the ‘materials’ of the Italian 
landscape that Percy ‘so much loved’ were processed in his ‘senses’ and ‘fancy’ to 
‘form’ ‘The Witch of Atlas’.124 Coleridge envisions the Lakeland scenery of her youth 
‘clad with “the light that never was on sea or land”’. As Joanne E. Taylor observes, ‘the 
various regions’ of Coleridge’s ‘[f]airyland […] reflect different parts of [her] beloved 
Lake District’, and recall STC’s ‘geographical descriptions’.125 Coleridge transforms as 
well as recollects Lake District scenery: her settings are interwoven with descriptions of 
character and emotion. For example, the dying Albinian realizes that his daughter, 
Iarine, will never accede to his wishes to marry Karadan: ‘Iarine saw that his 
countenance was disturbed, though no new words had been spoken, as a lake appears 
ruffled on the surface while not a breath of air is stirring abroad, and the valesmen 
imagine a wind under the waters.’ Equally, features of landscape are personified: 
 
The well-attired valley seemed to smile on the lake which smiled radiantly in 
return, as a conscious beauty, beaming on her lover, causes his face to brighten 
with pleasure and hope. The little brook, too, which murmured so fretfully in the 
darksome pass, now gushed with a wider stream, arrayed in sparkling white, and 
bounded to the lake, raising a gladsome cry as if of thankfulness at having 
escaped from those torturing rocks and dreary prison.126  
 
The personification of the valley as an elegantly dressed ‘conscious beauty, beaming on 
her lover’, the lake, creates a mood of excited anticipation, enhanced by the sibilance of 
‘seemed’, ‘smile’, ‘smiled’ and ‘conscious’. The trope functions emotionally rather than 
visually, particularly in the adjectives ‘well-attired’ and ‘conscious’, which carry hints of 
artful seduction. In the second sentence the onomatopoeic ‘murmured’, ‘gushed’ and 
‘cry’ contribute to the atmosphere of joy and release. The contrast between gloom and 
elation is evoked by an economic use of adjectives: ‘darksome pass’, ‘gladsome cry’, 
‘gloomy prison’, and the personification of ‘torturing rocks’. In a tale in which 
characters lack psychological depth, in conformity with its genre, such personifications 
of landscape heighten the novel’s emotional tone. 
 Coleridge pictures the settings of Phantasmion with vivid immediacy. This is 
suggested by her dedication in a copy presented to a friend: ‘To Miss Hinckes from Mrs 
H. N. Coleridge in memory of a visit to her poetically beautiful residence which recalls 
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the vision of Magnart’s Garden in the Vale of Polyanthida p. 57, to the mind of the 
writer of this Fairy Tale more than any portion of the real world she ever beheld’.127 The 
passage in Phantasmion with which Coleridge identifies her friend’s garden evokes the 
‘twice five miles of fertile ground’, and ‘gardens bright’ of ‘Kubla Khan’:  
 
Turning round a broad rock, they beheld the vale of Polyanthida, vested in sunny 
green, luxuriant with orange groves, meadows of golden bloom and sloping 
gardens, whence the rainbow might have borrowed all its colours. From the high 
ground where the travellers stood, they looked down upon a bright blue lake, 
partly girt by hills of soft wavy outline, clad in freshest verdure, to which an 
amethystine tinge was imparted by blossoms of the fragrant thyme. The skirts of 
these grassy hills were bathed by the water, while on the opposite side was a 
thick wood, stretching beyond the rocky shores, which looked as if they had 
been carved by a graver’s chisel, and formed bays and promontories overhung, 
here and there, with knots of drooping trees.128  
 
The ‘sunny green’ vale recalls Kubla Khan’s ‘sunny spots of greenery’: the luxuriance of 
‘Polyanthida’ parallels the fertility of STC’s visionary landscape.129 The passage is 
characteristic of the novel’s style in its use of personification and simple vocabulary, 
heightened by sparingly deployed poetic diction, such as ‘vested’, ‘girt’, ‘verdure’. The 
sequence of descriptive phrases in the first sentence, separated by commas, gives the 
effect of ‘the travellers’ scanning the bright and richly coloured panorama. In the second 
sentence, their gaze moves from the lake – its bold vividness expressed by 
monosyllables and alliteration – to the surrounding hills, their ‘soft wavy outline’ 
enhanced by assonance. The sentence’s tempo slows on the polysyllabic ‘amethystine’, 
the sound of its final syllable picked up by ‘tinge’, to linger on the radiant ‘blossoms of 
the ‘fragrant thyme’. This closing phrase echoes the ‘t’ sound picked up by ‘tinge’, and 
evokes the ‘incense-bearing tree[s]’ and scented landscape of ‘Kubla Khan’. The 
‘fragrance’ of Coleridge’s landscape is natural and light, contrasting with the strong, 
intoxicating associations of STC’s ‘incense’. In his poetic tribute, Hartley alludes to the 
‘amethystine tinge’ of ‘blossom’ in his image of ‘a purple mist | Of self-diffusing 
Amethyst’.130 The passage – characteristically – uses adjectives with precise economy, 
which contributes to the stylized presentation of the panorama. Only in two phrases, 
‘bright blue lake’ and ‘soft wavy outline’, is more than one adjective applied to a single 
noun. The positioning of ‘here and there’ as the penultimate, rather than the final phrase 
of the last sentence, conveys how the ‘knots’ of ‘trees’ are scattered haphazardly, rather 
than densely, on the ‘promontories’. The structural qualities of Coleridge’s prose – her 
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sound-patterns and syntax – are precisely and deliberately crafted.  STC’s ‘prose was 
that of a poet’, Coleridge contends, and the same is true of her own style in 
Phantasmion.131 
 The novel’s narrative structure exploits moments of tension. Coleridge 
concludes chapters in ways that provoke expectation. Chapter 3 of Part 4, for example, 
heightens anticipation of the final battle: ‘[t]hen the two chiefs issued forth into the 
daylight, and beheld the united armies ranged upon the plain, their burnished armour 
shining coldly in the light of the newly-risen sun’. The dramatic final clause freezes the 
action in suspense, as Chapter 4 switches to a different strand of the story. The battle 
itself is withheld until Chapter 5. The novel’s narrative tensions continue to its 
conclusion, reflected in the ambiguity of the final sentence:  
 
 Phantasmion looked around in momentary dread, lest Iarine should have proved 
 a spirit and vanished like the rest; but there she stood, her face beaming bright as 
 ever in full sunshine, the earnest that all he remembered and all he hoped for 
 was not to fade like a dream.132  
 
In the final clause, ‘not’ is balanced against the resonance of the closing words, ‘to fade 
like a dream’, in which emphases rest on ‘fade’ and ‘dream’. The novel’s final note, 
therefore, is subdued, and counters the image of Iarine’s sunlit face, which, had the 
sentence ended at ‘full sunshine’, would have produced a traditionally uplifting and 
morally certain resolution for the fairy-tale. An intimation that ‘all’ might ‘fade’ lingers. 
  Coleridge’s literary development is further reflected in the thirty-five poems that 
accompany the prose of Phantasmion. Whereas many of her poems up to 1834 had been 
personal in context and theme, the Phantasmion poems are in dialogue with the prose 
narrative, and explore its situations of love, desire and jealousy. The following ‘song’, 
for example, addresses ‘the blight of infidelity in love’: 
 
 The winds were whispering, the waters glistering, 
 A bay-tree shaded a sun-lit stream; 
 Blasts came blighting, the bay-tree smiting, 
 When leaf and flower, like a morning dream, 
 Vanished full suddenly. 
 
 The winds yet whisper, the waters glister, 
 And softly below the bay-tree glide; 
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 Vain is their cherishing, for, slowly perishing, 
 It doth but cumber the riverside, 
 Leafless in summer-time.133 
 
The chilling impact of desertion is expressed through visual imagery and the bleak anti-
climactic shock of the short unrhymed line, with which each stanza concludes. This short 
lyric exemplifies the quality George Saintsbury praises in Phantasmion: ‘most of the 
songs are in undertones’, he remarks: ‘[t]hey have, however, an air of suppressed 
power’.134 Although Coleridge would ultimately envisage publishing some of the poems 
separately, she took care to craft the style of each poem for its dramatic and 
psychological contexts. In his essay ‘Modern English Poetesses’, Henry observes that 
‘the verses scattered throughout the volume have […] a dramatic propriety’, and he 
apologizes for ‘tearing out some of the [poetic] gems from their settings’.135 
  Coleridge completed the first draft of Phantasmion on 31 January 1836, and 
revised it through the year. She did much of the correcting and rewriting in October and 
November, during what Mudge describes as ‘the worst period of nervous hysteria she 
would ever endure’.136 Coleridge, like STC, finds that creativity, illness and opium use 
are inextricably interwoven. Nervous dejection provides her with a space in which to 
work, and itself furnishes material for literary exploitation, as it did for STC.  
Phantasmion depicts sensory and volitional derangements produced by ‘the use of 
stimulants and narcotics’, a topic she had considered in her essay ‘Nervousness’, written 
in 1834, unpublished until 1989.137 Zelneth, assisting the witch Malderyl, who detains 
Phantasmion against his will, causes him to drink a potion that, destroying his rational 
capacities, will make him love her instead of Iarine. The toxic but seductive atmosphere 
of Malderyl’s cavern has already weakened Phantasmion’s resistance: ‘the luscious 
vapours were stealing over his senses; he was gazing unconsciously upon Zelneth [...]. 
He retired to a recess […], and tried to think again his former thoughts and purposes; but 
insensibly they floated away’. In this loss of rational volition, he succumbs and drinks 
the liquor Zelneth offers him. Phantasmion’s intoxication is a solipsistic condition, in 
which his rational interaction with the outside world is blocked: ‘he felt intoxicated with 
pleasure which sprang from no cause and tended to no object’.138 In Biographia 1847, 
Coleridge describes STC’s creative mind as paralyzed, unable to connect with objective 
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reality: his thought is locked in ‘self-made channels’.139 There is also a parallel between 
Coleridge’s analysis of STC and her presentation of Penselimer, a character in 
Phantasmion who suffers a prolonged period of mental incapacity. When Penselimer 
finally emerges from his depression, he describes it in terms that anticipate Coleridge’s 
account of STC: ‘self’ broke out of ‘its natural limits, [and] sicklied the whole face of 
outward things, as vapours veil with one same lurid hue earth, sky and water’. 
Penselimer was trapped, unable to receive ‘nourishment from without’: his mind could 
only ‘multiply itself by a thousand vain reflections’.140 Similarly, in Biographia 1847, 
Coleridge describes STC as imprisoned by ‘the tyranny of ailments, which, by a spell of 
wretchedness, fix the thoughts upon themselves, perpetually drawing them inwards, as 
into a stifling gulf’.141 Penselimer and the intoxicated Phantasmion suffer from states 
that Coleridge associates with STC: they anticipate her description of him in Biographia 
1847. 
 
From Fairy-Tale to Theological Polemic 
Coleridge formed her commitment to theological writing while she was revising 
Phantasmion, or shortly after its completion. Mudge notes that she was ‘preparing a new 
edition of Aids to Reflection’ in autumn 1836.142 This work, and the ongoing project of 
editing STC’s Literary Remains (1836-1839), would pave the way for her essay ‘On 
Rationalism’ (1843). In October 1837, Coleridge announces to Henry her plans to 
engage with Tractarian theology: ‘[m]y love, if I were a man I should like above all 
things to review Newman’. This may be read as an appeal for Henry’s support, given her 
project’s social awkwardness. Coleridge begins her letter by thanking Henry for his 
‘kindness’ in supporting her production of Phantasmion. She reminds him of how 
important his encouragement has been ‘from beginning to end’. In an earlier letter to a 
friend, Coleridge praised Henry’s editorial collaboration: ‘[o]ne advantage the story has 
had – that of Henry’s criticism – whatever faults could be done away with, were so – 
through his remarks’. In her October letter, Coleridge reminds Henry that she shares 
some of STC’s ‘literary difficulties’, such as the tendency ‘to pursue’ an idea ‘in every 
direction’.143 Therefore, she would again require Henry’s patient and sympathetic 
editorial input. His support was forthcoming, which enabled Coleridge to participate in 
the male genre of theological polemic while maintaining the appearance of social 
decorum. In fact, all of her published work between 1822 and 1843 is produced in a 
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collaborative familial setting, and is ostensibly managed by the validating agency of a 
close male relative. Her critique of Newman will be framed in the context of wifely and 
filial duty. 
 Newman’s Tract 73, On The Introduction of Rationalistic Principles into 
Revealed Religion, appeared in February 1836. In it, he critiques the approach to religion 
associated with STC’s philosophy. In 1847, Coleridge describes this as ‘the religion of 
the heart and conscience’, in which the ‘voice’ of God ‘speaks in the heart and 
reasonable mind’, and in scripture, and ‘refers us to internal evidence as the only 
satisfying and adequate evidence of religion’.144 Newman attacks doctrine that ‘direct[s] 
its attention to the heart itself, not to anything external to us, whether creed, actions, or 
ritual’: it prioritizes man over God, he argues, and ‘tends to Socinianism’. Although 
Newman does not target STC directly in the Tract, he has STC’s religious philosophy in 
mind at the time of his writing it. In a letter of January 1836, between finishing the text 
of Tract 73 and writing its ‘Appendix’ on Schleiermacher, Newman criticizes STC in 
terms that recall his Tract. STC, according to Newman, ‘look[s] at the Church, 
Sacraments, doctrines, etc. rather as symbols of philosophy than as truths, as the mere 
accidental signs of principles’. Against such an approach, Newman advances the ‘faith’ 
of the ‘ancient Saints’ in ‘truths beyond’ the reach of ‘the mind’.145 Newman’s attitude 
to STC is divided; in an article in The British Critic in 1839 he expresses conflicting 
views in the same sentence. On the one hand, STC had ‘instilled a higher philosophy 
into inquiring minds’; on the other, his ‘conclusions […] were often heathen rather than 
Christian’.146 Coleridge must defend STC’s Christian philosophy from such charges, 
because she adapts his methodology in her original polemical writings. In staging a 
critical encounter between STC and Newman, Coleridge becomes a religious author in 
her own right. 
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Chapter Two 
 'On Rationalism': ‘The Authoritative Word’ and ‘Liberty of Conscience’  
           
From STC’s ‘Literary Remains’ to Coleridge’s ‘On Rationalism’ 
John Stuart Mill described ‘Jeremy Bentham and Samuel Taylor Coleridge’ as ‘the two 
great seminal minds of England in their age’.1 In Phantasmion, Coleridge sought to 
express the educative potential of Romantic imagination against the dominant 
assumptions of Benthamite Utilitarianism. As noted in the previous chapter, this stance 
aligns her with Newman. ‘On Rationalism’, though, is an assured and forthright critique 
of Newman’s theology. The essay’s publication history has caused it to be all-but-lost 
from view. It was published twice in Coleridge’s lifetime: as ‘Appendix C’ to the fifth 
and sixth editions of STC’s Aids to Reflection, in 1843 and 1848 respectively. 
Coleridge’s essay occupies almost the whole of the second volume of both editions. The 
1843 version is 220 pages in length, while that in the sixth edition has been expanded to 
235 pages. In the sixth edition it is followed by seventy-three pages of a new work, 
Coleridge’s ‘Extracts from a New Treatise on Regeneration’ (discussed in Chapter 4). 
The 1848 edition of Aids to Reflection contains more than three hundred pages of 
Coleridge’s original writing, all of it in Volume 2. Coleridge explains that William 
Pickering, the publisher, decided to divide ‘the new [1843] edition of the Aids into two 
volumes’, in order to accommodate writings by commentators on STC: James Marsh’s 
‘Preliminary Essay’, which had introduced the first American edition of 1829, and J. H. 
Green’s essay, ‘On Instinct’, as well as ‘On Rationalism’. STC’s work would occupy the 
first volume, ‘and the productions of his disciples […] the second’. Edward Moxon, the 
publisher with whom Coleridge and Henry were in negotiation over future STC editions, 
thought that ‘On Rationalism’ might ‘operate’ favourably on the sale of the whole work, 
‘as the subject is one that excites interest at present’.2 Derwent, who managed the 
family’s literary property after Coleridge’s death, did not include her essay in the 
seventh edition of Aids to Reflection in 1854. ‘On Rationalism’ has never been 
republished. 
 The presence of ‘On Rationalism’, with the addition of ‘Extracts from a New 
Treatise on Regeneration’ in 1848, changes the character of the fifth and sixth editions of 
Aids to Reflection. STC hoped that Aids to Reflection in 1825 would be read by ‘the 
studious Young at the close of their education’, and ‘especially’ those about to take up a 
life of Christian ‘Ministry’.3 The target readership of the fifth and sixth editions, as a 
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result of Coleridge’s polemical contributions, is that ‘best part of the community’ whom 
Newman addresses.4 These editions are composite, multi-voiced productions, in which 
Coleridge juxtaposes her own texts with STC’s. Addressing ‘subjects which are even 
now engaging public attention’, ‘On Rationalism’ becomes the mediator by which 
STC’s earlier text is to be understood in the 1840s by its new Victorian audience.5 In the 
terms of Gadamer’s hermeneutics, Coleridge ‘mediate[s] between [STC’s] texts and 
contemporary life’.6 
 In this chapter, I will discuss the origins of ‘On Rationalism’ in Coleridge’s 
collaborative editorial work. Her essay can only be properly understood in relation to the 
tensions arising from constitutional, political and ecclesiastical reform. I will place 
Coleridge’s essay in its historical context, therefore, and will show that her theological 
themes were matters of immediate public concern in the 1840s. The doctrine of 
baptismal regeneration, in particular, was the focal point of politico-religious 
controversy between 1835 and 1850. I will examine Coleridge’s critical application of 
Kantian epistemology to Tractarianism, and will suggest that this is her distinctive 
contribution to contemporary religious thought. I will consider the contradictions 
Coleridge exposes in Tractarian dogma, such as the problem of post-baptismal sin. She 
identifies tendencies of monologic authoritarianism in the Oxford theology, her critique 
of which, I suggest, is a major element of the essay. She draws attention, by contrast, to 
Methodism’s practical inclusiveness. Finally, the chapter will refer to the creative 
tensions that underlie ‘On Rationalism’. 
 Coleridge was contemplating a work in response to Tractarianism in 1837 and 
announced in September that she had formulated a basis on which to critique Newman’s 
‘scheme’.7 Mudge believes that Coleridge began to write ‘On Rationalism’ in December 
1838; Griggs gives the later date of 1839, though he does not specify the month. 
Whenever she began to draft the essay’s actual text, Coleridge’s editorial work was vital 
preparation for her theological critique of Tractarianism. It enabled her to undertake the 
necessary and extensive preliminary research. Coleridge evidently played a significant 
role in preparing the fourth edition of Aids to Reflection, published in 1839, although 
Henry is named as editor on the title pages of the fourth, fifth and sixth editions. It is 
difficult to know the exact extent of Coleridge’s editorial input before Henry’s death. 
Evidence suggests, though, that Coleridge was the intellectual director of the whole 
editorial enterprise. She writes as the managing partner in the collaborative venture, and 
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directs editorial policy from STC’s death onwards. Joseph Henry Green, future President 
of the Royal College of Surgeons, was named in STC’s will as literary executor. Green 
had acted as STC’s amanuensis and confidant, but lacked the time and philosophical 
expertise to contribute to the re-presentation of his work.  
 In the summer of 1834, Green asked Julius Hare and John Sterling to edit STC’s 
unpublished theological manuscripts. Coleridge countermanded Green’s plan, however, 
and directed that the theological works be published at a later date. This would give her 
time to prepare the ground, and ‘widen the audience for [STC’s] works’.8 In September 
1834, she established the guiding principle that STC’s works must be presented in 
context, as part of a greater whole, not in isolation: ‘STC’s works must be reissued, [but 
not] […] disjointed and unaccompanied’, she tells Henry: ‘[l]et them be set forth […] 
with the complete scheme of arguments which convinced his own mind.’ Henry looks to 
Coleridge’s ‘superior […] discrimination’ in matters of textual criticism; equally, she 
instructs him on precise interpretations of theological terminology. For example, she 
criticizes his use of ‘that vague High Church cant phrase of abuse rationalized […] It is 
true my father says “not to seek to make the mysteries of faith what the world calls 
rational”—but what the world calls rational is a definite phrase: rationalized is not so’.9 
A manuscript bears evidence of Coleridge’s painstaking hands-on editorial activity: she 
transcribes ‘from a scip [for scrap or slip?] of paper found in [STC’s] room’ a passage 
from ‘Introductory Aphorisms’ XIV – XV of Aids to Reflection, with the comment, ‘sad 
pity that paper here broke off’.10  
 Coleridge and Henry collaborated in editing STC’s Literary Remains. This 
project ran concurrently with the preparation of the fourth edition of Aids to Reflection. 
Volumes 1 and 2 of the Remains, published in 1836, are literary in content; Volumes 3 
and 4, published in 1838 and 1839 respectively, are religious. The contents of Volumes 
3 and 4 include STC’s notes on Hooker, Taylor and Waterland, theologians of 
significance in Coleridge’s writings. Volume 4 includes sixty-five pages of STC’s 
‘Notes on Luther’: the Reformer will feature prominently in her ‘Introduction’ to 
Biographia 1847. Coleridge may have taken sole charge of the religious volumes of the 
Remains, and, as suggested below, seems to have written the ‘Preface’ to Volume 3. Her 
work in preparing Volumes 3 and 4 of Literary Remains, and her editorial input for Aids 
to Reflection, contributed to the conceptual foundation of ‘On Rationalism’. For 
example, Remains Volume 4 closes with STC’s ‘An Essay on Faith’, the influence of 
which is reflected throughout Coleridge’s religious writings. STC concludes by arguing 
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that 
 
 [f]aith subsists in the synthesis of the reason and the individual will. By virtue of 
 the latter therefore it must be an energy. […] And by virtue of […] reason, faith 
 must be a light, a form of knowing, a beholding of truth.11  
 
Coleridge appropriates STC’s image of ‘faith’ as a ‘light’ of divine knowledge in her 
second sentence of ‘On Rationalism’, in which she defines ‘reason […] as the light by 
which we read the law written in the heart’.12 The concept of ‘faith’ as an ‘energy’ of the 
will drives her whole critique of Tractarian doctrine. Such parallels indicate the 
continuity between Coleridge’s work on Literary Remains and her composition of ‘On 
Rationalism’.  
 The ‘Preface’ to Volume 3 of Literary Remains bears notable intellectual and 
stylistic characteristics of Coleridge’s writing. These suggest that Coleridge, rather than 
Henry, is its author. Having explained that STC took a ‘middle path’ in his 
understanding of the Bible’s ‘transcendent character’, the author explodes any 
misinterpretation of his position: 
 
Did [STC], therefore, mean that the doctrines revealed in the Scriptures were to 
be judged according to their supposed harmony or discrepancy with the evidence 
of the senses, or the deductions of the mere understanding from that evidence? 
Exactly the reverse: he disdained to argue even against Transubstantiation on 
such a ground.13 
 
The abruptly terse retort, ‘Exactly the reverse’, has the energy of a viva voce utterance. 
Coleridge’s rhetorical question implies a dialogic relation with her reader. She exploits a 
style of oral delivery, particularly when contesting a specific point of interpretation: for 
example, her discussion of the conversion of the jailor in Philippi, analyzed below.14 The 
extract above employs ‘understanding’ in the same way that Coleridge applies it in ‘On 
Rationalism’, where it signifies STC’s Kantian concept of ‘a Faculty judging according 
to the Sense’.15 The ‘understanding’, in other words, apprehends the data of physical 
experience. Conceptual and linguistic similarities with other aspects of Coleridge’s 
writings suggest her authorship of this ‘Preface’. 
 In it, Coleridge positions STC’s ideas within the contemporary politico-
theological landscape. Her ability to map this contested territory underlies her power as a 
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polemicist. She anticipates that STC’s ideas will be unpalatable to ‘many […] readers’. 
With characteristic impersonality and tact, she does not specify the parties from which 
she expects opposition, though traditional High Church and Tractarian adherents will 
certainly be among them:  
 
[STC] distinguished so strongly between that internal faith which lies at the base 
of, and supports, the whole moral and religious being of man, and the belief, as 
historically true, of several incidents and relations found or supposed to be found 
in the text of the Scriptures, that he habitually exercised a liberty of criticism 
with respect to the latter, which will probably seem objectionable to many of his 
readers in this country. 
 
Coleridge, anticipating her candid procedure in Biographia 1847, gives evidence of what 
certain readers may find ‘objectionable’. She attaches a footnote in which she directs the 
reader to ‘Table Talk, p. 178, 2nd. edit.’, where an example of such ‘liberty of criticism’ 
is to be found. Here, STC applies linguistic analysis to the Old Testament, and an 
editorial note indicates that his religious ‘faith’ was independent of his belief in the 
Bible’s authenticity.16 Coleridge correctly anticipates the nature of contemporary 
opposition to STC: Newman, in 1839, echoes her phrase ‘liberty of criticism’ in his 
observation that STC ‘indulged a liberty of speculation which no Christian can 
tolerate’.17 A reference to Milton, in the context of Kantian metaphysics, provides 
further evidence that Coleridge is the author. STC, she contends, ‘sought to justify the 
ways of God to man […] by showing […] their consequence from, and […] their 
consistency with, the ideas or truths of the pure reason which is the same in all men’.18 
Milton is a constant presence in Coleridge’s religious writings. Her linking of the ‘ways 
of God’ with ‘the ideas […] of the pure reason’ anticipates her use of Kantian 
epistemology in ‘On Rationalism’, and her discussion of STC’s application of it to 
Christianity in Biographia 1847.   
 
‘A Glorious Church Betrayed’: Coleridge’s Political and Religious Context 
The Oxford Movement was a political response to political change: ‘[t]ractarianism 
represented a revolt of Oxford Toryism at the reforming measures which the [Earl] Grey 
ministry brought into parliament in the early 1830s’, according to Peter B. Nockles. 
These measures were preceded by constitutional reforms in the late 1820s that severely 
damaged the relationship of church and state. The first blow against the Church of 
England came in 1828, when the repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts granted 
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political liberty to Dissenters. Catholic Emancipation followed in 1829, in an attempt to 
stabilize a dangerously volatile situation in Ireland. A weakening and divided Tory 
government, incapable of withstanding intense Whig and radical pressures for change, 
passed these measures. As a result of the constitutional reforms of 1828 and 1829, 
dissenters and Roman Catholics could sit in Parliament and could therefore exert 
influence over the Church of England. Historian Eric J. Evans emphasizes how 
profoundly these measures unsettled the church: ‘the reform question encompassed more 
than an extension of the franchise. Concessions to Roman Catholics, and even Protestant 
dissenters, were viewed by many Anglicans as more damaging to the fabric of English 
society than the granting of a Parliamentary seat to Manchester or Birmingham’.19 
 The irreparable divisions in the Tory party caused by these reforms resulted in 
the collapse of Wellington’s government in 1830, ending decades of Tory rule. 
Wellington’s government was replaced by Grey’s Whig administration, which was 
committed to parliamentary reform. High Church and High Tory adherents continued to 
associate reform with hostility towards the established church. Henry expressed the 
intensity of Tory fears in his anti-reform pamphlet, Notes on the Reform Bill, in which 
he condemned the 1831 Reform Bill as ‘the first overt act’ of ‘a Revolution’. Henry 
anticipated a parliament that would wreak revolutionary destruction on the established 
Church: ‘[t]he Irish Reform Bill will send about thirty Roman Catholic Members to the 
House of Commons: add to these the English Roman Catholics, the Scotch 
Presbyterians, the English Dissenters, the Ubiquitarian enemies of any Establishment 
whatever’.20  Coleridge’s comment on her husband’s reactionary pamphlet is a cool 
report of its sales figures and public reception.21 Henry’s attitudes towards Grey’s 
reformist measures place him on the same political wing as Newman. They are wholly at 
odds, though, with the political implications of Coleridge’s later theological writings. 
 Grey’s establishment of an Ecclesiastical Revenues Commission in 1832, the 
year following Henry’s alarmist pamphlet, would exacerbate Tory and High Church 
anxieties. Grey was committed to ‘the removal of  […] causes for complaint’ in the 
financial arrangements of the church. The establishment of a Commission was the first 
step towards reforming the church’s notorious inequalities. Its uneven deployment of 
resources meant that ‘[t]he Church of England was overstocked with clergymen in the 
wrong places’.22 It was therefore unable to respond to social change, and its ministry in 
the rapidly expanding industrial areas was inadequate. In 1833, Grey’s administration 
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introduced the Irish Church Temporalities Bill, which Newman branded the ‘Sacrilege 
Bill’.23 The Bill proposed to abolish two out of four archbishoprics in Ireland and all 
eight bishoprics. The Ecclesiastical Commission might allocate some of the money 
saved ‘to build Catholic or secular schools, or even to pay Roman Catholic priests’.24 
Supporters of the established church regarded this as heinous secular interference in 
religious affairs. For the High Church party, by virtue of the doctrine of Apostolic 
Succession, only a bishop was entitled to rule on matters of church organization. 
Although the scheme to divert funds to secular and Catholic causes was dropped, the 
proposal itself, for High Anglicans, set a threatening precedent. The Tory leader, Peel, 
presented no more encouraging prospect for them. He was also committed to political 
reform of the church’s management of its resources. 
 John Keble responded to the State’s treatment of the church in a sermon entitled 
‘National Apostasy Considered’. Keble preached this sermon to the visiting Assize court 
in Oxford’s University Church on 14 July 1833. Newman assigns to this date the 
beginning of The Oxford Movement. Keble made his protest in rousing terms: ‘[t]here 
was once here a glorious Church’, he proclaimed, ‘but it was betrayed into the hands of 
Libertines for the real or affected love of a little temporary peace and good order’. He 
denounced the nation for having turned from God and for treating the church as a mere 
institution of society. Newman published the first two of his Tracts for the Times in 
September 1833. He called upon his fellow clerics to engage in political ‘protest’ both 
‘in public and private’. He warns that ‘abstinence’ from political engagement ‘is 
impossible’ for the clergy in such ‘troublous times’. Those who remain politically 
neutral, Newman warns, ‘may perchance find themselves with the enemies of CHRIST, 
while they think to remove themselves from worldly politics’. He reminds clerics that 
they are not appointees of the State, and emphasizes the decisive change in the church’s 
political status since 1828: ‘[n]o one can say that the British Legislature is in our 
communion, or that its members are necessarily even Christians’.25 Against secularism 
and heresy, Newman finds inspiration in the early church’s resistance to Roman tyranny: 
‘[t]hen as now’, he contends, in Arians of the Fourth Century (1833), ‘there was […] the 
presence in the Church, of an Heretical Power enthralling it, […] and interfering with the 
management of her internal affairs’. He concludes defiantly: ‘our Athanasius and Basil 
will be given us in their destined season, to break the bonds of the oppressor and let the 
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captives go free’.26 Newman’s friend Hurrell Froude suggested immediate political 
innovation: disestablishment, the replacement of the ‘national Church’ with a ‘real’ 
church.27 
 By the time Coleridge was preparing the editions of STC’s Literary Remains 
and Aids to Reflection, the church’s political crisis had assumed an increasingly doctrinal 
character. In July 1834 Lord Melbourne succeeded Grey as Whig Prime Minister. 
Melbourne was notoriously indifferent to religion and found Tractarian tenets 
particularly ‘obscure’. He introduced a Bill to admit Dissenters to the Universities of 
Oxford and Cambridge. Although the Bill was not passed, it was further evidence, for 
the Tractarians, of a Whig agenda to weaken the established church. In 1835, ‘the Whigs 
at Westminster’ ‘sponsored’ a proposal by the Heads of Houses at Oxford to cancel the 
requirement that undergraduates subscribe to the Thirty-Nine Articles.28 Dr. Renn 
Dickson Hampden, Principal of St. Mary Hall, led the faction at Oxford that supported 
this measure. Melbourne was keen to promote Whig interests at both universities. In 
1836, he promoted Hampden to the Regius Professorship of Divinity at Oxford. 
Tractarians declared Hampden unsuitable on doctrinal grounds. They alleged that his 
Bampton Lectures (1832) and his pamphlet, ‘Observations on Religious Dissent’ (1834), 
were heretical, because he had emphasized ‘a religion of the heart’ – a phrase Coleridge 
applies to STC’s Christian philosophy – and had placed Unitarians ‘on the same footing 
[…] of love for the Lord Jesus Christ […] [as] any other Christian[s]’.29 The political 
attacks on Hampden’s appointment were presented in theological terms. Owen 
Chadwick observes that the ‘Tory Press clamoured’ that Melbourne was ‘invad[ing] the 
citadel of faith, and intended to deluge the church with a torrent of scepticism and 
indifference to religious truth’.30 
 The ultimate target of Tory, traditional High Church and Tractarian opposition 
to Hampden was Lord Melbourne. According to the predominant Oxford view, ‘the 
Whig Prime Minister was unfit to choose leaders in the Church of England’. The focus 
of this political crisis was theological. In March 1836, Edward Bouverie Pusey secured 
in Oxford ‘a public declaration that Hampden was guilty of systematic teaching of 
rationalism’.31 This emotive word was associated with German critical methodology; 
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though in the context of the Hampden case, according to Frank M. Turner, ‘the term 
rationalism denoted a critical approach to clerical and ecclesiastical authority’.32 The 
Oxford Convocation initially vetoed, but ultimately passed a statute restricting 
Hampden’s sphere of influence, because his ‘theology failed to possess the confidence of 
the university’.33 Therefore, when Coleridge in 1837 begins to plan her anti-Tractarian 
work on the topic of ‘rationalism’, she is launching herself at the centre of public 
controversy. The matters on which she writes are far from ‘metaphysical trivialities’, as 
Griggs contends: they are topics of heated national debate. The political instability of the 
post-Reform church gives Coleridge significant authorial opportunities. As Nockles 
explains: ‘once other political props of the establishment had been removed in 1828–33, 
dogma assumed a greater importance’. The Oxford theologians had ‘rais[ed] […] the 
doctrinal temperature of the Church’ in their response to political change, ‘highlighting 
in an often provocative way theological issues that had lain dormant’.34 The most notable 
of these was baptismal regeneration, which recalled divisions earlier in the century 
between Orthodox and Evangelical wings of the church. Regeneration would become the 
major theme of Coleridge’s theological writings. In preparing the fourth edition of Aids 
to Reflection, and Volumes 3 and 4 of the Literary Remains, Coleridge recognizes that, 
in the new political conditions of post-Reform Britain, STC’s work may take on a 
wholly new significance. To re-present STC’s work ‘to a new and […] different Public’ 
becomes a pressing task. Coleridge is very far from the mere ‘fertilizer, […] [the] 
burrowing tunnelling reader, throwing up molehills’ of Virginia Woolf’s conception. To 
borrow Gadamer’s phrase, Coleridge brings STC ‘into the living present of 
conversation’.35 
  
‘Little Sara Coleridge’ versus ‘the Great Men’. 
Coleridge says that she found STC’s Aids to Reflection largely incomprehensible on first 
reading it in 1825. In the late 1830s, she sees it as a foundation for her intervention in the 
male genre of theological polemic, while maintaining her social standing as a ‘Lady’. 
Coleridge manages her position as a writer’s daughter, and his editor’s husband, in order 
to become a writer herself. She maintains social propriety, yet asserts the ability of ‘the 
less worthy gender’, as she puts it ironically for her eminent brother-in-law, John, to 
write on ‘speculative’ subjects.36 Coleridge negotiates tensions between conservative 
expectations and original authorship. She exploits a pious family context in the interests 
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of social respectability and literary autonomy. Henry explains that ‘On Rationalism’ is 
published as an appendix because it ‘appeared to be so much in harmony with the 
principles of the Aids to Reflection, and to represent, so accurately, the views of Mr. 
Coleridge on some points’.37 Henry wrote this in the ‘Advertisement’ that prefaces the 
1843 edition, and is dated 25 October 1842, exactly three months before his death. He 
does not mention the bold originality of ‘On Rationalism’. His presentation of the essay 
as a filially faithful account of STC’s principles preserves Coleridge’s social façade. She 
adds her own ‘Advertisement’ to the fifth edition of Aids to Reflection, dated ‘Regent’s 
Park, March 27, 1843’, two months and two days after Henry’s death. Here, Coleridge 
presents her publication of the essay as a dual memorial observance to father and 
husband. It was the ‘desire of the late Editor’ that she should write the essay ‘to 
accompany’ her father’s work, she says. She is publishing the essay under her own name 
‘in obedience’ to her husband’s ‘express wish and resolve’.38 Coleridge deftly presents 
her authorship as an act of female piety: not to publish ‘On Rationalism’ would be to 
flout her late husband’s wishes and to dishonour her father’s memory. The essay that 
mounts so strong an assault on patriarchal cultural authority is published in the name of 
obedience to patriarchal authority. Given the combative vehemence of the essay’s 
concluding pages, it is tempting to read some keen irony into Coleridge’s professions of 
compliant subservience. 
 Coleridge’s ‘rebel[lious]’ resistance to Tractarianism may express the agenda of 
the subordinated woman as well as that of the threatened Protestant.39 The Oxonian 
authority represented by Newman and his colleagues is an exclusively male tradition.  In 
his discussion of the letters of Newman’s sisters, David Goslee refers to ‘the dramatic 
discrepancy between the forums available to them’ and to their brother.40 Coleridge 
accepts no such ‘discrepancy’: she is the only woman writer of the 1840s to engage in 
the scholarly genre of theological polemics. No other woman presents a sustained 
scholarly and theological critique of Tractarian writings. Religious concerns appear in 
the work of women novelists of the period: for example, in Charlotte Bronte’s sharp 
satire of the evangelical clergyman William Carus Wilson through the character of Mr. 
Brocklehurst in Jane Eyre (1847). Charlotte Yonge, a pupil of Keble’s, was a 
committedly religious novelist who sought to promote Anglo-Catholicism. She intended 
that her novels, such as The Heir of Redclyffe (1853) and The Daisy Chain (1856), 
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should be ‘a sort of instrument for popularizing Church views’.41 On the opposite side of 
the religious spectrum was Catherine Sinclair, ‘a popular Anti-Catholic novelist’.42 In 
the ‘Preface’ to her novel, Beatrice; or, The Unknown Relatives (1852), Sinclair states 
her target readership: ‘the object of this narrative is to portray, for the consideration of 
young girls now first emerging into society, the enlightened happiness derived from the 
religion of England’.43 Coleridge, by contrast, operating in the male genre of the 
polemical essay, engages directly with the leading scholars and theologians of her day, 
and exploits a patriarchal tradition that stretches back to antiquity and the Church 
Fathers. It is significant that, in all of Coleridge’s theological writings, and of all the 
theological authorities she cites throughout her works, she never once refers to a woman 
writer, past or contemporary.  
 In ‘On Rationalism’, Coleridge makes no apology, as she sometimes does in her 
private letters, for engaging in theological or political discussion, ‘after [her] feminine 
fashion’.44 She resents the condescension to which, as female philosopher and 
theologian, she is liable. Of a projected philosophical work, Coleridge comments: ‘folks 
will see that the remarks I have ventured […] [are] only from little Sara Coleridge, and 
therefore my presumption will do no harm to any of the great men who have disputed on 
the question’.45 The phrase, ‘great men’, is bitterly ironic, considering the consummate 
assurance with which she critiques Newman and Pusey. She makes no reference to 
herself in the essay as a female author, and writes in a male third person: ‘we desire that 
fellow Christians should dwell together as brothers’. Venturing into the masculine 
domain of theology, Coleridge engages on equal terms. The ‘intoleran[ce]’ she perceives 
at the heart of Tractarianism includes an elitism that is gendered and social, as well as 
theological and political.46 Writing of Loss and Gain (1848), Coleridge finds 
objectionable a ‘girl-hatred’ that she perceives in Newman’s novel.47 Misogyny is 
suggested, for example, when the protagonist, Charles Reding, sees a former 
acquaintance, now a clergyman, with his ‘very pretty’ bride in a bookshop: ‘[l]ove was 
in their eyes, joy in their voice, and affluence in their gait and bearing’. Reding hides to 
avoid a direct encounter, eavesdrops on their domestic conversation, and suffers 
sensations of nausea. At the close of the episode ‘a severe text of Scripture arose on 
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[Reding’s] mind’.48 Newman satirizes the worldly influence of wives upon married 
clergy, and emphasizes his commitment to celibacy. Nonetheless, Newman felt 
comfortable to share his theological ideas with a few trusted, ‘benignly receptive’ 
‘female correspondents’, from whom he ‘sought sympathy, understanding and 
deference’. According to Turner, these women were unlikely to attempt ‘to check the 
expansion of his thought’ in the way that male colleagues such as Keble and Pusey 
might.49 ‘On Rationalism’, authored by a woman, presented by contrast an assured, 
rigorous and innovative attack on the whole basis of his religious thought.  
 Nonetheless, Coleridge had expected Newman to review ‘On Rationalism’. In 
October 1843, she expresses disappointment that ‘Mr. Newman’s promised review does 
not appear’. She adds, ‘[he] has something else to do and to think of’.50 Coleridge’s 
comment may reflect some personal hurt. Equally, though, its irony might refer to the 
crises with which Newman was preoccupied in 1843. Pusey had been denounced for 
heresy in June and banned from preaching for two years by Oxford University. Newman 
was considering his personal position in the Church of England, a situation exacerbated 
by the secession to Rome of one of his young followers. He resigned his ministry in 
September and preached his last sermon as an Anglican. Given Newman’s difficulties at 
the time, it is not surprising that he was unable to review ‘On Rationalism’. Newman felt 
vulnerable in 1843, reflected by his abandoning a projected ‘Saints of the British Isles’. 
He felt that if he edited this series, he would ‘expose himself by giving the bishops a 
sitting target to “aim at”’. A forthright review of Coleridge’s committedly Protestant ‘On 
Rationalism’ might also have made him a ‘sitting target’.51 Nonetheless, Newman 
appears to have read it. In 1846, Coleridge confides to Aubrey de Vere that Newman had 
spoken in complimentary terms about ‘On Rationalism’. ‘A lady’ has just told her, she 
reports, that ‘Mr. Newman wondered that the said essay was not more read’.52 
Ultimately, he may have avoided reviewing Coleridge’s essay because, lacking ‘even [a] 
modest knowledge of German idealist philosophy’, he was not equipped to engage with 
her underpinning Kantian epistemology. Newman would therefore have been at a 
significant disadvantage in answering Coleridge’s critique. Furthermore, he never did 
‘direct public battle with an intellectual or theological equal or with a person capable of 
powerfully expressing convictions at odds with his own’, according to Turner.53 
Newman’s difficulties in answering Coleridge would have been compounded by the fact 
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that this formidable opponent was a woman. 
 Writing to a friend whose husband was ‘honouring’ ‘On Rationalism’ with a 
‘slow reading’, Coleridge reports another favourable reception of her essay in high 
ecclesiastical quarters: ‘[t]he Bishop of London both to my brother and to Judge Erskine 
expressed an opinion that many of the [essay’s] arguments were “fatal” to Newman’s 
doctrine’.54 Balliol student John Duke Coleridge, Henry’s nephew, told Coleridge that 
‘Oxford theologians’ were discussing her essay, including W. G. Ward, a disciple of 
Newman and Fellow of Balliol.55 Hartley recognizes the scholarly and literary 
achievement of ‘On Rationalism’: it is ‘not ‘a wonder of a woman’s work—where lives 
that man who could have written it? None in Great Britain since our Father died’, he 
declares.56 That the eminent Charles Blomfield, Bishop of London, considers Coleridge 
on equal terms with Newman, and judges her to have overcome the great man’s 
arguments, indicates her significant achievement as a religious author. The eloquent 
cogency of Coleridge’s writing worked firmly against the enclosed citadel of male 
academia. 
 Coleridge strikes at male authority in a more personal way in her essay: she 
criticizes Derwent’s Scriptural Character of the English Church. Coleridge takes the 
opportunity to put Derwent, with formal academic propriety, in his intellectual place. 
She resents the way in which he attempts to police her ideas. In November 1820, she 
tells her friend, Elizabeth Crumpe, that Derwent ‘cautions’ her not to express political 
opinions: she refers sarcastically to his instruction as a ‘charge’, as though the 
Cambridge freshman were a bishop issuing orders to his diocese.57 More than two 
decades later, engaged in the editorial tasks that Derwent had avoided, she resents his 
disapproving interference after Henry’s death: ‘Derwent will not agree with me. He will 
not,’ she complains. She adds that neither Green nor Derwent are ‘pleased that [she] 
should be the Guardian of [her] Father’s doctrine’.58  
 Nonetheless, she goes through the motions of submitting her ideas for Derwent’s 
approval, though there is no guarantee that she will accede to his wishes, as with the 
continued inclusion of ‘Poppies’ in editions of Pretty Lessons. In October 1845, 
however, she lost patience and refused to show Derwent a draft of her ‘Introduction’ to 
Biographia 1847. She asked her High Church brother-in-law, John, to comment on it 
instead, telling Derwent sarcastically: ‘you may feel confident now that there will not be 
any thing disgraceful in it’. Her emphasis on ‘disgraceful’ suggests that Derwent had 
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used the word in commenting on an earlier draft she had shown him. At his insistence, 
she had reluctantly deleted a section on ‘private judgment’.59 Coleridge shares Hartley’s 
irritation at Derwent’s ‘freedom of rebuke’ and arrogance, which he attributes to 
Derwent’s professional ‘habits of command’ and ‘the worship universally paid him’.60  
 In ‘On Rationalism’, Coleridge makes a scholarly pre-emptive strike against the 
domineering clergyman: she critiques his discussion, in The Scriptural Character of the 
English Church, of the baptism of Jesus. She cites Derwent’s statement that ‘[t]he 
baptism of Jesus “was an example and  pattern of that which he subsequently enjoined 
upon his followers”’, and that by it we may be “confirmed in the belief that the spirit of 
adoption, by which we cry, Abba, Father, was henceforth to be bestowed in connexion 
with the ‘outward laver.”’’ Coleridge then delivers her incisive rebuttal: ‘[b]ut here is an 
example that does not exemplify’. She refers to Derwent satirically as the ‘reflective 
writer of those sentences’, and points out their underlying contradiction that ‘the Sinless 
One’ could ‘require forgiveness of sin, or to be born again of the Spirit.’ Coleridge 
concludes that Derwent’s discussion of the baptism of Jesus is ‘nugatory’. It merely 
suggests that ‘being a Son of God has some kind of connexion with baptism’ – a point 
that has never been ‘doubted’. Coleridge lacks professional status, but towers above 
Derwent intellectually. In a footnote near the end of ‘On Rationalism’, she engages with 
him again. She refers to his discussion of ‘Infant Baptism’ in The Scriptural Character 
of the English Church. Here, Derwent has ‘apparent[ly]’ adopted ‘Jeremy Taylor’s 
splendid sophistry on a particular point’. She disagrees with this ‘sophistry […] as a 
steadfast maintainer of the doctrines taught in the Aids to Reflection, according to the 
extent of my understanding’. She satirizes Derwent’s tendency to censor or belittle her 
‘understanding’, and concludes the note with ironical poise. She recommends Derwent’s 
book for its ‘able exposition‘ of STC’s ‘opinions’ on the Sacraments, ‘as far as I am a 
judge’.61 Again, she taunts Derwent with his disparagement of her ‘judg[ment]’. 
Furthermore, she does exactly what Derwent hopes in his ‘Preface’ the reader will not 
do: she reads him as an ‘exponent’ of STC rather than as an independent theologian in 
his own right.62 The adjective ‘able’, therefore, in the context of the whole note, is a term 
of ironically faint praise.  
 Derwent’s desire to censor Biographia 1847 may have been in retaliation for 
Coleridge’s treatment of him in ‘On Rationalism’, as well as in defence of his 
conservative religious agenda. Derwent is interested in the church as a national 
institution, ‘the great organ of public education’, and as a traditional medium of social 
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cohesion.63 Coleridge, meanwhile, is concerned with the theological principles that 
impact upon the spiritual life of the church’s members. Coleridge’s sharp critique of 
Derwent’s views may seem at odds with her concern to uphold the appearance of female 
propriety. The modest reticence of her literary persona, suggested by her absence from 
the title page of the fifth and sixth editions of Aids to Reflection, is not carried over into 
the text of her essay. Also, in subjecting her brother’s work to incisive criticism, 
Coleridge ostensibly demonstrates her impartiality. 
 
Kantian Epistemology and Christian Doctrine 
The works upon which Coleridge principally focuses in ‘On Rationalism’ belong to the 
mid-to-late 1830s. This was the period of Tractarianism’s ascendancy, in which its 
antiquarian basis was established, before the movement’s reversal of fortunes in 1841, 
occasioned by the public relations disaster of Tract 90. ‘On Rationalism’ was published 
two years after the appearance of this notorious Tract, yet Coleridge does not treat it 
directly in her essay. Tract 90, which sets out to show that the church’s Articles may be 
given ‘a Catholic interpretation’, is concerned with the politics of clerical subscription.64 
According to Turner, Tract 90 was seen as encouraging a ‘Tractarian ordinand’ to intend 
‘his subscription to embrace a meaning different from what his bishop, as well as the 
wider church community, thought his words conveyed’. In effect, it encouraged 
duplicity. Between 1841 and 1843, a significant number of bishops, High Church as well 
as Evangelical, issued charges strongly critical of the threat Tract 90 posed to ‘the 
integrity of subscription’ and ecclesiastical discipline.65 Coleridge, by contrast, seeks in 
‘On Rationalism’ to critique the conceptual basis of Tractarianism. She is concerned 
with its implications for the devotional experience of the individual Christian. 
 Coleridge has key Tractarian texts in her sights in ‘On Rationalism’: Newman’s 
Tract 73, On the Introduction of Rationalistic Principles Into Religion, and Pusey’s 
Tracts 67, 68 and 69 of 1835, collectively entitled Scriptural Views of Holy Baptism, 
published as a single volume in 1836. Pusey’s Tracts were decisive in ‘provoking years 
of internal disruption’ in the Church of England, according to Turner: they shifted the 
focus of Tractarian attack from ‘Dissenters’ to ‘evangelicals’ within the church itself.66 
Pusey argues in these Tracts that, according to Scripture, ‘Baptism is the source of our 
spiritual birth’, not ‘faith, or love, or prayer’, or any other ‘grace’.67 He maintains that 
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faith leads us to baptism, by which God saves us: regeneration, therefore, is conferred in 
the ritual of baptism administered by a priest. Newman, in his Lectures on Justification 
(1838), a work with which Coleridge is also deeply engaged, upholds Pusey’s position: 
‘[f]aith’, states Newman, ‘considered as an instrument, is always secondary to the 
Sacraments’. He then cites St. Paul’s pronouncement on faith and baptism in Galatians 
3. 26-27: ‘[y]e are all the children of God by faith in Christ Jesus; for as many of you as 
have been baptized into Christ have put on Christ’. According to Newman, St. Paul is 
telling the Galatians that they are ‘God’s children by faith’, because they have ‘put on 
Christ in Baptism’. In doctrinal terms, Newman explains, this means that ‘Faith justifies 
because Baptism has justified’. Baptism, for Newman, is the primary ‘instrument’ of 
justification.68   
 Another work of significance for Coleridge, in her composition of ‘On 
Rationalism’, is Hurrell Froude’s ‘Essay on Rationalism’ (1834), whose title she adopts 
with combative irony. Froude’s essay, first published in 1834, was reprinted 
posthumously in his controversial Remains (1838), prepared for publication by Newman 
and Keble. Froude introduced the word ‘rationalism’ into ‘Tractarian discourse’, Turner 
observes, ‘to disparage both historic Protestant theology and contemporary evangelical 
practices’.69 Froude advances a view fundamentally opposed to that maintained by 
Coleridge. He conceives of reason mechanistically as ‘the faculty by which we are 
enabled to weigh evidence’, and denies that Christians ‘have a faculty within them for 
recognizing and experiencing the supernatural action of the Holy Spirit on the human 
heart’.70 Coleridge rejects this premise, and the Tractarian idea of rationalism, in her 
opening sentences: she defines ‘reason in the primary and proper sense, as the light by 
which we read the law written in the heart, or rather the law itself, read by its own light, 
when that is enkindled from above’.71 Coleridge understands reason to be universal, a 
light in the minds equally of all individuals, whereby the divine is apprehended. This 
egalitarian concept, at once devotional and metaphysical, drives her critique of an 
exclusive and anti-democratic Oxford theology.  
 In her rejection of Newman’s understanding of ‘rationalism’, Coleridge 
refocuses STC’s distinction between Reason and Understanding, as developed in Aids to 
Reflection. ‘Reason’, says STC, ‘is the Power of universal and necessary Convictions, 
the Source and Substance of Truths above Sense, and having their evidence in 
themselves.’ He adopts Kant’s definition of the Understanding as ‘a Faculty judging 
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according to the Sense’; a faculty that enables us to ‘reflect and generalize’ the ‘notices 
received from the senses’.72 STC had been developing his definitions of these terms 
since the mid-1800s. In 1806, for example, he described the Understanding as ‘that 
Faculty of the Soul which apprehends and retains the mere notices of Experience’.73 As 
Monika Class observes, ‘[h]ere and throughout his future work, [STC] assumed that the 
Understanding played an inferior role’.74 Coleridge follows STC in assigning to the 
Understanding a function ‘inferior’ to that of Reason, but continues the ongoing 
Coleridgean process of refining and developing these essential terms. The polemical 
context of her re-application of STC’s definitions leads Coleridge to re-examine their 
Kantian basis. She uses them as tools of acute critical analysis for exposing what she 
regards as Tractarian errors. 
 Newman states that ‘[t]o Rationalize is to ask for reasons out of place; to ask 
improperly how we account for certain things, to be unwilling to believe them unless 
they can be accounted for’.75 Coleridge argues that rationalism is a mode of thinking that 
‘involves a forgetfulness of the spiritual and divine, a subserviency to the carnal, finite, 
and human’. This is not to be confused with the ‘necess[ity] […] to test the truth of 
doctrine […] by its correspondency to the rational, moral, and spiritual ideas within us.’ 
Such methodology is not rationalism, Coleridge maintains. Nor is it rationalistic to hold 
that the ‘intellectual faculty […] must […] be present and active’ in the reception of 
divine grace.76 In her critique of Tractarianism, Coleridge reapplies STC’s interpretation 
of Kant, in which there is a correspondence between Christianity and the configuration 
of the human mind. Coleridge refers to this in Biographia 1847 as the ‘accordance and 
identity’ of Christian faith with the ‘ideas of reason’.77 In ‘On Rationalism’, Coleridge 
adduces Kantian analysis to expose the imprecise epistemology of Tractarianism, in 
which ‘the use of the understanding in speculation and abstraction’ is confused with ‘its 
concrete and practical use’. Consequently, Tractarians fail to recognize that ‘the practical 
use of the understanding, as the organ of reason and the moral mind, […] [is] universally 
necessary in the conversion of the soul to God’.78  
 Coleridge’s originality as a religious polemicist resides in her application of 
Kantian philosophy to a critique of Tractarianism. Unlike other critics, who oppose the 
Oxford Movement in sectarian terms, Coleridge presents a succinct account of the 
epistemological basis of her theology: 
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It does not […] depend upon our will whether or no we see a rose when we have 
turned our eyes consciously toward the flower; yet we do not see a rose, our 
minds remaining wholly inactive as the crystal mirror when the image of a 
passing object flashes into it. In every perception the matter is given, […] 
excited within us by an outward stimulus; but, in order to its appearing in a 
definite form, the mind must […] arrange the affections of sense, apprehend, 
connect, and reproduce them; and this is to think in the widest sense of the term. 
Now the understanding is the faculty of thinking; […] it is the whole connecting 
power of the mind.  
 
In a footnote, Coleridge gives a ‘Free Translation’ and explanation of a passage from 
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, which helps to elucidate her conception of ‘thinking’ as 
‘the whole connecting power of the mind’. For Kant, she maintains,  
 
 that objects present themselves to us in any definite form, as wholes, having 
 each its own unity, depends upon the understanding and imagination, that is the 
 transcendental imagination […]  which is prior to experience, which orders and 
 shapes it, supplying form to the materials of sensation. 
 
 Coleridge contends that the mind’s synthesizing of its sensory impressions applies 
equally to the objects of ‘spiritual cognition’, which are given form and clarity by its 
‘plastic agency’.79 The mind, therefore, is so configured as to apprehend spiritual as well 
as physical reality. 
 In his critique of ‘private judgment’, Newman makes much of the distinction 
between ‘Objective and Subjective Truth’ in Tract 73, and argues that ‘the Rationalist 
[…] confines faith to the province of Subjective Truth’.80 Coleridge refutes Newman’s 
position by presenting ‘the mind of man as at once subjective and objective’, and 
adduces STC’s definition of the mind as ‘a subject which is its own object’. She 
elucidates her Kantian model of mind in a striking natural analogy, which recalls her 
opening image of ‘reason’ as ‘light’. Coleridge collapses Newman’s distinction between 
subjective and objective knowledge and replaces Froude’s mechanical view of reason 
with her dynamic concept of mind: 
 
The sky and the smooth expanse of skylike ocean, the one overhanging, and, as 
it were, looking down into the other, —the two, under a strong sun, appearing as 
one, a double heaven, —may image to us […] the mind reflecting and reflected, 
the mind as a power of representation, perception, thought, and the mind as a 
power of ideas, or spiritual realities, the substance and the life of all our 
knowledge.81  
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Coleridge’s image of ‘the mind as a power of ideas, or spiritual realities’ is the 
conceptual basis of her theology. It underlies her whole critique of Tractarianism, and 
her defence of the Protestant economy of salvation. It is grounded, ultimately, in Kant’s 
principle that ‘[t]he synthetic unity of consciousness is […] an objective condition of all 
knowledge’.82 In Coleridge’s conception of individual regeneration, therefore, 
consciousness works actively in the gradual reception of divine grace: ‘the soul of man 
cannot properly become religious’, she asserts, ‘without the concurrence of the 
understanding in every stage of the process’. In Tractarian theory the subject receives 
grace passively in baptism: as Coleridge puts it, the soul is ‘stamped with a character as 
the dead wax receives the impression of the seal.’ It is a process independent of the 
subject’s rational and volitional activity. Coleridge, by contrast, conceives of the 
Christian life as a dynamic process of devotional struggle towards a regenerate state: ‘we 
are living and growing in the Spirit in becoming the children of God’.83 Coleridge’s 
Kantian epistemology underpins her Christian devotion. 
 
The Tractarian Circumscription of Divine Mercy  
Pusey established the Tractarian doctrine of baptism in his Tracts of 1835. For 
Coleridge, this doctrine is not only metaphysically incoherent, but detrimental to 
individual faith in its limitation of the scope of God’s mercy. According to Pusey, 
regeneration occurs once and for all in baptism: it is a mystic event confined to the 
sacramental moment. In Tract 68, he addresses the ‘danger’ of ‘losing’ the ‘privileges of 
Baptism’. He emphasizes the extreme difficulty of ‘ris[ing] again after falling from 
baptismal grace’, and bases his argument on the view ‘of the ancient Church, that one 
who [has] fallen grievously after Baptism’ can never regain ‘the same condition as if he 
had never so fallen’. In Tract 69, Pusey cites St. Cyril to support the position that ‘all 
impairing of baptismal purity’ can never ‘be wholly repaired’: ‘[t]he bath cannot be 
received twice or thrice; else a man might say, “though I fail once, I shall succeed a 
second time”: but if thou failest the “once” it cannot be repaired’. Pusey then emphasizes 
the gravity of post-baptismal sin: ‘subjects of which [people] speak lightly’, he warns, 
are ‘indeed very fearful’.84 In Tract 82, written in defence of Pusey’s Tracts, Newman 
supports Pusey’s stern prescription that ‘those who have fallen after baptism’ exist in ‘a 
dark place’: they have ‘no personal assurance, no right to appropriate again what was 
given them plenarily in baptism’.85 Coleridge objects that, given ‘human nature’, it is 
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inevitable that a Christian ‘often falls into sin after Baptism’.86  
 She condemns the Tractarian ‘tenet that regeneration [...] and forgiveness of sin, 
as promised under the Gospel, [come] once for all in Baptism’. It is ‘a desolating belief’, 
she asserts, ‘which steals away from the Christian the boundless treasures of mercies in 
Christ. […]. [He] is robbed of the incentives, encouragements and consolations […] 
which the Gospel so abundantly supplies to all who really and deeply desire them.’ The 
trope of theft suggests that the sinning Christian may justly possess the hope of God’s 
mercy. ‘[B]oundless’ is a key word: Coleridge’s theology expresses her devotional sense 
that ‘the mercies of God, like Himself, are infinite’.87 It is an inclusive creed, in which 
God’s grace is open to ‘all’ who truly ‘desire’ it. By contrast, Tractarianism limits the 
scope of God’s mercy. Like Coleridge, Samuel Wilberforce deplored the demotivating 
implications of Pusey’s baptismal doctrine, and sensed its elitist implications. It held up 
‘a glorious standard of holiness’ for those educated in ‘the riches of the Gospel’, he 
observed, but was liable to shut out ‘ignorant and bowed-down souls’ who needed ‘a 
more welcoming treatment’. In 1838, Wilberforce, future Bishop of Oxford, preached 
two Oxford University sermons in opposition to Pusey’s teaching, in which he 
denounced ‘the preacher’s right to lay undue stress upon the fearfulness of post-
baptismal sin’.88 Coleridge, though, thought that Pusey and Newman had raised a matter 
that was better discussed than avoided. Throughout her theological writings, she is 
committed to the open discussion of religious doctrines, whether congenial or 
objectionable. By such means, she holds, the conceptual form of Christianity, which 
underlies faith and morality, may be clarified and understood. She increasingly regards 
such doctrinal investigation as a dialogic process, as reflected in the Socratic form of her 
final religious works. Rather than circumvent ‘a doctrine […] which the human heart 
very readily rejects’, Coleridge contends, it is the theologian’s responsibility to examine 
it, so that the grounds for its rejection are held rationally. Her critique of Tractarian 
negativity enables her to formulate her own positive view. Baptism, she affirms, is ‘an 
introduction to a perennial fount of living waters, in which our souls are to be washed 
and purified perpetually, so that at the end of life they may be  […] far more stainless 
and pure, than when those waters were first applied’.89 This reflects Coleridge’s 
devotional concept of a lifelong pilgrimage towards ultimate grace. 
 Coleridge exposes a disparity between moral intention and practical effect in 
Tractarian teaching: if ‘the ceremonial act’ of baptism is ‘entirely distinct’ from ‘the 
actuation of the will’, an individual may deem herself ‘pleasing in God’s sight’, even 
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though ‘purity and holiness [are] almost wanting’. Coleridge defines her own ethic of 
Christian commitment in evangelical language of military discipline: ‘Christ […] died to 
call’ our spiritual capacities ‘into action’, she proclaims. By contrast, she satirizes 
Newman and Pusey through a trope of epicurean luxury: their ‘doctrine […] would make 
our Baptism a down cushion to fall back on and repose upon through life’.90 
Tractarianism, Coleridge suggests, is self-defeating and undermines moral discipline. 
Yet, the leaders of the Oxford Movement were associated with severe personal austerity. 
Newman subjected himself to strict devotional exercises such as fasting; Pusey made his 
‘family life into a stronghold of rigid ascetic practices’.91 By exposing what she regards 
as a fundamental contradiction between its moral professions and practical effects, 
Coleridge strikes at the conceptual incohesion of Tractarianism.  
 The gravity of post-baptismal sin underlies Newman and Pusey’s rigorous 
asceticism, and drives Pusey’s interest in the concepts of confession and purgatory. 
Tractarian teaching on post-baptismal sin makes eternal perdition inevitable, unless the 
redemptive possibilities of purgatory exist. Coleridge recognizes this: ‘the notion of a 
purgatory intervening betwixt the soul’s departure from this world, and its entrance into 
final bliss and fullness of glory, is the natural and necessary pendant to [the Tractarian] 
scheme.’ While Tractarian baptismal doctrine oppresses the devout, the attendant 
concept of purgatory encourages the materialistic and spiritually uncommitted to persist 
in self-indulgence. Coleridge presents the notion in reductively satirical terms, and 
envisages ‘a painless purgatory, which Anglican Anti-protestants can alone venture 
upon’. The alliterative oxymoron, with its sense of the ludicrous, and the assonant 
expansion of the ‘Anti-protestant’ tag, which alludes to Newman’s Catholic 
interpretation of the Articles in Tract 90, heighten Coleridge’s satirical tone. The 
Tractarian version of purgatory would be unscriptural, she contends, and ‘more 
demoralizing in its tendency’ than medieval superstition.92   
 Coleridge satirizes the Anglo-Catholic purgatory as an exclusive resort, in which 
the recently-departed sinner is spared the stress of having to live in holiness straight 
away: a ‘self-indulgent nominal Christian […] will […] feel it a relief and a respite, that 
he has no chance of passing at once into the company of saints and angels, when he 
knows himself’ to be entirely unfitted for such company. The lax, self-pampered 
Christian hopes, in due course, to gain effortless access to heaven. Coleridge implies that 
he has no wish to exert the spiritual discipline by which he may be reconciled with God: 
‘he will rather enjoy the thought of an intermediate sojourn, where he is sure to obtain, 
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by some means or other, those qualifications for heaven which he took but little pains to 
work out for himself here’. Coleridge’s pointed parenthesis, ‘by some means or other’, 
has a tinge of humour in its implication that questionable ‘means’ might be used. 
Tractarian doctrine produces a psychology of simony, Coleridge implies, and would 
damage the church’s moral influence: ‘it must surely take the sting’ from the clergy’s 
‘dehortatory preaching’, she remarks drily. The spiritual struggle of Christian pilgrimage 
is degraded to a business of ‘obtaining […] qualifications’. Coleridge pursues the 
Tractarian tenet that grace is conveyed ‘plenarily in baptism’ to what she regards as its 
necessary conclusion: an ‘Anglican Anti-protestant’ purgatory that is spiritually vacuous 
and comically absurd.93 
 Coleridge refers to further contradictions in Tractarian baptismal doctrine. 
According to ‘Anti-Protestant divines’, God’s grace was bestowed upon the world in full 
measure only at the coming of Christ. For Coleridge, this is a misconception that arises 
principally from unbalanced interpretations of St Paul’s Epistle to the Hebrews. The 
distinction ‘intended’ in this Epistle is that ‘between the Law and the Gospel’, which has 
been mistaken for a ‘contrast […] between the spiritual state of the world before and 
after the manifestation of our Saviour’. According to this ‘Anti-Protestant’ 
misinterpretation, the ‘ancient Saints’ of the Old Testament, ‘lived and died without 
having their sins forgiven them’, which, Coleridge contends, is a ‘great […] outrage to 
sense and reason’. On the contrary, the Old Testament figures cited in Hebrews Chapter 
11 were ‘believers in Christ to come, […] witnesses to divine truth, of whom the world 
was not worthy’. Coleridge incorporates into her sentence the opening phrase of 
Hebrews 11. 38, in order to emphasize the sanctity of the Old Testament faithful. 
Although they lived ‘before the establishment of the Visible Church’, Coleridge believes 
that, ‘on their departure from this world, they entered the Jerusalem that is altogether 
above’.94 Again, Coleridge objects to the ‘Anti-Protestant’ dogma because it would limit 
the infinitude of God’s mercy. 
 Infant baptismal regeneration raises further contradictions for Coleridge: its 
long-standing and intricate confusions are the theological equivalent of ‘Arachne’s web, 
the prototype of cobwebs’. Coleridge’s Ovidian analogy reflects the imaginative vitality 
of her style in treating the gravest of subjects. She rejects St Augustine’s teaching that all 
unbaptized people, including all unbaptized infants, are condemned to eternal 
damnation. Nor can the problems of the mystic doctrine of baptism, she argues, be 
resolved by the Church’s pronouncement that, ‘children which are baptized, dying 
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before they commit actual sin, are undoubtedly saved’. Against this, Coleridge asserts 
her belief in the boundlessness of God’s grace:  
  
I must avow my conviction that children dying before they commit, or can 
commit actual sin, are safe […] whether baptized or no. […] It is enough to say 
that young children dying before they have sinned, are safe in the mercy and 
infinite loving-kindness of God; that they will not perish without Baptism, 
missed through no fault of their own.  
 
She applies the same principle to ‘the ignorant savage’, who has had no opportunity for 
conversion.95 Coleridge’s maternal experience of having lost four babies, including one 
stillborn, may influence her view. Nonetheless, before her daughter Bertha died aged ten 
days, Coleridge ‘sent for the clergyman to baptize the baby’.96 This was in July 1840, 
during the period in which she was occupied with ‘On Rationalism’. Coleridge’s 
theological position, though, is that baptism is not necessary in such a case, which, she 
observes, is supported by scriptural evidence: ‘Christ suffered’ ‘speechless babes’ ‘to 
come unto Him, […] independently of baptism, in right of their own innocence’. 
Coleridge’s view is based on her conviction that God’s grace is boundless. She argues 
that the conceptual problems surrounding infant baptism, and the related ‘notion of faith 
in babes’, have never been resolved. Even Luther and Calvin make irrational statements: 
‘these great teachers’, Coleridge observes, ‘as soon as they approach the present subject, 
as if wrought upon by a spell, straightway become children themselves’.97 The word 
‘spell’ for Coleridge signifies the suspension of rational volition. Here, she indicates that 
Luther and Calvin express views on ‘faith in babes’ that will not bear critical analysis. 
Ultimately, Coleridge’s critique of infant baptismal regeneration rests on two principles: 
first, that ‘the will [is] converted’ and ‘the heart purified’ through ‘the subordinate 
ministrative agency of the understanding’; second, that the salvation of all who die in 
infancy is secured by God’s infinite grace.98 
 
Coleridge’s Polemical Style 
Coleridge’s conceptualization of regeneration is governed by her tenet that ‘spiritual life 
can only be initiated by an intellectual process’. She supports the Kantian rationale of 
her theology by reference to scripture. In all accounts of conversion in the New 
Testament, she contends, reason is the vital medium of spiritual influence, not the ritual 
of baptism. Coleridge refers to the account, in Acts of the Apostles 16. 23 – 34, of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 OR 1843, II, p. 484 n, p. 482, p. 483. 
96 Waldegrave, p. 224. 
97 OR 1843, II, p. 484 n, p. 485 n. 
98 OR 1848, II, p. 70. 
	   79	  
conversion of ‘the Keeper of the prison’ in Philippi, where the Apostles Paul and Silas 
were in custody.99 STC had cited this episode in Aids to Reflection, arguing that the 
baptism of the jailor ‘and all his [h]ousehold’ did not substantiate the practice of infant 
baptism in Apostolic times.100 Newman also refers to the conversion of the jailor in 
Lectures on Justification: ‘[t]he words, “Believe, and thou shalt be saved”, do not 
‘negat[e] the use of a divine instrument, such as Baptism, as intervening between faith 
and its reward’. He adds that ‘[t]he jailor to whom [these words] were spoken was 
baptized forthwith’.101  
 Coleridge analyses the process of the jailor’s conversion. She suggests that he 
had already engaged with the Apostles’ preaching before his impulse for conversion. His 
‘terror’ at the earthquake ‘could not have led to a search after spiritual safety, had it not 
been for its connexion with that evangelical teaching, on account of which Paul and Silas 
were now in custody’. The jailor’s intellectual reception of the Gospel had already 
begun. His cognitive apprehension of some elements of the Apostles’ teaching, however 
vague, had prepared his mind for conversion. Furthermore, when he asked the Apostles 
what he must do to be saved, he was not baptized at once on the basis of ‘his shapeless 
emotions and indefinite religious apprehensions’. The Apostles require that the jailor 
should ‘believe’, and they give him –‘and unto all that were in his house’ – instruction 
to promote belief. In effect, Coleridge contends, the Apostles ‘set orthodox doctrine 
before his mind as a preparation for baptism’. The essential feature of this narrative, 
then, is the jailor’s active cognitive response to the Apostles’ teaching. Coleridge’s 
account of this interaction refutes W. E. Gladstone’s Tractarian position in Church 
Principles Considered in Their Results (1840), which she cites in a footnote: ‘“[i]t is 
rationalistic to maintain that intellectual apprehension is a necessary or invariable 
precondition of spiritual agency upon the soul.”’102 On the contrary, Coleridge’s 
interpretation of the jailor’s conversion emphasizes ‘intellectual apprehension’. She 
shows that his understanding of Christian doctrine was actively engaged before his 
baptism.  
 Coleridge’s dismissal of a Tractarian version of the episode is compellingly 
dramatic: 
 
It is strange indeed that some suppose the jailor to have inquired respecting his 
temporal safety alone. What! must he not have known that his prisoners 
professed to teach the way of salvation; and could they show him any other than 
the spiritual way, and does not their answer imply that he inquired after that 
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way; and is it not declared that, before the men of God departed, he believed in 
God with all his house? Believed in God. They were not atheists before, surely? 
But now they believed, explicitly believed, in the Lord Jesus, and that God had 
raised him from the dead, and doubtless also in remission of sins and true 
righteousness through the empowerment of the Spirit.103 
 
Coleridge’s prose has the dramatic energy of the speaking voice. It is dialogic in its tone 
of direct challenge to a silent addressee. Such zestful rhetoric might have been written 
for animated delivery from a pulpit. The passage opens with its hint of irony in the 
intensifying adverb ‘indeed’ – ‘strange indeed’ – anticipating the ridiculing exclamation 
with which the sentence ends. The rhetorical ‘What!’ jolts the reader with its shock of 
pretended incredulity. The passage proceeds with four rhetorical questions, which 
succeed one upon another in the same sentence. The last three clauses each start with 
‘and’, intensifying the cumulative syntactic effect, enforcing the sense that the jailor’s 
question was quite plainly spiritual. At the end of the first clause, Coleridge slows the 
pace of her words by italicizing ‘way of salvation’, quoted from Acts 16. 16, to heighten 
the significance of the phrase. The final clause of the sentence is given dramatic 
emphasis by the semi-colon that precedes it. The insistent repetition of ‘Believed in 
God’, in a single isolated phrase, again slows the pace of the passage to create dramatic 
tension. Its solemnity is then punctured by terse irony that borders on sarcasm: ‘[t]hey 
were not atheists before, surely?’ The rhetorical energy of the final sentence, in its 
syntactical and phonic qualities, maintains the sense that we might be reading the script 
of a sermon. The sentence begins colloquially with the terse conjunction ‘but’, which 
sets a brusquely emphatic tone. The note of authorial assurance is amplified by the 
repetition of ‘believed’ in the intensifying parenthetical phrase, ‘explicitly believed’. 
That the jailor and his family now have faith, specifically and exclusively in Christ, is 
emphasized by a reduction in tempo, signified by the key phrases in italics. ‘[D]oubtless 
also’ heightens the positive mood of the final clause as it develops to a climactic 
conclusion in the plosive alliterative consonants of ‘empowerment of the Spirit’. The 
polysyllabic ‘empowerment’, with its stress on the second syllable, clinches the 
sentence’s mood of restrainedly exultant triumph. It is surprising that E. L. Griggs 
describes ‘On Rationalism’ as ‘dry and unreadable’, even while he acknowledges its 
‘intellectual power’.104 On the contrary, the essay’s prose is rhetorically dynamic and, in 
its dramatic qualities, anticipates the dialogic modes of Coleridge’s later work. 
 Through her theological writings, Coleridge evolves a code of conduct for 
religious polemic. This becomes increasingly explicit in her writings from 1848 
onwards. She believes that opponents’ views should be represented accurately and fairly 
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so that the polemical process is one of dialogue rather than confrontational self-
promotion. Admittedly, her assault against the Oxford theologians’ authoritarianism is 
rhetorically vehement. Nonetheless, Coleridge avoids the emotive language of personal 
attack practised by some other opponents of Tractarianism. The leading Evangelical 
journal, The Christian Observer, launched in 1836 an uncompromising philippic against 
Pusey, occasioned by his Tracts on baptism. Pusey is a ‘most ignorant Popish fanatic’, 
according to The Christian Observer: he promotes ‘absurdity’ and ‘irrational 
fanaticism’; his writings are ‘intellectual drivelling’.105 Ironically, given the repetitive 
crudity of such insults, Chadwick characterizes The Christian Observer as the more 
charitable and moderate of the two Evangelical journals. The other, the Record, attacks 
Pusey’s ‘great ignorance of Scripture’ and ‘Popish feeling and superstition’.106 When 
Coleridge deploys emotive satirical imagery, she does so sparingly in order to maximize 
its effect. Unlike The Christian Observer, her target is a doctrine, not the individual who 
promotes that doctrine. She attacks the Tractarian principle, derived from ‘the Ancient 
Church’, that ‘a spiritual change [is] wrought in the human soul without a spiritual act of 
him that is to be changed’. This tenet ‘embodies [the] virus of superstition’, she 
contends, ‘which creeps like a cancer over the body of the Christian’s faith, and, if 
uncounteracted, must inevitably reduce it from an animated frame to a lifeless and 
corrupting mass’.107 Coleridge’s polysyllabic coinage, ‘uncounteracted’, followed by 
‘inevitably’, slows the sentence to focus attention on the images of degeneration and 
death in the preceding and following clauses. Her trope of ‘superstition’ as a ‘virus’ has 
greater impact than the Record’s predictable ‘Popish […] superstition’. She 
depersonalizes the issue, unlike The Christian Observer’s branding Pusey himself as a 
‘fanatic’.108 Her figurative language has a vigour beyond the reach of the clichéd 
personal insults and well-worn tags of the sectarian journals. Coleridge’s characteristic 
approach is to critique Tractarianism in precise conceptual terms and to employ a 
method of academic analysis, as in her discussion of the theology of the ancient church. 
She presents an alternative model of religious writing to the prevailing mode in which, 
according to Turner, ‘polemicists claimed exclusive truth for their own positions and 
substituted name-calling for actual recognition of other points of view’.109 
 When Coleridge uses a sectarian term, she does so to define a theological 
position.  For example, when she says, ‘Taylor was Romish on one side of his mind; 
Hooker had no Romish side, in his view of grace’, she is arguing a precise conceptual 
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distinction.110 Even Edward Bickersteth, a respected Evangelical, who abstains from 
personal criticism, employs emotive sectarian language: the Oxford theology, he 
contends, promotes ‘the very principles of popery’ which ‘open’ a ‘door to the land of 
darkness’.111 Coleridge avoids the label ‘Puseyite’ for exponents of the Oxford 
Movement. The term, which had ‘the quality of offensive slang’, according to Nockles, 
was widely used by the early 1840s. Coleridge’s avoidance of ‘Puseyite’ (and 
‘Puseyism’) reflects her authorial ethic of civil impersonality. Coleridge eschews other 
current pejorative labels, such as ‘Neomaniacs’, and Bishop Bloomfield’s satirical 
‘Newmania’. Nor does she use ‘Tractarian’, ‘first coined’ in 1839, ‘which soon became 
the most widely employed [term] as a description of followers of the Oxford 
Movement’. ‘Tractarian’ was the favoured epithet of ‘friends of the Movement’, which 
is the most likely reason why Coleridge, as independent critic, avoids it.112  In ‘On 
Rationalism’, Coleridge applies the epithets ‘Anglo-Catholics’ and ‘Anglican Anti-
protestants’ to adherents of the Oxford Movement.113 ‘Anglo-Catholic’, since the 
seventeenth-century a neutral term ‘for the Church of England as a whole’, was 
increasingly applied to the Oxford theology.114 Coleridge describes as Anglo-Catholics 
those who adhere to Newman’s sacramental doctrine. Coleridge coins her variation, 
‘Anglican Anti-protestants’, to emphasize contexts that strike at the basis of the 
Reformation; for example, where she envisages purgatory as a logical outcome of 
Oxford doctrine. 
 Coleridge becomes increasingly committed to a dialogic ethic in her religious 
writing. Her approach is both forthright and respectful. She expresses a ‘keen sense’ of 
‘the great services’ Newman ‘has rendered to the cause of truth’, and acknowledges the 
presence of ‘piety, genius and learning’ in his work. Yet, Newman’s ability and 
influence make it her duty to ‘bring forward what [she] consider[s] irreconcilable with 
truth in his teaching’. Coleridge’s commitment to religious ‘truth’ requires her to present 
Newman’s ideas with impartial precision. There must be no ‘unfairness’, nor ‘a single 
accusatory word’ which exceeds strict accuracy.115 This ethical imperative is reflected in 
her evolving dialogic methodology, in which she seeks to represent doctrines with she 
disagrees in their exponents’ own words. In a lengthy footnote, Coleridge quotes two 
key paragraphs from ‘Lecture X’ of Lectures on Justification, in which Newman argues 
that ‘Baptism is the primary instrument’ of justification. She ‘give[s] to the doctrine 
[she] opposes the utmost advantage’, she explains, ‘by citing in illustration of it, the 
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language of the author of Lectures on Justification’.116 It is significant that Coleridge 
depersonalizes the disagreement: she refers to herself as opposing the ‘doctrine’ not the 
‘author’. In ‘On Rationalism’, the citation of others’ views takes place predominantly in 
the footnotes. When Griggs complains that Coleridge’s essay ‘is filled with numerous 
footnotes’, he misses two key points.117 First, the inclusion of lengthy footnotes is a 
common feature of theological works of the period. Second, Coleridge’s use of footnotes 
reflects her dialogic ethic. She conceives of theological writing as participation in a 
debate, a textual dialogue. In ‘On Rationalism’, footnotes are a means of incorporating 
multiple voices into the text. In her later works, Coleridge experiments with different 
forms of dialogic writing, which will be discussed in chapters 4 and 5. 
  
The 1848 Text: Coleridge’s Development of her Argument. 
Coleridge regards ‘bad arrangement’ as her literary weakness, as it had been for STC. 
Professionally experienced in the business of revision and redrafting, as a result of 
Southey’s early mentoring, Coleridge seeks ‘to cast [the essay] anew’ for the sixth 
edition of Aids to Reflection, and writes in July 1847 of working on ‘a better 
arrangement’. Unfortunately, the restructured version, ‘reduc[ed] […] to more complete 
symmetry’, would have to be deferred ‘till a future edition’, because publisher Pickering 
was pressing her to submit the revised second volume. Nor would he re-issue the first 
volume separately. The 1843 edition of Aids to Reflection was selling well within a 
month of its publication. Pickering no doubt expected the sixth edition to be an equally 
marketable commodity. Not surprisingly, therefore, ‘[t]he new edition of the Aids was 
called for’, Coleridge explains, ‘as soon as ever [she] had finished the work of editing 
the Biographia’. Pickering promised that she ‘might do all [she] wished for a future 
edition’.118 Nonetheless, Coleridge’s revisions for the 1848 edition were more extensive 
than she implies, and contribute significantly to the text’s clarity and cohesion. She 
divides the essay into ten separate chapters, and gives each a heading. At the header of 
each page is a word or phrase indicating its topic. Some footnotes have been cut or 
abbreviated. At the end of her first chapter, Coleridge adds three paragraphs in which 
she recapitulates the main direction of her argument. She concludes the chapter with a 
confident summative challenge: ‘[s]hew me a single instance in which the will has been 
converted and the heart purified, apart from the subordinate ministrative agency of the 
understanding, and I will yield the point for which I contend in this essay’. Just short of 
three-quarters of the way through ‘On Rationalism’, Coleridge adds six and a half pages 
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to make a sixth chapter of ten pages. She strengthens her argument against the mystic 
theory of sacraments by contrasting the ‘[l]anguage of Bishop Taylor and of Hooker on 
Infant Regeneration’. Coleridge critiques Taylor’s position that only passivity and 
‘negative qualifications’ are ‘required’ of the individual in the reception of ‘grace’. He 
overlooks that the ‘non-resistance’ to the Holy Spirit exemplified in infants involves for 
an adult, who has ‘the opportunity of sinning, […] an energy […] of the intensest kind’. 
Hooker’s Calvinist ‘scheme’ is not without ‘flaw’, but conceives of regeneration as a 
renewal of the ‘mind and affections’ through ‘a course of action’: he opposes the notion 
of ‘a mystic passive holiness, obtained during a ritual moment’. Coleridge concludes this 
historical comparison by referring to contemporary Anglo-Catholics who confuse ‘the 
regeneration of the will with baptismal regeneration’.119 There is a further change 
between the 1843 and 1848 versions: Coleridge rewrites in its entirety a passage that 
becomes her penultimate chapter.  
          The 1843 version has a passage of twelve pages, in which Coleridge dismisses 
the notion that Tractarian views of baptism are validated by ‘any clear Apostolic 
tradition’. She examines what she considers to be a confusion between the terms 
‘regeneration’ and ‘Baptism’ in the Tractarian interpretation of the Bible: ‘[b]aptism is 
identified with regeneration in the language of Scripture: therefore men have forcibly 
accommodated regeneration to Baptism.’ This is ‘absurd’, Coleridge contends: it would 
be equivalent to ‘insist[ing] […] that health is nothing more than what comes with and 
by medicine, just because ‘medicine may, by a figure be called health.’ The conceptual 
precision of Coleridge’s language is characteristic. However, in revisiting this section 
while preparing the 1848 version, she clearly felt that her dismissal of the Apostolic 
tradition should be developed. She had presented an assumption in the 1843 version: ‘I 
believe it would be found on careful and impartial inquiry, that the Anti-protestant view 
of justification […] was unknown to the primitive Christians, those who lived in and 
nearest to the Apostolic times’.120 Given the importance of the early centuries of 
Christianity in Newman’s theology, Coleridge recognized that merely to state her belief 
was inadequate. As Nockles explains: ‘[a] ntiquity became an absolute standard and final 
court of appeal’ for the Tractarians on all matters of doctrine.121 Because of the centrality 
of the issue, Coleridge undertakes that ‘impartial inquiry’ into the Early Church’s 
teachings on justification, which she mentions hypothetically in 1843.  
         There is a recurring misconception, Coleridge argues, which ‘runs through the 
“Anglo-Catholic” expositions of […] Scriptural views of Baptism’. Tractarian writers 
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confuse ‘spiritual gifts bestowed upon men in order to [establish] the Visible Church 
with those that pertain to individual salvation’.122 Swiss theologian Huldrych Zwingli 
promoted this view in the sixteenth century. He maintained that baptism ‘represents the 
public declaration that a child is a member of the household of God’, and is equivalent to 
the Jewish rite of circumcision.123 STC adopts Zwingli’s position in Aids to Reflection: 
he contends that ‘one of the purposes of Baptism’ in Apostolic times was to make ‘it 
publicly manifest […] what Individuals were to be regarded  […] as belonging to the 
visible Community of Christians’.124 In a sentence added to the 1848 text, Coleridge 
reapplies this point in her revision of Tractarianism’s interpretation of Mark 16. 16. 
According to this verse, she asserts, ‘[t]o be baptized, in those days, meant to become a 
Christian’. The ‘Anglo-Catholic’ School misconstrues a public ritual intended as a sign 
of Church membership as an immediate receipt of spiritual grace.125  
 In her critical analysis of the Church Fathers’ teachings on baptism, Coleridge 
refers to the early eighteenth-century theologian, Daniel Waterland, whose procedure 
exemplifies what ‘all revivers of ancient teaching’ must undertake: he ‘readjust[s] 
Patrician doctrine and piece[s] out the mind of one Father with that of another, the mind 
of the earlier Fathers with the mind of the later ones’. The ‘bare primitive doctrine of 
baptism’ is not retrievable; what we ‘have instead’, Coleridge maintains, is an 
inconsistent construct based on ‘later’ developments of ‘the Medieval’ version of 
antiquarian doctrine.126 Her conclusion on the question of the Church Fathers, in the 
1848 version of her essay, is based on ten pages of close comparative analysis: 
 
Thus it is with the earliest Christian writers, as far as I have examined. They 
either identify baptism with the Christian life, after St. Paul, or they are guided 
by the history in the Acts, to suppose it to be a mere preparation of the soul for 
the reception of grace by Confirmation; or they are led by a literal interpretation 
of John 3. 5, and Titus 3. 5, to look upon water applied outwardly to the body as 
a seal, and the naming of the Holy Trinity as an amulet, which carry with them, 
as by charm, a specific virtue to keep off evil sprits, and endue the soul with a 
claim to everlasting life, apart from any sacramental change whatsoever. 
 
With its imagery of primitive superstition – ‘seal’, ‘amulet’, ‘charm’, ‘evil spirits’ – the 
passage prepares the way for Coleridge’s rejection of antiquarian doctrines. According 
to her research, the Church Fathers do not write with such apostolic authority as 
Tractarians maintain. The Fathers ‘talk’ on the doctrine of baptism, ‘like men 
conjecturing, reasoning, inferring, concluding, or as if they were paraphrasing the 
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written word; not like men reporting Apostolic instructions given viva voce, or handing 
down a definite apostolic tradition’.127 Coleridge finds the Church Fathers’ discourse to 
be tentative and unstable. Yet, the Tractarians confer upon it the status of what Bakhtin 
calls ‘authoritative discourse’, which ‘demands […] unconditional allegiance’.128  
 Coleridge then explodes in outrage, refusing blind adherence to a flawed and 
primitive authority: ‘[w]hy are we bound to their guesses? Why must we accept their 
commentaries on Scripture? Why may we not rather judge, as they did, according to the 
best of our ability, by the Bible?’129 In this stirring tricolon, ‘we’ carries compelling 
emphasis. She condemns the Tractarian appeal to the ‘authoritative discourse’ of the 
Church Fathers as a tactic to assert priestly power. A Bakhtinian analysis of Coleridge 
can highlight the radical nature of her critique of the Tractarians’ version of the Church 
Fathers. As Pam Morris observes, Bakhtin cites ‘religious, political, moral discourse, 
[and] the word of a father’ as examples of ‘the authoritative word’. Bakhtin defines 
‘authoritative discourse’ as ‘hieratic’, associating it with sacerdotal mastery; he also calls 
it ‘the word of the fathers’.130 Although Coleridge is historically specific in her rejection 
of the Church Fathers, Bakhtin’s terminology can shed light on her rejection of male 
authority enshrined in a religious tradition. 
 
Coleridge’s Defence of Liberty 
In Tract 73, Newman associates the exercise of individual reason with sins of pride and 
disobedience: a ‘desire of judging for oneself is discernible in the original fall of 
man’.131 Coleridge defends ‘reason and conscience’ against Tractarianism’s ‘exclusive 
view of authority’. Its appeal to ‘external’ authority ‘mystif[ies] and obscure[s] the 
foundations whereon all religious faith must ultimately rest’, and suppresses liberty of 
thought.132 Like Milton, in his renowned pamphlet of 1660, The Ready and Easy Way To 
Establish a Free Commonwealth, in which he asserts republican and Protestant freedom 
against the imminent repression of the Restoration, Coleridge seeks to defend ‘spiritual 
[…] liberty’ and ‘liberty of conscience’.133 She condemns Tractarianism as a ‘thought-
stifling doctrine’: its exponents, she fears, seek to impose their dogma and suppress 
opposition.134 As powerful preachers and writers, privileged by university and 
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ecclesiastical status, they have formidable media of influence at their disposal. Eminent 
evangelical James Stephens shares Coleridge’s apprehensions: ‘do not allow your 
Oxford friends to subjugate your understanding to their dreams’, he warns Samuel 
Wilberforce in 1837.135 
 Coleridge attacks Tractarianism for arrogance and intolerance: the Tractarian 
has ‘persuaded himself’ that God’s ‘teaching’ is ‘much better known to him than to other 
men’. Having closed his own mind to ‘reason and conscience’, he thinks it his duty to 
prevent others from exercising theirs.136 A key feature of Bakhtin’s theory of the 
‘authoritative word’, Pam Morris remarks, is that it ‘disallow[s] any dialogic 
interaction’.137 In his ‘Notes Made in 1970 and 1971’, Bakhtin defines ‘the authoritarian 
word’ as ‘inert’: it ‘retards and freezes thought’, and ‘withdraws from dialogue’.138 To 
read ‘On Rationalism’ with Bakhtin’s formulation in mind highlights the severity of 
Coleridge’s critique of Tractarianism. The Tractarian, Coleridge contends, remains aloof 
from opponents, and refuses to engage in dialogue: he ‘shrink[s] from contact with them 
or interchange of thought’. Bakhtin’s term ‘authoritarian’ highlights the political 
inflection of Coleridge’s critique: she envisages that a church ruled by Tractarians will 
‘silence’ its opponents. Those who will not submit to ‘correct[ion]’ will be condemned 
as ‘rebels against God’.139 Froude established Tractarianism’s oppressive character in an 
article of 1834, ‘On Shunning heretics and evil livers’. Because ‘the re-introduction of 
ritualized ecclesiastical excommunication’ was not realistically achievable, Froude 
‘advocated informal social ostracism of notorious “evil livers and professed heretics”’.140  
 In her condemnation of Tractarianism’s dictatorial intolerance, Coleridge also 
has in mind its anti-democratic principle of reserve, promoted in particular by Newman’s 
friend and colleague, Isaac Williams. In Tract 80, On Reserve in Communicating 
Religious Knowledge (1837), Williams argued ‘that the ready availability of religious 
knowledge in the contemporary world should be directly curtailed through the exercise 
of reserve in Christian teaching’. Williams held that the Evangelicals’ emphasis on the 
Atonement and the infinitude of God’s mercy obscured the necessity of Christian 
obedience and humility. Therefore, as Turner explains, ‘clergy should […] communicate 
knowledge of Gospel truth only as a person grew in obedience, personal holiness, and 
accompanying humility’.141 This directly opposes Coleridge’s inclusive theology, in 
which reason, the light through which God is apprehended, is present in all minds. She 
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exhorts her readers, therefore, to mobilize against the divisive and elitist Tractarians: 
‘[l]et us contend against them the more earnestly the more we value peace and concord’. 
Conceptually, their system is ‘founded on subtle error and confusion of thought’. 
Institutionally, it is an anti-democratic political construct, ‘sustained by the powers of 
this world’, and exploiting human weakness: ‘pride, prejudice, mental indolence, or 
inexpertness, fear of losing caste among the reputed pious and orthodox, or other such 
allies’.142 
 Coleridge warns her reader not to be deceived by the simple, unembellished 
elegance with which the Tractarians advance their dogma. She ranks Newman with 
Carlyle and Dickens as one of ‘the most striking writers of the day’. This is why his 
work poses an immediate threat to religious liberty. Newman the literary artist renders 
Newman the theologian all the more dangerous: Tractarian ‘false’ doctrines are with 
‘tenderness enforced’.143 Coleridge’s Orwellian oxymoron suggests a coercive agenda 
beneath stylistic polish. It carries also an undertone of sexual violence, as does her trope 
in ‘Extracts’, in which she describes her aim as being ‘to guard a spiritual faith from 
violation’.144 Coleridge’s unsettling oxymoron evokes one in Paradise Lost associated 
with Satan’s disordered sexuality. Satan, spying on Eve, is momentarily ‘with rapine 
sweet bereaved’ of ‘[h]is fierceness’ by her pure beauty. Yet, he is impelled to proceed 
with his corruption of her by the ‘fierce desire’ of sexual frustration. Eve’s beauty 
‘tortures him now more, the more he sees | Of pleasure not for him ordained’.145 The 
sexual associations of Coleridge’s oxymoron, ‘with tenderness enforced’, anticipate her 
view that Newman’s Loss and Gain is characterized by misogynistic aggression. The 
novel also ‘confirm[s]’ her ‘opinion that it is a hard thing for an Ascetic not to have an 
impure imagination’.146 She implies that the self-repressive tendencies of Tractarianism, 
such as Newman’s commitment to monastic celibacy, are prejudicial to psychological 
health. Her oxymoron hints that Tractarianism’s austere authoritarianism is associated 
with sexual tension. By this reading, Newman’s strict monasticism, at odds with the 
Victorian ethic of family life, is related to the coldly arrogant rejection of sociability that 
Coleridge perceives in Tractarianism: its principles, she asserts, are ‘in their own nature 
[…] especially intolerant, supercilious and estranging’.147  
 In the fervent vigour of her closing pages, Coleridge displays a Miltonic 
commitment to her Protestant cause. Like Milton in 1660, Coleridge in 1843 defends 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 OR 1843, II, p. 546. Coleridge’s emphasis. 
143 Criticism, p. 155. OR 1843, II, p. 546. Coleridge’s emphasis. 
144 ‘Extracts’, p. 256. 
145 John Milton, Paradise Lost, The Poems of John Milton, ed. by John Carey and Alistair Fowler 
(London: Longmans, 1968), pp. 419-1060 (p. 884, p. 642, p. 884). IX. 461-462; IV. 509; IX. 469-470. 
146 Criticism, p. 176. 
147 OR 1843, II, p. 546. 
	   89	  
‘liberty of conscience’ to determine ‘matters of religion’ according to ‘the Scriptures’. 
Such ‘liberty’, Milton asserts, ‘above all […] things ought to be to all men dearest and 
most precious’. Coleridge’s passionate commitment to this principle is the driving force 
of her essay. In 1802, Wordsworth had invoked the Miltonic spirit to restore ‘freedom’ 
to ‘England’. Coleridge, Wordsworth’s ‘child in heart’, takes on this challenge forty 
years later. She defends ‘Christian liberty’ from the ‘deadness and deathliness of 
authoritarian dogma.148 
 
Methodism: ‘An Agency permitted by God in the Restoration of our Church’ 
Coleridge rejects Tractarianism on three interrelated grounds: its conceptual 
contradictions; its promotion of mystery and superstition; its elitist and repressive 
authoritarianism. She rejects doctrines that ‘have nothing but [their] antiquity to 
recommend [them] to our veneration’.149 By contrast, she regards Methodism as a source 
of spiritual vitality, despite some doctrinal limitations. Coleridge uses the apt image of a 
worn chain with loose links to illustrate her attitude of religious inclusion:  
 
A chain in which two or three links are loosened is not like one in which all are 
broken, so that the whole is actually falling to pieces. It will probably last out the 
wearer’s time; it may be repaired at comparatively small expense and trouble; it 
has not lost all its beauty or all its utility, though, til repaired, it will not bear 
tight straining. 
 
An error or omission in one aspect of a creed does not invalidate the whole, Coleridge 
maintains. A scheme of partial truth may yet have a role in the progress of Christian 
faith. The Methodists, for example, have ‘misunderst[ood] sacraments’, but this 
tendency ‘has no connexion with rationalism’. On the contrary, Coleridge argues, it is 
easy to ‘los[e] sight of sacraments, because they are far less distinctly marked in the 
Bible, as instruments of the Spirit, than the preaching of the word’. She reveals her 
Protestant sympathies for Methodism, which, if ‘wanting some points of catholic truth’, 
has, notwithstanding, made a contribution to the spiritual development of the established 
church. She observes that even Pusey has described‘“Wesleyanism”’ as ‘“an agency 
permitted by God in the restoration of our church”’.150 
 Coleridge’s sympathy for Methodism reflects the influence of her early mentor, 
Uncle Southey. His appreciative Life of Wesley and the rise and progress of Methodism 
was published in 1820, during Coleridge’s literary apprenticeship. In concluding his 
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Life, Southey describes John Wesley as ‘a man of great views, great energy, and great 
virtues’, who ‘awakened a zealous spirit, not only in his own community, but in a 
Church which needed something to quicken it’; this is ‘acknowledged by the members 
of that Church itself’. While Southey regrets that Methodism ‘spread superstition as well 
as piety’, he emphasizes its immense contribution to individual lives and individual 
salvation: ‘[i]n its immediate effects, the powerful principle of religion which [Wesley] 
and his preachers diffused, has reclaimed many from a course of sin, has supported 
many in poverty, sickness, and affliction, and has imparted to many a triumphant joy in 
death’.151 Coleridge expresses her view of Methodism’s positive influence in a 
characteristic metaphor of water flowing through a channel: ‘there has been an influx of 
living waters into the channel of the church, in which before the stream was so low, so 
languid in its motion, though the freshening tide brought no small portion of impurity 
along with it’.152 Coleridge’s concise trope of ‘living water’, a ‘freshening tide’ that also 
carries some ‘impurity’, expresses a similar balance of admiration and reservation that 
the British Critic identified in its review of Southey’s Life: ‘[Southey] is not the 
advocate, or the accuser, but the historian of Methodism: his admiration of the piety, 
zeal, and perseverance which adorned the heroes of his tale, does not render him blind to 
their imperfections’.153 Like Southey, Coleridge values the qualities of ‘piety’ and ‘zeal’ 
that she perceives in Methodism. In particular, she defends its devotional integrity: ‘it is 
not a spirit of rationalism’, Coleridge contends, ‘but a spirit of faith which leads a man to 
embrace the fundamentals of Christianity from their accordance with the divine law 
written in his heart’. Ultimately, Coleridge’s discussion of Methodism is a plea for 
religious tolerance against the ‘estranging’ tendencies of Tractarianism. Rather than 
advancing ‘imputations’ of ‘rationalism’ against Methodists, their opponents should 
engage them in dialogue, in ‘a style exquisitely conscientious and tenderly charitable’.154 
 
Creative Tensions of Coleridge’s Authorship. 
Despite the fundamental religious differences between Coleridge and Newman, there are 
similarities in the ways in which they conceive of their authorship. In the 
‘Advertisement’ prefacing the first edition of Lectures on Justification, Newman 
suggests that his work is not itself definitive, but aims to lay the foundations for a more 
comprehensive production. He has delivered and published the lectures, he says, ‘in the 
hope that he might be thereby offering suggestions towards a work, which must be 
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uppermost in the mind of every true son of the English Church at this day, —the 
consolidation of a theological system, which […] may tend to inform, persuade, and 
absorb into itself religious minds’.155 The concept of a discrete, lesser work preparatory 
to a greater one, of which it will eventually form a small component, is distinctly 
Romantic. Wordsworth’s notion of The Prelude in relation to the projected Recluse is a 
case in point; or STC’s view of Aids to Reflection as preparatory to his projected ‘Opus 
Maximum’, which would, in the words of John Beer, develop ‘on a larger scale 
questions discussed’ in the earlier work, ‘along with others deliberately omitted there’. 
As STC puts it: he will discuss ‘the whole scheme of the Christian Faith’ in a future 
‘larger work’.156 Coleridge envisages ‘On Rationalism’ to be only her initial and limited 
assertion of ‘scientific divinity’ for the Victorian age.157 As Mill recognizes in 1840, the 
‘edifice’ of STC’s work is ‘still incomplete’; the available ‘fragments’, he implies, will 
require meticulous specialist reconstruction and mediation in order to become more fully 
‘intelligible’.158 The ‘edifice’ Coleridge has in mind, comprising her reconstruction, 
interpretation, and original development of STC’s ideas, would contribute to ‘the 
furtherance’ of religious truth in Victorian England; just as Newman, in his projected 
‘work’, would aim to ‘consolidat[e] a theological system’ for the ‘English Church’.159 
 From opposing religious viewpoints, Newman and Coleridge aim to contribute 
to a doctrinal renewal of the church. Both writers display the same paradox. According 
to Chadwick, ‘Newman, high Tory defender of the established church, had a streak of 
revolution’.160 Coleridge, similarly, connected by marriage to the High Tory branch of 
the Coleridge family, herself retaining elements of social conservatism, adopts radical 
positions. Her covert manipulation of gender conventions is potently subversive; her 
politico-religious sympathies are distinctly, and independently, liberal. Newman moves, 
meanwhile, with increasing inevitability from the late 1830s, towards Roman 
Catholicism; in doing so, he subverts the episcopal authority that he set out to defend. 
Both Coleridge and Newman, therefore, display characteristics opposed to traditional 
Toryism. In their combination of radical and reactionary tendencies, they are 
representative of their times: ‘the combination of conservatism and radicalism within the 
same individuals and movements’, according to historian George Herring, was ‘very 
much a characteristic feature of […] the period’; it was ‘at the root of much of [its] 
social reform’.161 Newman’s radical Roman Catholic leanings would ultimately destroy 
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Tractarianism’s politico-religious influence. The theology of spiritual regeneration, with 
its implications for religious liberty, would continue to be Coleridge’s main theme.  
 ‘On Rationalism’, for Coleridge, was the beginning of a major cultural project, 
driven by her mediation between STC’s works and her own politico-religious setting. As 
Gadamer maintains, ‘the course of events […] brings out new aspects of meaning in 
historical material. By being re-actualized in understanding, texts are drawn into a 
genuine course of events in exactly the same way as are events themselves’.162 Coleridge 
seeks to ‘re-actualize’ STC’s ‘texts’, and to draw his ideas into the ‘course’ of politico-
religious ‘events’ in early Victorian Britain. In doing so, she assumes a Miltonic voice in 
defence of religious liberty. Yet, the author of ‘On Rationalism’ is a barely visible 
producer of a composite text, which consists of multiple voices: principally, Kant’s, 
Newman’s, and STC’s. The multi-voiced nature of Coleridge’s essay anticipates her 
later development of dialogic forms of religious writing. In the independence of 
widowhood, Coleridge will continue to exploit the tensions of her authorship: between 
radical and reactionary inclinations; between authorial ambition and religious restraint; 
between editorial interpretation and dialogic creativity; between female authorship and 
the male genre of politico-theological polemic. In her next major undertaking, Coleridge 
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Chapter Three 
'Biographia 1847': Plagiarism, Literary Property and Dialogic Authorship.  
 
The Politics of Literary Property 
James Ferrier’s article, ‘The Plagiarisms of S.T. Coleridge’, published in March 1840 in 
Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine, would determine Sara Coleridge’s next literary 
project. At the time Ferrier’s article appeared, though, ‘On Rationalism’ was still three 
years from publication. In his opening sentences, Ferrier targets Coleridge and Henry’s 
editorial projects: 
 
Of late years the works of Mr. Coleridge, both in prose and verse, have been 
continually gaining upon public notice, and now enjoy, we believe, a pretty 
extensive popularity. Most of them have been reprinted since his death, and 
several volumes of posthumous miscellanies have been added to their number. 
 
John Stuart Mill thought that STC was far from popular in 1840, and Coleridge’s 
publisher remarked on the slow sales of Literary Remains. Ferrier’s hyperbole is a pre-
emptive strike at the re-publication of Biographia Literaria, which, he predicts, will 
soon be ‘re-issued […] by ‘some enterprising bookseller’.1 Ferrier placed the renovation 
of STC’s image under threat. Equally, if STC’s work were discredited, the conceptual 
basis of Coleridge’s original writings would be weakened. Editing Biographia Literaria 
would become the defining work of Coleridge’s literary career. In it, she subjects STC’s 
creative processes to critical scrutiny. At the same time, she encounters the politics of 
literary property in tension with these processes. 
 Changes to copyright law were under discussion at the time of Ferrier’s article. 
Wordsworth was a fervent campaigner for change. As Tilar J. Mazzeo observes, he 
viewed ‘literary borrowing’ as an act of ‘trespass upon a figurative “manor”’.2 
Wordsworth believed that the right of ownership to his work was conferred by its 
originality: by its having introduced ‘a new element into the intellectual universe’. 
Wordsworth’s concepts of original ‘genius’ and authorial ownership reverse the legal 
and aesthetic positions of the early eighteenth century.3 As Simon Stern contends: 
 
 [t]he 1710 Act of Anne prohibited piracy, but did not regulate imitations, 
 condensations, adaptations, anthologies, indexes and similar partial copies. The 
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 profusion of imitative texts testifies to a flourishing public domain that 
 depended on the absence of a copyright theory grounded in literary creativity.4 
 
In the late eighteenth century, an economic transition occurred, from ‘the limited 
patronage of an aristocratic society’ to ‘the democratic patronage of the market place’, 
and the emergence of the professional writer.5 The commercial developments in 
authorship, reinforced by the rise of ‘a Lockean discourse of progressive individualism’, 
involved an aesthetic and metaphysical shift, in which, according to Stern, there was a 
‘drift of aesthetic theories into the legal realm’.6 The valuing of tradition and imitation 
gave way to an aesthetic of originality.  
 In the 1830s and 1840s, wider economic and political issues governed debates 
about literary commerce. Wordsworth discovered this when he discussed Thomas Noon 
Talfourd’s Copyright Bill with Sir Robert Peel in July 1841, the month of a 
Conservative general election victory. Peel told Wordsworth that he was unable to 
declare approval for the Bill, for fear of ‘being charged with favouring monopoly if he 
gave it his support’.7 Peel had wider policy issues to balance. As incoming Prime 
Minister, he faced urgent economic and social problems: some industrial areas were 
suffering ‘severe distress’.8 Contrary to the ‘fervent’ Protectionist beliefs of ‘a large 
number of the Conservative MPs elected in 1841’, the new Conservative Prime Minister 
‘was in no doubt that [a] package of Free Trade reforms was necessary for the sake of 
social stability’.9 The choice for the destitute, in some industrial towns, might ‘soon be 
between starvation and crime’.10 Less than a year after Wordsworth had lobbied him in 
the cause of literary protectionism, Peel had implemented what T. A. Jenkins terms the 
‘Free Trade budget of 1842’.11 Peel believed that liberal economic policies would 
alleviate social distress. For him to support monopolistic protection for writers would 
have been inconsistent. Questions of copyright and authorship were located at decisive 
junctures of political tension. 
 Whig MP Thomas Macaulay opposed the protectionist provisions of the 1842 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Simon Stern, ‘Copyright, Originality and the Public Domain in Eighteenth Century England’, in 
Originality and Literary Property in the French and English Enlightenment, ed. by Reginald McGinnis 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), pp. 69-101 (p. 69). Stern’s emphasis. 
5 Martha Woodmansee, ‘The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions and the 
Emergence of the Author’, Eighteenth Century Studies, 17 (1984), (425-448) p. 433. 
6 Catherine Seville, Literary Copyright Reform in Early Victorian England (Cambridge University Press, 
1999; repr. 2011), p. 212. Stern, p. 70. 
7 William Wordsworth, The Letters of William and Dorothy Wordsworth, ed. by Ernest De Selincourt and 
others, 2nd edn, rev. by Alan G. Hill and others, 8 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976-1988), VII, Part 4 
(1982), p. 214. Wordsworth’s emphasis. 
8 Norman Gash, Peel (London: Longman, 1976), p. 212. 
9 Eric J. Evans, Sir Robert Peel: Statesmanship, Power and Party (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 46. T. A. 
Jenkins, Sir Robert Peel (London: Macmillan, 1999), p. 108. 
10 Gash, p. 225. 
11 Jenkins, p. 109. 
	   95	  
Copyright Bill: ‘[c]opyright is monopoly’, he declared in February 1841, ‘and produces 
all the effects which the general voice of mankind attributes to monopoly’. These effects, 
he adds, are ‘to make articles scarce, to make them dear, and to make them bad’. This 
opposes Wordsworth’s position that extension of copyright would promote high quality 
literature. Macaulay asserts that ‘a monopoly of books’ would produce the same ‘effect’ 
as that ‘produced by the East India Company’s monopoly of tea, or by Lord Essex’s 
monopoly of sweet wines’. Macaulay applies Benthamite terms to the proposal to extend 
copyright beyond an author’s lifetime: 
 
 It is good that authors should be remunerated; and the least exceptionable way of 
 remunerating them is by a monopoly. Yet monopoly is an evil. For the sake of 
 the good we submit to the evil; but the evil ought not to last a day longer than is 
 necessary for the purpose of securing the good.  
 
The term of copyright for an author’s descendants, Macaulay contends, must be 
‘determined in the way […] most conducive to the general good’.12 Wordsworth 
considered publishing a refutation of this speech, to which he referred as ‘that trash 
advanced by Macaulay’.13 The proposed extension of copyright impinged also upon 
Utilitarian principles in educational reform, and movements to extend the diffusion of 
knowledge for the working class. The British Medical Association presented a 
Benthamite petition against copyright reform in 1839:  
 
 your Petitioners consider every unnecessary restriction on […] literary 
 productions to be a great national injury, as tending to prevent that diffusion of 
 knowledge and general education so important in promoting habits of industry 
 and morality, and thereby increasing happiness and preventing crime.14  
 
Equally, evangelical organizations were concerned with the availability of cheap books 
in the cause of religious instruction. Like the stamp duty on newspapers – a tax on the 
‘dissemination of information’ – extension of copyright was regarded as politically 
repressive.15 
 The changing commercial conditions of authorship, in which the writer was 
dependent on the mass market rather than a patron, had been slow to gain recognition in 
law. In 1769, the Lord Chief Justice had supported an author’s legal rights of ownership, 
based on the Lockean principle that ‘an author should reap the pecuniary profit of his 
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own ingenuity and labour’. An appeal brought before the House of Lords in 1774, 
however, established opposing principles and ‘ended the perpetual common law right of 
literary property.’ The 1814 Copyright Act was a tentative response to the changing 
conditions of authorship. It made the writer’s lifespan the criterion in determining the 
length of copyright term, which it ‘set […] at twenty-eight years, or the author’s life if 
this was longer’.16 Wordsworth regarded the provisions of the 1814 Act as inadequate 
for authors who create works of genius. It protected second-rate producers of ephemeral 
popular matter, he believed, but failed to safeguard those who produce original works; 
who introduce ‘a new element into the intellectual universe’. Such works take time to be 
accepted into public consciousness. A ‘truly original poet’, Wordsworth argues, must 
‘creat[e] that taste by which [he] is to be relished’.17 Because original work gains 
recognition slowly, the law deals unjustly with the writer of genius. Wordsworth states 
his case in A Plea for Authors: 
 
 Failing impartial measure to dispense 
 To every suitor, Equity is lame; 
 And social Justice, stript of reverence 
 For natural rights, a mockery and a shame; 
 Law but a servile dupe of false pretence, 
 If, guarding grossest things from common claim 
 Now and for ever, She, to works that came 
 From mind and spirit, grudge a short-lived fence.18 
 
Wordsworth’s sonnet is one of two he wrote in May 1838 in support of Talfourd’s 
second Copyright Reform Bill. 
 Talfourd’s bill proposed an extension of the terms of the 1814 Copyright Act to 
the author’s life plus sixty years. In 1839, Wordsworth presented a petition to Parliament 
in support of this bill; he also lobbied former Whig Lord Chancellor, Lord Brougham, as 
well as Peel. Wordsworth was closely involved in Talfourd’s successive bills, which 
culminated in the moderated compromise of the 1842 Copyright Act. Seville refers to 
him as Talfourd’s ‘campaign manager’. As well as maintaining that an author owns his 
literary ‘oeuvre’ as a landowner possesses his estate, Wordsworth contended that an 
author, as a creator of literary commodities, is entitled to enjoy the material rewards of 
his work like any commercial producer, or purveyor of professional services. In his 
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parliamentary petition, Wordsworth refers to ‘the condition of distinguished authors’, in 
contrast to that of ‘men who rise to eminence in other professions or employments, 
whereby they not only acquire wealth, but […] obtain the means of forming family 
establishments in business, which enable them to provide at once for their 
descendants’.19 Concern for the inheritance of his descendants was central to 
Wordsworth’s desire for copyright reform.  
 In this chapter, I will discuss the ways in which Coleridge is influenced by 
Wordsworth and Southey in her attitudes to literary property. I will address the family 
and literary backgrounds to her editorship of Biographia Literaria. I will consider 
Hartley’s abortive attempt to write an introduction to Biographia, and the significance of 
the factors that inhibit him. The chapter will focus in detail on the first section of 
Coleridge’s ‘Introduction’ to Biographia 1847, thirty-eight pages in length, entitled ‘Mr. 
Coleridge’s obligations to Schelling, and the unfair view of the subject presented in 
Blackwood’s magazine’.20 The chapter will place Ferrier’s attack on STC, and 
Coleridge’s reply, in historical context. It will examine the grounds on which Ferrier 
attacks STC, and the methodology of Coleridge’s response. I will cover in detail her 
analysis of STC’s textual relationship with his sources, and her account of the 
psychological factors that resulted in his literary transgressions. The chapter will 
consider contradictions in Coleridge’s role as STC’s advocate, and will interrogate her 
analysis of STC’s text in relation to Romantic conceptions of authorship. I will conclude 
by considering the significance of Biographia 1847 in the context of Coleridge’s 
ongoing authorial development. 
 Coleridge, as executive manager of STC’s literary legacy from January 1843, 
shares Wordsworth’s position on the legal status of authorship. She contends that, as an 
author, STC had been treated unjustly. The Edinburgh Review had ‘declared’ his ‘works 
[…] worse than waste paper’: he had suffered emotionally and financially from such 
absence of critical ‘fair play’.21 Coleridge’s re-construction of STC’s ‘oeuvre’ would 
redress the posthumous balance: through her mediation, his ideas might exert at last their 
rightful influence on British culture. At the same time, Coleridge’s rebranded STC 
product would secure an income for her family and a dignified social position. 
Wordsworth thought that copyright reform would raise authors’ status: ‘the possession 
of Property tends to make any body of men more respectable, however high may be their 
claims to respect upon other considerations’.22 Along with financial stability, social 
respectability was important for Coleridge in helping her to secure her children’s future: 
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literary work became a prime duty of single parenthood. Her desire to exploit the 
commercial potential of STC’s work, and boost the family income and social status, 
reflects Wordsworth and Southey’s influence. 
 Southey was as committed an advocate of copyright reform as Wordsworth, 
though he was too ill to take any real part in the campaign in the run-up to the passing of 
the 1842 Act. In 1813, Southey had complained about a demand made by publishers, 
under consideration by a parliamentary select committee, to establish the term of 
copyright at a total of 28 years. In a letter to his friend, Charles Wynn MP, a member of 
the 1813 Select Committee on Copyright, Southey draws an analogy between the 
woodland of a landowner’s estate and an author’s literary productions: 
 
 My opinion is that literary property ought to be inheritable, like every other 
 property; and that a law which should allow you the use of the trees upon 
 your estate for eight-and-twenty years, and after that term make them over 
 to the Carpenters’ Company, would not be more unjust than that which takes 
 from me and my heirs the property of my literary labours, and gives it to the 
 Company of Booksellers.23 
 
Coleridge will go on to adopt the assumptions of Southey’s letter. In 1843, as manager 
of the STC legacy, she expresses concern that publishing the Fifth edition of Aids to 
Reflection in two volumes might jeopardize its sales: ‘I do not like to think that the 
estate – in which others are interested as well as myself, may lose by the enlarging of the 
publication’. Coleridge’s italicization of ‘estate’ reflects her commodification of literary 
property. She worries that her publisher is overlooking the likely ‘detriment to the sale of 
a book from a heavy price’, just as Wordsworth had worried, in 1814, that Longman’s 
price for The Excursion, ‘very high at two guineas,’ would detract from its sales.24 
Coleridge conceives of Aids to Reflection as the private property of STC’s heirs. As 
manager of the family ‘estate’, therefore, she must ensure that all who have a stake in 
that property should receive maximum income from its sales.  
 Southey may have influenced Coleridge to view a body of literary work as a 
potentially inheritable ‘estate’. In 1819, at the time of his mentoring her in translating 
Dobrizhoffer, Southey contributed an article on legal aspects of publishing to the 
Quarterly Review. He concluded by referring to the ‘descendants of Shakespeare and 
Milton’: ‘[t]o have placed’ them ‘in respectability and comfort […] simple justice was 
all that was required; only that they should have possessed the perpetual copyright of 
their ancestors’ works, only that they should not have been deprived of their proper 
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inheritance’.25 Wordsworth, meanwhile, had been concerned with matters of literary 
copyright since 1808. Coleridge had grown up in a setting in which the legal rights of 
authors were a pressing concern: two of her literary fathers were among the most 
vociferous and influential advocates of copyright reform. Their tenets about the legal 
status of authorship would underpin Coleridge’s project to establish the STC brand as a 
profitable Victorian commodity.      
                                                                                                                                             
Thomas De Quincey: the Puzzle of STC’s Plagiarisms                                                                                
In one crucial respect, the concept of literary property held by Southey and Wordsworth 
would threaten the integrity of the whole Coleridgean ‘estate’. When Ferrier charged 
STC with literary theft in March 1840, his indictment had the potential to destroy STC’s 
reputation irrecoverably. There is a tension, therefore, in Coleridge’s roles: on the one 
hand, as manager of the Coleridgean literary ‘estate’; on the other, as STC’s advocate in 
the plagiarism case. De Quincey had exposed STC as a plagiarist six and a half years 
before Ferrier’s charges. The Romantic concept of ‘culpable plagiarism’, Tilar J. 
Mazzeo contends, involves ‘borrowings that were simultaneously unacknowledged, 
unimproved, unfamiliar, and conscious’. The principle of ‘improvement’ was important: 
‘unimproved texts’, observes Mazzeo, were regarded as ‘monstrous, patchwork, or 
unassimilated’, lacking in stylistic cohesion. By contrast, ‘successful improvement’ of a 
source ‘justified any borrowing regardless of extent’. An author’s ‘mastery’ of sources 
was a legitimate criterion of literary achievement.26 
 Such criteria emerge in De Quincey’s discussion of STC’s plagiarisms in Tait’s 
Edinburgh Magazine between September 1834 and January 1835. De Quincey begins by 
mentioning three examples of plagiarism in STC’s poetry. These, he concludes, 
constitute acceptable uses of source material and are compatible with authorial 
originality. They ‘amount to nothing at all’ alongside the ‘real and palpable plagiarism’ 
he is about to expose. De Quincey indicates that STC’s reference to Schelling, in which 
he declares ‘his willingness to acknowledge himself indebted to so great a man’, left him 
unprepared for what was to follow. Having read STC’s preliminary remarks, De 
Quincey was astonished ‘to find that the entire essay, from the first word to the last, is a 
verbatim translation from Schelling’. This is ‘barefaced plagiarism’, De Quincey 
contends, because STC makes ‘no attempt in a single instance to appropriate 
[Schelling’s] paper by developing the arguments’.27 According to De Quincey, STC 
achieves neither philosophical nor literary control over his source. Biographia, therefore, 
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lacks intellectual and aesthetic cohesion; it fails to meet STC’s own definition of genius 
as ‘originality in intellectual construction’. At best, it may display ‘talent’, in STC’s 
terms, by its ‘facility of acquiring, arranging, and applying the stock furnished by 
others’.28 De Quincey, like Southey and Wordsworth, equates literary with material 
property, and conceives of ‘[i]ntellectual wealth’ as a commodity.29  
 Henry sought to address De Quincey’s allegations in his ‘Preface’ to the 1835 
edition of Table Talk, but lacked the expertise in German language and philosophy to 
answer the charge of plagiarism from Schelling. German scholar Julius Hare had 
published an initial reply to De Quincey in the British Magazine of January 1835. Hare 
gave Henry permission to include, in the ‘Preface’ to Table Talk, the section of his 
article relating to STC’s plagiarisms. Hare admits, at the outset, that De Quincey’s 
charges ‘are strictly, accurately, true’. He advances three main points of defence, all of 
which Coleridge will develop. First, the main appropriation from Schelling is so blatant 
that it cannot possibly have been a deliberate theft. Second, if STC’s work were to 
stimulate the desired interest in German philosophy, he was providing the means by 
which his appropriations would be detected. Third, STC’s plagiarisms are attributable to 
his ‘notoriously irretentive’ memory and haphazard notes.30 Coleridge develops Hare’s 
view of STC’s faulty memory in psychological depth. She analyzes his whole cognitive 
profile and compositional processes.  
 De Quincey’s articles were less damaging to STC’s intellectual reputation than 
Ferrier’s would be. Coleridge and Henry were upset by De Quincey’s harsh personal 
revelations, as much as by the exposure of the plagiarisms from Schelling. These private 
topics included a discussion of STC’s opium addiction and, more wounding still, a 
damning account of his family life and marriage. Nonetheless, De Quincey maintained 
his respect for STC’s abilities, and left his intellectual reputation essentially intact: ‘I 
will assert finally’, De Quincey declares, ‘that, after having read for thirty years in the 
same track as [STC] – that track in which few of any age will ever follow us […] and 
having thus discovered a large variety of trivial thefts, I do, nevertheless, most heartily 
believe him to have been as entirely original in all his capital pretensions, as any one 
man that ever has existed’.31 There is an apparent contradiction in De Quincey’s 
position.  Having revealed that STC had copied from Schelling verbatim, he asserts that 
he was ‘entirely original’. He contends, moreover, that the writer from whom STC had 
copied would be intellectually incapable of producing even an imitation of his work. De 
Quincey is not guilty of contradiction, though. His key phrase is ‘capital pretensions’, in 
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which he suggests that the essence of STC’s philosophy, when seen as a whole, will be 
revealed as fundamentally different from that of Schelling, of greater reach and depth. 
De Quincey’s implication is that the local plagiarisms are ‘trivial’ in the context of 
STC’s whole ‘oeuvre’.  
 Coleridge develops this point in her response to Ferrier’s article. Having 
admitted the existence of STC’s plagiarisms, she contends that there is no source in 
German philosophy for STC’s religious thought. Quoting De Quincey, she argues that, 
‘in the application of philosophical principles to the explanation, and […] support of the 
Catholic faith […] [STC] had a walk of his own in which “no German that ever 
breathed” has […] preceded or outstripped him’. She argues that STC’s ‘religious 
philosophy differed materially’ from Schelling’s thought. The ‘originality of [STC’s] 
authorship’ resides in ‘his design of applying philosophy to religion’. His ‘entire system 
of thought’, had he been able to ‘produce’ it, would have vindicated his originality.32 De 
Quincey is aware of the differences between STC’s metaphysics and Schelling’s, which 
make the plagiarisms a case for psychological investigation. Coleridge will pursue this 
line of analysis.   
                                                                                                 
Hartley Coleridge:‘The Chill’ of his Father’s ‘Shadow’ 
Following the plethora of articles immediately after STC’s death, particularly De 
Quincey’s, the Coleridge family had looked to Hartley to defend STC. De Quincey’s 
discussion of STC’s plagiarisms necessitated a new edition of Biographia, and Hartley 
was to write the introduction. Coleridge did not become involved at this stage: she 
declined to participate in what she called ‘a warfare of personalities’.33 The academic 
locus of Ferrier’s attack, though, would enable her to engage on textual and 
philosophical territory. In the event, Hartley began a tentative introduction to Biographia 
Literaria, but produced only a fragment. The haphazard pages that survive, published by 
Griggs in 1931, show Hartley’s reluctance to confront the questions that De Quincey 
raises about STC.  
 Hartley admits that STC failed to respect the boundaries of literary property: ‘he 
had no notion of meum and tuum’. Hartley relates this to STC’s tendency, in his recall of 
conversations, to confuse others’ words and ideas with his own. This deficiency, Hartley 
suggests, stemmed from STC’s poor judgment in personal relationships: ‘no man so 
egregiously overrated the understanding of those whom he loved.’ He had ‘a propensity 
to overunderstand’, to superimpose his own thoughts onto the words of others.34 This 
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kind of confusion, Hartley implies, underlies STC’s plagiarisms. Hartley does not take 
on the specific terms of De Quincey’s attack, though, and does not consider the question 
of STC’s textual and philosophical relationship with Schelling. Hartley anticipates some 
aspects of Coleridge’s analysis of STC, however. It is unlikely, though, that she ever saw 
Hartley’s writings on their father. He sent them neither to her, nor to any other member 
of the family. Hartley was keen, also, to create the impression that he had written more 
than was the case. Of all tasks that might have been imposed on Hartley, the essay on his 
father was least likely to succeed: it brought their broken relationship too sharply into 
focus. To adduce Bloomian terms, in engaging with Biographia Literaria, Hartley would 
‘feel the chill of being darkened by [his father’s] shadow’.35 
 Hartley was in a uniquely sensitive situation in confronting Biographia.  Having 
stayed with STC at Calne during his summer vacation of 1815, he was the only family 
member to have been present during its composition. Dictating to his amanuensis, John 
Morgan, STC ‘talked Biographia into life’ between ‘April and September 1815’, as 
biographer Richard Holmes puts it. Holmes thinks it likely that there was close literary 
interaction between father and son during that summer of viva voce composition; STC 
‘might have used’ Hartley as ‘a sounding board for his philosophical ideas’, he 
suggests.36 An element of collaboration is possible, given STC’s propensity for 
collaborative production in the 1790s. Having been in intimate contact with STC at the 
time of composition, Hartley seems to harbour a nagging unease about the extent to 
which STC might have relied on books, rather than his unreferenced notes, while 
dictating Biographia: ‘I do not think he had the works of Schelling by him’, Hartley says 
tentatively. ‘I do not think’ suggests some doubt. Hartley tells Henry that the plagiarism 
issue ‘perplexes and pains [him] deeply’. Having lived with STC through the summer of 
1815, Hartley was in a position to know whether Ferrier’s allegations were substantially 
true or false. He says that he refuses to ‘believe’ that STC ‘knowingly’ committed 
plagiarism, but fails to make a plain, unambiguous statement in STC’s defence. Hartley 
also explains to Henry that STC’s faculties were distorted by opium at the time he 
composed Biographia: the ‘infirmity of [STC’s] memory was […] increased at Calne 
from a cause to which it is painful to allude’.37 There lingers in Hartley’s hesitancy the 
unsettling possibility that opium temporarily distorted STC’s moral judgment.  
 Hartley’s difficulties are compounded by his principled rejection of STC’s 
metaphysics. STC is heuristic, ‘habituated to the Vast’; Hartley’s religious sensibility is 
attuned to the humble and domestic; to devotional contemplation of Scripture; to the 
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rhythms of parish worship, in which a local community follows in simple faith the 
liturgical traditions of its forebears.38 He ‘understand[s]’ STC’s ideas, Hartley assures 
Henry, but is unable to experience them as living realities: he ‘lack[s]’ STC’s ‘power’ to 
find ‘in the acts of the pure reason, a permanence —truth—beauty—and supersensuous 
life’.39 This is not an admission of incapacity, but a statement of intellectual and 
religious independence. Despite his stated reverence for STC, Hartley distrusts in his 
work the elevation of intellectual ‘power’ over religious experience. Like Newman in 
Tract 73, Hartley rejects the application of analytical methodology to religion.  
 Hartley’s fragmentary introduction also betrays a disabling depth of personal 
tension: the sense that he has been sacrificed to his father’s literary creativity. He refers 
to Christabel as his ‘[f]ather’s favourite child—the fondling of his genius’; it was, he 
adds, ‘the child in which he recognized himself most and finest’.40 It is significant that 
he refers to the poem in which he himself appears as a Romantic symbol of wild 
innocence, ‘A little Child, a limber Elf […] a faery Thing’, who is arbitrarily assaulted 
by his father’s ‘Words of unmeant Bitterness’.41 Implicit in Hartley’s reference to 
Christabel is the pressure and neglect he bore as the child of an emotionally unstable, 
mostly absentee father; for whom he was a poetic image, the focal point of a 
metaphysical ideal, or the subject of intense psychological scrutiny. He knows ‘what it is 
practically to be without a father’, Hartley observes in 1836: ‘[i]t is not easy to knit 
together links once broken’.42 Hartley is unable to repair the fractured ‘links’ with STC 
in a posthumous encounter with his work; he finds it impossible to restore the losses of 
the past. Coleridge attempts the ‘struggl[e]’ of this task.43 
 Hartley turns his back on Biographia; he ‘cannot say aught on the Metaphysical 
portion’ of the work, and desires his projected ‘essay’ to be ‘prefixed to the Poems’ 
instead. He does not wish ‘to discuss [STC’s] Philosophy at all’, and proposes to call his 
essay ‘Coleridge the Poet’. He attempts to pass the task of writing about Biographia to 
Derwent, suggesting that an introduction by his clerical brother would carry more 
authority: ‘[b]esides’, Hartley pleads, ‘Derwent was much more with STC in his latter 
years, is a much superior scholar, in every respect fitter for the task’.44 Derwent 
disagrees. In his ‘Preface’ to The Scriptural Character of the English Church, Derwent 
admits to having ‘shrunk from the […] responsibility’ of writing about STC, because he 
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lacks the ‘knowledge […] or talents’ necessary ‘for the office of [STC’s] interpreter’.45 
Only one family member possesses the necessary expertise, as ‘On Rationalism’ will 
demonstrate.  
 Hartley expresses a further reservation: Biographia contains ‘much respecting 
W. W. that I wish out’, he tells Henry.46 Hartley profoundly admires Wordsworth as 
poet, and does not wish to risk recalling past tensions between STC and Wordsworth. 
Coleridge, by contrast, will use her editorial notes in Volume 2 of Biographia to renew 
the Coleridgean appreciation of Wordsworth’s poetry. Her application of critical theory, 
and incisive practical criticism, will perform the reconciling role between her father and 
Wordsworth that is a theme of the whole edition, initiated at the outset in her Dedication 
to Wordsworth. She celebrates the collaborative origins of Wordsworth and STC’s work, 
when they ‘both together sought the Muse, in the lovely Vale of Stowey’, and refers to 
their shared vocation as ‘Teacher[s] of Wisdom’. The ‘dearest and proudest wish’ 
Coleridge can ‘form’ for STC’s ‘memory’, she says, is that he ‘may continue to be 
spoken of in connection with [Wordsworth], while [Wordsworth’s] writings become 
more and more fully and widely appreciated’. Coleridge’s crowning gesture of 
mediation is to acknowledge herself as Wordsworth’s ‘Child in heart’.47 She enacts the 
reconciliation that Hartley is unable to envisage. 
 Another factor connected with Wordsworth underlies Hartley’s reluctance to 
engage with Biographia.  Hartley participated in the campaign for copyright reform, and, 
in May 1839, submitted a petition in support of Talfourd’s Copyright Reform Bill. This 
was three months after Wordsworth had submitted his own petition. Hartley mentions in 
his petition that he is himself ‘engaged in the profession of literature’, but only ‘in the 
more popular and temporary branches’, and not those higher forms that would benefit 
from an extension of copyright provision. He pleads his case as eldest son of STC on 
behalf of himself, his siblings and his ‘aged’ mother, who ‘is dependent, in large 
measure, on the sale of [STC’s] works for those comforts and freedom from anxiety 
which her increasing years demand’. Hartley contends that the outcome of the Copyright 
Bill may affect the emergence of the whole corpus of STC’s work. STC ‘has left behind 
him many valuable manuscripts’, he explains, ‘the publication whereof may depend on 
the passing of the said bill for the protection of copyright’.48 The family project to bring 
STC’s unpublished writings before the public may cease to be viable, Hartley warns, 
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with the consequent loss to national culture. Talfourd published Hartley’s petition with 
Wordsworth’s and Carlyle’s, among others. Hartley’s high-profile statement for the 
protection of literary products, and the rights of authors and their descendants, would fit 
uncomfortably with the role of defender of STC the plagiarist. To uphold the 
Wordsworthian view of authors’ rights of possession, and to defend, or justify, STC’s 
verbatim appropriations from Schelling, would appear to be an impossible contradiction. 
As editor of Biographia Literaria, Coleridge takes on this challenge. 
 
Ferrier’s Case Against STC 
Ferrier invokes ‘truth and justice’ in his exposure of STC’s ‘very large and 
unacknowledged appropriations’ from Schelling. He pursues STC’s ‘plagiarisms to their 
true sources’, in order to reveal the fraud perpetrated in Biographia Literaria. Ferrier 
suggests that his article will assist ‘any future editor’ of Biographia. This is an ironic 
thrust against the editors of STC’s Literary Remains, in the first volume of which Ferrier 
identifies further unattributed passages copied verbatim from Schelling. Ferrier implies 
that the family editors are either ignorant of STC’s thefts, or are posthumous 
accomplices in the concealment of stolen literary goods. Ferrier’s frame of reference is 
moral, his terminology judicial. He conceives of literary property in material terms: STC 
has drawn ‘very large sums […] secretly from the bank of German transcendentalism’, 
without having made any ‘repayment’.49 Ferrier’s language reflects his concept of 
literary work as a physical possession, over which the author has proprietary rights. 
Ferrier holds the same view as Southey and Wordsworth, and others who supported 
Talfourd’s Copyright Reform Bill, including Blackwood’s editor, John Wilson, Ferrier’s 
uncle and father-in-law. Ironically, Coleridge herself regards STC’s ‘oeuvre’ in the same 
proprietary manner. 
 Blackwood’s owner, William Blackwood, had died in 1839, and Wilson himself 
had become ill with depression following the death of his wife. Consequently, Ferrier 
had become, in effect, Blackwood’s acting editor: he writes in the first person plural as 
spokesperson of the Tory Blackwood’s. He undertakes to comment on the plagiarized 
passages ‘with most scrupulous accuracy’, because the honourable ‘character’ of the 
magazine is at stake.50 He speaks, also, on behalf of Edinburgh’s academic and literary 
establishment, who advocated the protection of an author’s proprietary rights. Of twenty-
one Edinburgh signatories to a petition in 1839 supporting Talfourd’s Copyright Reform 
Bill, ten were senior Professors of Edinburgh University. These included John Wilson, 
who held the Chair of Moral Philosophy. Ferrier’s article, therefore, had a political 
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dimension in promoting a principle for which the Edinburgh academic establishment had 
recently expressed public support. 
 Ferrier’s judicial terminology amplifies the impression that STC has broken the 
law, if not of the land, of social and cultural relations: ‘the laws’ by which human 
‘relations and […] dealings’ should be ‘regulated’.51 Robert MacFarlane observes that 
the word ‘plagiarism comes from the Latin plagarius, meaning a slave-napper or 
kidnapper—and although it has never been a legal infraction, plagiarism has always 
carried this stigma of criminality with it’.52 Ferrier exploits this association, which is all 
the more potent given the political debate over copyright. At the outset, Ferrier refers to 
the earlier phase of the plagiarism controversy as an incompetently managed court case 
that must now be reopened. The matter was ‘mooted some years ago’, Ferrier recalls, 
‘Mr. De Quincey appearing […] for the prosecution, and Mr. J. C. Hare […] for the 
defence’. Ferrier condemns the incompetence of the advocates: ‘[o]n both sides the case 
was very badly conducted; indeed we may say it was altogether bungled’. Neither De 
Quincey nor Hare grasped the extent to which STC ‘unmercifully rifles’ Schelling’s 
works: ‘[n]either party appears to have possessed a competent knowledge of the facts’. 
Ferrier mocks De Quincey for having referred the reader ‘to a work which never 
existed!’ Hare ‘talks of [STC] having transferred “half a dozen” pages […] of Schelling. 
By [the heavens]!’ Ferrier proclaims dramatically, ‘they are nearer twenty’.53 
 Ferrier alleges that STC’s ‘general acknowledgement’ of his ‘similarity’ with 
Schelling is fraudulent and ‘altogether untenable’: the case is one of ‘absolute 
sameness’, not ‘similarity’. Ferrier is contemptuous of STC’s contention that he had 
found in Schelling’s work ‘a genial coincidence with much that [he] had toiled out for 
[him]self’. According to Ferrier, this is calculated deception, so framed as to secure the 
impression of originality while the plagiarisms remain undetected, and to provide a 
defence if they are exposed: 
 
 [STC] is not able to bring himself to admit that all the profounder philosophical 
 observations contained in his work are entirely the German’s, but wishes to have 
 it understood that they are all his own “genial coincidences” with Schelling. 
 Genial coincidences, forsooth! where every one word of the one author tallies 
 with every one word of the other. 
 
Ferrier repeats ‘genial coincidence’ through the article, in a way that recalls Antony’s 
devastating repetition of the Republican tag ‘honourable’, in Act 3, Scene 2 of Julius 
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Caesar. STC ‘has not the smallest chance of acquittal’, Ferrier contends, in view of the 
‘palpable presence of Schelling in thirty-three of [his] pages’.54  
 Ferrier conjectures, on the basis that STC was ‘a consummate plagiarist’ from 
Schelling, ‘so in the case of Schlegel, […] it is more than probable that he has borrowed 
ready-made from that author everything in which he “genially coincides” with him’. 
Ferrier refers also to two poetic plagiarisms, one from Schiller and one from Stollberg. 
He alleges, also, that STC’s aesthetics are ‘plunder[ed]’ from Schelling: ‘many parts’ of 
Lecture XIII, on Poetry or Art are translations from a work by the German. Ferrier then 
taunts STC’s supporters: 
 
 What will Coleridge’s admirers say, upon finding it thus proved that even his 
 notions upon poetry and the fine arts in general are mainly drawn from the 
 profound wells of the German philosopher – that his diamonds, no less than his 
 fuel, are dug up from Schelling’s inexhaustible mines! 
 
Having claimed that the ‘Magazine’ has no ‘desire’ to ‘detract from [STC’s] merits’, 
Ferrier’s tone is exultant.55 Thomas McFarland refers to the ‘open glee’ with which he 
reveals STC’s ‘thefts’.56 Ferrier’s tone of satirical zest, his use of exclamation marks, in 
one case double exclamation marks, and moments of rhetorical panache, reflect his 
elation: ‘can anything beat that? – this is surely plagiarism out-plagiarised’, he exults.57 
This sensationalist style weakens Ferrier’s academic authority, in contrast with 
Coleridge’s scholarly methodology. She admits to the temptation to ‘give [Ferrier] a 
trimming’, but disciplines herself to ‘cut’ or ‘soften’ any ‘sharp sentence[s]’.58 Norman 
Fruman praises Coleridge’s ‘sensitivity to the distorting pressures of personal bias, [...] 
which has not been surpassed by any other editor’, including Engell and Bate.59 Ferrier 
concludes with a triumphant courtroom flourish: ‘[l]et all men know and consider that 
plagiarism, like murder, sooner or later will out’.60 This theatrical hyperbole approaches 
self-parody. 
 Ferrier’s whole critique of STC reflects a Tory attitude to literary property, and 
supports the underlying monopolist assumptions of Talfourd’s bill. Coleridge’s account 
of STC’s methods would place him on the free trade side of the issue. Her own 
underlying assumption, though, assumes the monopolist position that a writer’s oeuvre is 
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equivalent to a landowner’s estate. She retains a footnote of Henry’s, which explains that 
the copyright of Lyrical Ballads, having been initially owned by publisher Joseph Cottle, 
was passed to Longman and Co. Longman at length gave it back to Cottle, who ‘restored 
[it] to Mr. Wordsworth. Would that he and his might hold it for ever!’61 Coleridge’s 
inclusion of Henry’s political rhetoric attacks the Copyright Act of 1842 in its limited 
provision for an author’s dependents. Coleridge maintains her monopolist stance on 
literary property in elucidating a text which, in its compositional procedures, wholly 
subverts the Wordsworthian concept of exclusive and perpetual ownership.  
          
Ferrier’s Nationalist Agenda                                                                                   
For Coleridge and Henry, the lack of any ostensible motive for Ferrier’s attack was 
highly disturbing. It had been sadly obvious to Coleridge that De Quincey had ‘stoop[ed] 
to the readiest mode of supplying his pressing necessities’. Despite his personal 
revelations, their force was weakened for Coleridge by the way in which the ‘poor man’ 
had demeaned himself: ‘[i]t is truly grievous to see a man of such original refinement 
and of so high an order of intellect, stimulating and gratifying the depraved appetites of 
the Reading Public’.62 On first acquaintance, there could be no such rationalization in the 
case of the Blackwood’s article. Hartley, who does not even cite the author’s name 
accurately, expresses the family’s puzzlement: ‘[t]he article was written, I am informed, 
by James Frazer, a son-in-law of Professor Wilson, whom I formerly knew’. Hartley 
adds that the author ‘is neither Liberal nor Dissenter, nor ever received advice or 
admonition from [STC]’; he cannot ‘conceive [any] motive of personal dislike’.63 An 
underlying, if ‘not overt’ aspect of Ferrier’s motivation, according to McFarland, was 
‘Scottish philosophical nationalism’. Vardy disagrees, and states that ‘nationalism didn’t 
actually work that way’.64 
 Ferrier’s ‘nationalism’ is more ‘overt’ than McFarland suggests. In his first two 
pages, Ferrier presents the issue in terms of national identity. It would ‘be highly 
discreditable to the literature of the country’, he observes, ‘if any reprint of [Biographia] 
were allowed to go abroad, without embodying some accurate notice […] of the very 
large and unacknowledged appropriations it contains of the great German philosopher 
Schelling’. The ‘country’ mentioned in this Scottish publication is, ironically, England, 
shown here to be intellectually dependent on German ‘great[ness]’. A national literature 
that allows ‘foreign productions’ to be ‘palmed off upon it as the indigenous growth of 
its own soil’ will be exposed as narrow-minded and ignorant. Ferrier pours further scorn 
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upon English literary and philosophical traditions: ‘one of the most distinguished 
English authors of the nineteenth century, at the mature age of forty-five, succeeded in 
founding by far the greater part of his metaphysical reputation […] upon verbatim 
plagiarisms from works written and published by a German youth, when little more than 
twenty years of age!’65 As Engell and Bate point out, the ‘German youth’ was influenced 
by his compatriot Johann Tetens, who ‘relied’ on a Scottish work, Essay on Genius 
(1774), by Alexander Gerard. Gerard’s Essay was ‘widely popular in Germany’, and 
also influenced Kant.66 Indirectly, then, STC’s philosophy might be traced to a Scottish 
source, via Tetens and Schelling. Ferrier portrays English intellectual identity as 
parochial and impoverished, and therefore susceptible to dishonesty on the one hand, 
and prone to gullibility on the other. Ironically, in the light of Ferrier’s nationalist theme, 
Talfourd, in his 1837 Parliamentary speech on copyright reform, had advocated ‘the 
expedience and justice of acknowledging the right of foreigners to copyright in this 
country, and of claiming it for ourselves in return’. He envisaged Great Britain as 
leading an international concord on copyright, and ‘setting an example’ of respect and 
protection for literary property to ‘France, Prussia, America and Germany’.67 Three 
years later, STC, a hero of Talfourd’s speech, would be exposed as having disgraced 
English letters by stealing German writers’ assets. 
 Sir William Hamilton, Ferrier’s mentor, praises his ‘friend, Professor Ferrier’s 
article’, describing it in his edition of The Works of Thomas Reid (1846) as ‘remarkable 
for the sagacity [with] which [it] tracks […] the footsteps of the literary reaver’. 
Hamilton adds further nationalistic criticism of STC for having attacked the reputation 
of the Scottish empiricist, David Hume: ‘[a]mong his other dreaming errors’, asserts 
Hamilton, STC ‘charges Hume with plagiarizing from Aquinas (who, by the way, herein 
only repeats Aristotle) his whole doctrine of Association. But [S. T.] Coleridge charging 
plagiarism! “Quis tulerit Gracchum de seditione querentum?”’68 In attacking Hume, 
Hamilton implies, STC compounds philosophical errors with hypocrisy. Coleridge, 
applying academic rigour, doubts that Hume was guilty of the plagiarism STC alleges; 
she analyses why the likeness between Hume and Aquinas was unduly ‘magnified’ by 
STC. Nonetheless, she attributes ‘the animosity of the Northern critics’ against STC to 
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wounded national pride: he has ‘ventur[ed] to find fault with some of their Most 
Profound and Irrefragable Doctors’.69 Ferrier’s motive is overtly nationalistic in his 
pursuit of a careerist agenda. According to Vardy, Ferrier ‘was hard at work integrating 
German idealist philosophy’, particularly Schelling’s, into Scottish philosophical debates 
about knowledge and belief.70 In the context of Ferrier’s aspirations to make an original 
contribution to Scottish philosophy, an exposure of STC’s plagiarisms, and the alleged 
inadequacy of previous commentators, provided him with an ideal career opportunity. 
Ferrier’s article would promote Scottish, while humiliating English philosophy. It would 
also reinforce Edinburgh University’s political stance on literary property. It would 
announce its author as a leading British authority on German philosophy, if not the pre-
eminent Germanist. Ferrier was thereby promoting his academic career and establishing 
his credentials as candidate for an Edinburgh Chair in Philosophy. 
 On another career front, Ferrier was enhancing his reputation by promoting 
Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine: his article exploits a theme that had strong appeal for 
the reading public. Mazzeo notes that there was ‘an intense reemergence of public 
interest in charges of plagiarism in British print culture from circa 1790 – 1850’.71 
Macfarlane suggests that, in the early to mid-nineteenth century, plagiarism was so 
popular a topic in magazines as to have become a discrete journalistic specialism: the 
exposure of ‘allusions, borrowings, and derivations’, and the attendant ‘arraignment of 
an author’s originality’, was a favourite among readers.72 Ferrier was also strengthening 
his position as acting editor of Blackwood’s, indicating his suitability to take over 
permanent editorship from his father-in-law. Coleridge recognizes that Ferrier’s motives 
are ultimately careerist. While De Quincey combines his discussion of STC’s plagiarism 
with personal revelations, Ferrier also feeds ‘the depraved appetites of the Reading 
Public’.73 Coleridge defines the debased transaction between writer and readership in the 
titillating sub-genre of ‘plagiarism hunt[ing]’: ‘[f]or one man who will fully and deeply 
examine any portion of the opinions, religious or philosophical, of a full and deep 
thinker, there are hundreds capable of comparing the run of sentences and paragraphs 
and being entertained by a charge of plagiarism’.74 The viability of Ferrier’s charges, 
Coleridge maintains, depends upon the market’s moral and intellectual impoverishment. 
                                                                              
Coleridge’s Critical Methodology                                                                                      
Coleridge, Henry and Hartley feared that the ‘light-reading and little-thinking’ British 
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public was not equipped to make a judgment on Ferrier’s charges.75 Hartley warned: 
  
 Now as there are probably not fifty copies of Schelling in the three kingdoms, 
 nor many more individuals who would or could refer to them to any purpose, the 
 attack may be carried into many, many quarters where it has no chance of fair 
 examination. 
 
Therefore, for ‘95 out of 100’ of Ferrier’s readers, his article ‘must be fact’.76 The 
public’s inability to give Ferrier’s case ‘fair examination’ determined Coleridge’s tactics. 
She makes ‘no attempt’ to ‘deny’ STC’s ‘literary omissions and inaccuracies’, or to 
‘justify’ them. She admits that STC ‘adopted [an] important […] portion of the words 
and thoughts of Schelling’, and failed to make the necessary ‘distinct and accurate 
references’.77 She seeks therefore to present the full evidence of STC’s appropriations. 
Her method is dialogic: she encourages the reader’s ‘active response’, to use V. N. 
Voloshinov’s phrase.78 She provides the evidence and invites the ‘reader of the present 
edition […] to judge for himself’ on the nature of STC’s ‘obligations to the great 
German Philosopher’.79 For Ferrier’s sensationalist rhetoric, Coleridge substitutes 
textual, philosophical and psychological analysis. 
 Coleridge’s notes are characterized by scholarly exactitude. She explains that 
Ferrier’s article ‘directed’ her ‘to those passages in the works of Schelling and of Maasz, 
to which references are given in the following pages, […] and to a few more through the 
strict investigation which it occasioned’.80 In her notes, she identifies the parts of STC’s 
text that he transcribed from the German philosophers. She comments on any additions 
or modifications he made; and refers to manuscript material that illuminates the 
relationship of STC’s ideas with those of his German sources. She translates the most 
significant German passages, and gives the exact reference of each source she identifies. 
Engell and Bate reprint Coleridge’s translations, which therefore remain authoritative in 
the twenty-first century, because Adam Roberts’s recent edition of Biographia (2014) 
pays ‘much’ less attention to STC’s textual relationship with his ‘German sources’.81 
Coleridge is objective in procedure at what are likely to have been the most emotive of 
moments. At the beginning of Chapter 10 of Biographia, STC claims that he 
‘constructed’ the term ‘[e]semplastic’ himself ‘from […] Greek words’.82 Ferrier brands 
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this a lie. To STC’s claim that he coined ‘esemplastic’, Ferrier retorts, ‘[w]e beg your 
pardon, sir, you did nothing of the sort – you met with it in Schelling’s Darlegung, p. 61. 
You found there the word “In-eins-bildung.”’83 He mentions that the term appears also in 
Schelling’s Vorlesungen. Coleridge gives the actual sentence from Darlegung, which 
Ferrier does not, and translates it: ‘the bond is the living formation-into-one of the one 
with the many’. She also gives the context of Schelling’s use of ‘In-Eins-Bildung’ in his 
Vorlesungen: ‘Schelling […] talks of the absolute, perfect In-Eins-Bildung of the Real 
and Ideal, toward the end of his Vorlesungen über die Methods des Academischen 
Studium  - p. 313’.84 Coleridge verifies impartially the textual evidence that enables 
Ferrier to charge her father with mendacity and theft.  
 Coleridge, rather than De Quincey or Ferrier, is the most scholarly pioneer in 
establishing the facts of STC’s plagiarisms. In 1942, Joseph Warren Beach observed that 
‘[t]he borrowings from Schelling and others in Biographia are a matter of common 
notoriety since 1847’.85 McFarland concurs: ‘[t]he year 1847, as the publication date of 
the second edition of the Biographia, marks an epoch in the [plagiarism] controversy’.86 
Fruman makes extensive use of Coleridge’s notes and translations in The Damaged 
Archangel (1971), and pays tribute to her thoroughness in laying ‘damaging materials 
clearly before the reader’.87 Arthur Thomson, Ferrier’s twentieth century biographer, 
finds Coleridge’s approach more rigorous and thorough than Ferrier’s: ‘[w]hen dealing 
with such an obscure and complicated study’, Thomson observes, ‘moral indignation is a 
poor substitute for a precise citation of parallel passages and a wide familiarity with the 
questions at issue’.88 He implies that Coleridge is the greater philosopher. 
 Coleridge’s edition serves not only as the definitive site of forensic 
investigation; it contributes also to the understanding of STC’s philosophical 
development. The first twenty-four pages of Coleridge’s ‘Appendix’ to Volume 1 
consist of notes on Schelling from STC’s marginalia. F.J.A. Hort, Cambridge Biblical 
scholar and theologian, comments in 1856 on the significance of this material: ‘[t]he 
marginalia on some of Schelling’s treatises, published in the last edition of Biographia 
Literaria, are of great value, personal and intrinsic. They show well the instinctive 
rebellion of [STC’s] mind against the implicit materialism in some of Schelling’s early 
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doctrines’. Coleridge’s inclusion of the marginalia confirms Hort in his view of STC’s 
Platonism: that he was ‘independent’ of ‘Englishmen and Germans’, and was, 
essentially, a ‘disciple’ of ‘Greek wisdom’. Hort regards ‘Plato […], in conjunction with 
the New Testament’, as the source of STC’s concept of ‘reason’ as ‘a divine nature of 
which we are all partakers, and that equally’.89 Such an interpretation of STC’s thought 
remains influential in the twenty-first century. Douglas Hedley comments: ‘[STC’s] 
Platonism mitigated against an acceptance of some of Schelling’s central tenets, 
particularly the latent materialism of Schelling’s philosophy’.90 Coleridge’s Biographia 
1847, in elucidating STC’s complex relationship with his sources, illuminates his 
thought in relation to differing philosophical traditions.     
                                                                                                                                                          
Tradition, Dialogue, and the Collective Search for Truth                                                 
Coleridge maintains that STC’s dialogic practice of composition does not involve theft. 
Portions of text transposed verbatim into a new work remain discrete entities. They exist 
intact within a ‘new form’, or in juxtaposition with ‘fresh matter’ that ‘the borrower […] 
engrafts upon it’. The borrowed material forms either ‘the substance’ or ‘the nucleus’ of 
the new composite text, but does not ‘cease to be [the property] of the original 
possessor’. Aids to Reflection is also hybrid in construction, Coleridge observes: it 
consists of texts produced by multiple authors, in which STC ‘has given his thoughts in 
the form of comments on passages in the works of other men’.91 STC refers to himself as 
‘Editor’ of Aids to Reflection: he has ‘compiled’ the work as well as having ‘written’ the 
commentaries.92 It is deliberately designed as an hybrid work, in which a single product 
is formed from the dialogic interaction of discrete texts. This mode of composition, 
Coleridge argues, expresses STC’s ‘exhaustive intensity’ of thought more fully than 
‘regularity of structure in the architecture of a book’.93 
 Coleridge describes a radical textual hybridity in Biographia. Her analysis has 
influenced scholars from the 1850s to the twenty-first century. In his 1856 essay, Hort 
adopts Coleridge’s terminology when he refers to STC ‘us[ing] the sayings of others as a 
Nucleus of his own sayings’.94 The most recent (albeit brief) consideration of STC’s 
plagiarism, by Roberts in his 2014 edition of Biographia, also understands the matter as 
one of ‘form’: STC’s plagiarism is not ‘an attempt silently to reappropriate another’s 
thoughts so that people believe them [STC’s] own’; rather, it is part of a procedure ‘to 
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generate something that is more than merely reappropriated’.95 Although based on 
philosophical rather than textual interpretation, Roberts’s fundamental position, that 
STC’s plagiarisms reflect idiosyncratic creative processes, is the same as that held – 
albeit in different terms – by Coleridge. This is true, also, of G.N.G. Orsini’s description, 
in 1969, of STC ‘incorporating other men’s views with his own views as bricks in a 
wall’.96 McFarland, in the same year, describes Coleridge’s ‘plagiarism’ as ‘a mode of 
composition […] by mosaic organization’.97 Jerome C. Christensen, in 1977, refined 
McFarland’s terminology. He suggested the epithet ‘marginal discourse’ for STC’s 
writings, because, echoing Coleridge and Hort, they ‘consist of marginalia on a central 
text’.98  
 Engell and Bate, in their editorial research, found that STC’s practice 
‘repeatedly confirmed’ McFarland’s description.99 McFarland’s terminology derives 
from Julia Kristeva’s concept of ‘intertextuality’, in which ‘any text is constructed as a 
mosaic of quotations’. Kristeva, though, rejected applications of her theory to ‘source-
criticism’.100 Nonetheless, ‘mosaic organization’ is applicable to the textual structure 
Coleridge exposes in Biographia 1847, where components from different authors are 
arranged in a new setting. Andrew Keanie, in ‘Coleridge and Plagiarism’ (2009), refers 
to STC’s generating his ideas orally – significant in the case of the dictated Biographia. 
STC translates ‘the energy of his speaking self’ into textual form, Keanie contends, by a 
process of ‘inspissation’, in which he ‘stead[ily] thicken[s] [his own] qualities of vision 
and method over the original framework’ of a source.101 This confirms the definitive 
nature of Coleridge’s original analysis, in which STC composes by ‘engraft[ing]’ ‘fresh 
matter’ onto a ‘nucleus’ of source material.102 Later commentators restate Coleridge’s 
original interpretation in various ways. 
 In Biographia 1847, Coleridge refers to STC’s use of Schelling’s Oration on the 
relationship of the Plastic Arts to Nature in his lecture On Poesy and Art: the nucleus of 
STC’s lecture consists of Schelling’s text, from which he ‘omits a great deal […] but 
adds […] materially, to what is borrowed’.103 In her edition of Notes and Lectures Upon 
Shakespeare (1849), Coleridge concludes that ‘the leading thought of the whole’ of 
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STC’s lecture is Schelling’s, but that the work ‘is STC’s also’. She finds that ‘the 
thoughts of Schelling are mixed up with those of the borrower’. As ‘borrower’, STC has 
assembled the diverse components to construct a new product. In the Notes and 
Lectures, Coleridge brings ‘forward […] every sentence in Schelling’s Oration which 
has been adopted in [STC’s] Lecture’, and indicates every ‘passage’ from which he 
might have drawn. As in Biographia 1847, Coleridge presents the textual evidence: 
every reader ‘will be able to decide for himself [on the nature of STC’s borrowings] […] 
without going beyond the present volume’.104 Coleridge argues that the rights of the 
author whose property forms the ‘nucleus’ of the new work have not been infringed. The 
greater the author whose work has been incorporated into the later text, the more secure 
is his individual ownership of it. Coleridge maintains that Schelling’s ‘writings, though 
unknown in this country, when [STC] first brought them forward, were too considerable 
in his own to be finally merged in those of any other man’.105 The principal author from 
whom STC copied, therefore, was too eminent to have suffered any loss. This reflects 
De Quincey’s view that a writer need not record borrowings from major canonical 
figures, such as Milton or Spencer. Coleridge negates Ferrier’s claim, therefore, that ‘the 
rights of [STC’s] victims’ must be ‘vindic[ated]’.106 
 V. N. Voloshinov states that ‘[l]ife begins […] at the point where utterance 
crosses utterance’.107 Coleridge anticipates this theoretical position in her account of 
Biographia as a text produced by multiple authors. To attempt to understand Biographia 
in terms of individual ‘property’ and ownership is tantamount to a category error: 
 
 [STC’s] accuser urges against him that he did not elaborate over again what he 
 borrowed and thus make it, in some sense, his own. It is not easy to see how that 
 which is borrowed can ever, strictly speaking, become the property of the 
 borrower, so as to cease to be that of the original possessor.108 
 
The extracts from Schelling copied verbatim into Biographia remain Schelling’s 
distinctive product, but are incorporated into a work that includes other texts, which, 
together, form a new literary entity. Coleridge understands as a practitioner the 
translator’s dialogic negotiation with the original author, and that the process of 
translation inevitably transforms a text. In Notes and Lectures, she maintains that 
‘[t]ranslations’ cannot be ‘substitutes’ for originals, because they tend ‘to mislead, and 
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give a partially false colouring to that which they aim to represent’.109 In her analysis of 
STC’s translation both of Schelling’s words and ideas, she finds that he alters their 
‘colouring’ by incorporating them into a new, discrete text. 
 According to Coleridge’s analysis, Biographia does not belong to a single 
author. Her conception of its complex textual structure can be analyzed through 
Bahktinian theory. A Bahktinian theorization of textual dialogue inflects my whole 
reading of Coleridge’s analysis of Biographia. Its ‘meaning’ is ‘communally 
constructed’, and is ‘derived from multiple viewpoints’.110 This negates the idea of a 
writer’s work as a private estate defined by distinct boundaries, and resists the myth of 
inspired individual authorship. Martha Woodmansee observes that the Romantic concept 
of individual genius ‘came to fruition in Wordsworth’s “Essay, Supplementary to the 
Preface of 1815”’, in which he presents ‘a mystification of an activity which is of 
necessity rooted in tradition’.111 STC’s production of a composite text in Biographia 
negates not only the concept of solitary genius but, as Stillinger observes, ‘the myth of 
single authorship itself’.112 Yet, STC appears overtly to support the Wordsworthian 
view, referring in Volume I, Chapter 2 of Biographia to the ‘unjust distinction, made by 
the public itself between literary, and all other property’.113 In Chapter 9 of Volume 1, 
he upholds a radically contradictory position, which Coleridge foregrounds. STC’s 
theory and practice of authorship, she suggests, are communal and democratic: 
 
 [f[airly considered his conduct in this matter does but help to prove the truth of 
 his assertion, that he “regarded Truth as a divine ventriloquist, not caring from 
 whose mouth the sounds are supposed to proceed, if only the words are audible 
 and intelligible”.114  
 
In politico-economic terms, Coleridge recognizes, the processes of STC’s authorship are 
radically opposed to ‘monopoly’. Philosophically, his communal conception of 
knowledge anticipates a Bakhtinian model of ‘epistemological openness’, in which 
‘truth’ is generated by a ‘dynamic, collective’ process of ‘continuing interchange’.115 
Coleridge understands STC’s relationship with Schelling and Maass in terms of a 
shared, dialogic quest.   
 Coleridge includes in Biographia 1847 a ‘marginalium’ that exposes further 
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contradictions in STC’s attitudes to originality. He alleges that Schelling has borrowed 
from the Protestant mystic, Jakob Boehme, without adequate acknowledgement: ‘[h]ow 
can I explain Schelling’s strange silence respecting Jacob Boehme?’ STC ponders.116 
According to STC’s principle of ‘truth as a divine ventriloquist’, the answer would be 
‘genial coincidence’.117 STC implies, though, that Schelling should have admitted a 
significant debt to Boehme: ‘[t]he identity of [Schelling’s] system [with Boehme’s 
work] was exulted in by the Tiecks at Rome in 1805, to me; and these were Schelling’s 
intimate friends’. STC alleges not only the identity between Schelling’s ideas and those 
of Boehme, but a correspondence in language: ‘[t]he coincidence in the expressions, 
illustrations, and even in the mystical obscurities, is too glaring to be solved by mere 
independent coincidence in thought and intention’.118 STC’s identification of ‘glaring’ 
verbal parallels between Schelling and Boehme anticipates, ironically, Ferrier’s citing 
‘absolute sameness of phrase’ between STC and Schelling.119 STC absolves Schelling of 
any moral blame in his appropriations from Boehme, though, on the grounds of 
Schelling’s intellectual stature. This sympathetic stance anticipates De Quincey’s 
equivocal representation of STC’s philosophical plagiarisms. STC speculates that 
‘[p]robably prudential motives restrain Schelling for a while’ from revealing his debts to 
Boehme: ‘for I will not think that pride or a dishonest lurking desire to appear not only 
an original, but the original can have influenced a genius like Schelling’.120 
 In Chapter 9 of the first volume of Biographia, STC denies that he is in 
competition with Schelling. He acknowledges Schelling’s precedence as ‘founder of the 
Philosophy of Nature’ and deplores the possibility of his being seen as ‘enter[ing] into a 
rivalry with Schelling’. STC refers to the fact that he and Schelling share the same 
intellectual predecessors: Kant, Bruno and Boehme. He admits his own ‘direct […] debt’ 
to Boehme. By contrast, he says, developing the ideas of his ‘marginalium’, Schelling 
regards the relation of his ‘system’ to Boehme’s as ‘mere coincidence’. Commenting, in 
the same chapter, on his own relationship with Schelling, STC states that an author’s 
originality is not determined by reference to chronology: ‘[w]hether a work is the 
offspring of a man’s own spirit, and the product of original thinking, will be discovered 
[…] by better tests than the mere reference to dates’. Yet, STC denies to Schelling the 
same privilege of ‘genial coincidence’ that he claims for himself.121 In his ‘marginalium’ 
on Schelling and Boehme, STC adopts the criterion of chronological priority. Although 
Coleridge includes the ‘marginalium’ on Boehme and Schelling without comment, her 
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edition as a whole fully exposes STC’s contradictions. She shows Biographia, a work 
anxiously concerned with the definition of individual genius, to consist of the texts of 
multiple authors; and, at different moments, to assert mutually contradictory concepts of 
authorship. Coleridge acknowledges the conceptually inchoate and inconsistent nature of 
Biographia, and describes it as a ‘fragmentary work’.122 
 Coleridge relates STC’s practice to the historical development of philosophical 
tradition. Her account of the cultural ownership of ideas echoes a distinction made by 
Talfourd in a parliamentary debate of 1838. Seville refers to Talfourd’s differentiation 
between the content of an intellectual ‘discovery, rendering the essence of truth to 
mankind’, and the ‘form in which it is enshrined’. The author has right of possession of 
the text, the ‘form’, but the idea itself belongs to ‘mankind’.123 Coleridge elaborates on 
how human understanding progresses. She describes the way in which ‘the discoveries 
of science’ are dependent on the development of tradition. By ‘science’ she means 
philosophy, as when she refers to ‘scientific divinity’ in ‘On Rationalism’.124 ‘In all 
scientific product’, Coleridge explains, ‘two factors are required; energy of thought in 
the discoverer, and a special state of preparation for the particular advance in the science 
itself’. Despite her reference to ‘the discoverer’, Coleridge conceives of ‘the human 
intellect’ progressing inevitably and impersonally along ‘its pre-appointed course’.125 
She prioritizes collective development over individual heurism. 
 Coleridge refers to Schelling’s philosophy having its source in the ‘Idealism of 
Kant, which was surely founded on the Idealism of Berkeley’.126 She cites a precedent 
for STC’s ‘genial coincidence’ with Schelling. In the early eighteenth century, Arthur 
Collier, a contemporary of George Berkeley, ‘defend[ed] immaterialism as the only 
alternative to skepticism’.127 Collier reached the same philosophical conclusions as 
Berkeley, by the same arguments, without having read Berkeley’s work: 
 
 Berkeleyanism presented itself to the mind of Arthur Collier before he had read 
 a syllable of Berkeley’s metaphysical writings and he maintained the non-
 existence of matter by arguments substantially the same as those employed in 
 [Berkeley’s] Principles of Human Knowledge and Dialogues between Hylas and 
 Philonous.  
 
According to Coleridge’s understanding of tradition, such ‘genial coincidence’ occurs 
inevitably through the impersonal operation of an historical process. Indeed, she implies 
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that the force of tradition is so strong that literary borrowing is inescapable and largely 
unconscious: ‘how commonly do men imagine themselves producing and creating, when 
they are but metamorphosing!’128 In Notes and Lectures, Coleridge observes that those 
who advance ‘positive charges of dishonest plagiarism’ have not ‘properly examined’ 
the ‘grounds’ on which their accusations rest. They ‘are absolutely ignorant’ of ‘the true 
nature’ of literary production, which involves an inevitable, dynamic interaction of the 
individual author with tradition.129 The ‘plagiarism hunter[s]’, though, ignore cultural 
processes, in order to exploit the personal and the sensational.130  
 
Literary Property and Nervous Disorder 
Coleridge attributes STC’s radical practice, in which he treats authorial products as 
communal property, to psychological as well as historical and philosophical factors. In 
1837, she explains that she recognizes STC’s ‘literary difficulties’ in her own 
experience: like him, she wishes to ‘pursue’ ideas ‘to the farthest bounds of thought’, 
while the ‘notion of the indefinite vastness which [she] long[s] to fill’ ‘paralyze[s]’ her 
productive ‘energies’.131 She understands the passionate single-mindedness, therefore, 
which impeded STC’s productive skills, and rendered him culpably inattentive to 
matters of literary ownership. She maintains that the strengths and weaknesses of his 
creative constitution were inseparably interwoven. His ‘power of abstracting and 
referring to universal principles’, Coleridge contends, ‘rendered him unconscious of 
incorrectness of statement’. Simple facts and material realities ‘laid no hold on [STC’s] 
mind’, she admits. He was obsessively absorbed in the development of ideas to the 
exclusion of formal academic considerations: ‘[h]e was ever more intent upon the 
pursuit and enunciation of truth than alive to the collateral benefits that wait upon it, as it 
is the exclusive property of this or that individual’. Coleridge contrasts the kind of 
commercial and legal imagery adopted by Ferrier with the idealistic abstraction –‘ 
pursuit and enunciation of truth’ – she applies to STC.132 
 STC was too immersed in ideas themselves to protect even his own intellectual 
property, Coleridge maintains. He gave away, in letters, marginalia and conversation, 
much valuable thought and ‘brilliant illustration’, which he might have prudently ‘kept 
back’ in order to ‘procure for himself a permanent reward’. She presents STC’s 
absorption in metaphysics as both a virtue and a flaw: ‘[h]e loved to go forward, 
expanding and ennobling the soul of his teaching’, she explains, but ‘hated the trouble of 
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turning back to look after its body’. Coleridge’s terms – ‘ennobling the soul’ and 
neglecting the ‘body’ – reflect STC’s metaphysical idealism. For Coleridge, though, 
STC’s absence of proprietorial care for his work is ‘an inherent defect’ of ‘character’, as 
J.H. Green suggests in a letter she quotes. Green describes STC’s ‘selflessness’ as ‘an 
absence of a sense of self’, which disabled him in practical affairs. STC’s ‘selflessness’ 
had resulted in his family’s dependence on Robert Southey. In this sense, STC’s 
‘profuse[ness] of his own [property]’ was far from a virtue: ‘in regard to all property, of 
what kind soever [, STC] did not enough regard or value it whether for himself or his 
neighbour’. Coleridge explains that STC’s incapacity was such that he would attribute 
his own ideas to others, as Hartley also observes.133 
 Coleridge’s practical approach to literary property contrasted with that of STC. 
As editor and author, she paid meticulous attention to accurate referencing, and 
exercised scrupulous care over commercial affairs. In widowhood, Coleridge became an 
accomplished businesswoman in managing the family’s literary estate. She found 
unacceptable publisher Pickering’s haphazard record keeping, and lack of punctuality in 
paying annual royalties. In 1851, she successfully completed negotiations with 
Wordsworth’s publisher, Edward Moxon, ‘an extremely able businessman’, to take over 
publication of STC’s ‘oeuvre’.134 That this was a viable business proposition for Moxon 
in 1851 was due entirely to the success of Coleridge’s literary and entrepreneurial work 
over the past eight years. Henry had attempted, in the months before his death, to 
transfer publication of STC’s works to Moxon. He failed, because the prospective 
publisher did not find the proposition commercially convincing at that time. Coleridge’s 
systematic productivity in the intervening years enabled her to secure the contract with 
Moxon in 1851. This successful transaction, clinched during her terminal illness, 
confirms Coleridge’s business acumen in making provision for the long-term viability of 
the family’s literary estate. 
 In philosophical and literary terms, Coleridge attributes STC’s relationship with 
his sources to an historical process: the development of literary and intellectual tradition 
draws writers into dialogic forms of creativity. In psychological terms, Coleridge 
exposes idiosyncratic contradictions in STC’s authorial theory and practice. She 
suggests, for example, that STC’s extensive use of A. W. Schlegel’s ‘sentences’ and 
‘illustrations’ in his lectures of 1818 indicates mental imbalance: ‘[h]ad he been fully 
conscious’ of his substantial debts to Schlegel in the lectures, ‘common caution would 
have induced [STC] to acknowledge what he had obtained from a book which was in the 
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hands of so many readers in England’.135 Even more inexplicable was STC’s having 
‘published The Fall of Robespierre as An Historic Drama by S. T. Coleridge, without 
joining Mr. Southey’s name with his in the title page, though my Uncle and all his many 
friends knew that he wrote the second and third act of it’. Coleridge suggests that the 
conceptual contradictions of individual authorship, in terms of a writer’s relationship 
with source material, are exacerbated for STC by psychological disorder. She admits that 
she ‘should not have believed [STC’s] confusions […] possible in a man of sound 
mind’.136     
 
Coleridge’s Revision of Romantic Concepts of Creativity                                       
Coleridge reveals that Biographia was ‘composed’ at the time of STC’s life ‘when his 
health was most deranged, and his mind most subjected to the influence of bodily 
disorder’.137 She describes STC’s creativity as being dependent on ‘bodily’ powers. Her 
description revises Romantic conceptions of creativity: 
 
The nerveless languor, which, after early youth, became almost the habit of his 
body and bodily mind, which to a great degree paralysed his powers both of rest 
and action, precluding by a torpid irritability their happy vicissitude, — rendered 
all exercises difficult to him except of thought and imagination flowing onward 
freely and in self-made channels; for these brought with them their own warm 
atmosphere to thaw the chains of frost that bound his spirit. Soon as that 
spontaneous impulse was suspended, the apathy and sadness induced by his 
physical condition reabsorbed his mind, as sluggish mists creep over the valley 
when the breeze ceases to blow; and to counteract it he lacked any other 
sufficient stimulus.138  
 
Inertia, Coleridge contends, became ‘the habit of [STC’s] body and bodily mind’ in early 
adulthood. The term ‘habit’ here has two implications. In ‘Nervousness’, Coleridge uses 
‘habit’ in relation to the danger of drug abuse: ‘it is the liability to become a habit that is 
the chief evil of laudanum taking’.139 The word’s presence in the Biographia 1847 
passage implies a causal link between STC’s opium consumption and his ‘nerveless 
langour’.  
 The second implication of ‘habit’ refers to the Lockean concept that the nerves 
retain sense impressions. This theory was adopted in eighteenth-century medical theory, 
and remained current in the early nineteenth century. The influential physician Thomas 
Trotter, for example, held that ‘impressions’ are ‘hoarded as it were in the structure of 
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[the body’s] nerves’.140 Coleridge adopts this concept in ‘Nervousness’ – there is a ‘force 
of habit in the nerves’ – which she then re-applies in her analysis of STC.141 His sense 
impressions are retained in his ‘nerves’, so that ‘langour’ becomes a permanent 
condition. In Coleridge’s Lockean account, STC’s cognitive capacities are subject to the 
mechanistic determinism he sought in his metaphysics to overcome. The medical history 
inscribed in the fibres of STC’s nerves deprives him of free will: he is incapable ‘both of 
rest and action’. He is trapped in a state of ‘torpid irritability’, perpetual unproductive 
agitation. The oxymoron refers to Trotter’s description of the nervous symptoms to 
which writers are subject: ‘[t]he mind itself, by pursuing one train of thought […] 
becomes torpid to external agents’.142 Coleridge describes this process in STC. His 
creative faculty becomes solipsistic: his ‘thought and imagination’ flow ‘freely’ only ‘in 
self-made channels’. Ferrier alleged that STC had ‘stopped short in the process of 
unfolding a theory of the imagination’ because he had exhausted Schelling’s resources. 
Coleridge’s account of STC’s powers, subject to sudden involuntary paralysis, refutes 
this damaging view. More was at stake than STC’s inability to develop a complete 
theory of imagination. What occurred, Coleridge suggests, was a total implosion of his 
creative capacities: ‘he broke down in the prosecution of his whole scheme’. It was not 
the support of appropriate source materials in Schelling that STC lacked: ‘his energies 
for regular composition in any line were deserting him’. Nervous breakdown prevented 
STC from progressing in his account of imagination. The flaws of Biographia – its 
‘transgressions’ and incompletion – ‘belonged not to [STC’s] moral being […] but to the 
frame of his intellect’.143 
 In the passage cited above, in which Coleridge describes STC’s ‘nerveless 
languor’, she is in dialogue with his conversation poems of the late 1790s. She locates 
the later failure of STC’s creative powers in the metaphysical vision of poems such as 
‘The Eolian Harp’ (1795) and ‘Frost at Midnight’ (1798). The structure of these poems 
depends on a systolic movement of expansion and contraction in the continuous and 
vital interaction between the poet’s inner world and the sensory stimuli of his immediate 
surroundings. Coleridge refers to ‘Frost at Midnight’, in which the ‘sun-thaw’ is an 
image of universal harmony and beauty. In Coleridge’s account of STC’s flawed 
creative powers, the warmth that ‘thaw[s] the chains of frost that bound his spirit’ is not 
located in external nature. It derives, solipsistically, from his own ‘thought and 
imagination’, and is subject to arbitrary and abrupt ‘suspen[sion]’. Coleridge’s allusion 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 Peter Melville Logan, Nerves and Narratives: A Cultural History of Hysteria in Nineteenth-Century 
British Prose (London: University of California Press, 1997), p. 28. 
141 ‘Nervousness’, Mudge, p. 209. 
142 Thomas Trotter, A View of The Nervous Temperament, 2nd edn (London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, and 
Orme, 1807; repr. Forgotten Books: www.forgottenbooks.org, 2012), p. 39. 
143 Biographia 1847, I, p. xxi, p. xl. 
	   123	  
to ‘Frost at Midnight’ implies the failure of the Romantic imagination, and the 
breakdown of the domestic structure that forms the poem’s social setting. STC casts 
himself in a maternal role as night-time carer for the ‘[d]ear [b]abe’, Hartley, ‘that 
sleepest cradled by [his] side’. Unlike STC’s later solipsistic imagination, his creativity 
in the poem is energized by acute sensitivity to the external scene: the baby’s  
 
 ‘gentle breathings’, heard in this deep calm,  
 Fill up the interspersed vacancies  
 And momentary pauses of the thought!’  
 
The poet’s perspectives expand to envision his child’s natural education as a wanderer 
‘[b]y lakes and sandy shores, beneath the crags | Of ancient mountain’, from which he 
may learn the ‘eternal language’ of ‘God’.144 However, STC will fail to sustain the 
parental role he performs in the poem, just as his imagination, drawn in upon itself by 
disordered ‘nerves’, will become ‘bound’ by ‘chains of frost’. The juxtaposition of 
STC’s celebrated poem of the 1790s against Coleridge’s revisionary analysis in the 
1840s suggests the losses and limitations of STC’s career. The pantheistic vistas of 
‘Frost at Midnight’, the opium-fuelled visions of ‘Kubla Khan’, close down and fade. 
They give way to self-enclosed suffering and a fragmentary inchoate aesthetic. 
 Coleridge rejects, psychologically and theologically, the Romantic tenet of ‘wise 
passiveness’: a state in which the poet’s creativity and moral intellect are nurtured by 
powers of external nature, with no corresponding effort exerted by the poet himself.145 
She describes STC’s ‘mind’ being ‘reabsorbed’ by ‘apathy and sadness’, just as 
‘sluggish mists creep over the valley when the breeze ceases to blow’. Coleridge 
reverses the situation STC describes in ‘The Eolian Harp’, in which the poet lies at ease 
on a sunny hillside ‘at noon’. His ‘brain’ is ‘indolent and passive’ as it receives arbitrary 
visitations of creative ‘thought’. In the same way, an eolian harp produces music in 
response to ‘random gales’. However, as Coleridge states, ‘when the breeze ceases to 
blow’, STC is enclosed in ‘sluggish mists’. He is cut off from such inspiration as he 
experiences in ‘The Eolian Harp’, in the prospect of the Bristol Channel, where 
‘sunbeams dance, like diamonds, on the main’, enabling him, in a ‘tranquil’ state, to 
‘muse upon tranquillity’.146 Coleridge alludes to the failure of STC’s early poetic vision 
in her discussion of his opium addiction: she represents the disorder of STC’s ‘nervous 
system’, on which his creativity depends, as ‘the jangled strings of some shattered 
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lyre’.147 In her revisionary analysis, STC ‘lacked any […] sufficient stimulus’ to 
reanimate his passive and paralyzed creativity. This confirms his despairing admission in 
‘Dejection: an Ode’ (1802): ‘I may not hope from outward forms to win | The passion 
and the life, whose fountains are within’.148 If ‘poetry is the spontaneous overflow of 
powerful feelings’, Coleridge shows how easily and how arbitrarily, in STC’s case, the 
‘spontaneous impulse is suspended’: his capacities as poet and metaphysician are 
governed by what she terms ‘bodily depression’.149 
 Coleridge’s location of authorial creativity in physiological processes revises 
STC’s metaphysical theory of Imagination. Donelle Ruwe contends that Coleridge 
‘privileges a type of imagination more closely akin to her father’s category of fancy’.150 
In STC’s cognitive hierarchy, ‘Fancy’ occupies a position below that of ‘Imagination’, 
which he divides into ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ functions. The secondary imagination 
‘differ[s]’ from the primary ‘only in degree, and in the mode of its operation’. STC 
defines the ‘primary Imagination’ as ‘the living Power and prime Agent of all human 
Perception, and as a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the 
infinite I AM’.151 In a footnote, Coleridge explains that the ‘last clause’ of the definition, 
‘“and as a repetition”, etc.’, is 
 
  stroked out in a copy of the B. L. containing a few MS. marginal notes of the 
 author, which are printed in this edition. I think it best to preserve the sentence, 
 while I mention the author’s judgment upon it, especially as it has been 
 quoted’.152  
   
The crossing-out, Coleridge implies, reveals that STC rejected his metaphysical 
conception of the imagination. She retains the deleted ‘clause’ in her edition, though, 
because it has entered literary history.  
 STC defines ‘Fancy’ as ‘a mode of Memory emancipated from the order of time 
and space’. It is dependent on sensory experience, and, like ‘ordinary memory’, takes 
‘all its materials ready made from the law of association’.153 The creative imagination, 
that Coleridge terms the ‘bodily mind’, also depends on sensory experience and ‘the law 
of association’. In Coleridge’s account of STC’s cognitive imbalance, ‘imagination’ 
impinges upon, and distorts, the operation of his ‘memory’. She finds, in effect, a single 
cognitive faculty in STC, where two separate functions should exist: ‘it seemed as if the 
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door betwixt his memory and imagination was always open’, Coleridge explains; ‘and 
though the former was a large strong room, its contents were perpetually mingling with 
those of the adjoining chamber’.154 STC’s nervous disorder produces abnormal cognitive 
operations, the literary effects of which are plagiarism and fragmentation. It is ironic that 
Coleridge locates the source of STC’s literary disabilities in memory and imagination, 
the key faculties in the poetics and metaphysics of her literary fathers. Coleridge’s 
construction of STC’s defective ‘bodily mind’, influenced by Locke’s conception that 
delusion originates in the imagination, may appear to contradict the metaphysical 
concept of Reason in her religious writings. 
 On the contrary, Coleridge maintains consistently through her career that the 
sensory and the rational are distinct. In her introduction to ‘Nervousness’, she states that 
nervous ‘disorders […] affect the mind but do not radically and directly impair the 
Reason’.155 At the beginning of ‘On Rationalism’, Coleridge defines reason as ‘the light 
by which we read the law written in the heart, or rather the law itself, read by its own 
light, when that is kindled from above’. Reason is the medium in which we encounter 
the Divine in Coleridge’s theology. She applies the same terms six months before her 
death, in the Dialogues on Personality (1851). Her main protagonist, Markright, an 
exponent of Coleridgean philosophical principles, defines ‘Reason’ as the ‘downshine of 
the Divine Light into the soul’. He explains that ‘brutes in common with man have not 
only a sensitive soul and bodily organism, appetites, instincts, senses, but affections and 
intelligence’. Only man possesses Reason, ‘which exalts his will from a mere actuating 
principle into a capability of acting according to ultimate ends’. Markright refers to 
Aquinas’s definition of ‘a person’ as ‘an individual substance of rational nature’, and 
distinguishes between ‘the outward tangible body’ and ‘the true permanent supersensual 
body’. Coleridge maintains the classical dualism between body and spirit, but places 
creative imagination in the physical realm, in which all human attributes reside, save 
one. The exception is Reason, ‘the organ of beholding the Divine Spirit’.156                                                                                                                        
                                                                                                                                   
 STC’s Limitations: Coleridge’s Opportunities 
Coleridge exposes STC’s flaws in Biographia 1847 in the interests of her ultimate 
authorial agenda. Her defence of STC from the moral charge of plagiarism requires her 
to produce a comprehensive critique of his psychological weaknesses, and to define the 
limitations of his literary powers. This would seem to be at odds with Coleridge and 
Henry’s original project to re-present STC as a Christian philosopher. Molly Lefebure, 
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in her otherwise insightful biographical study of STC’s family relationships, misreads 
Coleridge as sharing Henry’s eulogizing agenda in editing STC. Their collaborative aim, 
according to Lefebure, was ‘reverently’ to pass on ‘to posterity’ a ‘sacrosanct [STC], 
“saint and sage”’, from which ‘any trace’ of STC’s ‘human’ flaws would be ‘religiously 
excluded’. 
 This is plainly untrue of Biographia 1847. After Henry’s death, Coleridge’s 
editorial agenda shifts decisively, and is inflected by the evolving conception of her own 
religious authorship. Lefebure suggests that Henry had envisaged a new edition of 
Biographia as ‘the crowning glory’ of the editorial project.157 For Coleridge, Biographia 
1847 marks the point at which Coleridgean controversies are confronted directly, 
answered candidly, and laid finally to rest. She aims to free the re-interpretation of 
STC’s works from the distractions of biographical speculation and sensationalism. She 
deals with the issue of plagiarism head-on, and gives fuller and more precise evidence 
than STC’s accusers. She also rejects and revises the views of those who had surrounded 
STC in idealized mystique. She indicates that she is ‘weary’ of those who had referred to 
STC as ‘wonderful’, because they had created unrealistic expectations of his literary 
capabilities.158 
 Coleridge contends that contemporaries ‘over-rated’ STC’s literary capacity. As 
a result, he had been viewed as a failure. STC’s constitution, she argues, enabled him to 
pursue ideas ‘in their remotest ramifications’, but prevented him from presenting them in 
sustained and structured productions.159 In 1837, she attributed the fragmentary nature of 
STC’s work to literary idealism: he ‘wrote by snatches’ because ‘[h]e could not bear to 
complete incompletely, which every body else does’.160 In Biographia 1847, though, she 
emphasizes his disabilities. Contemporaries who ‘were struck by [STC’s] marked 
intellectual gifts’ – as suggested by his mesmerizing viva voce performances – ‘took no 
note of his intellectual impediments’. Coleridge adds a forthright and defining statement: 
the ‘want of proportion in the faculties of [STC’s] mind […] would always have 
prevented him from making many or good books’.161 His capacities for actual literary 
production were limited. Those such as Hazlitt, who had criticized STC for having 
‘wasted’ boundless philosophical and literary potential, misunderstood his creative 
character.162 On the contrary, Coleridge asserts, STC achieved all that his innate 
limitations would allow: ‘[h]is powers, compounded and balanced as they were, enabled 
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him to do that which he did, and possibly that alone’.163 This is a crucial moment in the 
development of Coleridge’s own authorship and her conception of it.  
 Coleridge’s literary achievement is founded on her father’s incapacity. STC’s 
inability to produce ‘good books’ opens an authorial space for her. His haphazard 
fragments offer her the opportunity to create the works he was unable to realize, 
including the projected masterpiece, ‘which was to explain his system of thought at 
large’.164 STC’s inability to construct a systematic ‘ouevre’ confers on Coleridge the role 
of author. The fragments of his major unpublished project, constructed and mediated by 
her, with her own future independent works, would carry forward the whole Coleridgean 
project. One such work, ‘Extracts from a New Treatise on Regeneration’ (1848) 
appeared shortly after the publication of Biographia 1847. The reconstructions and 
original works Coleridge envisaged would be productions for her own times: they would 
not be what STC might have written earlier in the century. Her project is polemical not 
academic: a vocational engagement with contemporary life is the rationale of her 
authorship. The dynamic relationship between Coleridge the Victorian polemicist and 
STC the Romantic metaphysician is suggested by Gadamer’s concept of an ‘historical 
horizon’: a viewpoint through which ‘we approach the testimony of the past under [the] 
influence’ of the ‘present’. Such a strategy requires us to rise ‘to a higher universality,’ 
in which we ‘overcome not only our own particularity but also that of the other’. 
Therefore, Gadamer contends, ‘[t]o acquire a horizon means that one learns to look 
beyond what is close at hand—not in order to look away from it but to see it better, 
within a larger whole and in truer proportion’. Coleridge’s ‘transpos[ition]’ of STC’s 
thought into the Victorian setting enables her ‘to see’ that setting ‘better’.165 It requires 
her, also, to develop innovative literary methods in her polemical writings, as the 
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Chapter Four 
The Theory and Practice of Polemical Writing: Religious Authorship from 1847 to 
1849 
 
‘Biographia 1847’: Coleridge’s Mediation between STC’s Text and ‘Contemporary Life’ 
Sara Coleridge’s ‘On Rationalism’ presents a rigorous critique of Tractarian doctrine. 
Between 1843 and 1849, she published three more theological writings. The first of 
these is the second section of her ‘Introduction’ to Biographia 1847, which extends her 
critical examination of Anglo-Catholic doctrine from the viewpoint of STC’s 
metaphysics. The second work is ‘Extracts From a New Treatise on Regeneration’ 
(1848), which appears in the ‘Appendix’ to the sixth edition of Aids to Reflection, after 
the revised version of ‘On Rationalism’. Finally, there is the ‘Note on Confessions of an 
Inquiring Spirit’ (1849), an essay in response to an intemperate attack on STC and some 
of those influenced by him. These are not her final theological works, however. In 1850 
and 1851, she pursues the topic of baptismal regeneration in a substantial series of 
unpublished dialogues, discussed in Chapter 5. The present chapter will address 
questions raised by Coleridge’s religious writings from 1847 to 1849. First, how does 
Coleridge’s elucidation of STC’s doctrines relate to her independent religious writing? 
Second, how does Coleridge’s dialogue with the Tractarians influence her intellectual 
and authorial development after 1843? Third, how do Coleridge’s evolving religious 
ideas inflect her ethic and practice of authorship?  
 Coleridge’s editing of Biographia Literaria was the pivotal factor in her 
intellectual and literary development through the 1840s. The necessary textual 
investigations enabled her to develop her metaphysical resources. Her analyses of STC’s 
debts to Schelling and Maass yield insights into the dialogic nature of his writing, and 
into the different strands and development of his thought. Also, most significantly, 
Coleridge chooses not to examine STC’s religious philosophy in terms of his own times, 
but in the troubled context of her own. Ferrier, after all, treated STC’s philosophical 
status as a live and contested contemporary issue. In Coleridge’s view, STC comes into 
his own as a religious philosopher in the politico-theological crises of the 1840s. STC’s 
presence in her dialogue with Tractarianism anticipates Gadamer’s hermeneutic theory. 
According to Piercey, ‘Gadamer’s critique of Romantic hermeneutics […] argues that 
the goal of hermeneutics is not to reconstruct the past, but to mediate between traditional 
texts and contemporary life’.1 This ‘goal’ is reflected in Coleridge’s discussion of the 
contested doctrine of justification in the second section of her ‘Introduction’ to 
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Biographia 1847. The section comprises 114 pages, and is entitled ‘Mr. Coleridge’s 
Religious Opinions; their formation; misconceptions and misrepresentations on the 
subject’.2 
 
The Shifting Grounds of Politico-Religious Controversy, 1843 to 1847  
During the years in which Coleridge was preparing her edition of Biographia, from 1843 
to 1847, doctrinal controversy continued to destabilize the Church of England in the 
wake of Newman’s Tract 90, published in February 1841. What Hartley Coleridge calls 
‘the pugnacious colloquies of high-Churchmen and liberals’ continued with heated 
intensity through the 1840s.3 Although it was clear by 1843 that a Tory government 
could not ‘resuscitate the old alliance of church and state’, the Tractarian agenda in the 
1840s had shifted since the mid-1830s, and continued to change in response to rapidly 
evolving politico-religious circumstances.4 Newman became increasingly concerned to 
secure the position of Anglo-Catholics in the Church of England, and thereby to prevent 
his followers from converting to Roman Catholicism. With such considerations in mind, 
he published Tract 90. The tract created ‘a dangerous situation’ for Newman. It was said 
to have ‘opened the door to the teaching of Roman Catholicism’ in Oxford University, 
and was publically censured by the ‘Vice-Chancellor, Heads of Houses and Proctors’.5 
 In Tract 90, Newman maintains that it is possible for Catholics to subscribe to 
the Articles of the Church of England. In the ‘Introduction’, Newman announces his 
intention 
 
to show that, while our Prayer Book is acknowledged on all hands to be of 
Catholic origin, our Articles also, the offspring of an uncatholic age, are, 
through God’s good providence, to say the least, not uncatholic, and may be 
subscribed by those who aim at being catholic in heart and doctrine. 
 
Newman then examines a range of Articles to substantiate his contention. With reference 
to Article 31, for example, on ‘the sacrifice […] of Masses’, he contends: ‘[n]othing can 
show more clearly than this passage that the Articles are not written against the creed of 
the Roman Church, but against actual existing errors in it’. In his ‘Conclusion’, Newman 
asserts that ‘it is a duty which we owe both to the Catholic Church and to our own, to 
take our reformed confessions in the most catholic sense they will admit’. Ultimately, 
Tract 90 exposes the Church of England’s conceptual instability: ‘[w]here exactly did 
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the Church stand?’ was the question raised by Newman in Tract 90, according to James 
Tolhurst. In Biographia 1847, Coleridge addresses this question in the context of 
justification, a topic which Newman discusses with reference to Article 11, which 
affirms, ‘[t]hat we are justified by Faith only is a most wholesome doctrine’. He also 
refers to the statement in the ‘Homilies’ that ‘Faith is the sole means, the sole instrument 
of justification’. Newman glosses the Article and the precept from the Homilies by 
quoting Lectures on Justification, in which he argues that ‘Faith’ is the ‘inward 
instrument’ of justification, while ‘Baptism’ is the ‘outward instrument’.6 In Biographia 
1847, Coleridge critiques Newman’s position from the perspective of STC’s Christian 
philosophy.  
 Tract 90 had irreversible religious and political consequences: it ‘damage[d] 
[…] the dogmatic integrity of Protestant High Church Orthodoxy’, according to 
Nockles, and exacerbated the breach between traditional High Churchmen and 
Tractarians. Tract 90 also weakened the political influence of Tractarianism and 
discredited it in the eyes of the Tory party. In the aftermath of Tract 90, ‘a genuinely 
“Romanising” wing’ of the Oxford Movement emerged ‘in the early 1840s’, which 
created further divisions, antagonized university and church authorities, and ultimately 
precipitated Newman’s leaving the Church of England.7 W. G. Ward, a forthright 
exponent of this Roman Catholic tendency, published The Ideal of a Christian Church 
(1844), in which he criticized ‘the emptiness, hollowness, folly, laxity, unreality of 
English Protestantism’ against the ideal of ‘Roman doctrine’.8 Ward’s book was 
formally condemned by Oxford University, which also cancelled the author’s degrees. 
Newman states in his autobiography that he ‘was on [his] death-bed, as regards [his] 
membership with the Anglican Church’ as early as 1841. His awareness of this, he says, 
came on him, ‘only by degrees’.9 This gradual movement would culminate in his 
reception into the Roman Catholic Church in October 1845. Newman’s conversion is a 
significant underlying factor for Coleridge in Biographia 1847, in which she defines 
STC’s conceptual relationship with Anglo-Catholicism and Roman Catholicism.  
 Also in 1845, Tory Prime Minister Sir Robert Peel, for reasons of political 
expediency, ‘passed an act of Parliament to give money for the Roman Catholic Church 
in Ireland’, for the renovation of a seminary at Maynooth.10 This measure increased 
hostility towards Anglo-Catholics, and renewed tensions in the relationship of church 
and state. Some High Churchmen regarded the Maynooth grant in the same light as ‘the 
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Whig suppression of the Irish bishoprics’ in 1833, and condemned it as state support for 
‘theological error’. Other High Churchmen, such as Gladstone, supported the measure 
on the grounds of ‘social justice’ and toleration.11 Meanwhile, tensions arose among the 
laity in 1845. A movement to revive church ritual, inspired by Tractarianism, culminated 
in violent protests among the public in Exeter, who were encouraged by sections of the 
press to regard ‘the surplice’ as ‘the badge of a party which declared war on the 
Protestant Reformation’.12 Ward and Frederick Oakely, another of Newman’s outspoken 
disciples, were notoriously ‘obsessed’ with attacking ‘the Reformers’.13 Eleanor A. 
Towle, Coleridge’s first biographer, describes the tense religious atmosphere of 1845: 
‘even those whose hold upon Christian verities and the doctrines of the Church was most 
tenacious were clinging to an anchor in the midst of the storm’.14  
 Divisions between opposing parties in the church were brought into even sharper 
focus by the political upheavals of 1846. Sir Robert Peel resigned as Prime Minister in 
June, when Tory unity collapsed following his repeal of the Corn Laws. Coleridge, in a 
letter of 1850, praises Peel as a principled ‘practical statesman’, who had acted 
according to what he judged ‘under the circumstances, necessary, let them say what they 
might, let him lose office or retain it’.15 What Coleridge admires as Peel’s courageous 
practicality had made him unpopular with those of a High Church and High Tory 
persuasion, especially Tractarians: ‘Newman […] loathed Peel’s politics’, Turner 
observes.16 Peel had supported Catholic Emancipation in 1829, and, in his first ministry, 
had promoted the Commission for ecclesiastical reform. He believed that the survival of 
the established church would depend on its capacity to adapt to political and social 
change. Pragmatically supportive of the church, Peel opposed the Tractarians for their 
rigid dogmatism, and sought to appoint opponents of Tractarianism to bishoprics. The 
Whig leader, Lord John Russell, who followed Peel as Prime Minister in 1846, was 
committedly anti-clerical and anti-Tractarian. He ‘considered baptism’, for example, ‘to 
be a mere symbol of dedication’. He pursued the suppression of Tractarianism as a 
deliberate policy, and encouraged liberal theology. Russell was supported in his 
liberalizing approach by Prince Albert, whose German background led him to favour the 
appointment of ‘“scientists” […] to high office in the church’.17 Coleridge, who had 
advocated ‘scientific divinity’ in ‘On Rationalism’, was, in 1846, on the same liberal 
wing of ecclesiastical controversy as the new Whig Prime Minister and his royal 
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supporter.18 Coleridge approves equally of the ministries of Peel and Russell, which 
reflects her liberal and independent approach to politics and religion.  
 
The Principled Independence of Coleridgean Authorship 
In Biographia 1847, Coleridge emphasizes STC’s independence from ‘any […] sect or 
party’, political or religious (p. lxii). She refers to a misconception, expressed by the 
Christian Miscellany in 1842, that he had once been ‘engaged in a course of heretical 
and schismatical teaching’; in other words, that he had been employed as a Unitarian 
preacher (p. lii). This past allegiance unbalances STC’s ‘Christian philosophy’, the 
journal maintains, and gives rise to ‘inconsistencies’ in his view of ‘Catholic truths’ (p. 
lii). Coleridge explains that, although he had ‘[o]nce […] entertained thoughts’ of 
becoming a Unitarian minister, he had soon ‘abandoned the prospect that had been held 
out to him’ (pp. lxvi, lxvii). She argues that, far from having been ‘impaired’ as a 
Christian thinker by his early Unitarianism, STC learned ‘to perceive the deficiencies 
and errors of the creed in which he had sought refuge’ (p. lxvii). Coleridge’s argument 
supports STC’s statement, ‘that the difference of my metaphysical notions from those of 
Unitarians in general contributed to my final re-conversion to the whole truth in 
Christ’.19 STC’s Unitarian phase, Coleridge contends, was ‘a strengthening experiment’, 
which would enable him, ultimately, ‘to arrive at a more explicit knowledge of the truth’ 
(p. lxvii). J. Robert Barth, in his influential study, Coleridge and Christian Doctrine 
(1969), gives a similar account of underlying continuity in STC’s movement from 
‘Unitarianism to Trinitarian Christianity’. Barth makes no reference to Coleridge’s 
interpretation, but, stating that STC’s Unitarianism ‘was a stage through which, for his 
spiritual growth, he had to pass’, he echoes her view.20  
 Coleridge elaborates on the contribution of Unitarianism to the whole body of 
STC’s Christian thought. It prepared him, she argues, for the application of Kantian 
critical philosophy to Christian faith: his insight into the ‘deep and perfect harmony’ of 
‘the whole scheme of Redemption’ with ‘the structure of the human mind’ (p. lxviii). 
Coleridge indicates that there was nothing to prevent STC, having abandoned 
Unitarianism, from adopting ‘High Church doctrine’ (p. lxix). Equally, she suggests, he 
might have ‘combined German metaphysics with an atheistic Pantheism, instead of 
bringing them into the service of revealed religion’ (p. lxix). STC adduced diverse 
sources in ‘the formation’ of his Christian philosophy, the synthesis of which, Coleridge 
argues, was ‘the result and product of his own intellect and will’ (p. lxviii). His 
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philosophy avoids sectarian bias, therefore, and offers a universal perspective. 
Sectarianism, for Coleridge, resists creative synthesis. She rejects Newman’s argument 
for ‘party religion’, that ‘Christ […] made a party the vehicle of his doctrine’ (p. lxii). 
She maintains that ‘party compact’ is a conservative force, which represses the heurism 
of those ‘who are labouring to advance the truth, to reform and expand the stock of 
divine knowledge’ (pp. lxiv, lxv). This is not a restatement of Romantic individual 
genius. Coleridge envisages that a variety of thinkers, who may express contrasting 
individual viewpoints, contribute to the advancement of truth. She contends that truth is 
maintained, and the ‘Church at large […] preserved from error’ by theological 
‘controversy’; or ‘discussion’, as she prefers to call it.21 She values and respects the work 
of all contributors to religious debate, even those with whom she disagrees. This 
principle influences her use of literary form in the ‘Extracts’ and Dialogues on 
Regeneration. Furthermore, in her promotion of Christian truth, the vocational task is 
foregrounded, not the writer’s literary individuality.  
 For Coleridge, as for Newman, the religious writer works in service of 
Christianity, and must abjure ‘the pretence of authorship’.22 At the opening of Tract 1, 
Newman announces his authorial ethic: he writes as an anonymous ‘Presbyter’. To speak 
‘in [his] own person’ would be to ‘take too much on [him]self’. Yet, it is a sacred duty to 
defend the church, ‘for the times are very evil’.23 Coleridge follows Newman’s model of 
self-effacing authorship, and defines STC’s literary identity in terms of his religious 
duty. STC’s ‘vocation’, she asserts, ‘was to defend the Holy Faith by developing it, and 
showing its accordance and identity with ideas of reason’ (p. lxv). This concept of 
individual identity subsumed in the authorial ‘vocation’ is a Tractarian ideal, reflected 
also in the ‘monotonous’ impersonal delivery of Pusey’s sermons.24 It inflects 
Coleridge’s account of STC as a Christian writer, and shapes her developing conception 
of her own authorship. 
 
STC, Newman and Coleridge: Cross Currents of Influence and Tension 
Newman is the starting point for Coleridge’s autonomous work as a theologian. Her 
desire to engage with Newman motivates her to undertake ‘On Rationalism’. She lays no 
claim to be an objective academic theologian: she does not approach STC’s philosophy 
as an historian of ideas. To do so would preclude her application of STC’s thought to 
contemporary situations. Gadamer explains the ontological problem of an historical 
approach: 
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The text that is understood historically is forced to abandon its claim to be 
saying something true. We think we understand when we see the past from a 
historical standpoint — ie., transpose ourselves into the historical situation and 
try to reconstruct the historical horizon. In fact, however, we have given up the 
claim to find in the past any truth that is valid and intelligible for ourselves. 
Acknowledging the otherness of the other in this way, making him the object of 
objective knowledge, involves the fundamental suspension of his claim to 
truth.25  
 
Gadamer’s critique enables a clear distinction to be drawn between academic definition 
and creative re-application of historical material. Coleridge uses STC’s metaphysics as a 
means to create ‘truth’ anew in a new setting. She is a Christian Apologist, working in a 
public arena of volatile polemic. When her eminent High Church, High Tory brother-in-
law, John, teases her with a reference to ‘Eichhorn, Schleiermacher or some of your 
Neologistic friends’, Coleridge retorts with a robust statement of her polemical 
methodology. She describes her procedure as ‘an attentive perusal of the writings of Mr. 
Newman, a comparison of his views […] with those of S.T.C. – those of both with our 
old Divines, and the whole with the Bible’.26 Coleridge ‘mediate[s]’ her ‘present’ 
situation with Scripture, ‘historical tradition’, and the more recent history of STC’s 
metaphysics.27 Her frame of reference is far broader and more rigorous than John’s taunt 
allowed. On a personal level, her foregrounding of Newman is tactically shrewd. John 
was a friend of Keble, Newman’s close associate, and would at length become his 
biographer. Coleridge’s statement of method is combined with a firm assertion of her 
authorial identity as a female theologian: ‘women exercise a considerable influence over 
the religion of this land, even speculatively’, she tells John. She claims the ability, and 
prerogative, of women to exercise a ‘masculine vigour’ in religious writing.28 She 
relishes taking on Newman, both as a source and as an opponent. 
 Coleridge’s discussion of STC’s Christian philosophy is inflected by her 
awareness of some affinities between Newman and STC. STC’s influence emerges most 
clearly in Newman’s later work, as Philip Rule shows when he compares Aids to 
Reflection with An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent (1870). 29 However, there are 
earlier instances of what STC himself might have called ‘genial coincidence’, as 
Newman recognizes on first reading STC in 1835: ‘I […] am surprised’, he declares, 
‘how much I thought mine, is to be found’ in STC’s writings. Newman comments 
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privately that STC’s work ‘seems capable of rendering’ the Oxford Movement 
‘important service’. In the April edition of The British Critic in 1839, Newman cites 
Scott, Wordsworth, Southey and STC as Romantic predecessors who have helped to 
create a cultural ethos conducive to the reception of Catholic doctrine. Newman 
celebrates, also, what he sees as ‘the old Benthamism shrivelling up, and the richer 
warmer philosophies succeeding’, such as ‘Shelleyism, and Coleridgism’ at Cambridge, 
‘edging forward and forward, no one knowing how, to a more Catholic theology’.30 
  In Biographia 1847, though, Coleridge draws a clear distinction between STC’s 
‘teaching’ and ‘the Oxford theology’. Some Anglo-Catholics, she observes,  
  
aver that, in the beginning of their course they were conducted for a little way by 
the writings of [STC]; that he first led them out of the dry land of negative 
Protestantism; but that now, by help of newer guides, they have advanced 
beyond him.  
 
Their view of ‘Aids to Reflection as a half-way house to Anglo-catholic orthodoxy’ is 
‘radically wrong’, Coleridge maintains. Others, she adds, who have advanced further in 
acceptance of Catholic theology, ‘consider their Anglo-Catholic doctrine a half-way 
house to what they consider the true Catholicism – namely that of the Church of Rome’ 
(p. lxxi). The relationship of the Oxford theology with Roman Catholicism remained a 
contested issue in 1847, two years after the reception into the Roman Church of 
Newman, and his controversial disciples, W. G. Ward and Frederick Oakley. If Roman 
Catholicism was the inevitable destination of Newman’s Anglo-Catholic journey, 
Coleridge refutes the notion that STC’s religious thought might be a preliminary step on 
the same route.   
 She argues that STC’s ‘religious system, considered as to its intellectual form’, 
is ‘different throughout from that of Anglo or Roman Catholic’. Nonetheless, she 
‘believe[s]’ that STC’s Christian philosophy ‘coincide[s]’ with the core ‘substance’ of 
‘Catholic doctrine’, as held both by Roman and Anglican churches (p. lxxi). She 
maintains that STC’s ‘Christian divinity agreed more with “Catholicism” than with the 
doctrines of any sect’. Although the ‘objects of faith’ of STC’s Christian philosophy are 
those of Anglo and Roman Catholicism, his ‘rationale’ – methodology – is 
fundamentally different.31 For STC, the ‘objects of faith’ are apprehended in the ‘reason 
and spiritual sense’; Anglo-Catholics and Roman Catholics receive the ‘objects of faith’ 
through the authority of dogma (p. lxxii). Coleridge admits that she held one bias in 
embarking on her study of STC’s religious philosophy. This was ‘the natural wish […] 
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to find [his] opinions as near as may be to established orthodoxy’. Ultimately, though, 
she has no alternative but to admit that STC’s ‘system of belief’, in its intellectual form, 
‘differs materially from “Catholic” doctrine as commonly understood’ (p. lxxiii). She 
finds that the distance between STC’s thought and “‘Catholic” doctrine’ increased 
during his later years, and she attributes this increasing division to the Kantian basis of 
his epistemology. 
 Nonetheless, there is a similarity between STC’s attitudes to Anglican and 
Roman orthodoxy and those that Newman came to hold by the early 1840s. STC, 
contends Coleridge, ‘came to consider the notions of the Church entertained by ordinary 
Protestants inadequate and unspiritual’ (pp. lxix-lxx). Equally, he rejected key ‘Romish 
doctrines’ (p. lxx). Newman, likewise, found himself isolated in a middle ground 
between Protestant and Catholic orthodoxies. According to James Tolhurst, the Newman 
of Tract 90  ‘did not want [the English Church] to be papistical. But he also did not want 
it to be protestant’.32 Coleridge attributes the Church’s lack of doctrinal cohesion to the 
imprecision of its professional discourse, while Newman regards ‘half the religious 
controversies’ as ‘verbal ones’.33 For Coleridge, STC’s application of Kantian 
philosophy to religion addresses the conceptual deficiencies of Anglicanism: ‘modern 
mental philosophy […] shew[s] what spiritual things are not’, Coleridge insists, ‘and 
thus […] remove[s] the obstructions which prevent men from seeing […] what they are’ 
(p. lxxv).34 She refers to materialistic ‘obstructions’ to spiritual understanding produced 
by the Church ‘Fathers’, who ‘change[d] soul into body, and condense[d] spirit into 
matter’: Tertullian, for example, describes the soul as ‘a lucid aerial image of the 
outward man’, which ‘accords exactly’ with the ‘common conception of a ghost’ (p. 
lxxvii). 
 
Baptism and the Eucharist: ‘It is our Will to which [Christ] is Present’ 
Coleridge argues that Tractarian baptismal doctrine is vitiated by primitive materialism. 
She re-engages with Pusey’s Scriptural Views of Holy Baptism. She argues that Pusey is 
influenced by early Christian writers who ‘conceiv[e] spiritual subjects’ in a ‘sensuous 
way’ (p. lxxvii). The problem of relying on the early writers is that vacuous ‘dogma’ is 
confused with ‘religious verity’ (p. lxxix). As Coleridge puts it: ‘the Antiquarian 
doctrine’ of baptism ‘contradicts the laws of human understanding, and either affirms 
what cannot be true […] or converts the doctrine into an ineffectual vapour’ (pp. lxxx-
lxxxi). STC, by contrast, viewed baptism in two ways, Coleridge explains. First, 
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institutionally, it is ‘a formal and public reception into a state of spiritual opportunities’ 
(p. lxxx). This is close to the Evangelical position: ‘most Evangelicals regarded baptism 
as little more than an initiation into the visible church’, Nockles observes.35 Spiritually, 
STC held baptism to be ‘an external grant […] which comes into effect gradually, as the 
will yields to the pressure of the Spirit from without, but which may be made of none 
effect by the will’s resistance’ (p. lxxxii). Coleridge appropriates and re-develops this 
formulation in her writings on regeneration.  
 Coleridge tested her views on regeneration and baptism in an intensive exchange 
of letters with liberal theologian and future Christian Socialist, F. D. Maurice. Maurice 
found ‘On Rationalism’ compelling and provocative. He wrote five letters to Coleridge 
between May 1843 and March 1844 in response to her essay. Baptism is a major theme 
of the correspondence. Maurice’s dialogue with Coleridge was of decisive significance 
for him, as Frank M. McClain suggests:  
 
Maurice’s correspondence with Sara Coleridge is fresh and valuable. To accept 
the integrity of the mystery [of baptism], all the while open to the widest 
possibilities of its meaning, may be the distinctively Anglican contribution 
which Maurice has made to Christian thought.36 
 
Maurice differs from Coleridge on a fundamental point. He asserts that baptism ‘takes 
[him] out of [his] little circle of individual thought & feelings, that it connects [him] with 
the universe’.37 This is reminiscent of Newman’s concept of justification, that it ‘buries 
self in the absorbing vision of a present, an indwelling God’.38 Similarly, Maurice tells 
Coleridge that baptism ‘save[s]’ him from his ‘individuality’.39 Maurice is a 
Coleridgean: he acknowledges his debt to STC in The Kingdom of Christ (1842), which 
he dedicates to Derwent. Coleridge, however, disagrees fundamentally with Maurice’s 
concept of baptism as liberation from self. She says that ‘one great object’ of ‘On 
Rationalism’ was ‘to shew that it is our personality which is the ground of our union 
with Christ in the Spirit – that it is our will to which He is present’. The active, 
continuing response of the individual will to Divine influence forms the core of 
Coleridge’s theology: ‘[w]e work out our own salvation’, she tells Maurice.40  
 Coleridge emphasizes the engagement of the individual will with Divine 
influence in her account of the Eucharist. STC’s writings on the Eucharist are scattered 
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and unsystematic: Coleridge’s task is that of creative reconstruction. She describes 
STC’s Christian philosophy as drawing together Lutheran consubstantiation with 
Catholic transubstantiation, ‘so as not to involve a contradiction in terms’ (p. xci). She 
adds that ‘neither doctrine is necessary’ in relation to the spiritual ‘gift and effect’ of the 
Eucharist (p. xci). Her account of STC’s view accords with ‘Anglican teaching’, which, 
in the words of E. C. S. Gibson, ‘rejects all […] theories’ on the presence of the Lord’s 
Body and Blood in the Eucharist, ‘whether that of Transubstantiation, or […] 
Consubstantiation’.41 Coleridge describes ‘the Supper of the Lord’ as a ‘spiritual 
doctrine’, which STC understands as ‘an assimilation of the spirit of a man to the divine 
humanity’ (p. xci). In Biographia 1847, as in ‘On Rationalism’, Coleridge presents the 
Tractarian interpretation of the sacraments, as sanctioned by the Church Fathers, as 
contrary to reason, lacking in moral substance, and repressive: it circumscribes and 
restricts the operation of God’s mercy. Coleridge, by contrast, is committed to an 
inclusive and liberating theology. As she puts it in her discussion of baptism, ‘[o]ur 
capability of being spiritualized by divine grace is unlimited’ (p. lxxx). She approaches 
the contested ground of justification from this viewpoint. 
 
Newman, Luther and Justification 
Coleridge devotes thirty pages to a discussion of justification. This amounts to almost a 
quarter of the whole sub-section on ‘Mr. Coleridge’s Religious Opinions’. She revisits 
Lectures on Justification, and engages in a critical re-application of STC’s ideas and 
methods. In her discussion of justification, Coleridge ‘bring[s] [STC] down into the 
present hour’, as she puts it in Essays, and applies his principles, in her own terms, to 
‘subjects which are even now engaging public attention’.42 Her discussion of 
justification anticipates Gadamer’s hermeneutic principle in which past texts are brought 
into ‘thoughtful mediation with contemporary life’, and in which ‘[t]he past and the 
present mutually shape each other’.43 A question remains: why does Coleridge choose to 
critique a work published nine years before Biographia 1847, if she aims to bring STC 
‘down into the present hour’?44   
  Newman’s Lectures on Justification, from its publication in 1838, was 
continuously influential. It was a work of authority and conspicuous achievement, 
‘Newman’s most powerful, eloquent, and moving theological work’, according to 
Turner: ‘[i]ts arguments […] deeply informed all later Tractarian theological polemics 
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against evangelical religion and historical Protestantism’.45 The Lectures’ themes 
remained unresolved in the Church of England through the 1840s. Tensions between 
Evangelical and High Church doctrines, such as had exercised Newman in the Lectures, 
would come to a head when the Gorham crisis erupted in December 1847. Coleridge 
states that Lectures on Justification ‘is generally considered by the High Anglican party 
as an utter demolition of Luther’s teaching’ (p. c). To re-engage with the Lectures offers 
Coleridge a significant authorial opportunity. According to Nockles, Newman attempts 
in the Lectures ‘to construct a via media that would embody a synthesis of various 
scattered strands of older High Anglican teaching’.46  
  At the beginning of ‘Lecture XII’, Newman presents a core component of his 
argument: ‘I now proceed to show that though we are justified, as St Paul says, by faith, 
and as our Articles and Homilies say, by faith only, nevertheless we are justified, as St 
James says, by works’. Newman contends that St Paul conceives of justifying faith as 
being expressed in action. He observes that St Paul and St James support their positions 
by reference to the same Old Testament examples, most notably that of Abraham: ‘St 
Paul […] says, “By faith Abraham, when he was tried, offered up Isaac”; and St James, 
“Was not Abraham our father justified by works, when he had offered Isaac his son upon 
the altar?”’ Such a parallel, Newman argues, ‘show[s] that faith is practically identical 
with the works of faith, and that when it justifies, it is as existing in works’. He 
maintains, also, that his viewpoint is supported by ‘the notion, which obtained in the 
early Church, that St James was alluding to St Paul’s words, and fixing their sense by an 
inspired comment’. Newman cites a passage from Luther in which, he alleges, the 
Reformer ‘will be found to corroborate by his testimony’ the Catholic view of 
justification.47 Newman contends that the weight of evidence forces Luther into a 
position in which he unwillingly validates the Catholic doctrine. Coleridge, by contrast, 
seeks to resolve divisions in a re-establishment of Lutheran principles. She reverses 
Newman’s conclusion and argues that, far from demolishing Luther’s ‘teaching’ on 
justification, the Lectures on Justification amount to a ‘tacit establishment of it, or at 
least of its most important position’: 
 
  on this cardinal point, this hinge of the question, whether faith justifies alone, as 
 uniting us with  Christ, or as informed by love and works, and as itself a work 
 and a part of Christian holiness,—[Newman] decides with Luther, not with the 
 Tridentines or High Anglicans. For he expressly states that faith does in one 
 sense, (the sense of uniting us with Christ, which is the same as Luther’s sense,) 
 justify alone; that it is the “only inward instrument of justification”; that as such 
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 inward instrument, it is […] distinct from love and other graces, and not a mere 
 name for them all (p. c).48    
 
Newman had argued that Luther ultimately reinforces the Catholic position. Coleridge 
concludes that, in attempting to critique Luther’s doctrine of justification by faith, 
Newman has in fact confirmed it.  
 The tone of Coleridge’s discussion is measured and irenic: she refers to ‘Mr. 
Newman’s splendid work on justification’ (c). She pays tribute to W. G. Ward, and 
records her strong ‘interest’ in his Ideal of a Christian Church, while regretting his 
book’s treatment of Luther and of justification (p. cvii n, p. cvii). At only one point does 
her assured critique of Newman’s argument assume a satirical tone. She employs a trope 
of love and marriage to express the celibate Newman’s instinctive and irresistible 
attraction to Luther’s teaching:  
 
  Mr. Newman has beautifully described Luther’s conception of justifying  
  faith in his first Lecture. It was then perhaps that he fell in love with it, though 
  he did not tell love at the time, but acted the lover in Lecture X taking it for 
  better for worse. I hope he will never divorce it! 
 
Coleridge’s mildly satirical humour supports her argument that apparently divergent 
views of justification bear ‘no real difference at all’. Ultimately, she maintains that there 
is no disagreement ‘about the proper cause of salvation, but only concerning the internal 
condition on our part’ (pp. xcvi, xcv).49 She argues that ‘[t]he Tridentine and the 
Anglican statements of Justification are tantamount to each other,—may be resolved into 
each other’ (p. xcix). For both Luther and Newman, she contends, faith is the instrument 
of justification, and faith makes us one with Christ. Newman seeks to separate himself 
from Luther by arguing that baptism is faith’s ‘antecedent external instrument’, and ‘that 
Baptism gives to faith all its justifying power’. Again, though, Coleridge maintains that 
there is no real difference, because Luther ‘held the doctrine of regeneration in baptism 
as well as [Newman]’ (p. ci).  
 She moderates the apparent disagreement by placing Lutheran teaching in 
historical context. Luther opposed ‘justification by charity’, because it led to the corrupt 
expedient of ‘money gifts’: he ‘thought to preclude this abuse and establish Scripture at 
the same time by declaring faith alone the means of salvation, and good works the 
necessary offspring of faith in the heart’ (pp. cii, ciii). In doing so, he ‘batter[ed] down 
for as many as possible that labyrinth of priestly salvation, in the mazy windings of 
which the timid and tender-conscienced wander weary and distressed’ (cxxvi). Luther 
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liberates the Christian to ‘cast [her] eye [safely] forward, in peace and gladness, hoping 
and striving through grace to live better from day to day’, instead of being ‘paralyzed’ 
by dwelling on ‘past transgressions’ (p. cix). Characteristically, Coleridge prioritizes 
individual devotion and the Christian life in her analysis of doctrine.  
 According to Coleridge, any division on the ‘subject’ of justification is 
ultimately ‘a mere dispute about words’ (p. xcvii). Twenty-first century theologian, 
Alistair E. McGrath, concurs. He maintains that the Council of Trent had misinterpreted 
Luther’s teaching on justification and, in ‘conced[ing] that the Christian life was begun 
through faith’, came very close to Luther’s position. This Catholic versus Protestant 
controversy, according to McGrath, was ‘a classic case of a theological 
misunderstanding, resting upon the disputed meaning of a major theological term’.50 
Coleridge’s insistence that the disagreement is essentially semantic anticipates, also, 
Newman’s retrospective view. In the ‘Advertisement’ to the ‘Third Edition’ of Lectures 
on the Doctrine of Justification (1874), he summarizes the lectures’ overarching theme: 
‘[t]heir drift is to show that there is little difference but what is verbal in the various 
views on justification, found whether among Catholic or Protestant divines’.51 In 1838, 
Newman had located the verbal difficulties in a Protestant ‘extravagance of 
interpretation’ which seeks ‘to cripple an Apostle [St James] into Lutheranism’.52 
Coleridge contends that the common ground between Newman and Luther negates the 
‘High Anglican’ view that ‘Luther’s teaching’ has been demolished (p. c).  
 Coleridge draws her discussion of justification to a close by summarizing the 
seven points of agreement she identifies between Luther and Newman. The one 
difference between them arises from the ‘contradiction’ in Newman’s ‘scheme’ that, 
‘after confessing faith to be the sole inward instrument of justification he should call 
graces and works instruments also’ (p. cxix).53 Ultimately, Coleridge turns to ‘Apostolic 
teaching’ and contends that St. Paul and St. James would have endorsed the views both 
of Luther and Newman: ‘I believe these inspired teachers’, Coleridge affirms, ‘would 
have assented to the statement of either party, and when they heard each confess Christ 
crucified and salvation by His merits, would have inquired no further’ (p. cxxii). 
Therefore, she dismisses the disputed definitions that surround justification as mere 
‘bubbles’ in relation to the major issues of religion (p. cxxiii). At a time when 
Christianity is threatened by scientific materialism and continental scriptural criticism, 
‘[i]t is grievous to hear Christians accuse each other of irreligion and impiety on such 
grounds as their different views’ of justification (p. cxxii). Her dismissal of Tractarian 
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polemics as trivial and sectarian is a shrewd tactic. She sets the stage for the contrasting 
universality of STC’s Christian philosophy: in his study of Kant, she contends, STC 
found that the structure of human cognition is attuned to the presence of the Divine. 
 
Kant and Christianity  
Coleridge presents STC as the heuristic discoverer of Kant’s religious significance. Kant 
was ‘a reformer of philosophy’, whose work, as mediated by STC, is as liberating for 
Christianity as that of Luther.54 She refers to the prejudice against all German philosophy 
in England, and to the disapproval STC incurred by ‘his partial advocacy of Spinoza’. 
She wishes at the outset of her discussion, therefore, to set STC’s ‘esteem’ of Kant in its 
‘true light, lest it be mistaken for what it is not’, namely atheism (p. cxxviii). On the 
contrary, Coleridge argues, Kant’s philosophical achievements undermine atheism. It 
was Kant ‘who […] overthrew the grand atheistic argument of Hume’, and ‘stated the 
fundamental error in the Pantheistic system of Spinoza’. Religious orthodoxy ‘abused it 
as impious; [Kant] alone proved it to be irrational’ (p. cxxx).  
 Kant’s appeal for STC was his refutation of the mechanistic and atheistic 
implications of Locke and Hume. The empiricism ‘adopted by both philosophers’, Kant 
proclaims, ‘cannot be reconciled with the scientific a priori knowledge that we actually 
have, namely, the knowledge in pure mathematics and general natural science, and is 
therefore refuted by this fact’.55 As James Vigus observes, Kant asserted ‘the active 
nature of mind’ and ‘decisively countered the empiricist teaching which [STC] summed 
up as “consciousness considered as a result” of mere mechanical processes’.56 Kant’s 
great service to Christianity, Coleridge contends, is that he ‘saw what Hume saw not, 
that there is a power in the human mind sufficient to support and substantiate religion’ 
(p. cxxxviii). It is an advantage that Kant was not personally religious and was 
‘independent of religious shackles’, she maintains (p. cxxxvi). He sets out with no 
preconceived dogmatic agenda; his ‘investigation’ is purely analytical, as he states in his 
‘Introduction’ to Critique of Pure Reason: he presents a ‘critique […] not a doctrine; his 
aim is not […] to expand our knowledge, but […] to correct it’.57 This critical 
methodology, Coleridge contends, enables Kant to produce, ‘independently and 
abstractly’, the ‘a priori map of the human mind’, and to describe its structure and limits 
(p. cxxxvi). Kant provides the basis for establishing ‘the harmony of the outward 
revelation with our internal conformation’ (p. cxxxvii). His conclusions, therefore, open 
the way for STC to establish, by scientific – philosophical – method, ‘the religion of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Coleridge’s emphasis. 
55 Kant, p. 119. 
56 James Vigus, Platonic Coleridge (London: Legenda, 2009), p. 41. 
57 Kant, p. 53. 
	   143	  
heart and conscience’ and ‘the law written in the heart’ (p. cxxxix).  
 In Biographia 1847, Coleridge develops ‘On Rationalism’s’ epistemological 
critique of Tractarianism. Her account of Kant directly opposes Newman’s view of the 
mind. Newman defines ‘Liberalism’ as ‘the exercise of thought upon matters, in which, 
from the constitution of the human mind, thought cannot be brought to any successful 
issue, and therefore is out of place’. He adds that ‘revealed doctrines […] are in their 
nature beyond and independent’ of the mind. It is wrong, Newman continues, to attempt 
‘to determine on intrinsic grounds the truth and value of propositions which rest for their 
reception simply on the external authority of the Divine Word’.58 Because the mind, 
according to Newman, is unable to ‘determine’ religious ‘truth’, Tractarianism’s claims 
are based on ‘external authority’, derived from antiquity and tradition. Coleridge, by 
contrast, holds that ‘the intellectual form’ of religion is clarified by application of 
Kantian methodology (p. cxxxvi). She invokes STC’s view that to base faith on ‘external 
evidence’ is ‘a most venturous and blind proceeding’, and that scripture ‘refers us to 
internal evidence as the only satisfying and adequate evidence of religion’ (p. cxxxix). 
She explains the separate roles of Kant and STC in establishing a philosophical 
framework for Christianity. Kant’s method is ‘analytic’; STC’s ‘synthetic’ (p. cxxxviii). 
According to Kant, ‘the first and most important task of philosophy [is] to deprive 
metaphysics once and for all of its pernicious influence, by blocking off the source of its 
errors’.59 Coleridge contends that Kant ‘shatter[s]’ misconceptions as ‘a necessary 
preliminary to the construction of what is sound’. This ‘preliminary’ work must then be 
‘enlivened and spiritualized’ by ‘the English mind’ (p. cxxxi). STC applied ‘imaginative 
power’ to Kant’s analytical conclusions, and sought to establish a ‘pure’ form of 
‘religion’ by synthesizing ‘the many into one’, and assessing ‘the parts with reference to 
the whole’ (p. cxxxi, p. cxxxii). 
 Coleridge’s account of the application of Kantian philosophy to Christianity 
reflects her religious liberalism. She takes respectful issue with Arthur Hallam, who 
brands ‘the spirit of critical philosophy’ as ‘much more dangerous than the spirit of 
mechanical philosophy’ (p. cxxxii). Coleridge rejects ‘the mechanical philosophy’ as 
being incompatible with Christianity. She then uses her characteristic image of the 
confluence of streams of flowing water, which blend to form a single current. Kantian 
metaphysics, Coleridge asserts, ‘is capable of flowing along with [Christianity] in one 
channel and even blending with it in one stream, as I contend that it does in the Christian 
philosophy of [STC]’. She elaborates on this dynamic synthesis by drawing an analogy 
with Wordsworth’s poetry. Kantian critical philosophy, she asserts, ‘is like the highest 
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poetry—like the poetry of Mr. Wordsworth, not religion itself, much less dogmatic 
divinity, but cognate with it and harmoniously co-operative’ (p. cxxxiii). In a footnote, 
she explains that she is not referring to Wordsworth’s Ecclesiastical Sonnets, or the parts 
of the Excursion that are ‘expressly Christian and Catholic’. She alludes to his ‘poetry in 
general, including much of an earlier date than’ those she has mentioned, ‘in which 
formal religion is not apparent, but in which the spirit of Christianity is “the spirit of the 
whole’” (p. cxxxiii n.). Coleridge’s association of the earlier Wordsworth with ‘the spirit 
of Christianity’ aligns her with Keble. In 1839 Oxford University conferred an honorary 
degree upon Wordsworth, and Keble gave the formal Oration. In his speech, Keble paid 
tribute to the poet’s having revealed the ‘secret and harmonious intimacy which exists 
between honourable Poverty, and the severer Muses, sublime Philosophy, yea, even our 
most holy Religion’. For Coleridge, Wordsworth’s poetry embodies ‘the truths 
expressed or understood in the Gospel illustrated by the Imagination’.60 
 Coleridge adds that Kantian philosophy is ‘harmoniously co-operative’ with 
‘religion’, though, like Wordsworth’s poetry, not in a dogmatic sense (p. cxxxiii). In her 
discussion of Kant, Coleridge places the German alongside two of her literary fathers. 
This implies that, by association, she confers upon Kant the status of an intellectual 
father. His epistemology underpins her whole theology, and defines the unique position 
she occupies in the religious culture of the mid-1840s. She does not simply repeat STC’s 
Kantian formulations: she restates and reapplies them in her own terms and language. 
Her image of the sky and sea to represent the Kantian model of mind (discussed above, 
in chapter 2) shows this.61 As STC’s Victorian mediator, Coleridge stands above and 
beyond STC as a re-interpreter of Kant. She analyzes STC’s relationship with German 
thought in her edition of Biographia Literaria, and describes the textual and intellectual 
processes by which STC appropriates his sources. By these means Coleridge constructs 
the conceptual base from which she mounts her independent critique of Tractarianism.  
 
Baptismal Regeneration and The Gorham Case 
Coleridge’s ‘Extracts from A New Treatise on Regeneration’ was published in 1848, at 
the end of ‘Appendix C’ of the second volume of the sixth edition of Aids to Reflection. 
This new work addresses the doctrine of baptismal regeneration that became the site of 
acute ecclesiastical and political tension between 1847 and 1850. The crisis was 
triggered in August 1847 when the Lord Chancellor offered to the Reverend George 
Gorham, an evangelical, the incumbency of Brampford Speke, a small rural parish near 
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Exeter. The traditional High Church Bishop Phillpotts of Exeter, though, refused to 
institute Gorham on the grounds that his principles were unsound. Gorham had already 
incurred the Bishop’s displeasure by advertising for ‘a curate “free from Tractarian 
error”’ in his Cornish parish.62 Bishop Phillpotts refused to institute Gorham in the new 
parish until he had tested his theology.  
  The Bishop’s examination of Gorham ‘was solely concerned with the doctrine of 
baptismal regeneration’. Although this doctrine is the theme of Coleridge’s ‘Extracts’, 
she does not mention the Gorham case in it directly. This is because she is concerned 
with the underlying theological principles; though she discusses the case’s politico-
religious implications in letters. The Bishop’s first session of questioning, in December 
1847, lasted thirty-eight hours. The interrogation was resumed nearly three months later 
for a further fourteen hours. At the conclusion of proceedings, the Bishop confirmed that 
he found Gorham’s doctrines to be unorthodox, and maintained his refusal to institute 
him as incumbent of Brampford Speke. The case was then subject to lengthy appeals 
procedures: first in the ecclesiastical court of arches, and ultimately before the judicial 
committee of the Privy Council. The outcome of this protracted inquiry was potentially 
disastrous for the Church of England: ‘[i]f the judicial committee upheld Phillpotts, 
many evangelicals might be compelled to secede from the Church of England’, 
according to Chadwick. Equally, ‘if the judicial committee upheld Gorham, the powerful 
body of high churchmen might secede from the Church of England or try to insist on its 
disestablishment’. At length, in March 1850, the Privy Council upheld Gorham’s 
position, and declared that his views did not contravene church doctrine. High 
Churchmen felt that this outcome threatened the survival of the Church of England. 
Particularly, they did not regard the Privy Council’s judicial committee as a legitimate 
body for determining religious doctrine. High Church Anglicans deplored the referral of 
such spiritual matters to an institution of the government: it was further evidence of 
Prime Minister Lord John Russell’s ‘erastian desire to keep the church under the heel of 
the state’.63  
 Coleridge’s view of the outcome of the Gorham case opposes that of High 
Churchmen, whether traditional or Anglo-Catholic. She opposes Bishop Phillpotts, sides 
with Gorham – despite regarding him as intellectually confused  – and views the Privy 
Council as an appropriate body to adjudicate on ‘what the law of the Church is’. In a 
letter to High Church clergyman Henry Taylor, she refers to ‘the late triumph of 
toleration and moderation, grand characteristics of the Reformed Religion, in the 
decision of the Privy Council in the Gorham case’. Coleridge elaborates on her political 
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opinion: ‘[i]nfallible guide we have none, and do not think it possible to have upon 
earth, but the doctrine of the Church of England has always been settled by the Church 
interpreting Scripture’. She then makes a distinction between the formulation and 
interpretation of doctrine: ‘[t]his judgment does but declare what the law of the Church 
is, what our formularies mean, and to make such a declaration is quite within the 
province of the learned body of which the Privy Council is composed’. In terms of the 
content of its judgment, the Privy Council ‘has but declared that to be an open question 
which has always been so’.64 In Coleridge’s view, the Privy Council upholds the 
church’s status and tradition. It confirms the church’s broad inclusiveness in leaving 
room for individual judgment.  
 As for the bitter caricature of Lord John Russell as ‘the “Pope of our Church’”, 
Coleridge admits that ‘in one sense he is so, and, as I believe, very properly and 
profitably for our country’. She adds a crucial distinction: ‘in another sense, the only one 
that concerns truly spiritual matters, he is not aught of the kind’. Coleridge divides the 
Church’s political and administrative functions from its spiritual character. This aligns 
her with an evangelical position that is less interested in church laws and procedures 
than in individual spirituality. Her views are wholly independent of any party, though. 
Although she supports Gorham on the grounds of religious liberty, she feels 
‘disagreement and dispathy with both parties’, and is inclined to ‘oppose’ both. Bishop 
Phillpotts attempts to extort from Gorham a narrower statement of belief than the 
relevant Article of the Church prescribes. Gorham, however, ‘betrays an ignorance of the 
history of thought and the nature of language on this particular subject of Baptism and 
the New Birth’. In Coleridge’s view, the Gorham crisis is rooted in a weak 
understanding of theological history on the one hand; and an imposition of arbitrary 
authority on the other. She regrets that the Church has no internal procedure for 
reconciling such differences as the case exposes. She feels that ‘a General Council of the 
Church’ should exist for the examination of contentious questions of doctrine. She refers 
to the precedent of Cardinal Contarini at the Council of Trent, who ‘sought so hard to 
bring about a reconciliation between the Protestants and the rest of the Western Church’. 
In the absence of such institutional procedures, the task of ‘ventilating and sifting’ the 
‘theology of all parties’ falls to individuals in collaborative dialogue.65 
 
'Extracts from a New Treatise on Regeneration’: the ‘idea of regeneration itself’ 
‘On Rationalism’ established the conceptual basis of Coleridge’s theology. In the essay, 
she rejects Tractarianism’s circumscription of God’s grace, and its oppressive assertion 
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of ecclesiastical authority over individual faith. The later essay complements ‘On 
Rationalism’ and develops the rationale of Coleridge’s religious position. There is a 
subtle shift in focus, which reflects the religious climate of 1848. In ‘On Rationalism’, 
Coleridge defines her opponents as ‘Anglican anti-protestants’, in other words, 
Tractarians, while in the ‘Extracts’ they are ‘High Churchmen’.66 From 1847 to 1850, 
the attack on liberal doctrines came principally from traditional High Church as well as 
Tractarian quarters: for example, in Phillpott’s campaign against the evangelical 
Gorham. In the ‘Extracts’, both Tractarian and traditional High Church parties are 
covered by the term, ‘High Churchmen’. Coleridge is concerned, in the ‘Extracts’, to 
balance a critique of her opponents’ doctrine against a clear, unambiguous assertion of 
her own position. This is implied in her statement of intention in Chapter 1. She defines 
Regeneration as  
 
a change wrought by the Holy Spirit on the intelligent will, gradually effected, 
with the active but subordinate co-operation of man at every step and throughout 
every stage of the process: a change which manifests itself in correspondent 
effects recognizable by man, in holiness of thought, word and deed. 
 
Coleridge then cites New Testament texts that support her position before stating the 
purpose of the ‘Extracts’: ‘[w]e are persuaded that our view is the truth, because it is that 
which best harmonizes with reason and the word of God. To the proof of this position, 
the present essay will be devoted’.67  
 Coleridge defines ‘[t]he will [as] the mind considered as determining its own 
acts’. High Church theologians, by contrast, conceive of the soul as ‘a dead receptacle’, 
which ‘can but receive what is poured into it as a […] goblet receives the wine with 
which it is filled’. Coleridge takes issue with High Churchmen’s profession that they 
‘have no metaphysics at all in their religion’. On the contrary, their unacknowledged 
epistemology is empiricist and mechanical: ‘a sensuous philosophy’. Against this 
Coleridge restates her dynamic alternative: ‘[t]he soul, we think, is essentially life and 
action, and the Holy Spirit acts upon it by exciting it to act in return as the strings of a 
harp vibrate under the harper’s hand, or those of an Aeolian Lute at the impulse of a 
passing breeze’.68 She refocuses in a Christian form STC’s pantheist imagery of 1795: 
   
 And what if all of animated nature 
 Be but organic harps diversely framed, 
 That tremble into thought, as o’er them sweeps 
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 Plastic and vast, one intellectual breeze, 
 At once the Soul of each, and God of All?69  
 
Coleridge superimposes a Christian meaning over STC’s pantheist speculation. This is 
reminiscent of her interpretation of STC’s Unitarian phase as an educative step in his 
progress towards the ‘universal ideas of Christianity’ (p. lxxii).  
 Coleridge may have read STC’s own revision of the eolian harp image. In the 
margin of a copy of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, STC rejects his earlier analogy:  
 
[t]he mind does not resemble an Eolian Harp, nor even a barrel-organ turned by 
a stream of water, conceive as many tunes mechanized in it as you like – but 
rather, as far as objects are concerned, a violin, or other instrument of few 
strings yet vast compass, played on by a musician of Genius’.70 
 
STC replaces the ‘vast’ impersonal ‘intellectual breeze’ of his poem with a ‘musician of 
Genius’. Both STC and Coleridge, in their revision of the poem’s imagery, use ‘a 
favourite metaphor’ of the Church Fathers for Biblical ‘inspiration’: that of a ‘musician 
who plays beautiful music on a stringed instrument’.71 STC’s revised formulation has a 
Christian resonance, whereas Coleridge appropriates the eolian harp image in overtly 
Christian terms, to express the intimate process by which ‘the Holy Spirit’ interacts with 
the individual ‘soul’.  
 
Regeneration and Moral Teaching 
In ‘On Rationalism’, Coleridge rejected Tractarian severity on the subject of post-
baptismal sin. In ‘Extracts’, she refutes the discouraging notion that the state of 
regeneration is not secure; that a regenerate individual remains always in danger of 
falling. She argues that ‘spiritual life, if the soul has truly received it, cannot be stifled 
from without; temptation cannot prevail against it; the world cannot overcome it’. The 
regenerate individual is confident in possessing, through long habits of spiritual 
discipline, the certain ‘means to keep [herself] from backsliding’.72 The doctrine of 
momentary mystic regeneration is damaging in another significant respect, according to 
Coleridge. It is ‘anti-scriptural’ and ‘unreasonable in itself’, because it ‘impute[s] 
spiritual regeneration to men whose outward course is evil, – to whom no one would 
impute a pure heart or enlightened mind’. This is a position severely detrimental to 
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Christian morality: it sanctions institutional laxity and is prejudicial to individual 
morality. ‘It is injurious to the mind’, Coleridge asserts, ‘not merely, as being false in 
itself, but because it generates a regular system of sophistication and logical fraud’. 
‘[L]ogical fraud’ may allude to the widespread view that Tract 90 sanctioned deception. 
The mystic doctrine of regeneration, Coleridge suggests, distorts the church’s moral 
character, and perverts its discourse. The clergy fill ‘sermons […] with dry artificial 
defences’ of unscriptural theories, in place of ethical guidance and spiritual 
enlightenment. The church fails in its duty of ‘enlivening the hearts and strengthening 
the understandings’ of its congregations, therefore, and betrays its evangelizing 
mission.73  
 To elevate ‘subsequent teaching’ over ‘the word of God’ in ‘Scripture’ is to 
promote ‘dangerous’ falsehood. Coleridge describes the mystic doctrine of regeneration 
in terms of fraudulent idolatry:  
 
 all the gold and jewels and purple and fine linen are boldly carried out of the 
 sanctuary and borrowed for the nonce to deck out an image of regeneration, 
 which is just so near to the real thing as a ‘mockery king of snow’ to a living, 
 breathing, governing monarch’.  
 
A fake ‘image’ displaces spiritual reality.‘[B]oldly’ signifies deliberate sacrilege; ‘for 
the nonce’ suggests an act of political opportunism. The fake ‘image’ of ‘regeneration’ 
produces a materialistic distortion of religion. The substitution of a counterfeit for a real 
‘governing monarch’ also implies that the imposture is motivated by a desire for worldly 
power. Coleridge develops this implication: the unscriptural mystic doctrine casts ‘the 
glowing robes’ of ‘Righteousness around the shapeless body of Unconsciousness’, 
which then ‘develop[s] into the distorted form of Iniquity’.74 The magnificent ‘robes’ 
incongruously covering an ugly form recall the political fraud of Macbeth, whose ‘titles | 
Hang loose about him, like a giant’s robe | Upon a dwarfish thief’.75 Coleridge’s 
personification of ‘Unconsciousness’ represents the subject’s passivity, her lack of moral 
change, and consequent spiritual vulnerability. Coleridge concludes this section with a 
poem, consisting of two sonnets, in which she critiques the mystic concept of infant 
baptism. The first stanza suggests the error of conferring upon a passive ‘infant’ the 
grace achieved only by ‘arduous’ pursuit of Christ’s ‘blessed steps’. In the second 
stanza, ‘[u]nconsciousness’ represents the oblivious state of early infancy that, in time, 
will respond actively to divine ‘Pow’r’, as ‘a frozen lake’ thaws in the sun’s ‘kindly 
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ray’.76  This Lakeland image is as characteristic of Coleridge’s style as her later Miltonic 
reference, in which she associates baptismal regeneration with the description of Old 
Testament polytheistic paganism in Paradise Lost: ‘gay religions full of pomp and gold, 
| Where devils were adored for deities’.77 This allusion emphasizes Coleridge’s 
association of mystic regeneration with idolatry and sacrilege. 
 The separation of the spiritual from the moral in Baptism, according to 
Coleridge, encourages a sinning Christian to harbour a ‘fatal delusion’. The fraudulent 
doctrine ‘deaden[s]’ the sense of ‘the incompatibility of moral evil with spiritual 
felicity’, and panders to human weakness. The doctrine is dangerous because it cocoons 
the soul in ‘vain security’, so that the individual ‘neglect[s] [her] powers and 
opportunities of religious improvement’ because she believes in the ‘hope of a change in 
[her] soul hereafter’. Coleridge here revisits themes of ‘On Rationalism’, particularly her 
construction of a convenient Anglo-Catholic purgatory, though her tone is no longer 
satirical. It is difficult enough to ‘forego the pleasures of sin’, Coleridge suggests, and to 
undertake ‘the labour of co-operating with God’, without the Church making it harder by 
teaching demotivating dogma. In Coleridge’s theology, by contrast, the individual is 
encouraged to embark on her spiritual journey, and is supported along the way: 
‘[b]aptism secures the Spirit to the soul to be its guide and guardian and educator in 
holiness’.78 Again, Coleridge re-applies the imagery of a Romantic literary father in a 
Christian context. In ‘Tintern Abbey’, Wordsworth refers to ‘nature and the language of 
the sense’ as ‘the guide, the guardian of [his] heart’.79 As in her revision of STC’s 
imagery in the ‘Eolian Harp’, Coleridge replaces Romanticism’s impersonal force of 
nature with the Holy Spirit, a Person of the Holy Trinity, as individual teacher.  
 
Polemical Writing: a Code of Conduct 
 Coleridge’s ‘Extracts’ develop her dialogic conception of religious discourse. The 
opening section consists of ‘Preliminary Observations’, in which she sets out her 
principles of polemical writing. In her later Dialogues on Regeneration, the Coleridgean 
speaker, Markright, critiques the prevailing approach. The theologian ‘affects to discuss 
points, but merely as an opportunity of putting forth his own […] notions rather than of 
subjecting them to any trial whether they be true or no’.80 This anticipates Gadamer’s 
comments on ‘Plato’s account of Socrates’, in which  
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there is the critical distinction between authentic and inauthentic dialogue. To 
someone who engages in dialogue only to prove himself right and not to gain 
insight, asking questions will indeed seem easier than answering them. 
[However,] people who think they know better cannot even ask the right 
questions. In order to be able to ask, one must want to know, and that means 
knowing that one does not know.81  
 
The ‘authentic’ participant, in questioning others, seeks to subject her own views to 
critical scrutiny. In her ‘Preliminary Observations’, Coleridge addresses the problem of 
how a polemical writer may present a balanced and principled examination of doctrine. 
She develops the tenet she first advocated in ‘On Rationalism’. The essential point is to 
describe opponents’ views impersonally and accurately: ‘[i]n all that follows’, Coleridge 
contends, ‘I shall endeavour to describe my adversaries’ opinions truly, and to give them 
as far as possible in their own words’.82 She implies that a constructive contribution to 
religious controversy must necessarily be a multi-voiced text: it must contain the ‘words’ 
of the author’s theological ‘adversaries’. As Voloshinov observes, ‘[a]ny true 
understanding is dialogic in nature’, in contrast to an ‘isolated, finished, monologic 
utterance, […] standing open not to any sort of active response but to passive 
understanding’.83 Coleridge invokes the dialogic principle she applied in treating STC’s 
plagiarisms. She will present the evidence as fully as possible, conveying her 
adversaries’ views and her own with academic exactitude, so that ‘readers will have all 
the material for judgment before them; they may look at the doctrine drest and undrest’. 
Her policy is one of openness: ‘I wish to conceal nothing: revelation, exposition is my 
whole aim’.84 
 A polemical context seems inevitably to drive writers into adversarial conflict, 
Coleridge acknowledges: ‘[a] defence of any scheme of doctrine cannot be maintained 
without offence to that which is directly opposed to it’.85 In the Regeneration Dialogues, 
Markright elaborates on this difficulty: ‘I’m aware’, he admits, ‘how difficult it is to 
make doctrinal statements understood without distinctions, how difficult to distinguish 
without arguing and reflecting, and to argue and reflect without censure and 
condemnation’. Shortly before, Markright’s companion, Marvell, had rebuked him for 
lacking an appropriate ‘degree of respect’ in discussing a theological adversary.86 Given 
the inevitability that ‘an internecine war’ is ‘waged between two […] divided opposites’, 
such as the Calvinist and Romanist tendencies in the church, Coleridge advocates that a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Gadamer, p. 371. 
82 ‘Extracts’, p. 249. 
83 Bakhtin Reader, p. 35. Voloshinov’s emphases. 
84 ‘Extracts’, p. 250. Coleridge’s emphasis. 
85 ‘Extracts’, p. 255. 
86 HRC. 
	   152	  
controversial author must ‘pay due attention to what others advance’.87 He must be open-
mindedly alert to find points he accepts in his adversary’s theories. This anticipates 
Gadamer’s dialogic principle that ‘[d]ialectic consists not in trying to discover the 
weakness of what is said, but in bringing out its real strength’.88 The polemicist must 
‘carefully distinguish [an opponent’s] genuine claim on our regard from any particular of 
their teaching, from which we have to express dissent’.89 He must not be arbitrarily 
prejudiced against a whole theory by individual aspects with which he disagrees. 
Dialogue, in these terms, is not ‘the art of arguing’, according to Gadamer, ‘but the art of 
thinking’.90  
 The Tractarians ‘established rules of religious encounter that threw decency, 
fairness, and truthfulness to the winds’.91 Turner’s observation indicates why Coleridge 
sought to change the culture of religious debate, and why this task was so important. In 
her ‘Preliminary Observations’ at the beginning of ‘Extracts’, she defines a code of 
conduct whereby dogmatic ‘warfare’ is waged ‘in perfect fairness, and even in charity 
and kindness’. Her practice supports her principles: for example, she praises Pusey’s 
account of regeneration as ‘a beautiful description’, while rejecting his baptismal theory. 
Ultimately, the issue for Coleridge is literary, in specific respect of language, tone and 
form. If the polemicist is to treat opponents with cordial respect, he must moderate his 
style accordingly. He must exclude ‘summary censures’ and ‘disparaging remarks’, and 
avoid ‘pompous’ language that blocks analytical exchange.92  
 Although Coleridge is theologically opposed to Anglo-Catholicism, her literary 
theorisation and practice reflect Keble’s devotional aesthetic of personal restraint: she re-
applies to prose his principle that religious poets should avoid ‘originality and what is 
technically called effect’.93 Polemicists too often aim for ‘effect’, Coleridge maintains, 
borrowing Keble’s term: ‘[t]here is a large crop of mock arguments and shewy fallacies 
in current use upon the subject of baptismal Regeneration’. The authors of such ‘popular 
productions’ flaunt their ingenuity ‘in a taking style, brief, terse and pithy’: their works 
like ‘clear but shallow brooks […] “run glittering in the sunshine” of anticipatory 
approbation’. They cultivate a ‘keen edge […] and animated flow’, which misrepresent 
doctrine and resist dialogue. Their ‘glittering’ style is a mere showcase for individual 
talent, unfitted ‘to trace out the fine lines of doctrine, the real mysteries of thought which 
possess the minds of men’: it distorts and falsifies, creating arbitrary divisions and 
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artificial polarities, obscuring ‘how narrow is that mid space on which the real 
differences betwixt themselves and their opponents run’.94 Coleridge, by contrast, 
advocates ‘the plainest form’ of expression as the vehicle for religious ideas. There is a 
crisp and purposeful terseness to her style in the ‘Extracts’, which reflects her tenet. For 
example, early in Chapter 3 of ‘Extracts’, Coleridge uses simple syntactical 
constructions as she guides the reader forward to the next stage of her argument:  
 
 I now proceed to argue, that the change is not passively undergone; because the 
 seat or subject of it is the will and the will is essentially active. A will which 
 passively receives impressions, which is changed or in any degree affected, 
 without a co-operant self-determining act of its own, is a contradiction.95 
 
The punctuation of the first sentence, with its comma after ‘argue’ and a semi-colon, 
rather than a comma, before the subordinate clause’s ‘because’, separates very clearly 
the proposition from the formulation of its rationale. There is no risk of semantic 
ambiguity in the simple syntax. It might be objected that the technical terminology  – 
‘seat or subject’, ‘will’, ‘co-operant self-determining act’ – is ‘pompous’ and complex.96 
In the context of Coleridge’s specialist genre of theological polemic, though, in which 
she writes as an academic addressing her peers, her language is plain and functional. 
 
Religious Authorship and Collaborative Dialogue 
Coleridge’s polemical ethic of presenting opponents’ views fairly leads her to make 
extensive use of footnotes in ‘On Rationalism’ and in Biographia 1847. In ‘Extracts’, 
Coleridge experiments with other methods of producing a dialogic text. The second 
section of Chapter 5 concludes with her poem, ‘O change that strain with man’s best 
hopes at strife’.97 The poem engages in dialogue with Keble’s ‘The Eighth Sunday After 
Trinity’, from his celebrated collection The Christian Year, published in 1827. The poem 
is based on the Old Testament story in which a ‘man of God’, sent by the Lord to 
destroy the idols of Jeroboam, disobeys Him and is killed by a lion.98 Keble’s poem 
warns of the risk of falling from a regenerate state, as the last three of its twelve stanzas 
emphasize: 
 
 Thy message given, thine home in sight, 
 To the forbidden feast return? 
 Yield to the false delight 
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 Thy better soul could spurn? 
 
 Alas, my brother! Round thy tomb 
 In sorrow kneeling, and in fear, 
 We read the Pastor’s doom 
 Who speaks and will not hear. 
 
 The grey-haired saint may fail at last 
 The surest guide a wanderer prove; 
 Death only binds us fast 
 To the bright shore of love.99 
 
In the preceding paragraphs of the ‘Extracts’, Coleridge has argued that regeneration, 
once attained, is a condition that cannot be lost. The doctrine of Keble’s poem, according 
to Coleridge, is contrary to reason and detrimental to morality, because it implies that 
God’s justice is arbitrary: 
 
They who say that a man may fall from the regenerate estate, the highest state 
attainable in this life, inferentially though unintentionally represent God as an 
author of Absolute Decrees, an arbitrary awarder of destruction or salvation: 
when, according to their theory, He allows some of the justified time to forfeit 
their inheritance, and rescues others by a timely deliverance from spiritual 
chance and change.100                                                                                            
 
Coleridge’s ‘unintentionally’ is important: in addressing the theology of Keble’s poem, 
she maintains respect for the integrity of the author. 
 Keble’s final verse (‘The grey-haired saint may fail at last’) is the epigraph of 
the whole section in which Coleridge’s poem appears. At the beginning of the section, it 
elicits from her four immediate questions fired at the poet with the vehemence of 
spontaneous viva voce expression: ‘[w]hat then? Are men always fluctuating in this 
preparatory state? Do they never enter a haven? Are they never anchored firmly on the 
rock of salvation?’ She repeats Keble’s stanza three pages later as the epigraph of her 
poem. Again, her response is a forceful interjection:  
 
 O change that strain with man’s best hopes at strife, 
 A recreant strain that wrongs the steadfast soul! 
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It is as though Coleridge, having heard the whole poem and, respectfully, though with 
difficulty, restraining herself from breaking in before the end, explodes in distress as 
soon as Keble’s voice ceases. Her phrase ‘A recreant strain’ alludes to Wordsworth’s 
‘The Song at the Feast of Brougham Castle’, as she indicates in a note.101 Wordsworth’s 
poem expresses, for Coleridge, the ‘profoundly thoughtful Christian heart’ of its author, 
and represents, therefore, Christian reason to counter the ‘unintentionally’ irrational 
implications of Keble’s poem.102 For Coleridge, Wordsworth’s poetry expresses ‘the 
power of Faith’.103 He is a significant collaborative voice, therefore, in her dialogue with 
Keble, in which she asserts that an individual’s eternal destiny is determined by the way 
in which she exercises Free Will: ‘[e]ternal joys or pains, | These wait on man by man’s 
own changeless choice’.104  
 Having set out her doctrinal position, Coleridge turns again in her eighth stanza 
to address Keble directly. She does so in terms that reflect her principles for the 
productive conduct of religious dialogue. She addresses Keble with reverent courtesy 
and appeals to devotional qualities of ‘joy’ and faith: 
 
 Then, gentle Harmonist, that strain forebear; 
 Oh! Cast not out from joy the faithful heart!105  
 
Coleridge’s ‘kindly and respectful’ tone is maintained through the final stanza, the 
didacticism of which is softened by the sibilant rhyme of the middle couplet, and a tone 
of subdued affirmation: 
  
 Heav’n even here surrounds the filial breast, 
 Even here our earthly cares and troubles cease. 
 And what were heav’n without a settled peace, – 
 Has He not promised His beloved rest? 
 
The poem ends with a question which, with quiet insistence, invites Keble, the ‘gentle 
Harmonist’, to respond and engage in cordial dialogue. This poetic interchange affirms 
that, for Coleridge, participation in religious polemic is a collaborative vocation.106 
 Coleridge hopes that her work on baptismal regeneration ‘may lead some minds 
of greater power than [her own] to take up the argument and put it in a better form than 
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any in which it has hitherto appeared’.107 This is not tactical self-effacement, but an 
expression of her dialogic ethic. This is emphasized by her use of the plural, ‘minds’, 
which suggests the initiation of a communal dialogue. As she puts it in Biographia 1847, 
‘[t]ruth is advanced by the efforts of various minds’: by multiple authors in collaborative 
dialogue working from diverse viewpoints (p. cxxxvii). Julius Hare, to whom Coleridge 
dedicates Essays, holds a similar view. In his ‘Preface’ to The Mission of The Comforter 
(1846), Hare proclaims that ‘all who are striving for the truth are bringing their 
contributions […] for the erection of [the] heavenly temple’, and he hopes that his 
writings may ‘forward the carrying on of this work’.108  A strengthened and revitalized 
Anglican theology, he implies, will be the product of diverse individual components. 
Hare, like F. D. Maurice, is a disciple and advocate of STC with whom Coleridge 
corresponds. Her next ‘contribution to the heavenly temple’ of liberal theology will 
concern a High Church attack launched against both Maurice and Hare, and STC 
himself. This will prompt some shifts in Coleridge’s religious and authorial agenda, in 
response to new pressures. 
 
The ‘Subversion of Faith’ 
A new threat to liberal theology appeared in The English Review of December 1848, in 
an essay emotively entitled, ‘ On Tendencies toward the Subversion of Faith’. The essay 
attacks a number of authors, including Hare and Maurice, in a seemingly indiscriminate 
manner. It brands them as having subverted English Christianity by the importation of 
German atheism. STC – with Carlyle – is said to be the seminal influence upon the 
alleged promoters of ‘complete Infidelity’.109 The author of the anonymous article was 
William Palmer of Worcester College, Oxford, who had been closely associated with 
Newman and continued to support him until 1844. Described by Chadwick as ‘driest of 
the stern, unbending Tractarians’, Palmer became increasingly perturbed by liberal 
trends in theology, and, in December 1848, ‘released a cry of agony’. His ‘cry’ is the 
article in which he condemns STC and those allegedly influenced by him, whom he 
labels ‘the Coleridge school’.110 
 Palmer’s article reflects STC’s continuingly precarious religious reputation in 
the late 1840s. While Coleridge brings STC’s principles ‘down into the present hour’ in 
the service of Christian doctrine, Palmer demonizes his metaphysics as insidiously 
destructive of mid-century faith. For Palmer, STC’s Christianity is ‘merely founded on 
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philosophical argument’, not ‘faith’; it has ‘no principle of cohesion’, and ‘may be 
dissolved by the same intellect’ that has ‘constructed it’. STC’s influence is to be blamed 
for Hare’s alleged promotion of David Friedrich Strauss’s notorious Das Leben Jesu, 
kritisch bearbeitet (1835) (The Life of Jesus, Critically Examined), published in the year 
after STC’s death. For all his intemperate lack of balance, Palmer correctly recognizes 
that, if Strauss’s ideas take hold, the issue for the church will shift from sectarian 
controversy over competing theories of doctrine, to the most basic question of all: 
‘whether Christianity be true or false’.111 Palmer’s extremist solutions to the problem of 
Strauss are repression and censorship. Coleridge, meanwhile, recognizes that Strauss’s 
arguments require a radical shift in religious discourse. 
 The English Review essay necessitates yet another defence of STC’s reputation. 
Coleridge, fully occupied in 1849 with preparing Notes and Lectures on Shakespeare 
and Essays, asked J. H. Green, still nominally in charge of STC’s philosophical remains, 
to write the introduction to the second edition of Confessions of An Inquiring Spirit 
(1849). Green, however, missed the point and repeats, ineffectually, earlier defences of 
STC from charges of plagiarism, this time from Lessing. Coleridge, therefore, had to lay 
aside her preparation of the new STC volumes in order to address Palmer’s article 
herself. Her essay, thirty-seven pages in length, is entitled, with characteristic 
understatement, ‘Note on The Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit’.112 Palmer’s article was 
published anonymously, and Coleridge is unlikely to have identified the author, so 
uncharacteristic of him was its style. Chadwick describes Palmer’s usual manner as that 
of ‘a cold prosaic analyst’.113 Newman characterizes him as coolly methodical: his 
‘ground of controversy was cut into squares and then every objection had its answer’.114 
Coleridge refers to her anonymous opponent as ‘the Anglican Inquisitor’; an allusion, 
perhaps, to the (literally) judicial policing of ideas and publications that he advocates. 
She gets straight to the heart of Palmer’s allegation that STC ‘undermines […] faith in 
the Bible as the Word of God’.115 For anyone who has read Confessions of an Inquiring 
Spirit, Coleridge contends, this ‘accusation […] is […] dead’.116 
 Palmer appeals to the vicious ignorance of ‘the English religious mind’. 
According to Coleridge, his readers will be ‘confirmed’ in their ‘unreflecting prejudice’ 
and will be ‘amused’ by its sweeping and extreme judgments. For Coleridge, the 
‘ignorant zealotry’ and intellectual impoverishment of author and audience are mutually 
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sustaining. The reviewer encourages the anti-intellectual prejudice of his readers: ‘the 
national mind of England is strongly adverse’ to the writers in question, he asserts. 
Coleridge refers to the anonymised William Palmer as the ‘English Reviewer’, punning 
on the journal’s name to use ‘English’ as a synonym for prejudiced and narrow-minded. 
She asserts that ‘the English Reviewer appeals in mean-minded triumph’ to the ‘existing 
majority’ who unthinkingly cleave to ‘vulgar conservative maxims’.117 Coleridge 
anticipates Newman’s critique of English religious culture in his sermon ‘Christ Upon 
the Waters’ (1850): ‘[w]here Dickens caricatured the materialism and snobbery of the 
great Victorian middle class, and where Arnold sneered at cultural superficiality’, 
observes Ker, ‘Newman satirized its religious and spiritual provincialism and 
shallowness’. Both Coleridge and Newman critique English narrow-mindedness. The 
Englishman’s ‘vaunted “private judgment”’, according to Newman, is no more than the 
‘passive impression’ he derives from ‘his “intellectual servants”, the periodicals and 
newspapers’ that are employed to “‘tell him what to think and what to say’”.118 
Coleridge adds imputations of cultural tyranny and mob rule: the reviewer ‘appeal[s] to 
the violent and unthinking Many against the Few’.119 Although she rejects Newman’s 
interpretation of ‘History’ in his sermon, she shares his view of the public’s debased 
relationship with its newspapers and journals. Coleridge might have supplemented her 
income by regular reviewing, but for the meanly partisan character of the English press: 
‘I am shut out from several of the leading periodicals by their past conduct to my father, 
and there is scarcely a subject on which my notions would suit any journal’, she 
observes in 1849, a view based on direct experience. The previous year, Critical 
Quarterly editor John Lockhart had made ‘misogynistic’ alterations to her review of 
Tennyson’s The Princess, moderating, for example, her assertion of women’s pre-
eminence in the genre of the novel. Determined to maintain his journal’s long-standing 
opposition to the ‘Cockney’ poets, Lockhart had also cut her moderately favourable 
references to Keats ‘for reasons of literary politics’.120 
 
The Threat Posed by Strauss: Coleridge’s Changing Priorities 
The ‘English Reviewer’ condemns the writers he attacks for their alleged promotion of 
Strauss. STC, in Palmer’s heated interpretation, bears greatest responsibility as instigator 
of this tendency. In his penultimate paragraph, the reviewer’s distress is clear as he 
confronts the fear that Strauss’s influence might unsettle the whole edifice of the church. 
At the end of this paragraph, in which he lists the emerging symptoms of scepticism, he 
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cries: ‘[w]hat is to be the end of it all?’ If German methods of thought take hold, he 
implies, both the church, and Christianity itself, might struggle to survive. Strauss 
addresses this point at the conclusion of The Life of Jesus, Critically Examined: ‘[i]n 
what relation, then, must the pulpit stand to theology, – nay, how is the continuation of a 
ministry possible when theology has reached this stage?’121 
 The ‘stage’ which Strauss believes theology has ‘reached’ is exemplified in his 
view of Jesus: ‘historically’, Strauss regards Jesus as ‘nothing more than a person’, 
whose ‘exalted character […] exerted [such a] powerful influence over the religious 
sentiment, that it constituted him the ideal of piety; in accordance with the general rule, 
that an historical fact or person cannot become the basis of a positive religion until it is 
elevated into the sphere of the ideal’.122 Coleridge addresses early in her ‘Note’ the 
relation of STC’s thought to that of Strauss. As Rosemary Ashton observes, Strauss 
takes ‘the eighteenth century rationalism of writers like Lessing and Eichhorn […] one 
logical step further’ and employs a ‘Kantian investigative technique’.123 Coleridge turns 
Palmer’s assumption about STC’s relationship with German philosophy on its head. 
STC, she asserts, is ideally equipped to refute Strauss’s ‘hypothesis for solving the 
problem of Christianity’. She adds that ‘he was, by anticipation, a most zealous, I think I 
may add a very successful opponent!’124 Barth concurs with Coleridge: it ‘is 
remarkable’, he observes, ‘how [STC] has managed, without sacrificing the traditional 
belief of the Church that all Scripture is inspired by the Holy Spirit, to embrace the 
findings of the new literary and historical scholarship’.125 According to the Collected 
Coleridge editors of ‘Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit’, STC ‘had seen himself as 
making necessary concessions to historical scholarship in order to preserve the essentials 
of Christian belief’.126 Coleridge contends that ‘[t]here are many thoughtful men who 
declare that they were diverted from such notions as those of Strauss […] by the 
teaching of [STC]’.127 
 Coleridge elucidates STC’s approach. She cites the example of David’s 
‘Psalms’, which express the writer’s individual feelings and character in his own time 
and circumstances. Yet, STC would have viewed ‘the events of David’s life, his 
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composition of the Psalms included’, as having been ‘so ordered by Providence that the 
whole was typical and prophetic of our Lord and Saviour’. This view represents STC’s 
‘whole conception of the divine dealings with man’, including ‘the Inspiration of 
Scripture’. Nonetheless, for all her confidence in refuting Palmer’s prejudiced case, 
Coleridge indicates that further progress is now required in response to Strauss. STC’s 
Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit is ‘a step in the right direction’ on the issue of Biblical 
inspiration, she contends: the work ‘indicates, as far as it goes, the true principles on 
which the subject ought to be examined’.128  In 1850, Coleridge writes to her Brother-in-
Law, Reverend Edward Coleridge, about the threat posed to Christianity by Strauss, 
which, remarkably, she observes, contemporary polemicists largely ignore: ‘[n]o attempt 
at answering Strauss amid all the thousand pamphlets upon theories of doctrine, the 
practical result of which is insignificant’. The careerist polemicists, to whom she refers 
in her ‘Extracts’, continue to promote their personal interests by pursuing sectarian 
theories. They ignore the real ‘danger’ of ‘Infidelity creep[ing] on in silence’.129 The 
reviewer of Coleridge’s Memoir and Letters in 1874 alludes to this development in her 
priorities: ‘she had become aware of the new phase into which religious controversy was 
passing, and which made the polemics of Puseyism assume diminished importance in 
her eyes’.130 Coleridge believes that Newman is aware of the threat of Strauss’s critical 
methodology. He has referred in conversation, she understands, to the importance of 
addressing ‘the prospects of Christianity itself, instead of the differences between 
Anglican and Catholic’. Then ‘[w]hy does he not answer the adversary?’ she exclaims in 
frustration.131 Coleridge reveals her profound respect for Newman five years after his 
reception into the Roman Catholic Church. She turns to him as the supreme 
spokesperson for Christianity, regardless of his denomination. Her priorities as a 
theological author are changing. She has no difficulty in offering a forthright and 
convincing rebuttal of the English Review’s distorted case against STC. However, she 
recognizes as urgent its underlying theme of Strauss’s threat to Christianity. 
 The initial reception of Strauss’s ideas in England was slow. There were two 
reasons for this. Few English people were able to read German, and blasphemy laws 
inhibited the publication of translations. However, a legal judgment of 1843 confined the 
definition of blasphemy to works that mocked Christianity. Thereafter, publishers such 
as Chapman, who published Mary Ann Evans’s translation of Strauss in 1846, ran 
negligible risk of prosecution. In the late 1840s, therefore, the need arose for a new 
approach to theology to answer Strauss. As Chadwick puts it: ‘[s]omeone must restate 
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Christian divinity so that readers of […] Strauss would find ideas to […] convince, ideas 
which did not sound obsolete’.132 Coleridge changes her agenda in response to this 
shifting intellectual milieu. Referring to the last years of Coleridge’s life, Barbeau 
asserts that the ‘wedge between Protestants and Catholics cut straight through Sara’s 
heart’.133 This is not the case. In October 1851, Coleridge indicates her revised focus in a 
letter to Aubrey de Vere. She uses terms that echo Newman’s reported shift in attitude: 
‘it is the foundations of religion, those problems and difficulties that belong to every 
system, or underlie them all, which engage my serious thoughts’, she explains. ‘I care 
not so much about the differences between Romish and Anglican’.134 In December 1851, 
writing to Henry Reed, Coleridge again alludes to this change of priority. She explains 
that she has been ‘deeply interested and delighted with Dr. Nitsch’s letter to Ida 
Countess of Hahn Hahn’.135 This is one month after she completed her final theological 
work, the Dialogues on Personality. 
 Karl Immanuel Nitzsch, an eminent German theologian, upholds a committedly 
Protestant position. He defends the Reformation, and maintains that God is encountered 
‘only in the inmost sanctuary of the human heart’. At the same time, he expresses an 
irenic attitude towards Roman Catholicism. He believes that, at mid-century, Protestant 
and Roman Catholic Churches are equally involved in a common ‘fight […] against the 
world and the devil’. Nitzsch argues that the Churches can learn from each other, and be 
mutually sustaining. He looks forward to their uniting as ‘the Church of the Future’. He 
contends that the Christian’s ‘duty’ to work ‘steadfastly’ towards this goal ‘can be 
fulfilled in the Catholic as well as in the Protestant Church’.136 While Coleridge retains 
fundamental reservations about Roman Catholicism as a ‘system’, she agrees that the 
Roman Church may be for the ‘individual’ a potent ‘means of grace and […] 
spirituality’.137 Coleridge’s positive reception of Nitzsch’s book reflects the direction of 
her thought in the final months of her life. Her concern for ‘the foundations of religion’ 
belongs to the same year in which Matthew Arnold senses the withdrawal of ‘[t]he Sea 
of Faith’ in ‘Dover Beach’, and envisages a dark, valueless world.138 Coleridge is ready 
to take on the intellectual challenges to Christianity. She is confident enough to develop 
the approach to scriptural criticism exemplified in Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit. As 
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she said in her ‘Note’, STC’s ‘work is a step in the right direction’, and she clearly 
relishes the prospect of making the next strides forward herself. At the time of her 
‘Note’, Coleridge was fully occupied with her editorial undertakings, and was 
contemplating her innovative Dialogues on Regeneration. She was therefore unable to 
embark on a new theological work straight away. By the time she would have been 
ready to begin, she had less than six months to live. 
 In 1849, Coleridge states confidence in the growing influence of STC’s 
‘Christian Philosophy’, which has ‘many vigorous youthful champions’. Her theological 
mastery and authorial assurance are reflected in the literary qualities of her response to 
the anonymous review. For example, she ridicules the folly and futility of the reviewer’s 
attack on STC, and indicates, in a striking Homeric allusion, how utterly inadequate he is 
as STC’s opponent: 
 
Achilles pursued one whom he took to be a mere man beside the deep-eddying 
Scamander, and ever and anon he thought to overtake him with his swift feet and 
overpower him with his potent arm. But after a while the supposed Agenor 
turned about and confronted him, and began to remonstrate seriously with the 
pride-blinded hero on the vanity of his endeavours; and behold it was no mere 
man, weak, mortal, vanquishable; but a god, even the god Apollo, strong, 
deathless, unconquerable, full of light and full of might. So in the strength of 
vaunted systems of outward evidence, unqualified submission to authority, 
passive acquiescence and logic apart from metaphysic insight, many a vain 
boaster will pursue beside the loud stream of Public Opinion, [STC’s] Christian 
Philosophy. 
 
Coleridge is confident both in the conceptual basis of her theological position, and, as 
foremost of STC’s current ‘champions’, in her own capacity to deal elegantly and 
convincingly with such deluded polemicists as ‘the English Reviewer’.139  
 She follows up her Homeric extended simile with a potent allusion to Paradise 
Lost. She contrasts the ‘keen clear’ methodology of STC’s approach to the ‘difficult 
problem of the Bible’ with the inadequacy of conventional unexamined assumptions. 
She refers to the ‘self-contradictoriness of the popular scheme, if scheme that can be 
called, which certain settled form has none’.140 Here Coleridge appropriates Milton’s 
description of Death when Satan first encounters him with Sin (a ‘shape’ that ‘seemed 
woman to the waist’) at the gates of hell. Death is ‘[t]he other shape, | If shape it might 
be called that shape had none’.141 Coleridge’s allusion emphasizes the ‘deadness and 
deathliness’ of Tractarian dogma, in contrast with her devotional concept of the living 
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‘power of divine light in the soul’.142 Coleridge’s metaphysical and literary assurance in 
this short but significant work of 1849 is carried over into her major, pioneering works 
of the last two years of her life: Essays, and the intellectually dynamic, multi-voiced 
Regeneration Dialogues. When Coleridge styles herself ‘the Esteesian housekeeper’ in a 
letter of 1851, she is maintaining the ironic fiction of social propriety as a cover for 
authorial independence.143 For the same reason, she refers to STC throughout her 
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Chapter Five  
Authorial Vocation and Literary Innovation, 1850 and 1851 
 
‘Essays on his Own Times’: Critical Problems  
Coleridge conceived of a collection of STC’s journalism while preparing Biographia 
1847, in which she discusses his relationship with The Morning Post. STC stated in 
Biographia that his journalism had ‘added nothing to [his] fortune or [his] reputation’.1 
Equally, he claimed that his contributions had been responsible for a decisive boost in 
The Morning Post’s circulation and influence. Daniel Stuart, editor of The Morning Post 
during the period of STC’s contributions, and later ‘half proprietor’ of The Courier, took 
exception to STC’s comments.2 He rejected STC’s claim of having caused The Morning 
Post’s circulation to rise between 1799 and 1803.3 Coleridge does not withdraw STC’s 
comments from Biographia 1847, but represents Stuart’s viewpoint by including letters 
that Stuart had written to Henry. Characteristically, Coleridge plays a reconciling role 
between STC and Stuart: ‘[i]f the anti-gallican policy of The Morning Post “increased its 
circulation”, I cannot but think that the influence of [STC’s] writings […] in directing 
the tone and determining the principles of the paper, must have served it materially. I 
believe him to have been the anti-gallican spirit that governed The Morning Post, though 
he may not have performed as much of the letter as he fancied’. Coleridge states also 
that STC was paid ‘far more than the market value of his contributions to the Papers that 
[Stuart] was concerned in’.4 Coleridge cites Stuart’s high opinion of STC’s statesman-
like qualities as a political journalist, despite his tendency to drift off task if left to 
himself.  
 Essays on His Own Times (1850) consists of three volumes, largely comprising 
articles published in The Morning Post between 1799 and 1802, and in The Courier in 
1811. Coleridge’s collection is a major contribution to literary history. She cites De 
Quincey, who lamented in 1834 the loss of STC’s writings in the ‘vast abyss’ of the 
‘daily press’: his vanished pieces are abandoned ‘pearls, confounded with the rubbish 
and “purgamenta” of ages’.5 Hazlitt viewed STC’s journalism as a dissipation of literary 
power: ‘[w]hat is become of all this mighty heap of hope, of thought, of learning and 
humanity?’ he asked with scathing disillusion in 1825: ‘[i]t has ended in swallowing 
doses of oblivion and in writing paragraphs in the Courier’.6 De Quincey, though, argues 
that STC’s newspaper articles are manifestations of his genius: ‘[n]o more appreciable 
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monument could be raised to [STC’s] memory’, he maintains, ‘than a re-publication of 
his essays in The Morning Post, [and] those afterwards published in The Courier’ (p. 
xv). Coleridge aims, therefore, to restore STC’s political writings to light, and to place 
them in the context of his whole ‘oeuvre’. Her purpose is to furnish ‘an important stock 
of material toward [STC’s] biography’; a project she began to contemplate around 1845 
(pp. xiii-xiv). 
 The ‘Introduction’ provides Coleridge with an opportunity to develop her 
authorial agenda and to test her innovatory conception of authorship. Essays raises 
questions about Coleridge’s presentation of STC, and her authorial relationship with his 
work. Alan Vardy rejects Coleridge’s argument for STC’s political consistency. It is, he 
says, an ‘ideological fiction’ designed to promote what he wrongly alleges to be 
Coleridge’s Tory agenda, and he calls into question her moral integrity.7 Waldegrave 
follows Vardy in suggesting that the STC of Coleridge’s ‘Introduction’ is a fictional 
construct, an idealized image of ‘the father she had always wanted’.8 On what grounds, 
then, does Coleridge argue for STC’s political consistency? How does Coleridge’s 
conception of authorship develop in her reconstruction and reapplication of STC’s 
political thought? Does Coleridge’s ‘discourse’ in her ‘Introduction’ relinquish ‘its claim 
to individual authorship’, as Mudge suggests?9 The following five sections of this 
chapter will address these questions. 
 
‘To Live is to Change’ 
In Section Two of her ‘Introduction’, Coleridge argues that STC was consistent in his 
‘career’ of political thought: ‘[t]he spirit of his teaching was ever the same amid all the 
variations and corrections of the letter’ (p. xxii, p. xxv). A fixed moral and religious core 
governs STC’s political judgments, which take different forms in different 
circumstances. Coleridge’s conception is peculiarly suited to the instabilities of the post-
Reform Act era, in which the same individual may hold conflicting opinions 
simultaneously. Tractarian activist Hurrell Froude, a Tory ‘reactionary’, advocated 
radical ‘anti-establishment’ views.10 Tory Prime Minister Peel pursued Whig policies of 
ecclesiastical reform and Free Trade. W. G. Ward exercised protestant private judgment 
in support of Roman Catholicism. Coleridge presents STC in similar terms, as upholding 
apparently opposing policies simultaneously: for example, as both opponent and 
advocate of reform:  
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 In 1811, when he united his forces with those who strove to drag the rushing 
 wheels of the Reform-Chariot, which appeared, from the state of the public 
 mind, to have an inclined plane  to travel upon, he carefully recorded his protest 
 in favour of reform, conducted judiciously and on sound principles of policy (p. 
 xxv). 
 
Such an apparent contradiction, for Coleridge, reflects STC’s consistent independence 
and integrity. His ‘system of belief’ – the structure of his thought, religious and political 
– is inseparable from ‘his personal character and individuality’, she contends, because 
‘the man and the author were in his case especially interfused’ (p. xxiii, p. xvi).   
 Coleridge’s conception of STC’s diachronic consistency of principle – that the 
same inner ‘spirit’ is expressed through a career of external ‘variations’– reflects the 
influence of Newman’s Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine (1845), in 
which he argues that an idea ‘changes’ in response to shifting external factors ‘in order 
to remain the same’. Its cultural vitality, Newman argues, depends on its ability to 
change: ‘to live is to change and to be perfect is to have changed often’.11 For Coleridge, 
STC’s core moral consistency required him to make practical shifts in outlook as events 
evolved; in response, for example, to Napoleon’s emerging despotism and aggression. In 
1864, Newman argues that he has been consistent, has held to the same core principle, 
through a career of changing sectarian allegiance, from Evangelicalism to Roman 
Catholicism: 
 
 From the age of fifteen, dogma has been the fundamental position of my 
 religion: I know no other religion; I cannot enter into the idea of any other sort 
 of religion; religion, as a mere sentiment, is to me a dream and a mockery. As 
 well can there be filial love without the fact of a  father, as devotion without the f
 act of a Supreme Being. What I held in 1816, I held in 1833, and I hold in 
 1864.12 
 
Coleridge anticipates Newman’s mode of argument in her presentation of STC’s 
political consistency. His core principles in 1816 and 1817 were the same as they had 
been in 1796 and 1797, she maintains. In the earlier period, STC had advocated the 
separation of church and state, while in 1816 and 1817, he had supported ‘our Episcopal 
Church’. Nonetheless, his underlying principles were consistent: in 1796 and 1797, he 
opposed ‘the evil of a rich hierarchy and entered into Milton’s mood on Prelacy’, while 
in 1816 and 1817 he continued to oppose ‘Mammon’ and ‘the rich and powerful’ (p. 
xxiv). In both periods he was upholding the principles of the Reformation: this is the 
significant factor for Coleridge following the Gorham crisis. Her insistence on STC’s 
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consistent adherence to ‘the doctrines and spirit of the Reformation’ speaks to the 
England of 1850 (p. xxiv). It also complements her discussion of STC’s admiration for 
Luther in Biographia 1847. 
 Coleridge argues that STC’s reversal in attitude towards war with France shows 
equal consistency of principle. What caused him to change ‘from earnest demands for 
peace to vigorous defence of renewed and continued war’ was ‘the character and 
conduct of Napoleon’ (pp. xxviii-xxix). She argues that STC, in The Morning Post, 
‘showed as discerning a patriotism in opposing the earlier war with France as in 
advocating the later one’ (p. xxxi). She does not know exactly how STC thought through 
his shift in viewpoint: the underlying intellectual process is ‘a subject upon which [she] 
can but guess darkly’ (p. xxxi). She contends, though, that STC’s political insight 
assured him that England would not follow France into Jacobinism. Therefore, he did 
not regard the first war as a necessary measure to reduce the risk of revolution in 
England. This exemplifies STC’s ‘gift of political prophecy’, which, according to 
Coleridge, ‘consists in a clear intuition of the present and the nature of existing things’ 
(p. xxxii). Her formulation echoes Percy Shelley’s definition of the poet as prophet, who 
‘not only beholds intensely the present as it is, and discovers those laws according to 
which present things might be ordered, but […] beholds the future in the present’.13 For 
Coleridge, STC’s ‘clear intuition’ of the ‘nature’ and ‘laws’ of ‘present things’ derives 
from his intellectual independence and consistency. 
 Coleridge argues that STC perceived the ‘internal stability of the English 
constitution’ and its essential differences from those of ‘continental kingdoms’ (p. 
xxxii). She explains his Burkean conception of the English constitution: he saw ‘that our 
social frame was too firmly compacted by the interdependence of interests and 
reciprocation of benefits, too closely cemented by gradual reforms and nice adjustments, 
to be in danger of shock and dislocation’ (p. xxxii). For Coleridge, STC’s perception of 
English constitutional stability, founded on empirical tradition and organic development, 
was ultimately a mark of his religious faith. She applies a religious interpretation of 
political history to her own times: ‘[n]ot to ascribe the peaceful state of England, in this 
epoch of change, and her exemption from injurious commotions, to [her constitutional 
stability], is to betray want of Faith in a moral Governor of the World’ (p. xxxiii). Vardy 
criticizes Coleridge for using ‘providence’ in an attempt to ‘efface […] history’.14 
However, ‘providence’ is the means by which Coleridge interprets history, as it was for 
her mentor, Southey. In Sir Thomas More: or Colloquies on the Progress and Prospects 
of Society (1829), Southey, in his persona as ‘Montesinos’, refers to ‘an excellent friend’ 
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who ‘delights to trace the moral order of Providence through the Revolutions of the 
world; and in his historical writings keeps it in view as the pole-star of his course’.15 
Southey uses the dramatic persona to refer to himself. Coleridge reflects Southey’s 
influence in her interpretation of history according to a Christian – ultimately Miltonic – 
concept of ‘Providence’. She has learned from Southey to read history in the light of 
religious principles: ‘in his large knowledge of history’, Coleridge maintains, Southey 
‘dwells on the moral of the historic page and its bearings on religion’ (p. xxxviii). The 
application of Christian criteria to history will underpin Coleridge’s discussion of 
Ireland.        
 
England’s ‘Misrule’ of Ireland: A Christian Interpretation of History 
Coleridge celebrates the protection afforded by divine providence for England through 
troubled times, but also highlights England’s political ‘sins’ (p. xxxv). This is the 
starting point for her discussion of England’s relationship with Ireland. Here, Coleridge 
‘bring[s]’ STC’s thought ‘down into the present hour’ (p. lxxxiv). Commentators 
generally regard the discussion of Ireland as all but irrelevant to the presentation of 
STC’s journalistic writings. However, the section reinterprets and reapplies STC’s 
principles, and defines the way in which Coleridge brings STC’s philosophy into her 
own times. She asserts herself in this section as the Coleridgean voice of her age. Her 
concept of literary and metaphysical creativity involves multiple minds working 
communally through a process of dialogue. In her discussion of contemporary Ireland, 
Coleridge adduces four other minds: STC, Wordsworth, Southey, and her friend, Irish 
poet and landowner, Aubrey de Vere. She develops her ideas in relation to her literary 
fathers, whose continuing influence is complemented by the closest confidant of her later 
years. She might have referred, equally, to other influential commentators to support her 
arguments. Leigh Hunt, for example, following the government’s rejection of a petition 
for Catholic civil rights in 1808, emphasizes the mutual interdependence of England and 
Ireland: ‘if ACHILLES in the midst of battle had bared his heel […] he would hardly 
have done a more foolish thing than we are at present in our treatment of the Irish’.16 
Hunt’s discussion is framed in political terms. He analyses ‘the three particular classes 
of men who refuse the petition’.17 The religious basis of Coleridge’s analysis determines 
her choice of sources.  
 Coleridge refers to ‘the sins of England’ (p. xxxv). She understands a nation’s 
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history in terms of its relationship with God. She indicates that her critique of England’s 
treatment of Ireland is based on de Vere’s English Misrule and Irish Misdeeds (1848), 
which, she observes, ‘partly failed of its purpose, first from saying too much at once […] 
but secondly and far more, because it made representations which those to whom they 
were addressed were pre-resolved not to hear’ (p. xxxvi). The English political class 
remains unrepentant and closed-minded. Coleridge’s discussion of the plight of the Irish 
poor, on the basis of Christianity morality, aims to hit home where de Vere’s combative 
pragmatism failed. Coleridge enumerates the sufferings England has inflicted on Ireland: 
‘religious persecution with denial of the most effective means of grace’; ‘repression of 
trade and commerce’; denial of the means of education (p. xxxvi). If conditions in 
Ireland have improved to a certain extent, ‘twenty or even fifty years of less unrighteous 
dealing can[not] atone for centuries of grievous wrong’ (p. xxxv). Coleridge’s language  
– ‘atone’, ‘unrighteous’ – suggests that ultimately England is answerable to God. The 
moral processes of history, Coleridge warns, are inescapable: ‘[b]ygones cannot be 
bygones in such a matter, for the Past, which, as a record of shame, is evil enough in 
itself, lives in the Present’ (p. xxxvii). She invokes the authority of Southey as a 
‘witness’ to the ‘cruelty’ of England towards Ireland, and the ‘atrocious manner’ in 
which the English implemented ‘iniquitous laws’, which surpassed even Spanish 
enormities in their ‘treatment’ of South American ‘Indians’ (pp. xxxviii-xxxix). 
 Coleridge also cites STC as a witness against the ‘long misgovernment’ of 
Ireland by England. She describes his response to this ‘record’ of national ‘shame’ in 
religious terms: ‘[m]y Father never ceased to be heartily sorry for these our misdoings, 
and he ever held the burden of them only to be lightened by confession and amendment’ 
(p. xxxv, p. xxxvii, p. xxxix). Her language is based on the general Confession before 
Holy Communion in the Book of Common Prayer: ‘[w]e do earnestly repent, And are 
heartily sorry for these our misdoings; The remembrance of them is grievous unto us; 
The burden of them is intolerable’.18 The process of political reconciliation, of righting 
political, economic and social injustices inflicted by England on Ireland, must begin in a 
devotional impulse. Coleridge implies that the political fracture is irreparable unless the 
malefactor first turns to God to confess and ask forgiveness: penitence and prayer must 
accompany ‘amendment’ (p. xxxix). The idea of national repentance was familiar in the 
mid-nineteenth century, as Chadwick explains: ‘[g]overnment was in the habit of 
ordering national days of prayer either of thanksgiving as in victory or of fasting and 
humiliation as in plague’, though after 1830 governments were more reluctant to do so. 
Nonetheless, there had been a day of ‘fasting and humiliation’ in March 1832 in 
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response to an outbreak of cholera, and cholera again prompted a request for such a day 
in 1853, which the Home Secretary rejected. Two days of national fasting and prayer 
were held in the 1850s, however: in 1854 for war in Crimea; and in 1857 for the Indian 
mutiny.19 That England should enact national penitence for its misrule of Ireland, as 
Coleridge implies, was theoretically feasible in 1850. Her liturgical language is designed 
to express the gravity of this suggestion. 
 
Post-Reform England’s Treatment of Ireland 
Coleridge critiques England’s treatment of Ireland in the age of Reform. She refers to  
 
the munificence of the present age, its Catholic emancipation and present of ten 
millions, —which might be imaged forth emblematically as a tree of rapid 
growth and showy bloom, attired in broad white blossoms of persuasive 
perfume, the odour of that best sanctity, which is one with goodness (p. lvi). 
 
Coleridge’s association of England’s post-Reform treatment of Ireland with ‘sanctity’ 
and ‘goodness’ is ambiguous. Her language contains subtle equivocations that question 
the solidity and permanence of recent improvements. ‘[R]apid growth’, ‘showy bloom’, 
‘persuasive perfume’ carry hints of superficiality, short-term pragmatism, and political 
spin. Coleridge places the blossoming emblem of post-Reform England in sight of ‘the 
knotted thorns of past oppression, blackening in the back-ground afar into the distance’ 
(p. lvi). She brings the whole scene sharply into moral focus by comparing it to ‘that 
infernal grove beheld by Dante, where self-murderers after the resurrection are to 
suspend the bodies they have violently cast aside’ (p. lvi). Coleridge establishes the 
rationale for her reference to Dante’s grove of suicides by invoking Berkeley’s Biblical 
formulation that Ireland is ‘bone of [England’s] bone, and flesh of her flesh’ (p. xl n). 
According to Berkeley’s conceit, England’s ‘murderous’ treatment of Ireland ‘might be 
called suicidal’ (pp. lvi–lvii).  
   Coleridge updates the landscape of Dante’s Inferno to incorporate the political 
catastrophe of Ireland. English oppression ‘might be […] represented in spectral vision 
as a huge black-thorn bearing the semi-animate mangled body of  “poor Ireland”’ (p. 
lvii). The bright emblem of post-reform justice is, after all, no more than a ‘showy’ 
deception, because the dangerous myth of ‘Celtic original defect’ persists (p. lvii). 
Coleridge quotes de Vere’s charge that the English have failed in their ‘duty’ to provide 
the Irish with an adequate ‘system of education, both intellectual and industrial’ (p. 
lviii). In place of education and agricultural reform, the English ‘introduce[d] hard men 
at arms into the soft bosom of the land’ (p. lviii). This language of sexual violence 
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recalls Milton’s ecological image of incestuous rape: ‘[m]en’, by Mammon’s ‘suggestion 
taught’, learned to exploit the natural world, ‘and, with impious hands | Rifled the 
bowels of their mother earth | For treasures better hid’.20 Coleridge goes on to present a 
Miltonic view of seventeenth-century history, in which she condemns the ‘Laxity and 
Corruption’ of the ‘Restoration’ (p. lix). This thwarted the possibility of reformation and 
prosperity in Ireland, she contends, following ‘what Cromwell actually did for [the 
country], after his campaign’ (p. lix). Coleridge aligns herself here with radical 
republicanism. Her attitudes are reminiscent of those underlying Charles Lamb’s 
historical drama John Woodvil (1802), in which republican virtue opposes Restoration 
courtly excess. 
 Coleridge recalls that, around ‘forty or fifty years ago’, some commentators had 
advocated genocidal policies on the grounds that the Irish were sub-human (xliii). De 
Vere refers to the English having branded the Irish ‘with a character below humanity’.21 
If no one would dare to advance such a view in the post-Reform era, the tendency to 
blame Irish poverty on ‘their Celtic blood’ prevails (p. xlii). For Coleridge, such 
complacent smugness leads to an ugly hypocrisy characteristic of contemporary 
England. The belief that the Irish character is innately flawed ‘encourage[s] a system of 
permissive cruelty’, which, Coleridge contends, is ‘adapted to the delicate selfishness 
and timid injustice of the present age’ (p. lvii). She compares contemporary English 
hypocrisy to that of ‘the brilliant and accomplished Edmund […] hasting out of sight of 
the barbarities about to be committed on the body of his miserable and defenceless 
parent’ (p. lvii). Coleridge’s personification of her age as ‘the brilliant and accomplished 
Edmund’ is a potent critique of a culture in which intellect is a mere instrument for the 
acquisition of power and wealth; in which, in STC’s words, ‘those attainments, which 
give a man the power of doing what he wishes in order to obtain what he desires, are 
alone to be considered knowledge’. Edmund, opportunistic empiricist, is a supreme 
practitioner of what STC calls ‘the Mechanic Philosophy’.22 Coleridge’s appropriation of 
Edmund to symbolize English political morality is a radical statement. She indicates, 
though, that her critique does not contradict the positive view of England’s political 
character and constitution that she expressed earlier: ‘[i]t only implies that as far as we 
have advanced beyond other lands and ages’, she explains, ‘so far do we lag behind the 
standard we ought to attain’ (p. lvii). Coleridge recognizes that, in contemporary 
England, contradictory political tendencies may exist in the same individual. She cites 
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people who are personally benevolent, yet support cruel and reactionary social policies: 
those ‘who would regard with horror any attempt to bring back the villenage of old 
times’, yet admire ‘Malthusian theories of the Poor Law, which really enslave the poor’ 
(p. lvii). 
 
The Poor Law: Christian Principles of Political Economy 
Coleridge’s reference to the Poor Law leads her to consider Christian principles of social 
justice. Ireland remains her focal point, but she encompasses the religious and 
philosophical grounds of socio-economic policy. She supports Hazlitt’s condemnation of 
‘Malthusian theories’, which, he contends, teach that ‘by the laws of God and Nature the 
Rich have a Right to starve the Poor, whenever they, the Poor, cannot maintain 
themselves’ (pp. lvii, lviii). Coleridge suggests that economic injustice is enshrined in 
Malthusian ‘laws’ which ‘protect the able and successful, […] in the accumulation, 
augmentation and transmission of wealth’, while failing to make provision for ‘those 
who cannot obtain work or cannot perform it’ (p. lviii). Coleridge’s language has a 
Biblical resonance: ‘the fortunate are adding field to field and vineyard to vineyard’, 
while the destitute are barely ‘granted enough’ to survive (p. lviii). She mocks the 
reactionary attitude that would condemn her argument as ‘the very principle of 
Socialism, of Communism’ (p. lviii). If Socialism and Communism make the required 
provision for those who have fallen through society’s net, the victims of ‘the 
complications of our Social System’, Coleridge contends, they are wholly in line with 
‘Christian Polity’ (p. lviii).   
 Coleridge argues that ‘justice is embodied in the principle of a Poor Law by the 
reciprocation of rights and duties’ (p. lxxii n.). She cites Wordsworth in support of this 
tenet, and quotes in a footnote the whole of the ninth paragraph of Wordsworth’s essay 
that forms the ‘Postscript’ to his volume Yarrow Revisited and Other Poems (1835).23 
Here, Wordsworth argues that it is ‘the duty of a Christian Government, standing in loco 
parentis towards all its subjects, to make such effectual provision, that no one shall be in 
danger of perishing either through the neglect or harshness of its legislation’ (p. lxiii n). 
Wordsworth is reacting against the Benthamite Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834. The 
Act aimed to reduce public expenditure on poor relief, and to encourage what the 1834 
Poor Law Report called ‘the spirit of industry’. The 1834 Act abolished ‘[a]ll relief 
whatever to able-bodied persons or to their families, otherwise than in well-regulated 
workhouses’. The living conditions in the new workhouses were to be worse —‘less 
eligible’ — than those of the ‘most wretched independent labourer’, and families would 
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be separated. Workhouse relief would ‘symbolize degradation’.24 Wordsworth, as Keble 
recognized, had promoted a noble vision of poverty. In The Old Cumberland Beggar 
(1800), a poem that Coleridge loved particularly, Wordsworth had celebrated an ideal of 
relief based on local tradition and individual charity, wholly at odds with the severely 
degrading provisions of the 1834 Act. The Tory Wordsworth would advocate relief 
managed locally by the landed gentry, on principles of Christian charity. In his essay, 
Wordsworth contends that the nation should implement ‘the political philosophy of the 
New Testament’.25 This is the defining assumption of Coleridge’s discussion of social 
justice. She pre-empts the objection that Christianity is no longer a universal creed. Even 
if agnosticism and atheism are held by some, ‘Christian morality is […] inscribed upon 
the heart of every member of the community’ (p. lxiv). Therefore, Coleridge argues, 
Christian values ‘ought to be expressed in acts of the Legislature’ (p. lxiv). Coleridge 
adduces both the radical Hazlitt and the Tory Wordsworth to support her critique of the 
Poor Law. 
 
Coleridge’s Dialogic Experiment 
In the penultimate section of her ‘Introduction’, Coleridge explains her dialogic 
relationship with STC. Ostensibly, Coleridge is asking the reader’s ‘pardon’ for having 
strayed beyond the confines of introducing STC’s journalism: 
 
In the foregoing sections I have noticed some salient points of my Father’s 
opinions on politics, — indeed to do this was alone my original intent; but once 
entered into the stream of such thought I was carried forward almost 
involuntarily by the current. I went on to imagine what my Father’s view would 
be of subjects which are even now engaging public attention. It has so deeply 
interested myself thus to bring him down into the present hour, — to fancy him 
speaking in detail as he would speak were he now alive; and by long dwelling on 
all that remains of him, his poems of sentiment and of satire, his prose works, 
his letters of various sorts, his sayings and the reports and remarks of others 
about him, I have come to feel so unified with him in mind, that I cannot help 
anticipating a ready pardon for my bold attempt; nay even a sympathy in it from 
genial readers, and such, or none at all, I think to have for the present 
publication (p. lxxxiv). 
 
Filial affection, she pleads, justifies how her writing breaks the bounds of its editorial 
brief. 
 The passage also reveals an underlying tension. Coleridge’s authorial autonomy 
strains against a literary and intellectual dependence on STC. This is reflected in 
Biographia 1847, where Coleridge’s interpretation of STC’s religious philosophy gives 
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way to her critique of Tractarianism. Similarly, in Essays, she says that her sole ‘original 
intent’ was to comment on ‘[her] Father’s opinions on politics’. She was then carried 
away by the persuasive impetus of STC’s ideas. She uses her familiar imagery of 
flowing water to denote creative energy. STC’s ‘thought’ is a strong ‘stream,’ in which 
she becomes immersed, to be ‘carried forward almost involuntarily by the current’. 
‘[I]nvoluntary’ is a term Coleridge associates with STC’s ‘defect[ive]’ cognitive 
processes. She describes the ‘flowing’ of STC’s ‘thought and imagination’ as being 
beyond his volitional control.26 Meanwhile, for a time, she is carried forward ‘almost 
involuntarily’. ‘[A]lmost’ is the vital word. It indicates that Coleridge retains intellectual 
autonomy, despite the compelling force of STC’s ideas.  
 Her independence then becomes mastery: she replaces the passive (‘I was 
carried’) with the active (‘I went on’). No longer immersed in STC’s thought, Coleridge 
stands apart from it, and subjects it to critical analysis: ‘I went on to imagine what my 
Father’s view would be of subjects which are even now engaging public attention’. 
Coleridge takes charge of STC’s ‘thought’ and applies it to the service of her own 
agenda: ‘[i]t has so deeply interested myself to bring him down into the present hour’. 
Coleridge’s emphatic ‘myself’ privileges her over STC (‘him’) and indicates her literary 
dominance. In her transposition of STC’s work to ‘the present hour’, Coleridge locates 
STC as a contributory voice within her own texts. Her appropriation of STC’s work is a 
coolly clinical process. It is not a spontaneous, subconscious phenomenon, but a ‘bold’ 
hermeneutic ‘attempt’ upon which she has engaged deliberately. The process Coleridge 
describes here applies to her appropriation of STC’s ideas throughout her politico-
religious writings, from the ‘Preface’ to Volume 3 of Literary Remains, to her final 
religious work, Dialogues on Personality. Coleridge’s methodology of ‘bring[ing]’ STC 
‘down into the present hour’ involves, in Gadamer’s terms, a ‘fusion’ of historical 
‘horizons’. Gadamer’s description of this hermeneutic process lends insight into 
Coleridge’s reapplication of STC’s ideas: 
 
understanding is certainly not concerned with “understanding historically” […]. 
Rather, one intends to understand the text itself. But this means that the 
interpreter’s own thoughts too have gone into re-awakening the text’s meaning. 
In this the interpreter’s own horizon is decisive, yet not as a personal standpoint 
that he maintains or enforces, but more as […] a possibility that one brings into 
play and puts at risk, and that helps one truly to make one’s own what the text 
says. I have described this […] as a “fusion of horizons”.27 
 
In Coleridge’s present ‘thoughts’, the ‘meaning’ of STC’s texts ‘re-awaken[s]’. She 
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‘fus[es]’ the historical past  with her current ‘horizon’. What she seeks to create in this 
‘fusion’ is a new understanding of ‘subjects which are even now engaging public 
attention’. The tension between authorial autonomy and editorial service is resolved, 
therefore, in the ‘fusion’ of ‘horizons’. Coleridge appropriates STC’s ideas for her own 
setting, rather than attempting to convey an ‘exact understanding’ of them as they 
existed in their own context. Coleridge concludes the paragraph by justifying her 
experimental procedure on the grounds of filial affection. She is a daughter who wishes 
to ‘fancy’ her departed father ‘speaking’. As a daughter, she has read her father’s 
writings so attentively that she feels ‘unified with him in mind’. Again, she exploits the 
family context to construct a position of unimpeachable social propriety. A work of 
major significance, Essays, with its ‘Introduction’, is the composite product of Coleridge 
and STC. Coleridge is the managing contributor in this partnership. 
 Her ‘Introduction’ to Essays is an experiment in dialogic writing: its text is 
multi-voiced. In the last three paragraphs of ‘Section V’, the first of her sections on 
Ireland, Coleridge sets up a textual conversation between Berkeley, STC and de Vere, in 
which her own role is managerial, guiding the direction and continuity of the textual 
interactions. The three paragraphs consist of seventeen lines of quotation from de Vere, 
twenty-four lines of quotation from STC, a quotation in a footnote of two lines from 
Canticles, viii. 8, a quotation of six lines from Berkeley in another footnote, and thirty-
six lines of Coleridge’s writing (including the notes). The first of these three concluding 
paragraphs follows that in which Coleridge appropriates liturgical language to express 
STC’s penitential remorse for England’s mistreatment of Ireland. In the next paragraph, 
three from the end of the section, she explains that STC held it to be a matter of ‘far-
sighted prudence and Christian Principle’ to treat ‘Ireland as flesh of our flesh and bone 
of our bone’ (p. xl). At this point, Coleridge directs the reader to the footnote in which 
she cites Berkeley as the source of the trope from Genesis 2. 23 to express the intimate 
relationship of England and Ireland (p. xl). The main text, from the footnote marker to 
the end of the paragraph, gives a quotation from de Vere which uses a different 
metaphor to restate the idea of mutual dependence: ‘consider whether your neighbours’ 
side of the house can be burned without your goods suffering damage’ (p. xl). 
 The next paragraph consists largely of a quotation from de Vere, which 
Coleridge introduces by emphasizing Ireland’s helpless vulnerability. She compares his 
‘feelings’ to those of ‘a mother defending unfortunate and aggrieved children’ (p. xl). In 
the quoted passage, de Vere expresses indignation that the English censure the Irish for 
characteristics of ‘sloth’ and ‘procrastinat[ion]’ that are the effects of English oppression 
(p. xl). Coleridge concludes the paragraph by addressing the reader directly, who, she 
assumes, is closely familiar with de Vere’s book, and has a copy ready to hand: ‘[s]ee 
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again that agitated paragraph, where [de Vere] enumerates the various things for which 
Ireland has to reproach the Government of England, beginning with “precious and 
repeated opportunities vouchsafed and rejected”, and ending with “the streams of 
knowledge choked in their channels and the springs of virtue poisoned at their 
source”’(p. xli). Coleridge conceives her text and de Vere’s as complementary. Hers 
collaborates with de Vere’s in acting for it as an intermediary or guide. The final 
paragraph of the section consists of quotations from an article by STC that was 
published in The Courier. This shows, Coleridge explains, that de Vere’s view of Ireland 
was ‘compendiously anticipated by [STC] [...] in 1811’ (p. xli). The effect of this textual 
dialogue is to present STC as a ‘political philosopher’ whose views earlier in the century 
support those of Christian commentators (de Vere, herself) in 1848 and 1850 
respectively. Berkeley, however, is the source of the essential concept, just as the 
writings of Archbishop Leighton underpin the religious discourse of STC’s Aids to 
Reflection. These paragraphs demonstrate Coleridge’s conception of a text as an 
assembly of separate components. The components bring together individual minds and 
discrete texts to create a new composite product. Coleridge exploits this method of 
construction in her unpublished religious dialogues. 
 
 Religious Polemic and Literary Form 
In the last few years of her life, Coleridge produced a series of texts entitled collectively 
Dialogues on Regeneration. This significant body of work remains unpublished. 
Coleridge exploits what Gadamer calls ‘the maieutic productivity of Socratic dialogue, 
the art of using words as a midwife’, as a model for the communal interchange and 
development of ideas.28 She had experimented with Socratic dialogue in ‘Nervousness’, 
and her use of the form in religious writing reflects several influences. Walter Savage 
Landor’s Imaginary Conversations had appeared in 1824, but his Pentameron (1837), on 
a theme that encompasses Catholicism and poetry, is a more likely influence. 
Pentameron presents an animated critique of Dante in the form of fictional conversations 
between Boccaccio and Petrarch. In a footnote to her ‘Critique of Dante and Milton’, 
Coleridge recommends Pentameron to ‘all students of Dante’, along with STC’s and 
Carlyle’s discussions of the Italian poet.29 Southey offers her a dialogic model in his Sir 
Thomas More: or, Colloquies on the Prospects and Progress of Society. Coleridge refers 
to Colloquies in Chapter 5 of the ‘Extracts’ in connection with her poetic dialogue with 
Keble. She can ‘speak as freely’ to Keble, the ‘phantom Harmonist’, she says, ‘as my 
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Uncle, Mr. Southey, does with the phantom Sir Thomas More, of his Colloquies’.30 
Southey addresses religious and political themes in a series of dialogues between a 
persona he adopts (‘Montesinos’) and the ghost of Sir Thomas More. Although the 
discourse is often historical, Southey’s concerns are those of contemporary England: 
Catholic Emancipation, the condition of Ireland, the established church, the Reform 
Movement. The tone of the exchanges between Sir Thomas and Montesinos ranges from 
the humorously familiar – ‘You are a good ghost, said I, to come at cock-crow instead of 
taking your departure at that sound’ – to the stern and prophetic: ‘there is no error […] 
more dangerous’, Sir Thomas warns, ‘than the doctrine […] that the state ought not to 
concern itself with the religion of its subjects’.31 In its combination of high seriousness 
with genial humour, Southey’s Colloquies anticipates the dramatic variety of 
Coleridge’s dialogues. 
 Newman provides models for dialogue as a medium of theological polemic. His 
Tract 38 and Tract 41 of 1834 are dialogues between ‘Laicus’ and ‘Clericus’. Laicus 
seeks to draw from Clericus an exposition of his theological position. Newman uses the 
Socratic form to anticipate and answer objections to evolving Tractarian theology, and to 
connect with a non-professional audience. Coleridge’s dialogues, though specialist in 
content, are also framed to be more accessibly varied in style than continuous essays. 
Newman again exploited dialogue as a form of religious writing in ‘Home Thoughts 
from Abroad’ (1836), and ‘The Catholicity of the Anglican Church’ (1840), in which he 
sets out to examine whether the Anglican Church is in a state of schism. The task 
requires him to ‘make a strong statement’ of the opposing case, which influences his 
methodology: ‘we shall best begin by setting down the pleadings of one side and the 
other in the form of dialogue, [….] so as to bring matters to an issue’. Dialogue, 
Newman claims, enables him to treat both sides ‘favourably’.32 This anticipates 
Coleridge’s precept, stated in the Regeneration Dialogues by her character Marvell, that 
it is ‘grossly unfair’ when a polemicist ‘presents the views he means to oppose in the 
statements of bitter prejudicial adversaries rather than as they are propounded by their 
intelligent maintainers’.33 Coleridge, like Newman, uses dialogue as a means of 
presenting a balanced argument. The Socratic dialogue of Newman’s 1840 article is 
brief, and forms the basis for an extended analysis, in which the author’s voice is that of 
an involved adjudicator who declares his interests: ‘[n]ow it would seem that in the 
above discussion each disputant has a strong point; our strong point is the argument from 
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primitiveness; that of the Romanists is the argument from universality’.34 In the closing 
pages, a strongly Anglican voice takes over. Newman’s essay suggests the possibilities 
offered by a text of ‘multiple voices and perspectives’ in negotiating theological 
divisions.35 
 ‘Home Thoughts Abroad’ is a dialogue between three friends, which takes place 
in Rome. The cordial relationship between Cyril and Ambrose anticipates the friendly 
exchanges between Markright and Marvell, Coleridge’s leading protagonists. Ambrose, 
says Cyril, is an ‘entertaining’ companion, who, in debate, ‘could bear a set down or a 
laugh easily, from the sweetness and amiableness of his nature’.36 With the exception of 
the fiercely dogmatic Newbolt, Coleridge’s characters are generally amiable, regardless 
of viewpoint, and ‘easily’ make or take jokes. Newman exploits dialogue, at a crucial 
stage of his development, to explore opposing views of the Anglican Church. In literary 
terms, ‘Home Thoughts Abroad’ is far less ambitious than Coleridge’s dialogues, whose 
speakers represent a broader theological spectrum. Coleridge exploits dialogue to test the 
viability of her theology amid diverse competing viewpoints. In a Bakhtinian sense, both 
Newman and Coleridge offer a model of individuals ‘collectively searching for truth, in 
[a] process of  […] dialogic interaction’.37 Newman’s dialogic novel Loss and Gain 
(1848) also influences Coleridge. The novel’s most significant passages are 
conversations in which characters debate religious theory. Despite reservations about its 
underlying attitudes, Coleridge admires the literary techniques of Loss and Gain: its 
‘style is excellent’, she remarks, and ‘the dialogue flows well’.38 
 Coleridge’s Regeneration Dialogues exploit multi-voiced textual structure 
within their Socratic form. A passage in ‘Dialogue VI’ of the ‘Introductory Dialogues’ 
exemplifies her techniques. Markright is the main protagonist, and represents a 
Coleridgean position. He, Marvell and Lyttelthocht have been discussing free will and 
determinism. Markright has argued that a regenerated individual cannot act in a way 
contrary to his changed nature: ‘[h]ow […] can a divinely changed will, a moral being 
endowed with a new nature in Christ, will what is contrary to this nature, will to neglect 
the grace of God?’ Before leaving, Lyttelthocht charges Markright with ‘Calvinism’ and 
a denial of ‘free will’. Markright, with Marvell as empathetic audience, then sets out the 
rationale for his viewpoint.  He hands Marvell his notebook: ‘Here are two stanzas and a 
brief commentary in verse and prose which bear upon the subject of circumstances and 
free agency’. The ‘stanzas’ are from The Christian Year, the first two of ‘S. Luke The 
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Evangelist’, which consists of twenty stanzas. Keble’s poem contrasts the steadfast 
endurance of St Luke, who continued to follow St Paul in his evangelizing ministry, with 
the weakness of Demas. St Paul, in his second Epistle to Timothy, explains that Demas 
left the evangelizing ministry for love of ‘this present world’.39 Keble’s poem cites 
Demas’s faithlessness as a warning against complacency: a baptized member of the 
Church may fall.  
 Marvell reads out the stanzas from Keble, headed ‘Remark’, followed by two 
stanzas by Coleridge entitled ‘Reply’. The ‘Reply’ is in quatrains, as are Keble’s verses. 
Keble’s are in uniform octameter – while in Coleridge’s the second and fourth lines each 
contain six syllables. The third extract is by Ralph Cudworth, one of the seventeenth-
century ‘Cambridge Platonists’.40 Cudworth’s passage is on the concept of free will. The 
three texts are presented without comment until the end of the third. 
 
  Remark 
 Two clouds before the summer gale 
 In equal race fleet o’er the sky; 
 Two flowers, when wintry blasts assail, 
 Together pine, together die. 
 
 But two capricious human hearts –  
 No sage’s rod may track their ways, 
 No eye pursue their lawless starts 
 Along their wild self chosen maze. 
 
  Reply 
 Two clouds alike may melt or fly,  
 Their essence is the same: 
 Two flowers together bloom or die 
 Of consubstantial frame. 
 
 Man’s outward part, like cloud or flower, 
 Is formed of common clay: 
 But souls of various thought and power 
 Take each a several way. 
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All “souls or personalities”, as Cudworth speaks, “have in them an 
individualizing principle whereby one may be exalted to heaven; the other 
abased unto hell; and this principle, even the Will, by which of course I mean 
the Man considered as self determinant – originating his own acts – is not 
subject to circumstances, determined from without”.41 
 
Markright summarizes how the three texts elucidate his conception of free will in the 
process of regeneration: ‘man by free acts of submission to the Holy Spirit acquires a 
holy nature’, he asserts. This is ‘as contrary to sin as it is to the nature of man to grovel 
in the mire like swine, or dive in the sea like an eel’. The cited texts, according to 
Markright, negate Robert Wilberforce’s theory that a person can possess a sinful and a 
regenerate nature at the same time. The individual is ‘self-determinant’, a free agent. As 
Coleridge comments on a separate sheet of draft notes, ‘a will determined from without, 
driven along the sky of existence like a breath of wind that meets it, would be no will at 
all, no ground of moral responsibility, because no free agent’.42 Both Keble’s and 
Coleridge’s verses show that, while similar natural phenomena and similar botanical 
organisms behave in the same way in the same conditions, human beings behave in 
different, unpredictable ways in the same circumstances, according to the will, which 
constitutes human individuality. This multi-voiced passage reflects the technique 
Coleridge identifies in STC’s work of forming his own writings around a nucleus of 
others’ texts. Coleridge assembles a new composite text from multiple discrete elements. 
Unlike STC, Coleridge is generally scrupulous in referencing her sources. 
 Occasionally, Coleridge leaves the reader to make the connection with a source: 
the effect is to highlight its semantic significance. For example, Markright makes an 
unreferenced allusion to the ‘Cerberian’ offspring of Sin and Death in Paradise Lost, 
which ‘creep’ back into Sin’s ‘womb’ [‘i]f aught disturbed their noise’.43 This allusion 
characterizes the ‘Catholicism’ of Anglo-Catholicism as Papist. Its ‘Romanism’, 
Markright asserts, ‘will creep back into the maternal bosom, whence it came out’. In 
another passage, Markright’s language interrogates the ontological status of 
Wilberforce’s theory. ‘Man is one thing’, Markright asserts, ‘no bundle of distinct 
essences – but one thing with many determinations’.44 Markright associates 
Wilberforce’s ‘divisional’ theory of human nature with David Hume’s sceptical 
formulation that human beings ‘are nothing but a bundle or collection of different 
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perceptions’.45 Coleridge’s use of a word in this way ‘as a sign of someone else’s 
semantic position’ anticipates Bakhtin’s tenet that ‘a dialogic approach is possible 
toward any signifying part of an utterance, even toward an individual word’.46 In 
Biographia 1847, Coleridge had associated Wordsworth’s phrase ‘inward eye’ – ‘They 
flash upon that inward eye | Which is the bliss of solitude’– with Kant’s construction of 
the mind: the ‘inward eye’ is ‘the intellectual medium’ through which we view 
‘[r]eligion’.47 She does not reference the phrase in Biographia 1847, and nor does she in 
Dialogues, when she appropriates it in Markright’s definition of ‘Reason’: ‘by Reason I 
mean the organ of religious apprehension –the inward eye by which we […] behold 
God’.48 Wordsworthian poetic vision is identified with Coleridgean ‘Reason’, the 
‘organ’ by which we encounter the Divine. In Biographia 1847, Coleridge had reversed 
STC’s negative criticism of ‘I wandered lonely’.49 The allusion to the poem in Dialogues 
represents STC and Wordsworth as complementary religious and cultural influences, and 
continues the reconciliation process she had initiated in Biographia 1847. 
  
‘Dialogues on Regeneration’: Theological Themes 
Coleridge’s ‘Dialogues on Regeneration’ consist of around eight hundred pages in total. 
The purpose of the dialogues is to update the anti-Tractarian territory of ‘On 
Rationalism’. Coleridge’s theology in 1850 and 1851 is consistent with that of 1843. By 
1850, though, the politico-religious ground had shifted. The Gorham crisis brought the 
divisions of the previous twenty years into sharp focus. In the wake of the Privy 
Council’s judgment of the Gorham case, Coleridge’s Tractarian parish priest, William 
Dodsworth, and Robert Wilberforce’s brother, Henry, were among those who seceded to 
Rome. The Pope’s establishment of Roman Catholic dioceses in England in autumn 
1850, and Prime Minister Lord John Russell’s consequent attack on Anglo-Catholics, 
exacerbated religious instabilities. The politico-religious disruptions of 1850 are 
reflected in Coleridge’s changing terminology: ‘the title Tractarian is ambiguous’, 
comments Markright, ‘because the earlier Tracts differ in spirit and principles from the 
later ones, and have little in common with that section of High Churchmen which I call 
Anglo-Romanists’. Coleridge used ‘Anglo-Catholic’ as a term synonymous with the 
theology of the Oxford Movement in Biographia 1847. Because of the distinct Roman 
Catholic tendencies in the post-Gorham successors to the Tractarians, Markright names 
them ‘Anglo-Romanists’, and implies that they belong in the Church of Rome. Marvell 
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articulates the dilemma of a High Churchman in 1850 and 1851, which is reminiscent of 
that of Charles Reding in Loss and Gain: ‘I am no Romanist – of that I am sure – that I 
am a thorough Reformationist I am not sure’.50 
 As in ‘On Rationalism’, Coleridge’s agenda in the Dialogues has a political 
inflection in her committed defence of religious freedom. Intellectually ‘empty and light 
as a blown egg shell’, Markright contends, the ‘mystic doctrine of sacraments’ upholds a 
‘domineering despotism’ that has potential to ‘become an instrument of grinding 
oppression’.51 Coleridge’s language here recalls Kant’s appeal for intellectual ‘freedom’, 
in defiance of the ‘despotism of the Schools, which cry danger whenever their cobwebs 
are swept away’.52 The ‘mystic doctrine’, Markright contends, exploits superstition as a 
means of psychological control: he compares the idea of ‘regeneration’ as ‘a momentary 
change’ to waving an ‘enchanter’s wand’.53 In Biographia 1847, Coleridge celebrates 
Luther’s liberation of individual Christians from the spiritual and emotional ‘labyrinth’ 
of sacerdotal domination.54 The Anglo-Romanists’ baptismal doctrine is based on a 
system designed to re-establish the clergy’s temporal power. It is, in Markright’s words, 
‘constructed for the benefit of priestly mediators between God and Man – it flows forth 
into the doctrine of penance devised in order to throw power and authority and honour 
into their hands’. Against the Anglo-Romanist doctrine that sustains the power of the 
clergy, Markright proposes ‘a cleansing of the medium through which the spiritual truth 
is beheld’.55 This summarizes Coleridge’s whole aim in the Dialogues. For Kant ‘the 
duty of philosophy was to remove the deception which arose from false interpretation, 
even though many a prized and cherished dream should vanish at the same time’.56 
Coleridge seeks to ‘cleanse the medium’ of ‘interpretation’ in order to eradicate 
‘deception’ in religious teaching. Her Kantian methodology is complemented in her final 
works by a dialogic form that promotes critical interchange. 
 It appears that the dialogues would have formed a substantial single work, 
consisting of an assembly of individual dialogues, each on a particular aspect of 
regeneration. For example, Coleridge’s final work, Dialogues on Personality in Man, 
was begun in September 1851 and completed in November, just six months before her 
death. These dialogues form a discrete and tightly structured critique of Robert 
Wilberforce’s The Doctrine of Holy Baptism (1849). Wilberforce, Archdeacon of the 
East Riding, hailed by William Gladstone as ‘the Athanasius or Augustine of his 
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generation’, was, like Newman, a formidable opponent. It is feasible to envisage that 
Dialogues on Personality might have been published separately as an answer to 
Wilberforce’s book; as such, it would have formed a bold and significant intervention. It 
was the second of three works in which Wilberforce ‘drew together the various strands 
of sacramental teaching’, in an attempt ‘to form a single corpus’ of Anglo-Catholic 
‘theology’.57 Wilberforce’s book also had an immediate polemical rationale. It aimed to 
refute the Calvinist tendencies of Effects of Infant Baptism (1849) by Evangelical 
theologian William Goode, whose learning, according to Chadwick, ‘bore comparison 
with that of any English divine’.58 Infant baptism raised the continuing problem of post-
baptismal sin in Anglo-Catholic theology. In the first volume of his parochial sermons, 
published in 1845, the Tractarian Henry Manning included ‘On Falling from the Grace 
of Baptism’, in which he echoes Pusey’s severity of the previous decade: ‘[l]et him that 
thinketh he standeth take heed lest he fall. Lot’s wife is an example of those who fall 
from baptismal grace’.59 In Dialogues on Personality, Coleridge’s character Una rejects 
the harshness of such teaching on post-baptismal sin: ‘Heaven forbid that we should 
look upon all who sin habitually after Baptism as dead branches fit only for burning!’60 
The other persistent problem, that potential grace resides in individuals who show no 
sign of regeneration, also remained unresolved: ‘even those whose lives are openly 
profane and evil’, according to Manning, ‘are of the nature of saints’.61 Wilberforce 
devised what Markright terms a ‘divisional theory’ of human nature in order to solve the 
problems raised by Anglo-Catholic baptismal doctrine. 
 Wilberforce conceives individual human nature as being separate from general 
human nature. Christ redeems our general human nature in baptism, while our individual 
nature, in which our distinct personality resides, remains subject to sin. Coleridge selects 
as an epigraph for the Dialogues on Personality a brief quotation from Wilberforce that 
summarizes the essence of his theory. She puts what she regards as the key words in 
italics: 
 
There is in each man some simple, single, indivisible principle, which invests 
him with individuality, whereby he is distinguished from his fellows. […] [T]his 
principle of Personality is something distinct from that common nature, which is 
re-constructed in Christ our Lord. 
 
As Hyflyte, who, with Marvell, is an exponent of Wilberforce’s theory, explains: ‘the 
gift of Holy Baptism concerns only the general humanity’. Hyflyte believes that 
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Wilberforce has solved the problems surrounding the Tractarian theory of baptismal 
regeneration: it is ‘as if an influx of light had removed, at once and for ever, the darkness 
that has so long brooded over the debated doctrine’. Wilberforce’s ‘new theory’, argues 
Hyflyte, 
 
shows that the principle of personality, that simple, single, indivisible principle, 
which invests each man with that individuality, whereby he is distinguished 
from his fellows, […] is something distinct from that general nature, which we 
have in common with our race, that common nature which is reconstituted in 
Christ our Lord. Now it is the general nature which receives the gift of 
regeneration in baptism. […] It follows, therefore, as a direct consequence, that 
a baptized individual may be regenerate as to his […] mere general humanity, 
even while he is personally sinful even to a high degree.  
 
Markright finds the theory illogical, because it conceives of an individual possessing two 
opposing natures simultaneously: a contradiction that undermines faith and morality. 
The ‘divisional theory’ is subjected through the course of the dialogues to a critique 
based on ‘reason, which is common to all mankind’; and on ‘free will’, which ‘freely 
submit[s] to the righteous guidance of Christ’.62 Coleridge appropriates these concepts 
from STC and re-applies them to the politico-religious problems of late 1851. 
 
STC in the ‘Regeneration Dialogues’ 
Marvell displays the critical open-mindedness that Coleridge advocates in polemical 
interchange. In the Dialogues on Personality, he interrogates Markright’s arguments 
rigorously, while gradually shifting in his own views. Marvell comes to reject 
Wilberforce’s ‘divisional theory’ because it contradicts STC’s concepts of reason and 
the moral will. Beneath the dialogue of Markright with Marvell and Hyflyte is a sub-
dialogue between the contemporary Archdeacon and the departed metaphysician. STC is 
a constant presence throughout the Regeneration Dialogues. Coleridge even makes a 
joke of the repeated allusions to him: ‘S. T. Coleridge again!’ exclaims Marvell at yet 
another reference to STC in a speech of Markright’s. Marvell contends that the mystic 
doctrine of baptismal regeneration ‘has been very fully vindicated by J. H. Newman and 
other Anglo-Catholic writers of the present day’. Markright counters that Anglo-
Catholics ignore the history of the topic: ‘[s]ome of your Anglo-Catholic maintainers of 
potential baptismal regeneration pretend’ that opponents ‘of their view don’t know what 
it is’. Yet, this is not the case, because STC ‘examined’ and refuted their mystic doctrine 
‘many years ago’. Markright adds: ‘his pointed exposure of it in the Literary Remains 
has been before the world since 1838, and never has even been noticed. Yet, this 
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assertion that their doctrine is condemned only because it is misunderstood is coolly 
repeated from year to year, and writers whose cobweb theories have been pulled to 
pieces even before they sate down to spin complain that their refinements and 
profundities have never been appreciated by opponents – that all must succumb under 
the weight of their reasonings if they dared draw nigh them’.63 Anglo-Catholic 
polemicists, according to Markright, are sustained by their own and their readers’ 
ignorance, or wilful neglect, of STC.  
 That STC refutes Anglo-Catholicism by anticipation, according to Markright, 
recalls Coleridge’s contention that STC had answered Strauss before The Life of Jesus 
was published. Markright’s comments lend insight into Coleridge as editor and author. 
As editor of the religious volumes of the Literary Remains, she selected extracts from 
STC’s manuscripts that could be applied directly to a critique of Tractarianism. 
However, the Literary Remains received only limited attention, she alleges. 
Consequently, the potential of STC’s ideas to resolve the problems of 1850 and 1851 
remains untapped. That STC’s writings have been neglected, according to Coleridge, 
requires her to appropriate his voice and engage his methodology in a new literary form. 
She ‘bring[s]’ STC ‘down into the present hour’ and re-applies his ideas in her dialogic 
critique of Wilberforce’s theory (p. lxxxiv). ‘[O]bserve’, Markright explains to Marvell, 
‘neither St Paul nor [STC] set forth the notion of two agents or causalities in one being’. 
STC ‘suggests that the Holy Spirit may ineffably unite or become one with our will. He 
does not [conceive?] of a Divine Principle and a human power of agency in one man, 
and acting contrary the one to the other, the latter resisting the suasions of the former’.64 
As the neglect of Literary Remains suggests, for Coleridge merely to collect and 
reassemble STC’s texts is inadequate. She must incorporate STC’s principles in new and 
original writings of her own if his ideas are to have significant impact at mid-century. 
This is the rationale underlying her Regeneration Dialogues.  
 
The Principles of Theological Debate 
Marvell ultimately assents to Markright’s arguments because they are based in STC’s 
concept of ‘reason’. Marvell concludes Dialogues on Personality by reading out ‘a 
beautiful description of regeneracy’ in STC’s ‘Notes on Luther’. The passage includes a 
celebration of ‘reason’ as ‘the light that lighteth every man’.65 Marvell’s change of 
viewpoint involves a Christian attitude of humility, and a vocational commitment to seek 
true doctrine. He follows Coleridge’s principle, stated in ‘Extracts’, that ‘all mankind are 
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bound to serve and defend’ ‘Truth’.66 He is also an agile critical thinker, in contrast with 
characters such as Thychnesse and Newbolt, whose unreflecting sectarian affiliations 
produce intellectual paralysis. As Markright observes, ‘long devotion to a peculiar 
dogmatism […] habituates the mind to incoherency’.67 A disputant who seeks 
‘understanding’, according to Bakhtin, ‘must not reject the possibility of abandoning his 
already prepared viewpoints and positions’.68 At the conclusion of the Dialogues on 
Personality, Una praises Marvell’s intellectual and moral strength in ‘abandoning’ his 
original ‘viewpoint’: ‘he has allowed himself to be instructed by the reasonings of an 
opponent, and is not afraid to correct his views lest their improvement should be 
ascribed to powers of thought beyond his own’.69 Marvell represents a model of the 
transformative potential of dialogue. Gadamer describes such a process: ‘[t]o reach an 
understanding in a dialogue is not merely a matter of putting oneself forward and 
successfully asserting one’s own point of view, but being transformed into a communion 
in which we do not remain what we were’.70 Marvell exemplifies the abandonment of 
monologic assertion and its replacement by dialogic ‘communion’. His rational openness 
is a regrettably rare attitude: ‘[f]or one controversialist who has the thought of mind to 
own his opinion changed in the course of debate’, Una observes, ‘there are fifty 
thousand who can make a shew of maintaining their opinion against all the reasoning in 
the world’.71 Theological ‘debate’ reflects the male arrogance of academic competition, 
in which the object is self-promotion, and the means monologic. Coleridge presents a 
model of collaborative dialogue, in which ‘meaning is […] communally constructed and 
exchanged’.72 
 Coleridge’s ‘communal’ form of religious discourse reflects an historical 
process described by Jürgen Habermas. Through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
according to Habermas, a broadening public sphere emerged. It was produced by a 
culture of dialogue between ‘critically debating private persons’ of the rising 
bourgeoisie. Habermas regards Kant as a key influence on this growing dialogic culture. 
He cites Kant’s view of the importance of dialogue in the formation of ideas: ‘[c]ertainly 
one may say, “Freedom to speak or write can be taken from us by a superior power, but 
never the freedom to think!” But how much, and how correctly, would we think if we 
did not think as it were in common with others, with whom we mutually communicate!’ 
Coleridge’s Kantian epistemology is based on a universal concept of reason; combined 
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with her politico-theological Lutheranism, it underpins her commitment to intellectual 
liberty. Similarly, her adoption of dialogic discourse reflects a Kantian commitment to 
‘think […] in common with others’. Habermas identifies the decades that followed the 
1832 Reform Act, in which Coleridge was writing, as an era in which ‘public discussion’ 
flourished. According to Habermas, Peel’s Tamworth Manifesto of 1834, in which ‘for 
the first time a party published its election platform’, confirmed the importance of 
‘[p]ublic opinion […] formed in the conflict of arguments concerning a substantive 
issue’.73 The post-Reform public sphere of political and religious argument enabled 
Coleridge to become an author, and determined the dialogic forms she would adopt and 
develop in her writing. 
 In the Dialogues on Personality, Coleridge represents Wilberforce’s divisional 
theory largely through speeches of his supporter Hyflyte, who paraphrases and quotes 
extensively from Wilberforce’s writings. According to the principles she advocated in 
her ‘Extracts’, Coleridge presents the views she opposes ‘truly’, using, ‘as far as 
possible’ the author’s ‘own words’.74 As the guiding intelligence managing the dialogue, 
Coleridge makes her own bias clear. In doing so, she draws the reader into the dialogue. 
Just as in Essays, in which she expects the reader to have de Vere’s book by him, she 
assumes that her reader will have a copy of The Doctrine of Holy Baptism to hand, and 
challenges his active response. In a footnote her authorial voice intervenes. She directs 
the reader to consider some specific passages: 
 
If any admirer of the theory under discussion demurs at the description implied 
in the words put in italics, I would ask him, what he understands by the author’s 
language in the Doctrine of Holy Baptism, at pages 26, 27, 47, 60, 118, 154, 
155? What is meant by the following at p. 87?  
 
After the quotation, Coleridge expresses her own view that ‘the theory’ fails to ‘meet the 
difficulty which it undertakes to remove, namely the personal non-sanctification of so 
many of the baptized’.75 Coleridge here extends her dialogic concept of religious 
polemic as a collaborative activity. She invites the reader to work through Markright’s 
interpretations in the main text and use them as a basis for analyzing the passages she 
cites in the footnote. Coleridge’s literary procedure expresses her ethic of inclusive 
collaborative discourse. 
 Coleridge’s innovatory approach reflects her evolving religious and authorial 
agenda. The threat posed by Strauss’s Biblical criticism requires that theological 
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discourse be rigorously cogent: ‘religious truth’ must have a ‘clear […] intellectual 
form’. High Churchmen, though, rely in polemical argument on their traditional 
hierarchical status: ‘[s]uch preachers [as Novel Primitive]’, states Markright, ‘deal with 
argument as game is knocked down [… ]. Wretched animals shorn of their strength are 
driven from the stations of the gallant sportsman, who aims at them luxuriously from 
beneath the shade of a green silk umbrella’. Markright envisages a future in which 
traditional religious authority and ecclesiastical privilege will count for nothing. High 
Church polemicists will be unequipped to defend religion from Straussian critical 
analysis: ‘[t]urn Primitive or Newbolt adrift into the forest of controversy to take his 
chance against a drove of wild arguments ….’ Marvell cuts Markright off with a sharp 
rebuke for indulging in ‘a wild sort of talk’. Throughout the dialogues, Markright and 
Marvell demonstrate a rigorously critical methodology. They interrogate imprecise 
terminology, and unexamined assumptions, in order to expose what is vacuous or 
contradictory. For example, Markright questions Lyttelthocht’s appropriation of Jeremy 
Taylor’s metaphor for baptismal grace as a ‘seed sown in the ground of the heart’. 
Lyttelthocht is unable to explain what this means in plain terms, and can only substitute 
‘one metaphorical mode of speech for another’. Markright is committed to establishing 
‘clear thought and unity of system’ in his dialogic analysis of doctrine.76 For Coleridge, 
the shifting grounds of religious and cultural discourse at mid-century require literary 
innovation as much as intellectual subtlety: her dialogues are concerned with language 
and method.  
 In Newman’s Loss and Gain, some characters are caricatured through their 
names: for example, a liberal evangelical who regards ‘[r]eligion as a matter of the heart’ 
is named ‘Mr. Freeborn’; ‘Mr. Gabb’ and ‘Mr. Macanoise’ are verbose dissenting 
preachers.77 In Coleridge’s dialogues all the speakers are given names that indicate their 
dominant characteristics. The main protagonists are Phosphilus Markright, the critical 
analyst who upholds the Coleridgean concept of reason as the light in which we 
encounter the divine; and Mystes Marvell, an Anglo-Catholic, who, as his name 
indicates, maintains the mystic doctrine of baptismal regeneration. Markright is by no 
means a model practitioner of polemic: at times he is satirically scathing, and expresses 
himself intemperately. On one occasion Marvell has to pull him up for arrogance. There 
is perhaps an element of self-criticism in Coleridge’s portrayal of Markright’s lapses of 
restraint. Marvell, by contrast, presents the most constructive approach to theological 
debate. Most of the names in the dialogues are satirically humorous: Brightwit 
Lyttelthocht, Hyflyte (reminiscent of ‘Mr. Highfly’ in Loss and Gain), Dr. Wordsall, 
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Smoothitt Smallthought, Mr. Thychnesse, and the Calvinist minister Mr. Knowell, for 
example. An Anglo-Catholic preacher is named Novel Primitive, while Oldways is a 
traditional High Church minister. Coleridge creates a community of characters who 
bring different shades of language and meaning to ‘the dynamic, collective generation of 
truth’, to borrow Macovski’s phrase.78  
 None of the characters is a caricature of a contemporary public figure. This 
contrasts with Newman’s practice in Loss and Gain, where Jennings, ‘the Vice-Principal 
of St. Saviour’s, was plainly meant to be Edward Hawkins’, Provost of Oriel College.79 
To caricature individuals would be to indulge in personal disparagement of a kind that 
Coleridge deplores. When she exploits the comic possibilities of characters’ names she is 
satirizing a tendency or attitude. There is, for example, a comic scene in which the two 
women, Una and Irenia, draw out Mr. Thychnesse to express himself with increasing 
absurdity; so much so that Una can barely contain her mirth: ‘[y]ou may smile, Miss 
Una’, remonstrates Mr. Thychnesse, ‘but I can tell you that this is no exaggeration’. The 
comedy of the scene, which satirizes Thychnesse’s unreflecting acceptance of the 
authority of ‘our spiritual superiors’, recalls Molière’s Tartuffe, in which the maid 
Dorine exposes her master Orgon’s ludicrous self-delusions. There are abundant comic 
moments such as Dr. Wordsall’s reference to his ecclesiastical career as ‘my long 
warfare in the ministry’; or Hyflyte’s joke, taken in characteristic good humour by Mr. 
Thychnesse, that Newman’s doctrine would not have much chance of being fairly 
represented by him ‘if his name was to represent his nature’. There is often a lively 
dramatic sense, particularly at the beginnings and ends of scenes, maintaining the tone of 
a stage play, rather than that of a text designed to be analyzed in the study. The animated 
opening of ‘Dialogue VI’ of the Dialogues on Personality, for example, begins in media 
res: 
 
Marvell: Here comes an auxiliary. Our friend, Markright, stoutly denies that we 
have any such thing as a principle of personality – 
Markright: – Distinct from our general humanity: a thing per se: a separate 
essence. This novel doctrine 
Thychnessse: Novel doctrine! Why it is as old as Aquinas and older too. 
Athanasius is full of it.80 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
The quick pace, colloquial vigour, and humorous military allusion create variety in a 
work of sustained doctrinal exposition. Such features reflect the stylistic influence of 
Southey’s Colloquies.  
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 The Anglo-Catholic disputants participate in dialogue to lecture rather than 
listen. Marvell is the exception. Newbolt exemplifies the aggressive and supercilious 
manner that disrupts theological discourse. When Lytellthocht disagrees with him, 
Newbolt speaks ‘angrily and with much contempt of look and voice’. He issues arrogant 
directives, fails to analyze or discuss, and responds to others’ arguments with sectarian 
insults: ‘[i]t is a mere piece of German Rationalism, a vapour – a vile exhalation from 
the foul corrupt marsh of German unsoundness and infidelity’. Newbolt’s language is 
satirically reminiscent of the British Critic’s attack on STC. Irenia, as her name 
indicates, represents the opposite, conciliatory tendency. She refers to all fellow 
participants, whatever their views, as ‘colleagues’. Her response to Markright’s 
argument, which Newbolt dismisses with such venom, is devotional: ‘[m]eantime do see 
how Dr. Pusey explains the Anglo-Catholic doctrine of baptismal regeneration. He is so 
pious, so truly evangelical, that by a spiritual simplicity he may have found what keener 
logicians have missed’.81 Neither Newbolt nor Irenia represents the procedure for 
productive religious dialogue that Coleridge advocates. Newbolt’s aggressive 
authoritarianism blocks intellectual interchange, while Irenia’s affective response is not 
conducive to the conceptual renewal, or defence, of religion. In face of the threat posed 
to Christianity by Strauss, neither Newbolt nor Irenia would offer a viable strategy. 
Irenia’s devotional response to Pusey reflects Coleridge’s experience of Pusey’s 
preaching: ‘[w]hile listening to him, you do not seem to see and hear a preacher, but to 
have visible before you a most earnest and devout spirit, striving to carry out in this 
world a high religious theory’.82 In Biographia 1847, Coleridge cautions that the 
‘persuasive’ qualities of Pusey’s ‘discourses’ are intellectually misleading.83  
 
The Gender Politics of Coleridge’s ‘Dialogues’ 
Coleridge’s inclusion of two women in her dialogues is innovatory. Nonetheless, the 
gender politics of the dialogues are overtly patriarchal. In the Regeneration Dialogues as 
a whole the roles of Una and Irenia are minor. They appear less frequently and say much 
less than their brothers, Markright and Marvell, who are the leading protagonists. 
Throughout, the male characters condescend to the women in belittlingly conventional 
language. Thychnesse, for example, addresses Irenia, plainly his intellectual superior, as 
‘my dear young lady’, as though speaking to a child.84 In the ‘Introductory Dialogue’, 
the usually considerate and restrained Marvell cuts across a poetic observation of 
Irenia’s with a brusque statement of his agenda. Markright presumes to tell Irenia what 
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she means and translates her affective devotional language into academic terminology. A 
romantic relationship between Markright and Irenia is implied and, because Markright is 
a major protagonist, the impression of a traditional gender hierarchy is reinforced. Yet, 
Coleridge deploys her women characters in a subtly subversive manner. This is shown 
by comparison with the female characters in Loss and Gain. In Newman’s novel, the 
main protagonist’s mother and sisters do not contribute to its substance of religious 
debate. Their presence serves to heighten the pathos of Reding’s emotional dilemma 
over conversion. By contrast, both Una and Irenia contribute to the dialogues in a 
significant manner, particularly the Dialogues on Personality. 
 In this final set of dialogues, completed in November 1851, Una seconds 
Markright in his critique of Wilberforce’s theory, expounded by Hyflyte and Marvell. In 
doing so, she shows herself to be, at the very least, the intellectual equal of her brother 
and a notable authority on the metaphysical writings of STC. She is also more restrained 
in her expression and avoids the notes of satire and irritation to which Markright 
occasionally succumbs. She is particularly sharp and succinct in summarizing key 
Coleridgean concepts, for example: ‘[r]eason, which, by its down-shining into the soul, 
converts it from earthly to heavenly, is the Divine Light, no faculty or personal property 
of any human mind’. She summarizes the concept of the active will in response to 
Irenia’s poetic image that ‘a divine seed implanted in baptism meets the opening 
faculties and gradually assimilates them to itself, as the moon beams permeate a leaden 
cloud and convert it into silver’. Una gently corrects the conceptual grounds of Irenia’s 
observation: ‘[b]ut there is this difference, dear Reny. The cloud passively receives or is 
absorbed by the moonshine. But the spirit of man with its faculties of thinking, feeling, 
willing, is essentially active. Our spirit is a will. It cannot, by its own nature, passively 
absorb divine grace’.85 In her formulations of reason and the will, Una summarizes the 
whole conceptual basis of Markright’s arguments, and those of Coleridge herself. The 
gentle collaborative exchange between the women is a model for the productive conduct 
of theological debate. 
 Irenia, like Una, is an accomplished student of divinity. However, like Hartley 
Coleridge, she values spiritual devotion rather than theological debate. In the Dialogues 
on Personality, Irenia attempts to draw her companions from conceptual dispute to 
contemplation. After Markright delivers a confident case that man’s personal and 
general natures are not ‘separate essence[s]’, the company takes time to assimilate his 
arguments. There is ‘a Silence – broken at last by Irenia’. She aims to bring the 
disputants together in a shared appreciation of the scene outside the window: ‘[d]o look 
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Una, at that darling squirrel, up there in the Weymouth Pine! He shakes his shady tail at 
us, as if in derision of our metaphysics’. Markright replies with affectionate irritation: 
‘[y]es, let us look at the squirrel, and he shall help our metaphysics instead of hindering 
them as Madam Irenia wants to make him do’. He trumps Irenia’s diversionary tactic by 
using the squirrel as an illustration in his argument: ‘[c]an you conceive the activity of 
the creature to be a separate and a distinct creature from his life and general physical 
nature?’86 In their attempts to subvert each other’s agenda here, Irenia and Markright are 
a version of Shakespeare’s Beatrice and Benedick. The passage illustrates the lively 
theatrical sense of Coleridge’s dialogues. It also appears to confirm patriarchal 
stereotypes in presenting an intellectual male protagonist and a sentimental female 
whose response to religion is affective. As Carol Engelhardt Herringer observes, ‘[a] key 
component of the [Victorian] feminine ideal was the belief that women were more 
spiritual than men’.87 Coleridge’s portrayal of Irenia seems to support this aspect of the 
Victorian ‘feminine ideal’. However, the gender politics of the Dialogues on Personality 
are more subtle and subversive than immediate impressions suggest. 
 Irenia’s contributions in the Dialogues on Personality of late 1851 are more 
significant and distinct than in those written earlier. This is because Derwent’s 
posthumous editions of Hartley’s poems and prose had been published in 1851, and the 
construction of Irenia in the Dialogues on Personality reflects the influence of Hartley’s 
religious poems;88 particularly the conversation poems ‘Religious Differences’ and ‘The 
Word of God’, and sonnets such as ‘The Bible’, ‘The Litany’, and ‘Multum Dilexit’, in 
which Hartley identifies with the penitential devotion of Mary Magdalene.89 In 1846, 
Hartley intended to send Coleridge ‘a heap of sonnets and other poems on religious 
subjects’, so that she could annotate any passage that might provoke controversy.90 This 
is characteristic of his irenic attitude. Whether he sent the poems is uncertain, though by 
the autumn of 1851 Coleridge had read Derwent’s edition of Hartley’s poetry. The final 
section, headed ‘Scriptural and Religious Subjects’, presents a homogenous body of 
religious poetry committed to personal devotion and the unity of Christian communion. 
This ethic is reflected in Irenia’s role in the Dialogues on Personality.   
 The structure of Hartley’s ‘Religious Differences’, a conversation poem in 
which he addresses a silent auditor, is dialogic. In Bakhtinian terms, the poem ‘enacts 
[…] a poetics of dialogue’, in which a ‘mute listener […] stands as a figure for literary 
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addressivity’.91 The conversational tone is relaxed, meditative and egalitarian. Hartley’s 
addressee is of a different religious persuasion, which he dismisses as a matter of 
linguistic interpretation. Hartley distrusts the claims of dogmatic theology to express 
religious truth. F. D. Maurice suggested a similar view of the inadequacy of verbal 
definition in a letter to Coleridge of March 1843: ‘verbal forms and propositions answer 
for the facts of the understanding’, but not for the ‘higher spiritual realities’. For 
Maurice, ‘Sacraments’ are ‘the transcendent language’ in which spiritual ‘truths’ are 
expressed.92  Hartley’s poem rejects the discourse of religious sectarianism: he offers 
instead a Marian image as an aid to devotion, in which professors of ‘seeming different 
creeds’ may meet in childlike simplicity of faith: 
 
 Sweet dove, sweet image of the faith that rests 
 All doubts, all questions past, 
 In babe-like love at last, 
 With that dear Babe divine, between the Virgin’s breasts. 
 
Beyond technicalities of doctrine, Hartley envisages Christians of diverse denominations 
and sects unified in reverent apprehension of the divine: 
 
 Yes, we do differ when we most agree,  
 For words are not the same to you and me.  
 And it may be our several spiritual needs 
 Are best supplied by seeming different creeds. 
 And differing, we agree in one 
 Inseparable communion, 
 If the true life be in our hearts – the faith, 
 Which 
  […]  
        to believe 
 Is all of Heaven that earth can e’er receive.93 
 
For Hartley, Christians meet in a unified ‘communion’ of simple ‘faith’. In 1846, 
Coleridge similarly affirms ‘that the life and soul and substance of Christianity may be 
pretty equally partaken by those who logically differ,’ though she remains committed to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Macovski, p. 19. 
92 Jeremy Morris, F. D. Maurice and the Crisis of Christian Authority (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008), p. 82 n. Maurice’s emphasis. 
93 HCPW, pp. 353-354, ll. 24-27, 28-35, 38-39. 
	   194	  
the development of an intellectually cohesive body of doctrine.94  
 Hartley’s view, that differences between ‘creeds’ are irrelevant in contrast with 
the living reality of devotion, is radically inclusive. Newman satirizes such an attitude in 
Loss and Gain in the character of a young woman who, with some friends, is ‘organizing 
a new religious body’, about which she seeks Reding’s advice. Her language is used also 
by Hartley: ‘[w]e are all scriptural’, she tells Reding, ‘and therefore are all one; we may 
differ, but we agree’.95 In an unfinished essay published posthumously in 1851, Hartley 
expresses his vision of a single, liberating, unifying faith: ‘all shapes and hues’ of 
sectarian difference ‘will vanish’, he proclaims, ‘in the universal light, and nothing 
remain but the love, which is perfect light, and life, and immortality, which flows from 
God, and is God, even God with us, uniting all blessed souls, from the beginning to the 
end of time, in a beautiful communion, identifying the love of God with the love of all 
that are God’s, that God may be all in all’.96 Hartley’s rhythmic prose, in which he 
appropriates St Paul’s language, is reminiscent of the devotional lyricism of medieval 
mystic Richard Rolle.  
 Coleridge gives voice to Hartley’s devotional attitudes in the character of Irenia. 
When Markright addresses Wilberforce’s theory in relation to the doctrine of Original 
Sin, she pleads: ‘[s]urely these are mysteries which man’s wit cannot fathom’. Attempts 
to verbalize spiritual mysteries risk blasphemy, in Irenia’s view. She objects to 
Markright’s use of horticultural language in relation to the Incarnation: ‘[o]h!’ she 
warns, ‘take care not to lower such sublimities by earthly comparisons’. Irenia 
distinguishes between ‘theories’ and ‘doctrines’. She has no difficulty in ‘receiving’ 
doctrines, but finds ‘theories’ unsettling and irreligious.97 This is an important distinction 
following the innovations of the Oxford Movement. In their political project to retain 
ecclesiastical authority amid political change, its leaders attempted to create a new form 
of Anglicanism: in effect, a new religion. They destabilized Anglican doctrine by 
advancing novel theories, such as Newman’s antiquarianism and Wilberforce’s 
construction of human nature. Hartley fears that ‘plain, pious, straightforward, believing 
church-goers’ will be ‘disturbed’ by the polemical warfare of opposing theorists.98 
Hartley’s division between piety and polemics, spirituality and theory, anticipates that 
made by Markright in an earlier dialogue, where he defines ‘the several theories of 
‘Regeneration’ as ‘a question of metaphysical science rather than spiritual religion’. 
Irenia describes how the theoretical disputes of her companions ‘disturb’ her spiritual 
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devotion: 
 
I cannot follow theories, Phosphilus […]. When I listen to your debates with my 
brother and our friends, I seem to be entering a dark tangled forest. I enter in, the 
more I penetrate the umbrageous region, the dimmer grows the prospect all 
around. Every trunk splits into boughs, and the boughs break forth into 
innumerable branches, and the branches are subdivided into endless twigs and 
leaves and leafits, and the leaves grow thinner and become mere needles – mere 
needles that pierce and prick my poor mind and imagination, startling it out of 
the repose of deep unquestioning faith: and the further I go in this wearisome 
wood, the less light there is and the more I lose sight of heaven!99 
 
In one sense the passage may be read in terms of a conventional gender stereotype: 
Irenia presents herself as the traditional lost child of fairy-tale. She looks for rescue to 
Markright (‘Phosphilus’), who responds with gallantry, addressing her as ‘my fair one’. 
There are also other associations. Irenia’s evocation of ‘gloom’, Markright says, ‘is 
worthy of a place in Dante’s Purgatorio’.100 Irenia’s Dantesque description alludes to the 
Protestant versus Romanist locus of contemporary religious division. Again, Irenia’s 
point of view is not Coleridge’s. Coleridge believes that faith should be tested and 
developed through critical debate: she is committed to ‘the [dialogic] process of question 
and answer, giving and taking’, to borrow Gadamer’s terms, and to ‘forming concepts 
through working out the common meaning’.101 She conceives of the Christian life as an 
active spiritual ‘struggle’, not a passive state of ‘repose’, as Irenia suggests.102 
Nonetheless, Coleridge presents Irenia’s rejection of religious theorizing as a valid, 
principled position. It is comparable to that of Hartley in his sonnet ‘The Bible’: 
  
 Whate’er of truth the antique sages sought, 
 And could but guess of his benign decree, 
 Is given to Faith affectionate and free, 
 Not wrung by force of self-confounding thought.103 
 
For Hartley, as for Irenia, the minute intellectual distinctions over which competing 
theorists argue are ‘self-confounding’ and disruptive of Christian communion. Like 
Irenia, Hartley implies that grace is acquired passively, whereas for Coleridge grace is 
not simply ‘given’, but received gradually by ongoing efforts of the will responding to 
promptings of the Holy Spirit. However, Coleridge acknowledges that rejection of 
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theoretical debate is a valid position at mid-century. If religious discourse remains 
focused on theoretical technicalities, she recognizes, the field will be left open for 
Straussian analysts. In that case, the whole culture may ‘lose sight of heaven’. 
  Irenia’s rejection of intellectual theorizing in favour of ‘unquestioning faith’ 
gives way to a moment of romance. The inclusion of romance in the religious dialogue 
implies a rejection of the ethic of celibacy, upheld by Newman before as well as after his 
reception as a Roman Catholic. Markright responds to Irenia’s plea and rescues her from 
the ‘dark tangled forest’ of controversy, and closes the dialogue. Affectionately 
appropriating language Irenia has used earlier, he suggests that the company ‘walk out 
into the grove and look at the moon silvering those fleecy clouds from among the firs 
and Weymouth pines with their quaint stems and fairy foliage’. Markright’s imagery 
shrinks Irenia’s bewildering tree trunks into daintily ornamental ‘quaint stems’; the pine 
‘needles’ that ‘prick and pierce’ her are transformed into magical ‘fairy foliage’.104 The 
threatening forest becomes a romantic grotto. Irenia’s protest against polemics and 
Markright’s romantic response suggest a conventional construction of gender. Markright 
soothes Irenia in her intellectual confusion. The episode appears to uphold the 
patriarchal positions of Derwent and John Taylor Coleridge that women ‘ought not to 
enter upon controversy’.105 The irony, however, is that the author of the ‘Dialogues’ is a 
woman, debarred from university education, from academic or ecclesiastical position. 
By use of male speakers, she infiltrates the exclusively male domain of theological 
controversy. 
  In the Dialogues on Personality Coleridge confronts the arguments of an 
eminent theologian, who, as an Anglo-Catholic Archdeacon, is an archetype of 
patriarchal authority. Coleridge’s subversive irony is that she creates male speakers to 
refute a theory designed to uphold male power. Una assumes a major role towards the 
end of the Dialogues on Personality and delivers the decisive blow to Hyflyte’s 
argument. Coleridge could have written the leading protagonists as female roles, but 
chooses to produce texts that are overtly conventional. I suggest that there are three 
reasons for this. First, Coleridge’s agenda is primarily religious. To have foregrounded 
female protagonists would have distracted from her assertion of inclusive rational 
theology. Second, a radical public statement on gender would have undermined her 
religious ethic of restrained and self-effacing authorship. Her apparent upholding of 
gender conventions in the Dialogues enables her to maintain the stance of social 
propriety that she has adopted throughout her literary career. The frequent references to 
STC and the Literary Remains (edited by Henry Nelson Coleridge according to their title 
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pages) imply that the Dialogues, like Coleridge’s earlier writings, are based in pious and 
dutiful regard for her departed father and husband. And third, a female author’s 
intervention in the patriarchal academy, under cover of male speakers, is uniquely 
subversive. 
 
Critical Theory and Authorial Practice. 
Coleridge intended to include some poems in her religious dialogues. These illustrate 
how Coleridge’s theory and practice have developed through her career. As late as 1848, 
when she was contemplating a second volume of children’s verse, Coleridge admits to 
having ‘been restrained’ from writing religious poetry, ‘by a reverential feeling and a 
fear to vulgarize and trivialize and desecrate’. She adds that religious poetry is ‘the 
easiest of all to write commonplaceishly – the hardest to write worthily in’.106 
Coleridge’s sibilant coinage emphasizes her disdain for second-rate religious verse that 
demeans its subject. In the poems for inclusion in the Regeneration Dialogues, however, 
Coleridge finds an idiom for religious verse that she employs with accomplished 
assurance. ‘The Mystic Doctrine of Baptism’, for example, is based on a central conceit 
that the Tower of Babel represents the delusory, irreverent construct of ‘false Theology’. 
The tower ‘[d]issolves in air’ when struck by God’s ‘beams’. By contrast, ‘[t]he golden 
stair to heaven’, an allusion to the ladder of Jacob’s dream in Genesis, is to be found 
‘[d]eep in the heart of man’.107 God has ‘cast’ this ‘structure fair’, which provides the 
means to reach heaven. Here, Coleridge alludes to ‘the broad and deep foundation’ of 
faith ‘laid by the creator himself ’, which she describes in Biographia 1847.108 Whether 
man reaches heaven by the means God has provided depends upon his own efforts. The 
emphasis at the end of the poem is on spiritual exertion. From lines of eight syllables 
alternating with four or five syllable lines, the final stanza concludes with a couplet of 
six syllable lines and a final line of twelve syllables: 
 
 Deep in the heart of man was cast 
  Its broad foundation 
 More glorious each day than the last 
  It keeps its station: – 
 This is the gradual stair sublime 
  The golden stair to heaven, 
  By Truth and Mercy given, 
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 Knowledge, Faith, Hope and Love, by which to God we climb!109 
 
The ten successive monosyllables create the sense of effort, of climbing step by step. 
Coleridge here appropriates a Miltonic technique by using a monosyllabic line to mime 
energetic exertion. Milton describes Satan struggling to cross Chaos: 
 
O’er bog or steep, through straight, rough, dense, or rare, 
With head, hands, wings or feet pursues his way, 
And swims or sinks, or wades, or creeps, or flies.110 
 
Coleridge uses a similar rhythmic technique to slow her line to a jerking crawl. She 
creates the impression of spiritual struggle: the vigorous exercise of ‘Faith, Hope and 
Love’. 
 Coleridge’s poetic practice in the Regeneration poems contradicts her critical 
theory. In 1843 she critiques The Christian Year in terms that are exactly applicable to 
her own religious poems: ‘[s]et doctrine and poetry are in my mind uncombinable 
things; just so much as there is of the former in any poem just so far it contradicts its 
own nature as it seems to me and becomes a failure’. On this topic, as on others, such as 
the capacity of women to write on Political Economy, she has changed her mind. 
Coleridge aims, in the poems that accompany her dialogues, to convey theological 
arguments with conceptual precision. The poems show technical accomplishment and 
rhetorical vigour, though their poetic range is limited by their polemical context. For 
Coleridge, modesty of purpose in religious poetry is a virtue. Elizabeth Barrett’s ‘style’ 
in The Seraphim, she maintains, is unsuited ‘to the seriousness of a Gospel theme’. 
Coleridge holds that ‘women are not good poets’, and that the higher the aspirations of a 
female poet, the less likely she is to succeed.111 Even the greatest of poets may fall short 
in religious verse: Dante, and even ‘our glorious bright-souled “‘Puritan’”, as she calls 
Milton, confuse ‘the material with the spiritual’ in their poetic language.112 ‘The Mystic 
Doctrine of Baptism’ tests a style of verse designed to convey a theological doctrine 
with precise clarity. Its scope is purely conceptual, its purpose polemical. Like the other 
‘Regeneration’ poems, it is accommodated to the limitations within which Coleridge 
conceives herself as working. She produces accomplished but unambitious verse that, 
like her poems written for children – including those that accompany her fairy-tale, 
Phantasmion – do not aspire to be great poetry. Coleridge’s dogmatic poems lack 
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devotional passion or contemplative spirituality, but answer their polemical purpose as 
subsidiary components of her Dialogues. 
 
Christian ‘Life’ and the Vocation of Authorship  
Coleridge advocates ‘practical Christianity’.113 In Aids to Reflection, STC had asserted 
that ‘Christianity is not a Theory, or a Speculation; but a Life. Not a Philosophy of Life, 
but a Life and a living Process’.114 Coleridge suggests that critical discourse is an 
essential basis of the ‘living Process’ of Christianity. At the conclusion of a dialogue in 
which Marvell has made the Anglo-Catholic case for ‘momentary passive regeneration’, 
and Markright has critiqued it for incoherence, Coleridge presents a model of ‘practical’ 
religious unity. Markright concludes the theoretical debate in order to make a pastoral 
visit: 
 
 I am going to Widow Wornout, for whom you have done so much, Marvell. I 
 think I can give her some comfort about her poor daughter. Country physicians 
 sometimes […] mismanage both the minds and bodies of their patients: the 
 former especially […] from fixing their eye too abstractedly on the complaint 
 without due consideration of the patient.115 
 
Whatever their theoretical differences, Markright and Marvell work together in ‘one | 
Inseparable communion’ of ‘practical’ Christian ministry.116 Both are involved in 
pastoral care of ‘Widow Wornout’, whose ‘poor daughter’, we may infer, is suffering 
from mental illness. In terms that recall ‘Nervousness’, it appears that Markright is 
arranging medical care for the daughter of a more effective kind than is available from 
local ‘physicians’.  
 This passage about pastoral care sheds light upon Coleridge’s conception of 
religious dialogue. Markright and Marvell’s mutual commitment to a dialogic 
community is paralleled by their pastoral collaboration. Coleridge’s reference to the 
theme of pastoral service reflects the social concerns of her friend and correspondent F. 
D. Maurice. His initiatives in Christian Socialism, with his associates John Malcolm 
Ludlow and Charles Kingsley, belong to the last four years of Coleridge’s life. Maurice 
and his colleagues sought to achieve a ‘renewal of the Church’s social mission’. At the 
heart of their project ‘were seemingly minor, practical ventures’ conceived on a local 
scale.117 Maurice’s approach to social issues was dialogic and democratic, as shown in 
his meetings with ‘one of the antichristian Chartist leaders, the tailor Walter Cooper’. In 
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dialogue with Cooper and his followers, Maurice ‘freely allowed criticism, encouraged 
the men to talk frankly, guided the discussion without dominating, and tried to give a 
fair summary at the end. Whereas most clergymen of the day wished to promulgate truth 
to the workmen’, Chadwick adds, ‘Maurice wished to learn from them’.118 The dialogic, 
democratic ethos of Maurice’s socio-political methods is paralleled by Coleridge’s ideal 
of free and open interchange in religious discourse. The dialogic model of communal 
exchange is important for both Maurice and Coleridge. As Gadamer puts it, participants 
‘in a successful conversation […] come under the influence of the truth of the object and 
are thus bound to one another in a new community’.119 Maurice collaborates with the 
workmen in order that both he and they might progress to a new, shared understanding. 
Similarly, Coleridge’s dialogues show how ‘a new community’ of understanding is 
formed through processes of open ‘conversation’. 
 Coleridge, like Hartley, recognizes that the devotional life of Christianity 
transcends theoretical ‘misunderstandings’ and ‘dogmatic differences’.120 Nonetheless, 
she holds that the conceptual definition of doctrine gives Christianity its practical moral 
direction. Without such definition, spiritual belief is vulnerable to materialistic distortion 
and authoritarian repression. As Marvell puts it: ‘[t]he intellectual form of religious truth 
is necessary in order to perceive the moral and spiritual content’.121 Coleridge’s vocation 
is to contribute to the development of this ‘intellectual form’. She maintains ‘that the 
whole logical truth is not the possession of any one party, that it exists in fragments 
amongst the several parties, and that much of it is yet to be developed’.122 This 
statement, from a letter of 1846, reflects the rationale of Coleridge’s religious dialogues. 
Each of her personae represents a particular feature or ‘fragment’ of ‘truth’, which 
Coleridge subjects to analysis by reference to principles she has appropriated from STC. 
To borrow Bakhtin’s terminology, Coleridge stages ‘the event of an interaction of 
voices’, in order to renew religious discourse as a dynamic and collective process.123 In 
the same letter, she describes how she has formed her religious views by dialogic 
interaction: ‘I […] have gone between various parties’, she explains: ‘I have […] not 
merely read on both sides, that is by no means enough, but eat and drunk and slept, and 
talked confidentially and interchanged, not only courtesies, but heart kindnesses on both 
or all sides’.124 Religious dialogue, for Coleridge, is a sociable, intimate and heartfelt 
interchange, the opposite of monologic self-promoting confrontation. According to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 Chadwick, p. 354. 
119 Gadamer, p. 387. 
120 M & L, II, pp. 14-15. Coleridge’s emphasis. 
121 HRC. 
122 M & L, II, p. 15. 
123 Macovski, p. 6. 
124 M & L, II, p. 15. Coleridge’s emphasis. 
	   201	  
Gadamer, ‘[t]he literary form of the dialogue places language and concept back within 
the original movement of the conversation. This protects words from all dogmatic 
abuse’.125 Significantly, in her final theological work, Coleridge replaces the polemical 
essay with the Socratic form, which frames discourse within the flow of egalitarian, 
communal ‘conversation’. In this context, a ‘dogmatic’, monologic speaker such as 
Newbolt appears both irrelevant and ridiculous. Coleridge promotes liberal inclusive 
theology in the form as much as the content of her Regeneration Dialogues. In doing so, 
she aims to fulfil the vocation of ‘practical usefulness’ she ascribes to STC: to contribute 
to ‘the furtherance of man’s well-being here and hereafter’.126 For Coleridge at mid-
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Conclusion  
Public Renewal, Personal Redemption. 
 
STC: a Writer for Post-Reform Britain 
I will present the conclusions of my investigation by discussing two poems. Both belong 
to Coleridge’s early phase of mature productivity, in which she was working on her 
edition of Biographia Literaria. The first poem, an experimental hybrid text, appears in 
that edition. It presents a formal public statement of Coleridgean authorship. In the 
second poem, unpublished as a complete text for almost a century, Coleridge explores 
her personal and literary relationship with STC in the context of loss and death.1 I 
consider these poems as complementary texts. They lend insight into Coleridge’s 
conception of her public role as STC’s literary heir, both as editor and original author, 
and her private agenda to heal the fractures of the past, and to repair its losses. The poem 
published in Biographia 1847, an adaptation of lines by Horace, has been noticed 
previously only once before, in an article in The Coleridge Bulletin by the present 
author.2 Therefore, it requires extensive contextualization. 
 The final section of Coleridge’s ‘Introduction’ to Biographia 1847 presents a 
brief discussion of STC’s involvement in literary polemics. She focuses on STC’s 
hostile engagement with Francis Jeffrey. Jeffery’s attacks in The Edinburgh Review 
against STC, Southey, and particularly against Wordsworth, had drawn STC into 
combative response. Coleridge’s discussion is based on Biographia Volume 2, Chapter 
8, ‘Remarks on the present mode of conducting critical journals’. Coleridge explains that 
she has cut a paragraph on the subject of Jeffrey from this chapter, and also a footnote 
from Volume 1, Chapter 3.3 These passages contain personal remarks that, in 
Coleridge’s view, are beneath STC’s high principles. They are uncharacteristic of the 
general moral tenor of his works, she believes. Coleridge regards The Edinburgh 
Review’s attacks on the Lake Poets, and STC’s barbed reactions, as symptomatic of the 
debased literary culture of earlier decades. This, in itself, was part of a more general 
moral malaise in public life, according to her historical interpretation.  
 Coleridge is uncompromisingly critical of pre-Reform Britain: ‘[t]hirty years 
ago many things were done by honourable men which honourable men would not do 
now, or would gain great dishonour by doing’.4 Coleridge’s repetitions around ‘honour’ 
are pointed, as if, like Antony after Caesar’s assassination, she is ironically interrogating 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  Edith Coleridge published the first stanza only in M & L, 1, p. 47. 
2 R Schofield, ‘“My Father’s Fragmentary Work”: Sara Coleridge’s Restoration of Biographia Literaria’, 
Coleridge Bulletin, n.s., 38 (2011), 17-36. 
3 Biographia 1847, II, pp. 117-128. BLCC, I, pp. 50n-52n. 
4 Biographia 1847, I, p. clxx. Further references to Volume 1 of this edition are given after quotations in 
the text. 
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the word’s meaning. She implies that, in the pre-Reform decades, honour, as an absolute 
moral value, was absent from public life. Coleridge targets the institutional corruption of 
the pre-Reform established church: ‘money intended for the benefit of the Public, 
especially for making men living members of the Church and followers of Christ, public 
functionaries too often thought they might employ according to their own private 
fancies’ (pp. clxx–clxxi). This allegation of malfeasance taints the Tory government of 
the period as well as the church. The ‘functionaries’ who ‘employ’ public money to 
serve ‘their own private fancies’ may include clerics, politicians or civil servants. 
Coleridge leaves the embezzlers’ exact identity uncomfortably vague. Her implied 
approval of Reform in the passage aligns her with Whig attitudes. She adds, with ironic 
restraint, that ‘[a] dimness of vision on the subject of duty prevailed among the servants 
of the public in general’ earlier in the century (p. clxxi). Pre-Reform civic life, according 
to Coleridge, was morally unprincipled. 
 The world of letters was infected by the institutional corruption of pre-Reform 
society. Coleridge contends that literary reviewing was conducted in a wholly unethical 
manner: ‘reviewers’ were no more aware of their public duty ‘than the rest’ and ‘they 
thought themselves quite at liberty to make the public taste in literature subservient to 
their own purposes as members of a party’ (p. clxxi). Coleridge places irresponsible 
reviewing in the same moral category as the corrupt management of public finances. 
Partisan reviewers did not hesitate ‘to choke up with rubbish and weeds the streams of 
Parnassus, if a political adversary might be annoyed thereby, though all parties alike had 
an interest in the water’ (p. clxxi). This juxtaposition of the classical with the 
geopolitical suggests the sacrilegious amorality of unscrupulous reviewers, and their 
corruption of the national culture. Coleridge regrets that STC, in the unprincipled milieu 
of pre-Reform public life, was undeniably drawn, on occasions, into conducting literary 
debate in personal terms. She believes that the moral tone of public life has changed for 
the better; that the abuses she condemns in pre-Reform England ‘would not’ happen 
‘now’, in 1847 (p. clxx). This is significant for two reasons. First, it confirms the Whig 
tendencies in Coleridge’s political thought. Her position is diametrically opposed to the 
Ultra-Toryism of Henry’s anti-Reform pamphlet of 1831. Second, Coleridge’s 
distinction between pre-Reform and post-Reform culture enables her to suggest that 
STC’s problems of literary reception belong to a former corrupt state of society. In 
renewed cultural conditions, Coleridge suggests, STC’s work and influence will come 
into their own. 
 In the final chapter of Biographia Literaria, STC discusses how The Edinburgh 
Review subjected him to extreme personal abuse. Christabel was reviewed with 
particular venom, and an anticipatory review of The Statesman’s Manual was written 
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‘with a malignity, so avowedly and exclusively personal, as is, I believe, unprecedented 
even in the present contempt of all humanity that disgraces and endangers the liberty of 
the press’. STC does not actually mention the author, Hazlitt, by name, although he 
believed him to have written the Christabel review as well. This was particularly 
treacherous, STC felt, because Hazlitt had warmly praised the poem in his presence. At 
the beginning of the chapter, STC explains that he has always ‘felt’ undeserved 
sufferings to be ‘the severest punishment’. He adduces a poem of Catullus, given below 
in the prose translation cited by Engell and Bate, to express his sense of literary 
rejection: 
 
Leave off wishing to deserve any thanks from anyone, or thinking that anyone 
can ever become grateful. All this wins no thanks; to have acted kindly is 
nothing, rather it is wearisome, wearisome and harmful; so is it now with me, 
who am vexed and troubled by no one so bitterly as by him who but now held 
me for his one and only friend.5 
 
STC uses Catullus to voice a grief that is at once personal and professional. 
 In a footnote near the end of the final section of her ‘Introduction’ to Biographia 
1847, Coleridge discusses The Edinburgh Review’s vehement hostility towards STC’s 
treatment of Hume. She comments that ‘the Northern critics’ have been – and still are – 
the most aggressive of STC’s detractors (p. clxxvii n). Reverting to language that reflects 
Southey and Wordsworth’s views of literary property, she refers to ‘the Exteesian 
domain’ having been battered by ‘Boreal blasts’ and ‘obscured’ by ‘Scotch mists’. She 
comments that, in the preceding pages, she has ‘necessarily been looking of late more at 
the bad weather of [STC’s] literary life, —the rough gales and chilling snow-falls, —
than at its calm and sunshine’. She ‘trust[s]’, nonetheless, that STC’s literary ‘domain’ 
will be largely untroubled in future (p. clxxix n). She develops this remark by adapting 
lines from Horace, in which she promises STC a favourable culture for the reception of 
his work in post-Reform England. Horace is a congenial poet on whom to base a 
consolatory message for STC: in his view, Horace’s literary ‘precepts are grounded […] 
on the nature both of poetry and of the human mind’.6 Furthermore, Coleridge’s choice 
of Horace as the basis for her poetic statement counters STC’s pessimistic self-alignment 
with Catullus. It enables her to emphasize the difference between pre-Reform disorder 
and post-Reform renewal. Catullus, whose voice STC adduces in 1817, is a poet of the 
late Roman Republic, a culture disintegrating into political anarchy and moral chaos. 
Horace, by contrast, is a poet of a new political order, of stability and restored values: 
the voice of a morally regenerated culture. Horace’s renewed State is one in which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 BLCC, II, pp. 241-242, p. 234, p. 242 n. 
6 BLCC, II, p. 133. 
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poetry and literary criticism flourish. Coleridge exploits the historical context of 
Horace’s lines to emphasize STC’s future stature. 
 
Coleridge’s Horation Manifesto 
Coleridge’s version of Horace’s Odes II. 9, lines 1 - 8 is further evidence of her 
originality and relish for literary experimentation. The ‘hybrid construction’ of 
Coleridge’s version of Horace, to borrow Bakhtin’s terminology, fits well in the 
‘Introduction’ to a text that is defined by its ‘hybridization’.7 Coleridge places in italics 
the words with which she replaces those of the original: 
 
 Non semper imbres dulce-poeticos 
 Manant in agros; nec mare lucidum 
  Vexant inaequales procellae 
  Usque; nec aetheriis in oris, 
 Esteese Parens, stat glacies iners 
 Menses per omnes; aut Aquilonibus 
  Myrteta Colerigi laborant 
  Vitibus et viduantur ulmi. (p. clxxix n). 
 
These lines, which Coleridge does not translate, may be rendered as follows: 
 
 Not always do rains drip into sweetly-poetic fields; 
 Nor do rough storms harass the shining sea continuously; 
        Nor, my father STC, does inert ice stand on heavenly shores 
 Through all months; or with the North winds 
 Do the myrtle groves of Coleridge toil 
 And are elms deprived of vines.8 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 M. M. Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays by M. M. Bakhtin, ed. by Michael Holquist, 
trans. by Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), p. 358. 
8 I am grateful to Dr Simon Hall of Radley College Classics Department for his translation of Coleridge’s 
version of Horace.       
 Horace’s Odes II. 9, ll. 1-8 are as follows: 
  Non semper imbres nubibus hispidos 
 manant in agros aut mare Caspium 
 vexant inaequales procellae 
 usque, nec Armeniis in oris, 
 amice Valgi, stat glacies iners 
 mensis per omnis aut Aquilonibus 
 querquerta Gargani laborant 
 et foliis viduantur orni. 
Niall Rudd translates Horace’s lines as follows: 
Not forever does the rain pour down from the clouds onto the bedraggled fields, nor do gusty squalls 
always whip up the Caspian Sea, my dear Valgius; the ice does not stand motionless on Armenia’s coast 
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Straight after these lines, Coleridge explains: ‘[t]he twining vines are popularity and 
usefulness’ (p. clxxix n), which recalls her contention, earlier in the ‘Introduction’, that, 
during his lifetime, STC ‘had no hope of gainful popularity’ (p. xx). The perceived 
‘obscurity of his prose writings’ prevented readers from making ‘any’ effort of ‘co-
operation’ with him (p. xx). Although STC’s consistent aim in his writings was 
‘practical usefulness’, his unpopularity limited the cultural impact of his work (p. clvi). 
In her explanation, Coleridge adds that ‘the elms’ are ‘literary productions of slow 
growth and stately character’ (p. clxxix n). Coleridge, as mediator, reviser and re-writer 
of STC’s work, will ensure that its ‘slow growth’ to full public influence will come to 
fruition. Appropriated and re-interpreted by Coleridge in a later historical period, STC 
will enjoy both the ‘popularity’, and ‘usefulness’ of influence, which he was denied in 
times past. Coleridge makes of STC’s initials a Latin pun in line five of her verse. 
‘Esteese’ combines two of the commonest forms of the verb ‘to be’: ‘est’ and ‘esse’ (p. 
clxxix, n). The pun expresses the theme of Coleridge’s verse. More broadly, it states her 
purpose in recovering and reconstructing STC’s work: ‘he is to be’. STC will receive, 
ultimately, the wide recognition and respect denied him in his own day. Coleridge’s 
Latin pun on STC’s initials alludes, also, to STC’s Greek pun upon them. He frequently 
signed his articles in The Morning Post with the Greek form of his initials, ‘Es tee see’. 
He translates this by-line as ‘He hath stood’, to signify the consistency, commitment and 
independence of his principles.9 Such qualities will emerge, Coleridge implies, in her re-
presentation of STC’s work. 
 Horace’s ‘amice Valgi’ (‘my friend Valgius’), for whom Coleridge substitutes 
‘Esteese parens’, is an empowering association for STC, which amplifies the promise for 
him of future ‘popularity and usefulness’. C. Valgius Rufus, a versatile poet, and a writer 
on grammar, philology and medicine, was a ‘distinguished member’ of the cultural elite 
of Augustus’s court; he served as consul in 12 BC. Horace mentions Valgius in Satires I. 
10, as one of ‘the inner circle’ of distinguished literary critics, in company with 
Maecenas and Virgil, and Octavius – the future Augustus – himself.10 Coleridge’s 
superimposition of STC over Valgius’s name asserts his future influence. STC will 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
through every month of the year, nor do the oaks of Garganus always struggle against the northern blasts, 
nor are the ash trees widowed of their leaves.* 
* Horace, Odes and Epodes, ed. and trans. by Niall Rudd, Loeb Classical Library (London: Harvard, 
2004, repr. with corrections, 2012), pp. 112-113. 
  
 
9 Angela Esterhammer, ‘Coleridge in the Newspapers, Periodicals, and Annuals’, in The Oxford Handbook 
of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ed. by Frederick Burwick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009; paperback 
edn, 2012), pp. 165-184 (p. 170). 
10 R. G. M. Nisbet and Margaret Hubbard, A Commentary on Horace: Odes Book II (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1978), p. 135, p. 134. 
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finally take his place in society as an acknowledged intellectual and literary leader. His 
influence will extend across the whole culture, like that of Valgius and his illustrious 
associates. It will no longer be confined merely to those ‘who are as children to him in 
affectionate reverence for his mind’, as Coleridge puts it in her ‘Preface’ to Essays.11 In 
Horace’s Odes II. 9, Valgius is mourning the death of his friend, Myestes. Coleridge 
transforms this original context of grief into one of anticipated celebration. The times of 
literary loss and rejection for STC, such as he laments in the final chapter of Biographia, 
are almost over, Coleridge suggests. STC, re-presented by her, will become a defining 
influence upon Victorian culture, and, in due course, on posterity. 
 Coleridge’s Horatian manifesto recalls the beginnings of her own literary career. 
Her appropriation and modification of a Latin text suggest the abiding influence upon 
her of Southey’s early mentorship. This striking experiment in literary hybridization also 
implies Coleridge’s confidence in her own future authorship. Coleridge has developed 
her distinct authorial identity from the mid-1830s to the late 1840s. Nonetheless, STC’s 
oeuvre remains the point of departure for her writings, both editorial and original. The 
reception of Coleridge’s own work, therefore, depends to a certain extent upon STC’s 
public stature. She is aware of the market value of her name, as when she suggests that 
her poems will be saleable, simply because she is STC’s daughter. She and Henry may 
have had this in mind when they published her children’s verse and Phantasmion. 
Ultimately, Coleridge conceives of herself as editor of the whole Coleridgean ‘oeuvre’, 
including the Opus Maximum material that would remain unpublished until 2002. At the 
time of her work on Biographia, Coleridge expects, in due course, to reconstruct for the 
Victorian public STC’s ‘entire system of thought’ (p. xxvii). When, in her adaptation of 
Horace, she refers to the ‘toil’ of ‘the myrtle groves of Coleridge’ against ‘the North 
winds’, her use of the family name suggests that she is including her own efforts with 
those of her father. She envisages herself redeveloping, reapplying and reshaping STC’s 
ideas and fragmentary writings in a process of diachronic composite production. Her 
original writings will contribute to the whole construct, in the way that ‘On Rationalism’ 
complements the fifth and sixth editions of Aids to Reflection. The outcome will be a 
major body of work, the achievement, and property, of the Coleridge family. The Latin 
poem may be read as Coleridge’s confident public statement as director of the family 
business. 
 
An Aesthetic of ‘Inachievement’: ‘Work Without Hope’ 
In the private sphere, though, Coleridge’s production of the family ‘oeuvre’ is associated 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Essays, I, p. xiii. Coleridge’s emphasis. 
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with tension, incompletion, and grief. STC’s fragmentary remains represent a history of 
loss, personal and literary. Coleridge’s poem, ‘For my Father on his lines called “Work 
Without Hope”’ is ‘dated 1845’.12 Written two years after Henry’s death, it belongs to 
the period of Coleridge’s intensive work on her edition of Biographia. The month of the 
poem’s composition is not recorded, so it is not known whether the poem was written 
before or after the sudden, unexpected death of Coleridge’s mother, on 24 September 
1845. If Coleridge composed the poem after this date, her mother’s death would have 
contributed to the desolate mood of the opening stanza. Coleridge places her poem in 
dialogue with STC’s sonnet ‘Work Without Hope’, which was drafted in a notebook 
entry of 21 February 1825. In the 1852 edition of STC’s poems, Coleridge and Derwent 
give the date of the sonnet’s composition as 21 February 1827. This mistake may suggest 
that Coleridge had not seen the notebook entry from which the sonnet is abstracted. The 
full text in the notebook is a mixture of prose and verse. The verse consists of an extra 
fourteen lines, excluding ‘abortive drafts and cancellations’.13 It has been ‘much worked-
over’: ‘taken as a whole’, observes Morton D. Paley, ‘this poetry records a psychic 
disaster’.14 If Coleridge had read the original notebook draft, it would have added to the 
poignancy of STC’s sonnet as a poem of loss. The notebook reveals the sonnet’s 
putative addressee, Anne Gillman. Coleridge would have been reminded of STC’s 
continuing craving for love, of a kind for which he pleads in ‘The Pains of Sleep’, and 
which he had sought first from Sara Hutchinson, and later from Mary Morgan and her 
sister, Charlotte Brent. 
 ‘Work Without Hope’ is a key text for Coleridge in understanding STC’s 
psychological and creative instabilities, and in positioning her own authorship in relation 
to his. In ‘Nervousness’, the Invalid alludes to the sonnet’s concluding image of chronic 
incapacity: ‘[h]ow often we are called upon, when wretchedly disabled, to derive 
comfort from this source or from that: “to draw honey in a sieve!” It is not material for 
comfort but the capacity for comfort that is wanting’.15 The conceit of ‘draw[ing] honey 
in a sieve’ expresses the nervous invalid’s involuntary paralysis, and her inability to 
respond to external stimuli. Coleridge reapplies it in diagnosing STC’s nervous illness in 
Biographia 1847. She quotes the final quatrain, placing the concluding couplet in italics, 
suggesting the significance she attaches to the image of ‘draw[ing] nectar in a sieve’. It 
represents for her the ‘apathy and sadness’ that paralyze STC’s creativity (p. xix). In her 
poem of 1845, Coleridge engages with the whole sonnet. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Poems, p. 225. 
13 PWCC, I, Part 2, p. 1031. 
14 Morton D. Paley, Coleridge’s Later Poetry (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996; repr. with 
corrections, 1999), p. 78. 
15 ‘Nervousness’, Mudge, p. 203. 
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 Work Without Hope’s structure is innovatory. It is a ‘reversed’ sonnet, ‘in which 
the sestet precedes the octave’.16 STC’s sestet is limited to two rhymes and concludes 
with a rhyming triplet. The opening quatrain presents a celebration of reawakening life, 
of a springtime renewal before the end of winter: 
 
 All Nature seems at work. Slugs leave their lair— 
 The Bees are stirring—Birds are on the wing— 
 And Winter slumbering in the open air, 
 Wears on his smiling face a dream of Spring! 
 And I, the while, the sole unbusy thing, 
 Nor honey make, nor pair, nor build, nor sing.17  
 
The poet at first records his immediate observations with pleasurable surprise, 
emphasized by the dashes of the opening lines. ‘Winter’, personified as a genial 
dreamer, and the sibilance of the third and fourth lines, augment the celebratory tone. 
The fifth and sixth lines merge with the quatrain through the rhyming triplet with which 
the sestet closes. This juxtaposes the revival of life with the poet’s inertia, to which he 
draws attention in line five by the coined compound ‘unbusy’. The metrical stresses on 
‘I’, ‘sole’ and ‘thing’ emphasize STC’s alienation. In terms of purposive activity he 
places himself below the status of ‘slugs’. They at least warrant a name, whereas the 
poet anonymizes himself as a ‘thing’, an unclassified entity alienated from the common 
life of ‘Nature’. The four verbs of productivity in the monosyllabic sixth line, each 
preceded by the emphatically negative ‘nor’, indicate the sonnet’s central contradiction. 
STC, lyrically sensitive to the scene’s natural vitality and beauty, adopts a pose of inert 
detachment. The final word of line six is the active ‘sing’, however, which, though it has 
been negated by ‘nor’, may leave open just the faintest possibility of the poet’s revival. 
 The octave consists of four pairs of rhyming couplets, each presenting a 
perspective on the poet’s inactivity and failure. This structure expresses a single state of 
being. In the first couplet of the octave, STC alludes to poetic creativity as an experience 
of the past. ‘[A]maranths’, as Paley explains, ‘hold an important place in [STC’s] 
imaginative world’, and recall earlier ‘poems in which the flower signified friendship, 
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poetic immortality and the hope of a historical millennium’.18 The poet is now resigned 
to the irretrievable loss of such aspirations and ideals: 
 
 Yet well I ken the banks where amaranths blow, 
 Have traced the fount whence streams of nectar flow.  
 Bloom, O ye amaranths! bloom for whom ye may,  
 For me ye bloom not! Glide, rich streams, away! 
 With lips unbrighten’d, wreathless Brow, I stroll: 
 And would you learn the spells that drowse my soul?19  
 
In the repeated imperative ‘bloom’, STC rejects his former territory of poetic 
achievement. The verb reappears in the present tense, ‘[f]or me ye bloom not’, where the 
metrical emphasis on ‘me’ carries a note of self-pity. STC accepts his alienation and 
casually rejects any marks of distinction in two coined negatives: ‘[w]ith lips 
unbrightened, wreathless brow, I stroll’. The verb emphasizes a mood of louche and 
languid apathy. The poet then addresses the reader in line twelve with ironic self-
mockery: ‘[a]nd would you learn the spells that drowse my soul?’ ‘[S]pells’ and 
‘drowse’ allude to what he calls, in a note of 1826, ‘the seeming magic effects of 
opium’, by which he has been ‘deluded’ into paralyzing addiction.20 The grim joke is 
that the vocabulary of the question suggests its answer: ‘opium’.  
 The rhetorical structure of lines twelve, thirteen and fourteen is that of comedy, 
in which a leading question is followed by a bathetic answer:  
 
 And would you learn the spells that drowse my soul? 
 Work without hope draws nectar in a sieve, 
 And hope without an object cannot live.21 
 
The poet plays an absurdist role: he is a monstrous clown called ‘Work without Hope’, 
who attempts an obviously – laughably – futile task. The repetition of ‘without’ stresses 
the negative mood, as do the concluding words’ denial of life. The image of ‘draw[ing] 
nectar in a sieve’ amplifies the sonnet’s allusions to drugs. STC as addict engages in a 
self-defeating activity. He takes opium in an unending cycle to relieve the symptoms that 
opium produces. The image also suggests the interrelationship between creative failure 
and opium consumption. ‘Work Without Hope’ expresses the same contradiction as 
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‘Dejection’. STC writes an eloquent and innovatory sonnet in which he proclaims 
himself to be a literary failure. He states that he does not ‘sing’ while he is in the very 
act of ‘sing[ing]’, in the classical sense in which to recite or to compose verse is to 
‘sing’. The phonic structure of the octave, with its four pairs of rhyming couplets, 
expresses stasis and entrapment (as does the whole notebook entry from which the 
sonnet is extracted). ‘Work Without Hope’ subverts the whole concept of a sonnet, 
which carries expectations of progression through subtle nuances, shifts and tensions. 
J.C.C. Mays has suggested that STC, in seeking to define his own distinct poetic 
territory, practises an anti-Wordsworthian ‘aesthetics of failure and inachievement’.22 
‘Work Without Hope’ might suggest the pursuit of such an agenda. Coleridge, though, is 
dismissive of STC’s self-presentation in the sonnet.  
 
‘For My Father’: Loss and Restoration 
Coleridge’s ‘For my Father on his lines called “Work Without Hope’” adapts STC’s 
theme of lost creativity to the ultimate loss of death: 
 
 Father, no amaranths e’er shall wreathe my brow, – 
 Enough that round thy grave they flourish now: – 
 But Love ’mid my young locks his roses braided, 
 And what cared I for flow’rs of deeper bloom? 
 These too seemed deathless – here they never faded, 
 But, drenched and shattered, dropped into the tomb.23 
 
The opening line, with its initial trochaic foot, followed by four iambs, gives stern force 
to ‘Father’. Coleridge retorts sharply to the negative conclusion of STC’s sonnet. Her 
opening word is a firm rebuke, re-calling STC from morbid self-absorption. In the 
second line, Coleridge rejects STC’s whole premise in ‘Work Without Hope’ that no 
‘amaranths […] bloom’ for him: on the contrary, they ‘flourish’ around his ‘grave’. She 
contrasts STC’s ‘amaranths’ of high poetic achievement with her own ‘roses’ of ‘Love’, 
against which the celebratory ‘amaranths’ held no appeal for her. For Coleridge in her 
youth, the ‘roses’ of ‘Love’ seemed everlasting. To express this, she coins ‘deathless’, 
which bears the same form as STC’s ‘wreathless’ in ‘Work Without Hope’. The 
difference between the two coined compounds is that STC’s ‘wreathless’ concerns his 
self-image, whereas Coleridge’s ‘deathless’ introduces the theme of ultimate loss. The 
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roses her lover ‘braided’ into her hair become the petals she scatters into the grave at his 
funeral. The last line of the first stanza processes slowly through its triplet of heavily 
stressed syllables in ‘drenched, shattered, dropped’, coming to rest with stark finality on 
‘tomb’; which, with grim irony, rhymes with ‘bloom’. 
 The second stanza begins with the same metrical pattern as the first: a trochaic 
foot, followed by four iambs. Coleridge emphasizes her own indifference to personal 
achievement: 
 
 Ne’er was it mine t’ unlock rich founts of song, 
 As thine it was, ere Time had done thee wrong. 
 
Here Coleridge avoids the psychological territory of Biographia 1847, and presents the 
dysfunctional STC euphemistically as a victim of ‘Time’. In contrast with STC’s 
alienation from his poetic past, Coleridge seeks consolation in memory: 
 
 But ah! how blest I wandered nigh the stream, 
 Whilst Love, fond guardian, hovered o’er me still! 
 His downy pinions shed the tender gleam 
 That shone from river wide or scantiest rill.24 
 
The exclamation ‘ah!’ is a stressed syllable, which introduces the elegiac mood of joyful 
recollection with which the stanza closes. In a letter of October 1847, Coleridge 
confesses the danger of indulgence in memory; a temptation to ‘forget the present in the 
past’.25 The stanza expresses how ‘Love’ brought Coleridge close to the sources of 
poetic achievement. She alludes here to her literary collaboration with Henry, in which 
they ‘wandered’ together ‘nigh the stream’ of Romantic creativity. The imagery of light 
(‘the tender gleam that shone’) associates love with Reason, the medium, in Coleridge’s 
theology, by which we apprehend the Divine.  
 Coleridge uses her characteristic image of water flowing through a channel in 
stanza two. The ‘scantiest rill’ of line twelve alludes to ‘Sonnet VI’ in ‘Part 1’ of 
Wordsworth’s ‘Miscellaneous Sonnets’, ‘There is a little unpretending Rill’.26 In this 
poem, composed in 1802 but not published until 1820, Wordsworth commemorates a 
particular day when he and Dorothy, on their ‘first visit together to this part of the 
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country’, walked from Kendal to Windermere. As the manuscript draft records, they 
picnicked – ate ‘a Traveller’s meal’ – by the stream, and ‘slaked [their] thirst’ from its 
‘blessed water’. In the published texts, Dorothy figures first as ‘faithful Anna’, and then 
as ‘faithful Emma’ in the 1827 version, though in the first draft Wordsworth refers to her 
as ‘My Love’. The shared memory of that ‘happy day’ remains a sustaining ‘vision’ for 
the poet and his companion.27 Coleridge’s allusion to Wordsworth’s sonnet at the end of 
the second stanza suggests that she finds restoration and blessing in her memories of 
Henry and the life they shared.  
 From the Wordsworthian consolation of ‘private recollection sweet and still’, 
Coleridge returns in her third stanza to confront the material finality of death; what she 
refers to in the letter of October 1847 as her ‘deep irretrievable losses’.28 The opening 
words introduce a change in focus and emotional tone: 
 
 Now, whether Winter ‘slumbering, dreams of Spring’, 
 Or, heard far off, his resonant footsteps fling 
 O’er Autumn’s sunburnt cheek a paler hue,   
 While droops her heavy garland here and there, 
 Nought can for me those golden gleams renew,  
 The roses of my shattered wreath repair.29 
 
Coleridge replaces STC’s early anticipation of spring with an autumnal intimation of 
winter and death. The creative stimuli of the seasons hold no interest for her in her state 
of ‘irretrievable’ loss. Coleridge’s ‘shattered wreath’ carries poignant associations. The 
phrase at the end of the third line, ‘a paler hue’ echoes Henry’s ‘a graver hue’ in his 
‘Preface’ to Table Talk, in which he refers to the work’s place in STC’s ‘oeuvre’ as a 
whole: ‘[t]his sprig, though slight and immature, may yet become its place, in the Poet’s 
wreath of honour, among flowers of graver hue’.30 STC’s literary ‘wreath of honour’ is a 
bitter contrast to the ‘shattered’ wedding ‘wreath’ of Coleridge’s loving marriage, of 
which her phrase echoing Henry is a reminder. There is further irony for Coleridge in 
recalling Henry’s reference to STC’s ‘wreath of honour’. STC’s public image has been 
tarnished significantly since Henry’s ‘Preface’ to Table Talk. STC’s ‘wreath of honour’ 
in 1845 depends upon Coleridge’s success in reconstructing his reputation. If 
Coleridge’s efforts fail, STC may indeed remain ‘wreathless’. 
 The ‘shattered wreath’, the scattered rose petals dropping into Henry’s grave, 
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and ‘Autumn’s […] heavy garland’ about to fall, refer to an archetypal emblem of loss 
and death. Coleridge recalls the moment in Paradise Lost that expresses the whole 
human tragedy of the Fall. In shock at hearing that Eve has eaten the forbidden fruit, 
Adam 
 
 Astonied stood and blank, while horror chill 
 Ran through his veins, and all his joints relaxed; 
 From his slack hand the garland wreathed for Eve 
 Down dropped, and all the faded roses shed’.31 
 
Coleridge’s poem alludes to the ‘faded roses’ of Adam’s ‘garland wreathed for Eve’, 
which, like her own, ‘dropped’ in the face of death. The trochee at the beginning of 
Coleridge’s fifth line (‘Nought can’) emphasizes the tragic finality expressed by the 
‘shattered wreath’. Lines five and six of stanza three would seem to be setting the tone 
for a despairing conclusion to parallel the negativity (‘cannot live’) with which STC’s 
sonnet closes.  
 However, there is a syntactic turn four lines before the end of Coleridge’s final 
stanza. The pause signified by the comma after ‘repair’ precedes a decisive change in 
tone from the elegiac to the assertive: 
 
 Nought can for me those golden gleams renew, 
 The roses of my shattered wreath repair, 
 Yet Hope still lives, and oft, to objects fair 
 In prospect pointing, bids me still pursue 
 My humble tasks: – I list – but backward turn 
 Objects for ever lost still struggling to discern.32 
 
The monosyllables of the line that begins ‘[y]et Hope’, with strong rhythmic emphases 
on ‘Hope’ and ‘lives’, create a vigorous mood. Coleridge defiantly rejects STC’s 
acceptance of defeat, in which he proclaims the death of ‘Hope’. In Coleridge’s closing 
lines personified ‘Hope’ is an active presence, which urges and encourages the poet, 
amplified by the plosive alliteration of ‘prospect pointing […] pursue’. The enjambment 
after ‘still pursue’ and the medial caesura after four syllables of the following line focus 
attention on the key phrase: ‘[m]y humble tasks’. The metrical pattern, with ‘[m]y’ 
unstressed and ‘tasks’ stressed, suggests Coleridge’s devotional conception of her own 
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authorship, in which the works, the processes and products themselves, are 
foregrounded, and the producer is all but hidden. The phrase itself indicates Coleridge’s 
revision of the Romantic concept of the poet as celebrity or genius. The caesuras on 
either side of  ‘I list’ express a moment’s hesitation before an immense effort of will, the 
first of which represents an intake of breath as Coleridge gathers strength to recommence 
her struggle. The second caesura expresses a sigh as Coleridge turns ‘backward’ to 
search in memory for ‘[o]bjects for ever lost’. 
 Yet, the grammar and rhythm of the final line assert Coleridge’s resilient 
determination. In 1847, Coleridge describes herself in widowhood as possessing a 
‘tough state of mind’.33 This is reflected in her poem’s conclusion. The metrical structure 
of her final line expresses energy and stamina. The line’s third stressed syllable is ‘lost’. 
In the next foot, though, the stress falls on the first syllable of the dynamically energetic 
verb ‘struggling’; a word charged with moral and religious significance in Coleridge’s 
vocabulary. To struggle, for Coleridge, is the essence of the Christian life. As she puts it 
in her unpublished essay ‘Asceticism’: ‘a spiritual education must be one of continued 
effort and struggling – a contest of our human self must be for ever going on and can 
only cease to be painful when self is annulled and the contest is over’.34 Similarly, in her 
‘Extracts from a New Treatise on Regeneration’, Coleridge refers to ‘a state in which the 
spirit is struggling with the flesh’ as a stage on the individual’s journey towards ‘the 
spiritual life’.35 Therefore, in Biographia 1847, when she refers to STC ‘still struggling 
through his earthly career’, she not only applies to him the two key words of the final 
line of her poem; she represents him, also, as a Christian pilgrim leading a spiritual life 
of ‘effort’ and ‘contest’ (p. clxxii). Coleridge’s devotional ideal of the Christian life as a 
spiritual ‘struggle’ through an ‘earthly’ pilgrimage is rooted in her Kantian epistemology 
of the active mind and will, which underpins her radical Protestant theology. Through 
the word ‘struggle’, she associates intellectual efforts with spiritual exercise. Works that 
introduce ‘new thought’, such as STC’s metaphysical writings, require a reader’s 
‘cooperation from within’, which Coleridge describes as ‘a process full of conflict and 
struggle’ (p. xx). To ‘struggl[e]’, she confides in 1843 to John, is psychologically 
therapeutic and spiritually invigorating: ‘I have struggled and am still struggling, as for 
life’, she explains soon after Henry’s death: ‘[t]the struggle is its own reward, for it calls 
forth new energies’.36 The ‘struggle’ is a redemptive process. Her phrase, ‘still 
struggling’, therefore, defines Coleridge’s tenacious and resolute vitality at the end of 
her poem. Significantly, she first uses the phrase in her letter of 1843 to John, in 
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explaining the means by which she endures the loss of Henry. The personal and the 
authorial for Coleridge are mutually sustaining. 
 The last four lines of the poem suggest that the effort Coleridge applies to her 
‘humble tasks’, and her psychological and spiritual resilience in enduring loss, are 
inseparably linked. Coleridge’s performance of her ‘tasks’, and her stamina in 
‘struggling’, will lead in the future to those ‘objects fair’ in ‘prospect’ to which ‘Hope’ is 
‘pointing’. Coleridge creates a spiritual and literary union between past and future. She 
hopes that the ‘objects fair’ of the future, which are dependent on her own present 
efforts, will recompense the losses of the past. Coleridge’s conception of suffering and 
recuperation in the poem is Wordsworthian. Ten years earlier, Coleridge had defined the 
spiritual resource she finds in Wordsworth’s poetry: ‘Mr. Wordsworth opens to us a 
world of suffering […] but for every sorrow he presents an antidote – he shows us how 
man may endure as well as what he is doomed to suffer’.37 Coleridge resorts to the 
Wordsworthian ‘restoration’ of memory, as shown in her allusion to the ‘little 
unpretending Rill’ sonnet.38 At the same time, her response to loss reflects the 
Wordsworthian ethic of ‘Resolution and Independence’ and ‘Ode to Duty’. 
 Coleridge’s ‘objects fair’ and positive ‘prospect’ refer to the settled future she 
envisages for her children. Similarly, in ‘Time’s Acquittal’, a poem of 1846, Herbert and 
Edith are her source of consolation. She laments her loss of youth and beauty, but finds 
joyful reparation when ‘Time’ reveals her ‘children’s faces […] doubly blooming glad 
and strong’.39 Coleridge conceives her ‘humble’ literary ‘tasks’, therefore, in terms of 
parental and family duty. She strives, through her recovery and reconstruction of STC’s 
‘oeuvre’, to bequeath to her children – and to future descendants – a viable literary 
estate, in the sense that Wordsworth and Southey conceive of literary property. She will 
also pass on to them a respected name, and a secure position in English society. From 
the very beginning of her widowhood, Coleridge associates her literary and editorial 
work with parental duty: ‘I had children to consider and to act for’, she explains in 1847, 
looking back over her years of widowhood; ‘the sense how cruel and selfish it would be 
to shadow their young lives by the sight of a mother’s tears, was a motive for exertion’. 
For Coleridge, the religious, the domestic, the practical and the personal are inextricably 
interrelated, and coalesce in her literary activity. Coleridge’s projects, present and future, 
editorial and original, are ambitious in scope. Her description of them as ‘humble tasks’ 
is revealing, and carries strong religious associations. As historian Herringer contends, 
‘to categorise humility as feminine is to forget that it [is] also a Christian virtue. 
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Furthermore, as Newman articulated the role of humility […] it was a strength not a 
weakness’.40  Above all, Scripture promotes humility as a core value. In the Old 
Testament, for example, Proverbs commends ‘an humble spirit’. In the Sermon on the 
Mount, Jesus extols ‘the poor in spirit’ and ‘the meek’; while St Peter, in his first 
Epistle, teaches Christians to ‘be clothed in humility’. Similarly, St Paul urges the 
Colossians to ‘put on […] mercies, kindness, humbleness of mind, and long-suffering’; 
while the Epistle of St James proclaims that ‘God resisteth the proud and giveth grace to 
the humble’.41 Coleridge’s phrase defines the vocational ethic of her authorship. The 
example of Keble’s religious humility affords a parallel. His academic achievements 
promised, at the age of twenty-three, ‘a brilliant career leading to the highest offices in 
the land’, according to George Herring. Yet, Keble deliberately ‘turn[ed] aside from this 
path’ and in 1823 ‘retire[d] from Oxford’ to serve as a curate in his father’s rural 
parish.42 Keble was committed to Christian ideals of selfless service and personal 
devotion. Coleridge’s ‘humble tasks’ of editorship and authorship may be seen in the 
same vocational light. 
 
Coleridge’s Vocational Concept of Authorship 
In her poem in response to ‘Work Without Hope’, Coleridge conceives of editing and 
writing as vocational and redemptive activities. In the ‘Preliminary Observations’ of her 
‘Extracts’, she states her vocational concept of theological writing. It is the ‘duty, for 
those who think themselves able, in any degree, to serve the cause’ of religious ‘Truth’. 
She expands on her notion of authorial duty: ‘[f]or false doctrine is an offence against 
Truth, whom all mankind are bound to serve and defend as far as in them lies’.43 Her 
mediation of STC’s works is, in these terms, a vocational imperative: his Kantian ideas 
are the base on which her innovative critique of Tractarianism rests. Coleridge 
emphasizes the destructive potential of fallacious dogma, and the danger it poses to 
Christian faith and devotion. Her language is emotive and dramatic. Some ‘theological 
theories grievously shatter and distort’ the ‘great religious verities’, she contends, so that 
‘through the medium of those theories they look as strangely as the sun during an 
eclipse’.44 Coleridge alludes here to Milton’s description of Satan’s dimmed ‘glory’: 
 
   as when the sun new risen 
 Looks through the horizontal misty air 
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 Shorn of his beams, or from behind the moon 
 In dim eclipse disastrous twilight sheds 
 On half the nations, and with fear of change 
 Perplexes monarchs.45 
 
Coleridge’s allusion to this simile associates false ‘theological theories’ with Satanic 
deception. This is why it is a ‘duty’, for Coleridge, to engage in theological debate.46 
There is a further implication: Milton’s ‘eclipse’ portends political upheaval and spreads 
‘fear of change’, a theme strikingly applicable to Coleridge’s own times. The ‘duty’ to 
which she refers, to argue in ‘defence’ of ‘Truth’ is cultural and political as well as 
religious.47 To engage in theological dialogue, and to enlist her editorship of STC in that 
project, becomes Coleridge’s vocation, in service of religion and her family.  
 Coleridge’s output, like STC’s, is fragmentary and incomplete. This is because 
she died prematurely at the age of forty-nine. Derwent did not accomplish for Coleridge 
what he had performed for Hartley: he never collected nor published her literary 
remains. He included a mere six posthumous pages, a ‘Note on Mr Coleridge’s 
Observations Upon the Gift of Tongues’, at the end of his edition of STC’s marginalia.48 
In the ‘Preface’, he refers only to Henry as STC’s editor. Furthermore, Derwent omitted 
‘On Rationalism’ from the seventh edition of Aids to Reflection. The conservative 
clergyman, who had censored a draft of the ‘Introduction’ to Biographia 1847, 
suppressed his sister’s liberal theology after her death. The major works of Coleridge’s 
last years, the Dialogues on Regeneration, remain unpublished, all but unread and 
unstudied. They give insight into Coleridge’s ongoing innovative contribution to 
Victorian Christian discourse. The prevailing monologic forms of theological writing 
resulted in adversarial stalemate. She adopts dialogic techniques, therefore, that aim to 
promote communal collaboration and dialectical progression. New threats to religious 
belief required literary innovation, as well as revitalized metaphysical perspectives. 
Monologic religious discourse continued to rest upon traditional priestly authority at a 
time when new methodology was calling the basis of such authority into question. 
Admittedly, Coleridge’s final religious work, Dialogues on Personality, is a colloquy 
with Robert Wilberforce on the familiar ground of baptismal regeneration, for which the 
eminent Archdeacon had attempted to construct a new conceptual base. Nonetheless, it 
is reasonable to suppose that, had she lived longer, Coleridge might have applied her 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Paradise Lost, I. 594-599. 
46 ‘Extracts’, pp. 256-257, p. 255. 
47 ‘Extracts’, p. 255. 
48 Sara Coleridge, ‘Note on Mr Coleridge’s Observation Upon the Gift of Tongues’, in Notes, Theological, 
Political and Miscellaneous, by Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ed. by The Rev. Derwent Coleridge (London: 
Moxon, 1853), pp. 409-415. 
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dialogic techniques to a systematic critique of Strauss, and to an extended examination 
of ‘the foundations of religion’, as she puts it in October 1851.49 In the 1849 edition of 
Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit, she had already prepared the ground for a critique of 
Strauss on Coleridgean principles. She possessed in abundance the scholarly resources to 
have engaged with the controversial Essays and Reviews (1860), in which the historicity 
of the Bible was challenged. She had also developed a flexible multi-voiced medium of 
religious dialectic; an ‘answerable style’, to borrow Milton’s celebrated phrase, for the 
development of an inclusive yet cohesive Christian philosophy.50 Until Coleridge’s 
religious dialogues are published, our picture of a unique literary figure will remain 
incomplete. The publication of these works would make a significant contribution to our 
knowledge and understanding of mid-nineteenth-century culture and authorship. 
 Coleridge favours ‘a chronological arrangement of Poetry in completed 
collections’. She follows this principle in the 1852 edition of STC’s Poems: the poems 
have been ‘distributed with relation to time’, she explains, in order to show STC’s 
development through the successive stages of his poetic career.51 I have adopted a 
chronological analysis in my investigation of Coleridge’s authorship for a similar reason. 
I have shown how Coleridge responds to her literary fathers in writings up to and 
including the publication of Phantasmion in 1837. I have presented, also, the significant 
ways in which Coleridge’s authorship develops from 1837, when she takes her initial 
steps towards theological writing, to 1852, the year of her death. I have emphasized the 
ways in which Coleridge’s authorial development gains impetus in the last nine years of 
her life, and particularly in her final four years. In doing so, I have discovered the 
dialogic qualities of Coleridge’s literary theory and authorial practice. I have shown the 
dynamic and enabling processes of her interaction with her literary fathers, especially 
STC’s writings, and her use of the family context to subvert the gender conventions of 
authorship. Above all, I have found that Coleridge’s concept of authorship becomes 
vocational. It is based on a Kantian commitment to conceptual and methodological 
clarity, and a Miltonic assertion of individual religious freedom. I contend, therefore, 






	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 M & L, II, p. 462. 
50 Paradise Lost, IX. 20 
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